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Abstract 
The thesis provides an analysis of multilateral trade lawmaking in the GATT and the 
WTO from the late 1940s to the current Doha Round negotiations. It investigates the 
discourses, practices, techniques, and legal concepts that have come to define what it 
means to make trade law. These elements are essential to multilateral trade lawmaking 
insofar as they provide trade negotiators with a way to frame their arguments and to go 
about negotiating, and with the tools to construct trade policy disciplines and to record 
them in legal form. On the other hand, they are also limiting, in that they endorse certain 
ways of going about trade lawmaking as normal, and delimit what negotiators and their 
audiences perceive as reasonable, legitimate, and realistic arguments in the lawmaking 
process. The aim of the thesis is to destabilise these elements of trade lawmaking by 
revealing their contingent and often contested origins, and by showing how they 
foreclose alternative conceptions of the objectives, means, and possibilities of trade 
lawmaking. While the dissertation does not provide a full-fledged normative critique of 
the elements of lawmaking, it attempts to elucidate the discursive, practical, technical, 
and legal underpinnings of trade lawmaking that any such reform effort will, of 
necessity, confront. 
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Introduction 
On the second day of the World Trade Organization's Ministerial Conference held in 
Cancún in 2003, the then-United States Trade Representative Robert Zoellick met for the 
first time with a recently formed group of developing countries, the G-20.
1
 Sitting at a table 
facing the G-20 delegates, Zoellick listened to their presentations and wrote down their 
demands. When they were finished, Zoellick asked them to continue. The G-20 
representatives did not understand. Zoellick pointed out that, given that this was a trade 
negotiation, it was not sufficient to present a range of demands. They would also have to 
indicate what they were prepared to offer in return. Silence ensued, and Zoellick left the 
meeting. For him, the meeting had fulfilled its purpose: he had made the point that the G-20 
were not playing by the rules of the game.  
Zoellick asserted what many would regard as a 'truth' about international trade 
lawmaking: that “trade negotiations are based on reciprocal exchange”.2 This assertion is 
not problematic in itself. As a social practice, multilateral trade lawmaking is dependent on 
such truths, that is, on a set of relatively enduring conceptions of what it means to go about 
that practice. Reciprocity is just one of a whole range of concepts, formulas, principles, 
narratives and techniques that have come to define what it means to make trade law.
3
 These 
elements are essential to multilateral trade lawmaking insofar as they provide trade 
negotiators with a way to frame their arguments and to go about negotiating, and with the 
tools to construct trade policy disciplines and to record them in legal form. They represent 
the know-how of the trade negotiator, and make up her or his discursive, practical, 
technical, and legal repertoire. In short, they are "accomplishments"
4
 that render trade 
lawmaking thinkable and doable.  
                                                 
1
 This episode is recounted in Blustein 2009, 147-148. 
2
 As Wilkinson puts it matter-of-factly; Wilkinson 2004, 151.  
3
 Throughout this introduction, I will use the terms "truths" or "elements" of multilateral trade lawmaking as 
shorthand for these concepts, formulas, principles, narratives and techniques, or what could be called the 
"social structure" (in Giddens's sense; see Giddens 1984, 16-28) of multilateral trade lawmaking. The slightly 
polemical connotations of the term "truth" are intended, for reasons that I hope will become clear shortly. 
Note that not all of the elements of trade lawmaking that I discuss are explicitly articulated; some are just 
tacitly drawn upon and enacted in the day-to-day of multilateral trade lawmaking. 
4
 In the sociological (if not necessarily normative) sense; see Giddens 1993, 8, for whom "all social life is an 
active accomplishment"; see also ibid. 6 (routines as "contingent and potentially fragile accomplishments"); 
and Wendt 1999, 313 (social structures as "ongoing accomplishments of practice").  
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As crystallisations of what it means to make trade law, however, these elements are 
also prone to be reified – to be seen as natural, obvious, and immutable.5 Zoellick certainly 
treated the status of the principle of reciprocity in trade negotiations as self-evident in this 
way, in need of no further explanation or justification. Why was it, though, that the G-20 
representatives did not challenge this notion, or at least question the peculiar interpretation 
of reciprocity that Zoellick was implicitly invoking? After all, the G-20's demands 
concerned an area of trade law in which obligations are seen to be heavily tilted in favour 
of developed countries, namely, that of export subsidies and other trade-distorting subsidies 
on agricultural products.
6
 Given this context, it could have been plausible for the G-20 
representatives to argue that developed countries should reduce their subsidies without 
asking for 'payment' from the developing countries.  
I suspect that the reason that Zoellick's invocation of reciprocity left his 
counterparts speechless was the perceived status of the principle as a 'truth' about what it 
means to make trade law – a status that the G-20 representatives were not willing or able to 
contest.
7
 It was this status that made Zoellick's put-down so devastating: He wasn't simply 
saying that the G-20's position was unreasonable or unacceptable. What he was saying was 
that the G-20 representatives were either not serious or were clueless about what they were 
doing. He was asserting, in effect, that the G-20 had failed to understand what trade 
negotiations are.  
The truths of international trade lawmaking, then, are limiting, as well as enabling.
8
 
They are constraints, as well as accomplishments. They teach the negotiator what he or she 
needs to know in order to engage in trade lawmaking, but also what to forget, dismiss and 
not think about in the first place.
9
 These truths thus circumscribe what negotiators and their 
audiences perceive as reasonable, legitimate, and realistic arguments in the lawmaking 
                                                 
5
 One could also say: they come to be seen as "truisms" about trade lawmaking, i.e., as "trivially true"; see 
Giddens 1993. 
6
 The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture granted allowances for these kinds of subsidies only to those 
who had historically been subsidising (mostly developed countries), while others were barred from using 
export subsidies and employing trade-distorting agricultural support beyond a de minimis threshold. As a 
result, the Agreement on Agriculture has been characterized as "institutionalizing inequality" (Gonzales 2002) 
and "bestow[ing] special and differential treatment on developed rather than developing countries"; 
G/AG/NG/W/13, 2. 
7
 See Blustein 2009, 148, on some delegates' reactions to the episode. 
8
 This will come as a surprise to few, if any, social theorists; see in particular Giddens 1984, 25.   
9
 Andrew Lang makes a similar observation about the "cognitive infrastructure" of actors working in finance; 
see Lang 2013, 169.  
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process. While they do not determine the outcome of negotiations, they tend to delimit the 
terms in which it is conceived.  
The aim of the present dissertation is to destabilise the truths of international trade 
lawmaking. My method is to reveal the contingent and often contested origins of these 
truths, and to show how they foreclose alternative conceptions of the objectives, means, and 
possibilities of trade lawmaking. The dissertation does not provide a full-fledged normative 
critique of the elements of lawmaking, nor does it offer a blueprint for reform. However, it 
attempts to elucidate the discursive, practical, technical, and legal underpinnings of trade 
lawmaking that any reform effort will, of necessity, confront. 
In this introduction, I will first describe how I plan to implement my method and 
highlight some of the challenges that it confronts. I will then give a brief account of how 
the dissertation relates to other work on trade negotiations, and in particular to the debates 
about the legitimacy and effectiveness of WTO lawmaking. Finally, I will give an overview 
of the chapters.  
I. What Kind of History? 
Histories of multilateral trade lawmaking tend to follow the rhythm of negotiating rounds, 
or to trace the evolution of particular subfields of trade law.
10
 In the present dissertation, I 
am neither primarily interested in the factors that account for the successes and failures of 
negotiating rounds, nor in a simple exegesis of the development of international trade law 
per se. Rather, my units of analysis are the "knowledge practices"
11
 of trade negotiators. I 
distinguish four such practices: Discourses reflect the trade negotiator's knowledge of how 
to think and talk about multilateral trade lawmaking. Practices (in a narrower sense) 
manifest the trade negotiator's knowledge of how to organise a trade negotiation – with 
whom to negotiate and when, whether and with whom to ally, what role to accord to the 
                                                 
10
 For histories of the first kind, see: for the GATT/ITO negotiations: Wilcox 1949; Brown 1950; for the 
Kennedy Round: Evans 1971, Preeg 1970; for the Tokyo Round: Winham 1986; for the Uruguay Round: 
Oxley 1990; Paemen/Bensch 1995; for the Doha Round: Blustein 2009; Jones 2010. For histories of the 
second kind, see the Oxford Commentaries on GATT/WTO Agreements; Hoekman/Kostecki 2001; Van den 
Bossche/Zdouc 2013. Some histories are of a more comprehensive scope and combine elements of the two: 
Jackson 1969; Curzon 1965; Dam 1970; Trebilcock/Howse 2005.    
11
 I borrow this term from Annelise Riles; see Riles 1999. Adler/Pouliot 2011 define "practices" as 
"competent performances" (4), whereby "competence" refers to knowing what is implicated in a practice and 
"skill" (7) in executing it. The extent to which social action implicates "skill" is also emphasised by Giddens 
1993, 20, who describes "[t]he production of society" as a "skilled performance". (emphasis omitted) 
12 
 
chair, and how to take decisions.
12
 Techniques refer to the trade negotiator's knowledge of 
how to translate the objectives of multilateral trade regulation into legal text. And the use of 
law implicates the trade negotiator's understanding of why, when, and how to use law in the 
first place. While the boundaries between these elements of multilateral trade lawmaking 
are not always clear cut, each implicates the trade negotiator's know-how in distinctive 
ways. To illustrate this, consider how the 'truth' that "trade negotiations are based on 
reciprocal exchange",
13
 manifests itself at the level of discourses, practices, techniques, and 
in the use of law.  
At the level of discourses, this truth is reflected in what is said, and how it is said. A 
trade negotiator knows, for example, to think of, and refer to, the assumption of legal 
commitments in trade negotiations as 'payments', and to evaluate an agreement in terms of 
'balance'. A trade negotiator further knows that, to the extent that developing countries are 
not willing or able to assume reciprocal commitments, they will have to claim a 'special' 
status and ask for 'special and differential treatment' in trade negotiations. At the level of 
practices, in turn, this truth manifests itself in how negotiations are organised – who is 
allowed to participate in negotiations, how decisions are made, which role the chairs plays, 
and so forth. A trade negotiator knows, for instance, how to manage the participation in 
negotiations so that those who are unwilling to reciprocate commitments are excluded from 
meaningful participation and from the benefits of the resulting agreement. Lawmaking 
techniques represent ways of generating legal commitments. At the level of techniques, the 
imperatives of reciprocity manifest themselves in the design of the modalities that govern 
the assumption of legal commitments, such as tariff reduction formulas. Apart from their 
knowledge of specific lawmaking techniques, negotiators also have a more general 
conception of why, when, and how to use law. At this level, the ramifications of reciprocity 
are reflected in the notion that trade law should be modelled on the private law contract, the 
idea that only payment entitles to 'hard' law, and a particular conception of what kinds of 
subject matters are fit for legal regulation in the trading system.  
My aim in telling the history of these knowledge practices, and of the ways in 
which certain truths about multilateral trade lawmaking have become embodied in them, is 
                                                 
12
 See also Giddens' distinction between discursive and practical consciousness as relating to "differences 
between what can be said and what is characteristically simply done"; Giddens 1984, 7.  
13
 Wilkinson 2004, 151.  
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not primarily to give a historically more accurate account of trade lawmaking for its own 
sake. Rather, in keeping with my aim to destabilise these truths, what I seek to produce are 
histories that are thicker and messier than the streamlined accounts that make it into the 
speeches of trade policy officials and that any academic trade lawyer can recite off the top 
of their heads. One central way in which the history that I tell differs from other accounts is 
that, for the purposes of my story, proposals that were ignored, formulas that were not 
adopted, and ideas that were not pursued are just as relevant as the proposals, formulas, and 
ideas that were ultimately embodied in the law: These failures and dead-ends reveal the 
contingent and often contested origins of the truths of trade lawmaking; they bring the 
trade-offs embodied in the choices that were ultimately made into sharp relief; and they 
broaden our sense of the potentials of trade law.    
At the same time, the history offered here is not an alternative history in the sense 
that it primarily seeks to reveal things that were previously undiscovered.
14
 In fact, one 
problem that any account that seeks to destabilise the know-how involved in a particular 
practice confronts is that it must, to some extent at least, reproduce that knowledge.
15
 
Practitioners who employ that knowledge in their day-to-day work may find that this 
reproduction does not offer anything "new".
16
 That is true in the sense that, given that what 
I seek to describe is actually existing knowledge, it is, by definition, "known". However, 
the way in which the account offered here attempts to generate new insights is by 
presenting this knowledge in a new and different context, in the hope that the reader will 
come to "know" it in a different way – as contingent, contested, and partial, rather than 
natural and necessary. Thus, many people "know" that the principle of payment is 
foundational to international trade lawmaking; but that knowledge may acquire a different 
                                                 
14
 The reader may note that I have used the adverb "primarily" repeatedly in describing my objectives. I have 
done so consciously to indicate that, in addition to my "primary" interest, I also hope to illuminate the factors 
that account for the successes and failures of negotiating rounds, shed new light on the development of 
international trade law, give a historically more accurate account of trade lawmaking, and reveal things that 
were previously undiscovered. However, given that these objectives are not the raison d'être of my thesis, I 
accept that I can only achieve them in an uneven and limited way.   
15
 See Giddens 1993, 21:  
[A] grasp of the resources used by members of society to generate social interaction is a condition of 
the social scientist's understanding of their conduct in just the same way as it is for those members 
themselves.  
16
 See Giddens 1993, 20, on this problem generally in social theory, and sociology in particular: 
The objection which lay members of society frequently have to the claims of sociology is … that its 
'findings' tell them nothing which they did not already know – or worse, dress up in technical 
language that which is perfectly familiar in everyday terminology.   
14 
 
flavour if one considers that the adoption of the bilateral method of tariff bargaining for the 
multilateral trade regime, from which this principle stems, did not reflect the considered 
choice of the trade negotiators of the time, but was the result of the refusal of leading US 
Congressmen to embrace a horizontal reduction formula for the 1945 renewal of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act – a decision that was met with a mixture of resignation 
(on the part of US negotiators), and shock and despair (on the part of UK and Canadian 
negotiators), who considered the method anachronistic, unworkable, and harmful in its 
effects on the political economy of trade. Similarly, it is widely "known" that developing 
countries have a "special" status in multilateral trade lawmaking, a status that some have 
portrayed as having been opportunistically embraced by these countries in order to evade 
legal obligations. This status will arguably appear in a different light if we take into account 
that it originated in the decision by the major powers to confine the developing countries' 
preferred trade policy instruments to a series of 'exceptions' to the general rules embodied 
in their draft, and that it was adopted by developing countries only after years of failed 
efforts to have their difficulties in expanding their export earnings addressed as a structural 
problem of the trading system outside the context of reciprocal bargains. The developing 
countries' interests became "special", then, only because certain features of the GATT – its 
preference for tariffs as a protective instrument, and for lawmaking on the basis of 
reciprocity – were established as "normal". Finally, it may be widely known that trade law 
is to be conceived of on the image of the private law "contract". But are we equally 
comfortable in that knowledge if we think through the effects of this conception, if we 
consider the subject matters that have been deemed unfit for legal regulation in the trading 
system because they could not be easily moulded into "contractual undertakings", and if we 
contemplate what it means to imagine sovereign states negotiating their public policy in the 
image of self-interested economic actors pursuing their own individual gain?    
I am not suggesting that it would be easy to change the knowledge practices of 
multilateral trade lawmaking and dispense with its truths.
17
 After all, they only appear as 
truths because they are so deeply ingrained in the world view, language, and assumptions of 
trade negotiators that they appear hardly amenable to change. We thus need to guard 
against "false contingency", i.e., the suggestion that, just because social structures are not 
                                                 
17
 Nor am I arguing that this would necessarily be desirable. I will return to this point in my conclusion.  
15 
 
natural and necessary, they are easy to change.
18
 While the truths of trade lawmaking, just 
as social structures more generally, only exist as "instantiations" in the knowledge practices 
of trade negotiators and "as memory traces orienting" negotiators' conduct,
19
 this does not 
mean that they do not "stretch … away, in time and space, beyond the control of any 
individual actors."
20
 The episode recounted at the beginning of this introduction illustrates 
the risks of simply ignoring these truths: it is the risk of not "making sense" to one's 
counterparts,
21
 the risk of losing the sense of "ontological security" that one gains by 
following widely accepted assumptions,
22
 the risk of opening oneself up to the charge of 
not being "competent".   
The truths of trade lawmaking, then, confront the individual participant in trade 
lawmaking as something with which she or he has to engage in one way or another. This 
engagement – whether in form of an invocation of the truth, or an attack on it – will tend to 
confirm and reproduce the truth-status of the element in question. It is in this sense that the 
truths of trade lawmaking are "both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organize".
23
 At the same time, every "instantiation" of a truth is "an interpretation of it"
24
 
and thus represents a chance for its more or less subtle development.
25
 In fact, such 
evolution will often be necessary to adapt the principle, narrative, or technique in question 
to changing subject matters and circumstances.
26
 The story I will be telling in this thesis is 
in large part the story of the gradual evolution of the elements of multilateral trade 
                                                 
18
 See Marks 2009.  
19
 This sentence is adapted from Giddens 1984, 17:  
To say that structure is a 'virtual order' of transformative relations means that social systems, as 
reproduced social practices, do not have 'structures' but rather exhibit 'structural properties' and that 
structure exists, as time-space presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory 
traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents. 
See also ibid. 26: "Structure has no existence independent of the knowledge that agents have about what they 
do in their day-to-day activity." 
20
 Ibid. 25.  
21
 See Eagleton-Pierce 2013, 120, who notes that even "the heretic has to 'make sense' to orthodoxy". 
22
 Giddens 1984, 23: "deviant responses or acts … disturb … the sense of ontological security of the 'subjects' 
by undermining the intelligibility of discourse". 
23
 Giddens 1984, 25.  
24
 See Giddens 1984, 23: "The discursive formulation of a rule is already an interpretation of it".  
25
 For example, the gradual move from linear formulas to harmonisation formulas for tariff reductions during 
the 1960s and 1970s, discussed in Chapter 1, represented such an evolutionary change in the conception of 
reciprocity. 
26
 See, for example, the discussion of the adaption of reciprocity to the services context in Chapter 1.  
16 
 
lawmaking, of how they have been sustained, re-interpreted, brought to bear and "made to 
work"
27
 in an ever changing environment.
28
  
The history of multilateral trade lawmaking has also seen its share of more radical 
breaks. The use of new lawmaking techniques in the Tokyo and particularly the Uruguay 
Round, and the reconfiguration of the practices of participation in trade negotiations 
through the Uruguay Round 'single undertaking' are perhaps the most prominent examples. 
While I identify continuities between some of these breaks and long-running patterns in 
GATT/WTO lawmaking, I do not attempt to make any general claims about the conditions 
under which they are likely to occur – an ambition that I believe is impossible to fulfil, not 
least because, after each such break, lawmaking will go on under fundamentally changed 
premises, both with respect to the element of lawmaking affected by the break and with 
respect to the participants' awareness of and adaptation to the circumstances under which 
such breaks can be made to happen.
29
 Consider the example of the single undertaking: One 
effect of the adoption of the principle that 'nothing is agreed until everyone has agreed to 
everything' was to change the dynamics of participation in the Doha Round as compared to 
previous trade negotiations. However, that was not the only effect. Arguably, the 
developing countries' experience of the choice that they faced at the close of the Uruguay 
Round – to accept this principle or remain outside the multilateral trading system – has 
deeply transformed these countries' attitude in multilateral trade negotiations
30
 and thereby 
altered the conditions under which future changes of this magnitude can conceivably 
happen. This episode in the history of multilateral trade lawmaking provides a good 
example of how  
the reflexive nature of human social life subverts the explication of social change in 
terms of any simple and sovereign set of causal mechanisms. … The circumstances 
in which generalizations about what 'happens' to agents hold are mutable in respect 
of what those agents can learn knowledgeably to 'make happen'.
31
 
                                                 
27
 I borrow this phrase from Andrew Lang (personal communication).  
28
 My use of the term "evolution" is not meant to imply any kind of necessary or irreversible development; 
such a position would be untenable on the theoretical premises of this thesis (cf. Giddens 1984, chapter 5), 
and moreover finds no support in the historical record; for an illustration, see the reversal to bilateral request-
and-offer bargaining in the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations.   
29
 Giddens 1984, xix.  
30
 The emergence of developing country coalitions such as the G-20 can in large part be attributed to their fear 
of being faced with another such fait accompli. The G-20 was formed after the US and EU presented a joint 
paper on agriculture in the Doha Round negotiations; see Bluestein 2009, 139-144, for a vivid description, 
and Harbinson 2005, 123, for the perspective of the chair of the agricultural negotiations at the time.   
31
 Giddens 1984, 237 and xix.  
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It is through this ultimately unpredictable process of reflexive appropriation that the truths 
of multilateral trade lawmaking are perpetuated, but it is also through this process that they 
can be transformed.   
 
II. Relationship to the Literature 
Since the founding of the WTO, there have been two major waves of scrutiny of lawmaking 
in the multilateral trading system. The first, triggered in large part by the failed 1999 
Ministerial Conference in Seattle, inquired into the legitimacy of multilateral trade 
lawmaking.
32
 The second, which started to gain force in the aftermath of the equally failed 
2003 Ministerial Conference in Cancún and took on increased urgency after the 
"suspension" of the Doha Round in 2006 and the failure of the 2008 mini-ministerial in 
Geneva, has been more concerned with the effectiveness of the WTO lawmaking process.
33
  
It is difficult to generalise about this literature,
34
 and I will limit myself to 
highlighting a few respects in which the project that I undertake differs from the way in 
which this literature approaches the analysis of trade lawmaking. To begin with, this 
literature, on its own terms, is motivated by particular perceived problems of the WTO 
lawmaking process, namely, its (lack of) legitimacy and effectiveness, and the questions 
that authors ask about the elements of trade lawmaking are naturally tailored to these 
problems. They ask, for example, to what extent the consensus principle contributes to the 
legitimacy of WTO law,
35
 and whether it hinders the effectiveness of WTO negotiations,
36
 
and they answer these questions against the backdrop of an explicit or implicit normative 
yardstick for what legitimate and effective lawmaking would look like.
37
 The ambition of 
the current thesis is at the same time broader and more limited: it is broader in that I trace 
                                                 
32
 See Howse 2001; Krajewski 2001; Esty 2002; Howse/Nicolaïdis 2003; Steger 2003; Zampetti 2003; 
Kapoor 2004; Bacchus 2005; Cho 2005; Chimni 2006; Elsig 2007; for a critique of a subset of this literature 
for taking the current constellation of power as their starting point, see Lamp 2010.  
33
 See Jackson 2001; Wilkinson 2001; Ehlermann/Ehring 2005; Howse 2005; Martin/Messerlin 2007; Steger 
2007; Deere-Birkbeck 2009; Steger 2009.    
34
 See Hoekman 2012 for a recent overview of reform proposals, and Deere-Birkbeck/Monagle 2009 for a 
comprehensive documentation.    
35
 The best discussion is Howse 2001, 359-362. I should note that the concern of contributors to the 
legitimacy debate is not limited to the legislative branch of the WTO, but extends to the judicial side as well; 
see ibid. 374-394; Steger 2003, 120-134.  
36
 See Weiss 2002; Ehlermann/Ehring 2005; Tijmes-Lhl 2009; Hoekman 2012, 751-753.   
37
 As Hoekman notes, whether one regards the WTO as effective depends on the objectives that one thinks the 
WTO should pursue; Hoekman 2012, 745. 
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the evolution of the elements of trade lawmaking throughout the history of the trading 
system and attempt show how they delimit what trade law can achieve. But it is also more 
limited in that I do not systematically evaluate these elements in the light of a normative 
yardstick.  
Another aspect of writings exploring the legitimacy and effectiveness of WTO 
lawmaking that the present thesis seeks to avoid is that they typically focus their attention 
on a limited number of variables, most often of an institutional kind, and take other aspects 
of multilateral trade lawmaking as given. Thus, the attention particularly of legal scholars 
has been focused on procedural conventions such as the consensus principle, the single 
undertaking, transparency, the WTO's relationship to civil society, and the negotiation of 
package deals in "rounds". It is natural that authors who are primarily concerned with 
reforming the WTO lawmaking process would focus on those elements which appear most 
consequential or amenable to change. There is certainly a trade-off between the 
comprehensiveness of change that one advocates and the likelihood that it can be realised. 
However, there is also an evident danger that such an approach will normalise those aspects 
of lawmaking that are not selected as candidates for reform.
38
 In this thesis, I hope to 
question the knowledge practices of multilateral trade lawmaking on a broader basis; in 
fact, I will pay particular attention to those elements of trade lawmaking that appear so 
deeply entrenched that they are rarely seen as candidates for a quick or even medium term 
fix of the WTO's legislative dysfunction.  
 
III. Brief Overview of the Structure of the Thesis 
The four chapters of the thesis are devoted to problematizing the four types of knowledge 
practices in multilateral trade lawmaking identified above: discourses, practices, 
techniques, and the use of law. Chapter 1 discusses three discourses: the reciprocity 
discourse, the discourse of special and differential treatment, and the development 
discourse. Chapter 2 is solely devoted to the practices of participation in multilateral trade 
lawmaking. Other important practices, such as those relating to representation, decision-
                                                 
38
 It is for this reason that I will avoid giving a discrete list of the 'truths' of trade lawmaking. While it will 
probably be apparent which elements of trade lawmaking I consider of most concern in this regard, I do not 
want to prejudge the respects in which a reader may find the elements of trade lawmaking that I analyse to be 
promising, unremarkable, or troubling.   
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making, and chairing, are not discussed primarily for reasons of space, but also because 
they are already subject to an extensive literature. Chapter 3 analyses the techniques of 
trade lawmaking and the narratives that trade negotiators employ to make sense of these 
techniques. I identify five such techniques and their attendant narratives, namely, reduction 
techniques ("liberalisation"), levelling techniques ("fairness"), managing techniques 
("stability"), minimising techniques ("necessity"), and regulating techniques ("good 
governance", "harmonization", and others). The discussion focuses on the first three 
techniques, which have been most widely used in multilateral trade lawmaking. Chapter 4 
explores the use of law in the trading system, and in particular the questions of why law 
was chosen for the regulation of international trade, what kind of law trade negotiators have 
deemed suitable for the trade regime, and how law shapes the process of its own making.      
Each chapter uses a piece of writing that provides an unfamiliar angle of attack, 
from the perspective of which the chapter then scrutinises the knowledge practice at issue. 
With the exception of the last chapter, these pieces of writing are from outside the trade 
context: MacKinnon developed her critique of the Aristotelian conception of equality in the 
context of her feminist theory of domestic law; Cohen analyses the complementarities of 
the negotiation literature and the "new governance" approach; and Cover explores the 
relationship between law and narrative in the context of a discussion of the US Supreme 
Court's 1982 term. Hudec's article, though written in the trade context, investigates the role 
of law in the trade regime in the 1960s, an epoch that today, more than 40 years later and 
after 15 years of a WTO dispute settlement system with compulsory and exclusive 
jurisdiction, can seem very far away. Despite their distance from the (current) trade context, 
or rather, because of this distance, each of these articles prompts us to ask difficult 
questions of the trade regime: how did the most basic principles of the trade regime, such as 
the principle of reciprocity or the privileging of tariffs as a protective instrument, become 
established? How did some countries become "special"? What is the trade regime's 
relationship to the past? Which techniques do trade lawmakers use, and what is the 
rationale for these techniques? Why have trade negotiators always insisted on making "hard 
law" even though they were often not prepared to enforce it? These are just some of the 
questions that I will explore in the following pages, in the hope that, at the end of the 
exercise, the reader will be left with a greater awareness of the contingent and often 
contested origins of the truths of multilateral trade lawmaking, with a more acute sense of 
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the trade-offs embodied in these truths, and with a broader appreciation of the potentials 
and limitations of trade law.   
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Chapter 1: Discourses 
In her article "Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law", Catharine MacKinnon recounts the 
struggle of women to engage with and transform a legal system that had for centuries been 
authored, adjudicated and enforced exclusively by men. Initially the focus of these 
struggles was on demanding legal inclusion for women "on the same terms as men".
39
 The 
aim was to extend to women the same rights that men enjoyed, on the basis that women 
were equal to men. Underlying these efforts was a conception of equality that demanded 
"treating likes alike and unlikes unalike".
40
 MacKinnon questions this conception of 
equality in several respects: Why is it, she asks, that white men should set "the point of 
reference for sameness"?
41
 Are women truly equal when they gain access "on the same 
terms" to a legal system that is shaped by the experience of men, for example in its 
treatment of sexual violence and reproductive issues? Can the unequal treatment of women 
still be justified under this conception to the extent that women are not "like" men? And 
how does a conception of equality that focuses on the "likeness" of persons or situations 
take account of the fact that some respects in which women are not "like" men are the result 
of historical discrimination?  
MacKinnon's questions present a useful entry point to the analysis of the 
"architecture of distinctions"
42
 of the multilateral trading system. A number of parallels 
spring to mind. Just as women had no role in the authorship of most domestic legal 
systems, the multilateral trade regime did not come into being as a system of 159 members, 
nor arguably of the 23 original members of the GATT, but was shaped by the practices of a 
few states, whom others joined, through "accession" to the GATT or the WTO. 
MacKinnon's questions about the "point of reference for sameness", about who, or what, is 
regarded as "normal" or the "standard" in such a dynamic of exclusion and subsequent 
inclusion are thus highly pertinent to the evolution of the trading system.  
Moreover, MacKinnon's analysis draws attention to "how difference is socially 
created or defined", and to the fact that it is often defined in light of what are regarded as 
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 MacKinnon 1991, 1286. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid. 1287: "Why should anyone have to be like white men to get what they have, given that white men do 
not have to be like anyone except each other to have it?" 
42
 Luhmann 1995/2004, 371/330. 
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"normal" characteristics and practices.
43
 Again, these questions are highly relevant to the 
trading system. One could note that while the majority of WTO members are "developing 
countries", this is deemed to be a "special" status. The standard condition of a participant in 
the trading system – or at least the condition that everyone aspires to – is being a 
"developed" country. Pursuing the questions posed by MacKinnon might thus help to 
elucidate and destabilise distinctions such as the one between "developed" and 
"developing" countries in the trading system. In particular, MacKinnon prompts us to ask 
what other distinctions this distinction precludes, or, as Niklas Luhmann might put it, from 
what this distinction is itself distinct.
44
  
Third, MacKinnon emphasises the relationship between the definition of 
equality/difference and time. In her view, the conception of equal treatment as the like 
treatment of situations that are alike does not take account of how differences have been 
produced in the first place. This problem is most acute when it comes to the most deep-
rooted dimensions of inequality, since "the worse the inequality is, the more like a 
difference it looks."
45
 The result is "dominance essentialized as difference".
46
 Time, or 
"history", arguably plays a crucial role in the architecture of distinctions of the multilateral 
trading system. A large majority of the "developing" members of the trading system used to 
be colonial subjects of some of the "developed" members; many of the "developing" 
countries were just emerging from colonial occupation at the time the multilateral trading 
system was established in the late 1940s, and some did not gain independence until decades 
later. Yet the distinction between "developing" and "developed" countries is future-
oriented; instead of problematising the history of the members of the trading system, it 
conceptualises their relationship in terms of future convergence.     
In the present chapter, I will use the conceptual angles of attack that MacKinnon 
employs in her critique of the conception of equality as like treatment for an analysis of the 
discourses of multilateral trade lawmaking. As I will argue in the first section, the dynamic 
of inclusion/exclusion is crucial to understanding how a particular principle, namely the 
principle of reciprocity, came to be accepted as the 'normal' way of making trade law. 
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 MacKinnon 1991, 1290: "Society defines women as such according to differences from men … Then 
equality law tells women that they are entitled to equal treatment mainly to the degree they are the same as 
men."  
44
 Luhmann 1995/2004, 370-372/329-330.  
45
 MacKinnon 1991, 1296. 
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 Ibid. 1297. 
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According to the reciprocity discourse, a participant in trade negotiations can only be 
expected to make 'concessions', in the form of tariff cuts or other changes in its trade 
policy, if its counterpart is prepared to 'pay' for them with substantially equivalent 
'concessions' of its own. This idea has its origins in US trade policies of the 1930s, and in 
the particular dynamics of US domestic politics. As a result of these dynamics, the US 
could participate in a multilateral trading system only on its own terms. Its international 
position at the end of the Second World War forced other countries to accept these terms, 
and in particular the conception of trade negotiations as an exchange of reciprocal 
concessions, as the foundational principles of lawmaking in the emerging multilateral 
trading system.  
After briefly recalling the circumstances under which these principles of lawmaking 
were adopted for the multilateral trading system, I will analyse the effects of the conception 
of international trade lawmaking that is inherent in the reciprocity discourse. In particular, I 
will argue that the reciprocity discourse conceives of international trade lawmaking as 
being akin to a series of commercial transactions rather than as an exercise in public 
policymaking. I argue that this conception of the trade regime as essentially a market for 
the reciprocal exchange of concessions precludes considerations of equity and common 
purpose. I will also consider alternative conceptions of trade lawmaking that might have set 
the trading system on a different course. Finally, I will analyse the evolution of the 
reciprocity discourse from the early years of the trading system to the current Doha Round 
negotiations.   
In the second section, I will show how the demands and aspirations of "developing" 
countries in the trading system came to be conceptualised as "special". I will first analyse 
the preparatory negotiations of the GATT, in the course of which the US and other 
developed countries decided to accommodate the "less-developed" countries' desire to 
reserve a greater role for the state in the management of international trade through 
"exceptions", rather than by modifying the basic structure of their design. I will then argue 
that the first attempts of the GATT contracting parties to address the problems that the 
"less-developed" countries encountered in their trade relied on a cooperative approach to 
international trade lawmaking, in which considerations of reciprocity played virtually no 
role. This cooperative approach rested on the expectation that the GATT's contracting 
parties would undertake all efforts to eliminate obstacles to the exports of "less-developed 
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countries", a shared goal to which the contracting parties had repeatedly committed 
themselves. At the core of the cooperative approach were the identification, analysis, and 
discussion of these obstacles, and the attempt to persuade the industrialised countries to 
eliminate them. As I argue, it was the failure of the cooperative approach that forced the 
"less-developed" countries to seek accommodation within the dominant reciprocity 
discourse – by arguing for "special and differential treatment". The discourse of "special 
and differential treatment" differed profoundly from the cooperative approach; instead of 
conceptualising the obstacles confronting developing countries as a structural problem of 
the trading system, it merely modified the exchange rate between concessions by developed 
and developing countries. In the language of the market metaphor, the discourse stipulated 
that developed countries would "sell" concessions to developing countries at a discount, but 
it did not oblige them to sell them anything in the first place. Thus, the discourse of "special 
and differential treatment" did not fundamentally alter the logic of payment underlying 
trade negotiations; in fact, by claiming "special" status, the discourse arguably reinforced 
the status of reciprocity as the "normal" way of trade lawmaking.  
In the third section, I will examine the wider challenges that the idea of 
"development" posed to the US vision of the multilateral trading system. As I will argue, 
the development discourse tells a story about the temporality, teleology and relationality of 
the trading system that fundamentally differed from the US vision. To begin with, it rested 
on a different theory of history. While the US sought to portray the founding of the trading 
system as a "release" from an anarchic past of untrammelled protectionism, the 
development discourse appraised the significance of the trading system primarily in terms 
of a future goal, namely whether it would assist or hinder the "less-developed" countries to 
industrialise. Even though many "developing" countries arguably also had a formative 
"past" experience to overcome, namely, the history of colonial subjugation, the 
development discourse was exclusively future-oriented: Whereas the US narrative 
dramatised the past, the development discourse did not admit of a past, or, rather, imagined 
a generic state of underdevelopment in its stead.  
The US narrative and the development discourse also posited different aims for the 
trading system. Reciprocal trade liberalisation, which was at the heart of the US project, 
represented no more than a means to an end for those countries primarily concerned with 
industrialisation. Finally, the two discourses imagined the relationship between the 
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members of the trading system in different ways. Whereas the US sought to preserve the 
formal equality of all "contracting parties" to the GATT, the idea of "development" 
encouraged the differentiation between members according to their "stage" of development. 
I conclude that the development discourse has played a paradoxical role in international 
trade lawmaking in that the idea of development, on one hand, naturalised the subordinate 
and dependent position of the poorer members of the trading system – in MacKinnon's 
words, it essentialised dominance as difference –, but on the other hand expressed an 
emancipatory ambition for a clear break with the trading patterns entrenched under colonial 
rule.  
I. The "Reciprocity" Discourse 
As is well known, the "move to institutions"
47
 at the end of the Second World War almost 
faltered in the field of international trade. By 1950 it was clear that the Charter for an 
International Trade Organization (ITO), which had been adopted at the 1948 United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Employment in Havana, would never enter into force.
48
 
What survived was a provisional and, from an institutional perspective, incomplete 
agreement called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
The GATT was concluded at the second preparatory meeting for the Havana 
Conference held in Geneva in 1947. It consisted of three parts. The first part incorporated 
schedules of tariff bindings and barred the parties from charging customs duties on 
products imported from other parties in excess of those specified in their respective 
schedules. It also included the most-favoured nation (MFN) clause, which prohibited 
discrimination among like products from different members. The provisions in the second 
part concerned non-tariff barriers and were for the most part portrayed as "anti-
circumvention" provisions, i.e. rules designed to protect the value of tariff concessions.
49
 
The third part contained administrative and organisational provisions, carefully designed 
not to give the GATT the character of an international organisation, which would have 
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 I borrow this phrase from David Kennedy; see Kennedy 1987; see also Kennedy 1994.  
48
 For context, see Diebold 1994. 
49
 The report of the first preparatory meeting in London had recommended that the GATT contain "general 
provisions … considered essential to safeguard the value of tariff concessions and such other provisions as 
may be appropriate"; E/PC/T/33, 51. 
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made it incompatible with the US trade legislation under which it was designed to come 
into force.
50
  
In a memorandum to US President Truman requesting approval of the results of the 
negotiations, the head of the US delegation to the preparatory meeting characterised the 
GATT as follows:  
The General Agreement is, for the most part, an elaboration of familiar provisions of our 
trade agreements, adapted to the economic conditions of today and to the fact that it will be 
a multilateral agreement among twenty-three countries.
51
  
The US trade agreements that he was referring to were 32 bilateral agreements that had 
been concluded by the United States under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) 
of 1934.
52
 In fact, the substantive provisions of the GATT did embody some compromises 
with other contracting parties, principally the United Kingdom, which had used extensive 
bilateral consultations on commercial policy since 1943 to influence the thinking of US 
trade officials.
53
 In large part, however, the GATT mirrored the standard provisions of the 
reciprocal trade agreements negotiated by the US.
54
  
The US experience under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme provided 
the template not only for the structure and many substantive provisions of the GATT. It 
also shaped how the tariff concessions embodied in the GATT had been negotiated and how 
future trade negotiations under the auspices of the GATT were supposed to occur. The 
negotiation of the GATT marked the wholesale importation of the principles and practices 
of US trade lawmaking into the emerging multilateral trade regime. In order to appreciate 
the significance of this development, it is necessary to give some background on these 
principles and practices and to analyse the circumstances of their adoption for the GATT 
(A). I will then discuss the effects of the reciprocity discourse on the conception of 
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 See Hudec 1975, 45.  
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 FRUS 1947, 1017-1018; see also ibid. 1021:  
Part II [of the GATT, N.L.] reproduces many of the commercial-policy provision of the draft Charter 
for an International Trade Organization, which in turn have been largely drawn from, or developed 
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Dam 1970, 12, characterises the GATT as  
a sufficiently direct expression of U.S. views on the appropriate form of concerted international 
action in the commercial policy area that it cannot be understood without an examination of those 
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 For the "standard provisions" included in those agreements, see FRUS 1935, 536-549.  
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 For an account of these discussions, see Irwin/Mavroidis/Sykes 2008, chapter 1.  
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 Ibid. 12. 
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lawmaking in the emerging trade regime (B). Finally, I will analyse the evolution of the 
reciprocity discourse through the current Doha Round (C).  
A. The Origins of the Reciprocity Discourse 
Reciprocity had been an element of US trade policy long before the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act was adopted in 1934. In the 19
th
 century, US trade legislation had 
authorised the President to impose punitive tariffs on imports from countries which 
discriminated against US exports or provided less access to their market than the US 
President deemed to be "fair".
55
 This system preserved the autonomy of Congress in setting 
US tariff levels. The President's authority was limited to increasing tariff levels on 
specified grounds. At this time, reciprocity was thus understood as providing the basis for 
retaliation against trading partners, rather than for mutual tariff reductions. The US tariff 
remained non-negotiable and the sole preserve of Congress.   
The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, adopted against the backdrop of the 
escalating protectionism in the wake of the Great Depression, marked a sea change in US 
trade policy. It for the first time authorised the President to reduce tariffs in exchange for 
reciprocal tariff reductions by a trading partner.
56
 The authority of the President, however, 
was heavily circumscribed. In order to assuage fears that the tariff reductions would hurt 
US producers, the President could only reduce tariffs by a certain percentage. An elaborate 
institutional infrastructure for the preparation of trade negotiations was established.
57
 
Before entering into negotiations, the Administration would conduct detailed analyses of 
the competitive position of the US on products on which tariff concessions might be 
offered. A Committee for Reciprocity Information would then conduct public hearings on 
the proposed offers, which would often be amended in response to concerns voiced by US 
producers.
58
  
A second key element of US trade lawmaking was the unconditional most-favoured 
nation (MFN) principle. This principle had been adopted as US policy in the Tariff Act of 
1923, and initially attracted little attention: US tariffs were so high at the time that it had 
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 Goldstein 1993, 205-206; Rhodes 1993, chapter 2.  
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 The literature on the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act is voluminous; see Haggard 1988; Goldstein 1993; 
Bailey/Goldstein/Weingast 1997; Hiscox 1999. 
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 See Tasca 1938, chapter 4.  
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"Other Official Documents, Speeches, and Publications" section of the bibliography.]  
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little practical impact. In conjunction with the principle of reciprocity, however, it acquired 
considerable significance: The US would now have to extend concessions that it granted in 
a reciprocal trade agreement to all other countries with which it had concluded such 
agreements, without receiving anything in return. In order to minimise the impact of this 
constellation, the US developed the practice of negotiating tariff concessions on a particular 
product only with the principal supplier of the product in question.
59
   
The principles of reciprocity and MFN, in conjunction with the practice of only 
negotiating on tariff items of which the counterpart was the principal supplier, thus formed 
the fundamental elements of US trade lawmaking when the US started consultations with 
Britain and Canada on the shape of the post-war international economic order. That these 
elements would also inform the negotiation of a future multilateral agreement, however, 
was by no means a foregone conclusion. In the 1930s, Hull had considered the negotiation 
of "multilateral trade arrangements" on the basis of the principles of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements Act a possibility, and had stated that the United States  
welcome[d] such arrangements, provided they have for their object the liberalization and 
promotion of international trade in general, rather than the creation of closed areas of special 
preference.
60
 
However, when British, American and Canadian economists and state officials started 
discussing the shape of the post-war economic order in the early 1940s, they did not take 
the principles of the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme as their starting point. It 
was particularly the British and the Canadians who pressed the view that the post-war 
trading system should have a multilateral character and who argued that in the post-war 
trading system, tariff reductions should be negotiated through a multilateral procedure, 
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 Hull 1936, 15:  
Our rule is that the duty reductions granted to each individual country are restricted to those 
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happen, however, that, under existing abnormal conditions, some other country at any later stage 
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 Hull 1936, 15:  
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negotiation of multilateral trade arrangements.  
Reportedly US trade officials had considered a multilateral approach as an alternative to bilateral agreements 
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rather than the bilateral requests and offers characteristic of the negotiations of US 
reciprocal trade agreements.  
The first British proposals for the post-war international economic order stressed the 
importance of multilateral trade for Britain. In his "Proposal for an International 
Commercial Union", James Meade, who was an economist at the War Cabinet Secretariat 
at the time, argued that Britain would stand to gain "above all other countries … from a 
removal of those discriminations and rigidly bilateral bargains which remove the 
opportunities for multilateral trading".
61
 An interdepartmental committee tasked with 
developing a consensus position on international commercial policy on the basis of Meade's 
proposal suggested reducing tariffs through the application of a horizontal reduction 
formula applied to all rates, combined with a maximum "ceiling" that the resulting tariffs 
could not exceed, and a "floor" under which tariffs would not have to be reduced.
62
 This 
method of tariff reduction would remain the UK's preferred option throughout the 
negotiations with the US.  
In early conversations with the US, Canadian officials similarly envisioned that 
multilateral agreements would replace bilateral agreements in the post-war period.
63
 One 
Canadian official argued for "bold", even "heroic" action after the war, and expressed his 
view that the "old methods of trade negotiation" were "too cumbersome and should be 
abandoned".
64
 Specifically, he suggested the conclusion of a "broad multilateral agreement 
under which each nation would agree to a progressive reduction in all tariffs or in certain 
categories of tariffs".
65
 At the same time, Canada expressed interest in supplementing such 
a multilateral agreement with a bilateral agreement with the United States in order to 
achieve further liberalisation of its trade with the United States than would be possible in a 
multilateral context.
66
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In September 1943, a British delegation traveled to Washington for exploratory 
talks on post-war commercial policy and to formulate an agenda for more formal and high-
level consultations between the two nations.
67
  The comparative effectiveness of 
multilateral and bilateral methods of tariff reductions was one of the many subjects of 
discussion.
68
 A joint statement adopted at the end of the discussions outlined five different 
methods of tariff reductions and briefly presented the advantages and disadvantages of 
each.
69
 The first four options were multilateral reduction formulas, whereas the fifth 
mirrored the US practice under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme.
70
 The US 
and the UK agreed that "if a workable multilateral tariff-reduction formula acceptable to a 
large number of nations providing for a drastic reduction of tariffs without nullifying 
exceptions and reservations can be found, it would be superior".
71
 In addition, Britain 
expressed the view that it would "not be possible to obtain adherence to a multilateral 
convention prohibiting quantitative restrictions and limiting the use of other protective 
devices unless it includes a satisfactory formula for multilateral tariff reductions".
72
 This 
reflected the fact that Britain could only envisage giving up the imperial preferences – one 
of the principal goals of the US – if it could be assured that the US would significantly 
reduce its high pre-war tariffs.
73
  
In December 1943, a Special Committee on the Relaxation of Trade Barriers in the 
US State Department issued a report in which it reiterated the view that the adoption of a 
multilateral tariff-reduction formula would be superior.
74
 The Committee announced that it 
would continue to study a number of multilateral reduction formulas "from the viewpoint of 
their equity and technical soundness", though it would also consider "provisions whereby 
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each nation would agree to negotiate bilateral tariff-reduction agreements" – "either as a 
necessary substitute for a multilateral tariff reduction formula or as a supplement to it".
75
 
On the basis of the joint statement adopted by the United States and the United 
Kingdom in October 1943, the United States held similar exploratory talks with Canada 
during February and March 1944. The US and Canada agreed on a horizontal reduction 
formula with a floor of 10 percent as a "tentative basis" for further discussions.
76
 The 
Canadian group agreed with the view that had been expressed by the British that "a definite 
commitment to abolish quantitative restrictions should be accompanied by an equally 
precise commitment to effect substantial reductions in tariffs". The Canadian suggested that 
the "overall reduction should be of the order of, say, 50% in most-favoured-nation rates".
77
 
It was this formula – a 50 percent reduction of tariff rates with a floor of 10 percent – that 
was incorporated in a draft convention drawn up by an interagency group led by the US 
State Department in October 1944.
78
 It was also reflected in a draft resolution for the 
renewal of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act that the US Administration submitted to 
Congress for consideration in early 1945 and through which it hoped to gain Congressional 
advance authorisation for the tariff negotiations that would form part of a multilateral 
accord.
79
  
In March 1945, however, the prospects for the adoption of a multilateral reduction 
formula dimmed. The State Department had consulted with House leaders and described 
their initial reaction to the proposal of a horizontal tariff reduction as "very discouraging".
80
  
While the Congressmen had not closed the door to a horizontal approach entirely, the State 
Department officials "came away with the feeling that the leaders felt very strongly that it 
should be dropped".
81
 After some handwringing, the State Department decided to follow 
this advice, and narrowly secured the passage of the Act through the House and the Senate 
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in May and June 1945, respectively.
82
 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act tied the hands 
of the US government, since any future tariff reductions would have to be negotiated and 
implemented under its authority.
83
  
The reaction from the British and Canadian negotiators to the new realities was 
fierce. British negotiators described the "multilateral bilateral approach" to which the 
Americans were now committed – which called for a number of bilateral negotiations 
conducted simultaneously whose results would be generalised through the MFN rule – as "a 
nightmare conception", and announced that the abandonment of the multilateral approach 
"would be the end of all we hope to achieve" and the "end of everything worth having".
84
 
The Canadians pointed out that they were "deeply disappointed and dismayed by the 
change in the American position", and that they viewed any selective method of tariff 
reduction as "'hopelessly inadequate' to the needs".
85
  
The British and Canadian negotiators objected to the incorporation into the future 
multilateral trading system of the tariff negotiation methods required by the Reciprocal 
Trade Agreements Act both on pragmatic and normative grounds. A first concern raised by 
the British was the time that would be required to negotiate "a multiplicity of bilateral 
agreements", and the associated capacity constraints.
86
 This was in line with earlier 
Canadian complaints that the bilateral, selective method was "too cumbersome".
87
 The 
British also complained about the lack of transparency and predictability of a number of 
simultaneous bilateral negotiations: Negotiators would be required to "enter into a sea of 
general commercial policy obligations without knowing where they will, in fact, land", and 
"[y]ou could never tell where you stood or where you would come out".
88
 They also 
emphasised the psychological advantages associated with the horizontal, multilateral 
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method: as they put it, it was "psychologically … essential to make a comprehensive 
reduction where all parties will make sacrifices at once".
89
 These latter concerns could be 
described as going to the (moral) intelligibility of negotiating results. The different 
negotiating formulas had often been discussed in terms of their equity, an assessment that 
would be much harder to make with regard to the outcomes of bilateral, selective 
negotiations.
90
 The Canadians emphasised the significance of this appearance of equity for 
the wider dynamics of trade negotiations. Apart from the magnitude of the tariff cut that 
had been contemplated under the horizontal formula, they opined that "the fact that it would 
deal with all tariffs in all countries with an even hand would … weaken the vested minority 
interests in every country", whereas "[s]elective tariff reduction … tends to emphasize the 
sanctity of protectionism".
91
 The Canadian negotiators evidently feared that the adoption of 
the bilateral method would have the effect of universalising the mercantilist logic of the 
Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme by forcing other countries to emulate the 
political economy of American trade politics. They pointed out that the 
selective method of tariff reduction, as carried out by the United States under the Trade 
Agreements Act, had tended to strengthen the belief that trade barriers should be reduced 
only under the bargaining process and to obscure the truth that trade barrier reduction is also 
of benefit to the country doing the reducing.
92
  
If the selective method was adopted for the multilateral regime, other countries would 
"inevitably adopt the same careful and cautious attitude toward the reduction or removal of 
tariffs and other restrictions against United States exports" that the United States was 
adopting towards their exports.
93
 By way of example, the Canadian officials pointed out 
that "it was virtually becoming impossible for the Canadian Government to reduce its 
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duties unilaterally even though many of them should be reduced in the best interests of 
Canada."
94
  
Canada also noted the implications of the bilateral approach for the prospects of 
getting "outsiders" to join the planned multilateral agreement. The Canadians argued that 
the horizontal approach would have made it "possible to compel reluctant countries to 
participate in the plan by threatening to withhold tariff benefits if they did not 
participate".
95
 In the Canadians' view, this would have been "politically feasible 
internationally because the requirements under the plan for a horizontal tariff cut would be 
equitable, simple, and easily understandable".
96
 The selective method, by contrast, "would 
be complicated and to some extent inequitable vis-à-vis outsiders and could not well be 
used as a weapon to force them in".
97
  
Instead of leading to a reconsideration of the method for tariff negotiations, these 
concerns about how best to accomplish the "compulsion of outsiders"
98
 lent new impetus to 
the idea of negotiating tariff reductions and an accompanying multilateral agreement on 
non-tariff barriers first among a "nuclear group" of "major trading nations"
99
 and requiring 
outsiders "to negotiate their way in by entering into bilateral agreements with each of the 
countries making up the nuclear group".
100
 On the basis of these discussions with the 
Canadians, the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy recommended that a 
"selective nuclear-multilateral approach" be advocated in future negotiations. This 
approach envisaged that  
a nuclear group of approximately a dozen countries would agree to negotiate, first, bilateral 
agreements for selective tariff reductions, and second, an informal, multilateral program 
dealing with tariff preferences and non-tariff barriers, which program would then be 
presented at a general international conference to be concluded and made operative among 
the nuclear group and other nations wishing to participate.
101
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While the British continued to express disappointment at this approach,
102
 it had become 
virtually non-negotiable, and would become the way in which the GATT would in fact be 
negotiated and concluded.
103
 Subsequent procedural discussions between Britain and the 
United States focused on the composition of the nuclear group.
104
  
In sum, the origins of the GATT were marked by two moves of exclusion and 
subsequent inclusion: First, the procedure for tariff negotiations with bilateral reciprocity at 
its core was virtually dictated by the US Congress. If other nations, including the United 
Kingdom, wanted to negotiate with the United States on tariffs, they had to accept the 
United States' terms. Second, the structure of a multilateral agreement – the relation 
between tariffs and other forms of government action in relation to trade, and the degrees of 
stringency/leniency with which the other forms of government action would be treated – 
was broadly determined by the United States and the United Kingdom. This structure, in 
turn, would be safeguarded through the nuclear approach, which would leave newcomers 
virtually powerless to fundamentally shape the broad outlines of the agreement.  
One aspect of this structure is particularly important to note, since it greatly 
magnified the ramifications of the first exclusionary move. While the GATT contained 
substantive obligations with regard to other barriers to trade, it was envisaged that tariff 
barriers would be gradually reduced through continuous negotiations. As a result, tariffs 
would represent the primary area of negotiating activity in the first two decades of the 
GATT.
105
 Due to the centrality of tariffs in negotiations under the early GATT, tariff 
negotiations would become paradigmatic for international trade negotiations generally. As 
a result, the practices and procedures of tariff negotiations, imported as they were from the 
US Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme, came to fundamentally shape conceptions of 
how international trade lawmaking "works". The imprint that these practices and 
procedures left on multilateral trade lawmaking is most tangible in the effects of the 
reciprocity discourse.  
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B. The Effects of the Reciprocity Discourse 
The overarching effect of the two exclusionary moves that marked the origins of the GATT 
was to universalise the principles and practices of US trade lawmaking. What had until that 
point been US principles and practices became the principles and practices of the 
multilateral trade regime.
106
 These principles and practices gave multilateral trade 
lawmaking very particular features, which continue to shape it to this day.  
First, the concerns voiced by Canada in the preparatory negotiations, namely that 
the adoption of reciprocal bargaining as the method of trade negotiations in the GATT 
would universalise the mercantilist logic of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme 
and reproduce the political economy of US trade policymaking in other countries, proved 
well founded. As one of the US negotiators who participated in the negotiations with 
Canada observed four years after the adoption of the GATT:   
The conception of tariff bargaining has spread. It has now reached the stage in which 
negotiation is the internationally accepted method for the reduction of tariffs. The General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade accomplished an extensive downward revision of tariffs by 
the bargaining process. … There is, of course, nothing in the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade … that precludes unilateral tariff reduction. Once, however, the idea of tariff 
bargaining becomes widely established, a psychology adverse to unilateral tariff reduction is 
created. Even if a country has no expectations of future negotiations, the pervasive tariff-
bargaining idea would operate as a hindrance to any unilateral reductions that it might 
contemplate. The growth of the tariff-bargaining idea has fixed more firmly in the public 
mind the conception that a tariff reduction is a sacrifice for the country making it and that 
the country benefits only if similar action is taken concurrently by some other country. In 
public statements describing the results of negotiations, the common use of the term 
'concession' to describe a reduction or binding of a duty is strengthening the conception that 
a tariff reduction is a benefit to some one else. Henceforth, the legislator or public official 
who advocates a unilateral tariff reduction is going to have to contend to an increasing 
extent with this conception. He will have to explain why he wants to 'sacrifice' the national 
interest for the benefit of foreigners without getting counter balancing 'sacrifices' from 
them.
107
 
The adoption of the US model of reciprocal bargaining consolidated a mercantilist 
conception of the political economy of trade
108
 and marginalised other conceptions of the 
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political, economic, and cultural significance of trade. It is not inconceivable that the 
multilateral trading system could have fostered, and could in turn have been sustained by, a 
political culture less reliant on reciprocity. Britain in the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century 
provided a precedent for a society in which free trade was cherished as a political and 
cultural value, and reciprocity was rejected as an aberration and a betrayal of the principles 
of free trade.
109
 Of course, Britain was somewhat unique in this regard, and in light of the 
history of American trade politics, there was little prospect of the United States promoting a 
trading system on this basis internationally after the Second World War, for example by 
unilaterally liberalising its trade
110
 (though this option was often mentioned by US officials 
in order to stress the moderation of their proposals to domestic audiences
111
). What the 
example of Britain goes to show, however, is that there is no historically or geographically 
universal political economy of trade that renders reciprocity, which allows policymakers to 
trade off import-competing with export interests, the only politically feasible principle of 
international trade lawmaking. However, as Canada had feared, and Hawkins (and many 
others) subsequently confirmed, reciprocity – once it was accepted as the principle of trade 
lawmaking – works to produce domestic political-economic conditions that reinforce its 
logic, and hence weakens the influence of free trade as a political or cultural value. 
                                                                                                                                                    
valuable good". Hudec's use of the term "theory" highlights the contingent and malleable character of this 
conception, which was not simply describing a 'truth' about the political economy of trade.     
109
 Trentmann 1998; Dam 1970, 65, notes that the economist's perspective on tariff reduction – that tariff 
reduction is beneficial for the country doing the reducing – "prevailed among noneconomists as well in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century." 
110
 Dam 1970, 86:  
Hull's key insight was that unilateral tariff reduction was not in the political cards in most countries 
and certainly not in the US Congress. 
111
 See Hull 1936, 8:  
When we were formulating our basic policy, there were two ways open to us to make our vital 
contribution to the process of economic demobilization. We could undertake a downward revision of 
our tariff by unilateral and autonomous action, in the hope that other nations would, as a result, also 
begin to move away from their present suicidal policies in the field of foreign trade. Or else we 
could, by the negotiation of bilateral trade agreements, attempt a mitigation of trade barriers on a 
reciprocal basis.  
We chose the second course as offering by far the better promise of trade improvement. An 
autonomous reduction of our tariff would provide no assurance that our example would be followed 
by other nations or, if it would be followed, that the resulting mitigation of trade barriers would, in 
fact, apply to those commodities which are of the greatest interest to us. 
Sayre 1936, 5: 
… the question of method was long and carefully considered. The mere unilateral reduction of such 
of our own rates of duty as were excessively high no matter how wisely effected, could have given 
no assurance that the formidable barriers to our commerce created by foreign nations would likewise 
be modified. 
38 
 
Second, the adoption of the US method of trade negotiations into the multilateral 
trade regime also universalised the metaphors and imagery through which US officials 
perceived and described international trade lawmaking. This imagery assimilated the 
international arena to a marketplace, and conceived of international trade lawmaking as a 
series of commercial transactions. An expression of mercantilist calculus, the market 
metaphor was designed to assure US domestic audiences that the US would only make 
"concessions" when these were "paid for" with substantively equivalent concessions by its 
trading partners. As US negotiator Claire Wilcox assured his audience in a speech: "The 
United States makes no concessions, in the course of this bargaining, unless it obtains 
concessions in return."
112
 Under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, the US was to use 
trade agreements, in Secretary of State Stettinus's words, "to expand [its] foreign trade by a 
process of hard-headed and business-like bargaining";
113
 reciprocal trade liberalisation was 
"based on full payment by the other party".
114
  
The logic of payment was imported wholesale into the GATT, and later the WTO. 
The negotiating rules for early GATT negotiations spelled out the principle of payment, 
stipulating that "no participating government shall be required to grant unilateral 
concessions, or to grant concessions to other governments without receiving concessions in 
return".
115
 While the concept of a "market" is rarely explicitly used to describe trade 
lawmaking, at least in official pronouncements, metaphors that evoke the image of a market 
are ubiquitous both in official parlance and in academic commentary on trade 
negotiations:
116
 "requests" and "offers" are drawn up, improved, modified, or withdrawn in 
the course of negotiations, concessions are "bought", "banked", "purchased", "sold" and 
"paid for", negotiators worry about "free rides", i.e., about others receiving concessions "for 
free", and about getting something "in return". They request "compensation", present 
"bills", receive "debit", "credit", or "capital" for concessions, and worry about 
"redistribution" and about coming out of negotiations "with a negative balance sheet". 
"Non-paying members" cannot expect to receive concessions, the "price" of a concession 
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and the "exchange rate" between concessions in different areas has to be right, and new 
members have to pay an "entrance fee" and buy a "ticket of admission".     
The market metaphor lends international trade lawmaking a very distinctive logic 
and dynamic.
117
 Since the reciprocity discourse converts whatever is conceptualised as a 
trade "barrier" into a bargaining chip, and understands the reduction of such "barriers" as 
"concessions" and hence as "currency", it imbues these trade "barriers" with a status and 
value that bears no necessary relation to their economic effects or to other public policy 
merits that they may reflect.
118
 This disconnect between the economic benefits/costs and 
the bargaining status of trade "barrier" reduction as a "concession" is widely 
acknowledged.
119
 In the early days of the GATT, there were concerns that the logic of 
payment would not only inhibit the unilateral reduction of trade barriers where this was in 
the best interests of the country concerned, but would also lead to the "padding" of trade 
barriers in order to generate more currency, with potentially negative effects for the country 
concerned.
120
 As Abbott and Snidal observe, this disconnect between the 'currency' status 
of a proposed measure and its potential benefits "makes every proposal a bargaining chip, 
an opportunity for 'hold-up'", even where the participants have a common interest in the 
proposed measure.
121
 The opportunity to exact payment for whatever measure is proposed 
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in the obsessive quid pro quo thinking that has dominated tariff negotiations for fifty years.  
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leads trade officials to frame issues "as a bargaining problem with divided interests rather 
than as an issue of common concern".
122
 As a WTO Secretariat official explained to me, the 
difficulty in concluding negotiations on "systemic" issues such as the review of the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding was that no WTO Member would be willing to "pay" for 
systemic improvements with diffuse benefits.
123
 In sum, the 'currency' status of measures 
conceptualised as trade "barrier" reduction, and indeed of any proposals put forward by a 
participant in trade lawmaking, deflects questions as to their merit, economic or 
otherwise.
124
  
The status of trade "barriers" as the currency of trade negotiations also lends a 
certain inertia to trade liberalisation. The logic of payment necessitates that trade "barriers" 
have to be reduced in trade negotiations, because that is the only way in which participants 
can "pay" for whatever they want from their counterparts. The direction of trade negotiation 
is thus almost invariably liberalisation. The logic of payment can also, at least in part, 
account for the expansionary tendencies of trade lawmaking. Given that there is no easy 
way for countries to renew their reserves, countries inevitably run out of currency at some 
point, resulting in "inadequate bargaining ammunition"
125
 when "most of the available coin 
that could be used without serious political costs had already been spent".
126
 The expansion 
of trade lawmaking into new areas enhances the opportunity for trade-offs.
127
    
                                                                                                                                                    
See also Winham 1968, 364, referring to the Tokyo Round:  
In the code negotiations, reciprocity led negotiators to demand payment for the actions they took, 
regardless of whether those actions were more beneficial to the initiator or to the supposed 
recipients. 
122
 Abbott/Snidal 2002, 193. 
123
 Interview with a lawyer in the WTO Secretariat. The lawyer emphasised that this was especially the case 
where the proposals already reflected current practice or could be implemented without an amendment of the 
DSU. See also Odell 2005, 472, who identifies this as a general problem of WTO negotiations:  
Taking the initiative is costly in negotiation terms since a proposal for a compromise undermines the 
credibility of the speaker's commitment to his or her preferred position and hence the ability to claim 
the largest possible share of the gain. Only the very largest traders conceivably stand to gain enough 
individually to pay, individually, this cost of taking the initiative toward compromise in the WTO.  
124
 Jackson has contrasted the results of tariff bargaining with lawmaking on "fixed rules and principles based 
upon a rational appraisal of beneficial policy"; Jackson 1969, 669 (emphasis added). 
125
 Evans 1971, 14, notes that  
after some twenty years of whittling away at tariffs, many contracting parties were finding further 
reductions more difficult politically. In the case of the United States, this growing political resistance 
was expressed in the inadequate bargaining ammunition that was provided US negotiators after the 
initial round of GATT negotiations in 1947. 
126
 Evans 1971, 15; Cline 1982, 9: through liberalization the US "has lost its bargaining chips". 
127
 See the complaints by India about the expansion into services in MIN(86)/ST/33. 
41 
 
Apart from lending trade "barrier" reduction a status that is not necessarily 
connected to its merits, and imbuing trade lawmaking with unidirectional and expansionary 
tendencies, the reciprocity discourse works to preclude considerations of equity.
128
 
Historically, this effect first became evident in the differential effects of the reciprocity 
norm on countries with different levels of trade barriers. When a country already has very 
low trade barriers, it finds itself with much less 'currency' with which to pay for 
concessions from its trading partners.
129
 To address this problem, the negotiators of the ITO 
Charter and later the Contracting Parties of the GATT agreed that the "binding against 
increase of low duties or of duty-free treatment shall, in principle, be recognized as a 
concession equivalent in value to the reduction of high duties".
130
 However, in light of the 
logic of payment, this principle was reportedly "not expected to be effective", and offers to 
bind an existing low rate were "usually treated with polite indifference".
131
 This effect of 
the reciprocity discourse led to strong dissatisfaction of low-tariff countries with the 
reciprocity norm.
132
  
Over the course of the development of the trading regime, the normative cover that 
the reciprocity discourse and the logic of payment provide countries in ignoring appeals 
based on equity has developed much wider implications, especially as the perceived 
inequities of the trading system have been compounded over successive negotiating 
rounds.
133
 For example, many developing countries have perceived the outcomes of the 
Uruguay Round as grossly imbalanced and have hence seen a primary purpose of the 
implementation phase and the Doha Round in "rebalancing" the international trading 
system.
134
 In such a situation, the demand for reciprocity is a device for winners in previous 
negotiations to exclude from consideration the fairness of the outcomes of previous 
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negotiations and thus reset the baseline for the negotiations to zero.
135
 In other words, the 
reciprocity discourse is fundamentally ahistorical. 
As Stiglitz and Charlton have pointed out, the reciprocity discourse reflects a 
conception of the relationship between the participants in international trade lawmaking 
that is fundamentally different from the relationship between the members of a national 
community: "In national economic debates, we do not demand that the poor give up an 
amount commensurate with what they get. Rather, we talk about social justice and 
equity."
136
 Or, as the Indian delegate put it at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round:  
the basic principle of preservation of rights of trading countries is still based on the law of 
the jungle, i.e. tit for tat, and not what an enlightened world community might wish to 
follow in order to collectively safeguard and preserve the rights of the weaker partners.
137
 
                                                 
Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 107, remark that for developed countries to "demand a quid pro quo" in the Doha 
Round 
would be to look at the current negotiation outside of its historical context. The developed countries 
have to date received the lion's share of the benefits from previous trade negotiations. Accordingly, 
they ought to be willing to do more for the developing countries in this round.  
In the late 1950s, the ahistoricity of the reciprocity discourse astonished US President Eisenhower. In a 
memorandum preceding the Dillon Round, the US Secretary of State warned President Eisenhower about the 
lack of bargaining power of the US due to a lack of authority to offer tariff concessions, warning in particular 
that  
[u]nless the United States is able to induce the EEC to accept a one-sided agreement – and this is not 
a possibility to be relied upon – the United States will be unable to take full advantage of the offer 
already made by the EEC to reduce its common external tariff by 20 percent provided adequate 
reciprocity is offered by other countries in return.  
In his response, President Eisenhower said he was "struck" by this statement:  
While the phrase 'this is not a possibility to be relied upon' is possibly technically correct, it seems to 
me we ought to put our own current balance of payments situation very strongly before the conferees 
and make unmistakably clear that we have gotten into this situation through generous and liberal 
assistance and trading policies. Now it is time for them to do their share, and a failure on their part to 
do so would bring into question our basic relationships and attitudes toward these problems.  
FRUS 1958-1960, 284; for the response, see ibid. 286-287, where negotiators promise to "use to the utmost 
what bargaining strength we have, including appeal to the Common Market nations on the basis of the good-
will our assistance to them in the last ten years should have engendered." This strategy was at best partially 
successful: the Secretary of State would later write to President Kennedy to say that he was "[d]eeply 
concerned about state Dillon Round negotiations due to meagerness [of the] US offers"; FRUS 1961-1963, 
472-479. 
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 Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 107, fn 1. See already Jackson 1969, 671:  
a good argument can be made that GATT has tended to somewhat redress the balance of economic 
power for the less-developed and less-powerful countries. … Yet this does not mean that the status 
quo is adequate. Clearly, the redress of economic power imbalance could go farther in the sense of 
creating opportunities for the less-developed equal to those of the developed to pursue their 
economic and other national goals. This same policy choice has consistently been made within 
nations, and particularly the Western democratic nations, i.e., to assist internally depressed areas or 
groups at the expense of the richer portions of the society. There seems reason to apply this same 
principle on an international scale. (emphasis added) 
137
 MTN/P/5, 73.  
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Indeed, as a commentary on the WTO Agreement notes, "according to the WTO, there is 
no international community on economic issues."
138
 Instead, the reciprocity discourse 
conceives of the trade regime as a collection of bilateral contracts akin to commercial 
contracts between market actors.
139
 This conception of the trade regime, like the reciprocity 
norm itself, can be traced to the US method of bilateral tariff negotiations that provided the 
template for international trade lawmaking.
140
 Beyond the technical difficulties that had 
been the main concern of the British and Canadian negotiators with this method, the 
bilateralism of tariff negotiations has had a lasting impact on what was and is perceived to 
be the character of the trading regime, an impact that has persisted even as the bilateral 
method of tariff negotiations has been gradually abandoned. As Abbott has pointed out, 
"the roots of many GATT provisions and ways of thinking lay in bilateral arrangements, 
where the concept of a community interest separate from the interests of the two parties has 
less meaning."
141
  
Paradoxically, the one element of US trade policy that was at odds with the market 
logic – the principle of MFN, whereby every "concession" that was granted to one 
contracting party also had to be extended automatically to all others – had the effect of 
bringing this market logic into even sharper relief. The principal supplier rule, which the 
US had devised in response to the tension between the bilateral logic of reciprocity and the 
multilateral effects of MFN, was designed to minimise the effects of MFN and preserve the 
principle of payment. By stipulating that a party only had to consider requests for tariff 
reductions from another party that was a principal supplier of the product concerned, the 
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 Bogdandy 2006, 11; cf. ibid. 9:  
It is worth noting that the Preamble [of the WTO Agreement, N.L.] nowhere states that the aims of 
the first recital, in particular the environmentally sustainable economic growth of all Members, 
constitute a common interest, a common international good or an international value. Perhaps for 
that reason the term 'international community', which is ubiquitous in international legal parlance, is 
used by the Appellate Body only when referring to other treaty regimes, but is not applied to the 
WTO. In Appellate Body reports, one never finds a WTO interest as there is a 'Community interest' 
in EC law, a core concept of EU law; rather, it appears that only the Members have interests to be 
considered. (footnotes and emphasis omitted)  
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 Finger 2005; Bogdandy 2006, 12: "[M]ost, if not all, WTO obligations are best understood as bilateral and 
not collective in nature". For a discussion of the legal implications of this conception, see Pauwelyn 2003; for 
a contrary view, see Carmody 2006.  
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 Evans 1971, 10: "The Geneva negotiating techniques and those used in later GATT negotiations were not, 
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principal supplier rule minimised the potential of unrequited concessions through MFN.
142
 
In an early tariff negotiation, the rule was formulated as follows: 
Participating countries may request concessions on products of which they, individually or 
collectively, are or are likely to be the principal suppliers to the countries from which the 
concessions are asked. This rule shall not apply to prevent a country not a principal supplier 
from making a request, but the country concerned may invoke the principal supplier rule if 
the principal supplier of the product is not participating in the negotiations or is not a 
contracting party to the General Agreement.
143
 
The principal supplier rule thus confirmed the right of a party to exact the maximum price 
for its concessions; it only had to sell to the highest bidder. The principal supplier rule may 
thus have been the clearest indication that the market logic was not to be overridden by any 
considerations of collective purpose, which might have called for giving negotiating 
priority to the member in which the concession would lead to the largest rise in the standard 
of living, or would have made the largest contribution to development.
144
 While the 
principal supplier rule diminished in importance with the increasing use of horizontal 
reduction formulas, it still has echoes in the numerous contexts in which bilateral 
negotiations are continuing, and, more significantly perhaps, in the general importance that 
is still given to trade volume over potential trade effects.
145
    
In sum, to understand the effects of the reciprocity discourse, one has to take the 
market metaphor seriously. Fundamental to a market is the logic of payment, the idea that 
                                                 
142
 As Winters puts it, the principal supplier rule "maximized the bilateral internalisation of the concession – 
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143
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 In the 1950s India proposed rules "for the evaluation of concessions based on the relative importance of a 
commodity in the exporting country, rather than its relative importance to the trade of the importing country". 
This proposal was rejected; instead, the Contracting Parties reaffirmed that "governments participating in the 
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In the Tokyo Round, Zaire (as it then was) noted that the principal supplier rule "disregard[ed] the importance 
for our economy of the products in respect of which we had made requests for concessions"; MTN/P/5, 69. 
This argument resurfaced in the Uruguay Round:  
under the GATT rules, the 'principal supplying interest' was determined according to a country's 
relative share of the total volume of imports into the importing country. This method of calculation 
clearly benefited the large countries. With a view to improving their trading position, the developing 
countries and the smaller industrialised countries wanted the importance of the product within the 
structure of the supplier country's exports to be taken into account. 
Paemen/Bensch 1995, 65.  
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 See e.g. Winham 1986, 202; for the effects of the principal supplier rule on trade flows, see Gowa/Kim 
2005, 453-478; Gowa and Kim find that the GATT's "bargaining protocol … privileged trade expansion 
between the members of a remarkably small set of states", namely Britain, Canada, France, Germany, and the 
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one has to give something in order to get something. This logic tends to preclude collective 
action in pursuit of a common goal; any "public" benefits, i.e. any furtherance of the public 
good, are merely incidental to "private" commercial transactions, and there is no guarantee 
that they will materialise. Moreover, considerations of fairness play little role in a market. 
To the market, everyone is formally equal, and a market recognises no history, it only 
knows the here and now. Prices are the same whether you are rich or poor, or whether you 
got a bad deal in the past. A market is governed by those who have most to buy or sell, 
rather than those who are most needy. This is, in somewhat pointed form, the conception of 
trade lawmaking inherent in the reciprocity discourse.  
The effects of the reciprocity discourse come into sharper relief when we consider 
alternative methods and conceptions of trade lawmaking, which – had they been adopted 
instead of the US model – would have set multilateral trade lawmaking on a different 
course, since some or all of the effects of the reciprocity discourse would be weaker or non-
existent. The effects of these alternative discourses of trade lawmaking are of course 
hypothetical, at least in part. I will consider three alternatives, starting with those which had 
most chance of actually succeeding.   
It is likely that the lawmaking discourse would have taken a different form if the 
proposals for a horizontal reduction formula, instead of bilateral tariff bargaining, had been 
adopted for the negotiation of the GATT. The reciprocal character of the tariff reductions 
resulting from the application of a horizontal formula would have been much more 
diffuse.
146
 Reciprocity would have taken the form not so much of individual payments, but 
of a commitment that "what was done by one country would be done by all", as the British 
had put it.
147
 A multilateral formula would thereby have diminished the need for trade 
barriers as 'currency' and would thus have "bypassed the problem of differences in 
bargaining power".
148
 Moreover, the effect of a horizontal formula on countries with 
different tariff structures would have been readily apparent, and would thus have been 
predictable and intelligible in a way that the results of bilateral item-by-item negotiations 
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 Rehm, a participant in the Kennedy Round negotiations, where a formula approach to tariff reductions was 
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Reciprocity was considered to be inherent and self-evident in any scheme which required all 
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were not. As mentioned above, the discussion of alternative horizontal reduction formulas 
in the preparatory negotiations turned to a striking degree on the "equity" of the alternative 
formulas, especially on whether they would have a differential effect on high-tariff and 
low-tariff countries.
149
 Finally, the application of a horizontal reduction formula would 
have given the resulting obligations a distinctly multilateral character.
150
 
It is worth considering a second hypothetical scenario, namely whether the 
principles of lawmaking in the emerging multilateral trade regime would have taken a 
different form had the ITO Charter been ratified. The GATT was envisioned as a tariff 
agreement that would become an integral part of the ITO; the procedures for tariff 
negotiations under the ITO would thus have been the same as those that were in fact 
adopted under the GATT. However, since the ITO encompassed much more than tariffs, it 
is questionable whether the principles of tariff negotiations would have attained the same 
status as the paradigm for trade negotiations that they attained under the GATT. To begin 
with, the ITO Charter envisioned continuing negotiations on matters such as foreign 
investment
151
 and the regulation of international commodities trade.
152
 Moreover, the type 
of intervention contemplated in these and other chapters – in particular chapter V on 
restrictive business practices – would have made the ITO much more of a "public" 
institution engaged in the active regulation and management of trading relations
153
 – in 
marked contrast to the character of the GATT as a forum for the exchange of ultimately 
bilateral and hence "private" concessions. Finally, it is conceivable that the elaborate 
institutional set-up of the ITO, in particular the provision for an "Executive Board" akin to 
the United Nations Security Council,
154
 would have changed the dynamics of lawmaking as 
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also Anglo-American Discussions 1943, passim.  
150
 See L/1844, para. 5, which describes tariff reduction under linear formula as "a collective approach to 
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compared to the GATT, which, at least initially, had to operate in denial of its institutional 
existence.
155
  
A third alternative to lawmaking based on reciprocity that has been discussed in the 
academic literature would have been to adopt a more deliberative, incremental and less 
legalistic approach to international trade issues. As Dam has argued, the US negotiators 
adopted a "code-of-laws approach" to international trade policy and "tended to see the 
[ITO's] primary purpose as the application and enforcement of substantive rules of law".
156
 
It was arguably the "hard", enforceable character of the legal obligations which the parties 
would assume under the US design that made a more flexible approach to lawmaking than 
strict reciprocity unpalatable, at least to the US. According to Dam, however, such an 
approach would have been more appropriate:   
What was needed was not an enforcement agency, but rather, in view of the differences that 
divided countries and of the economic and financial environment of international trade, an 
institutional framework within which countries might examine the particular circumstances 
of specific trade problems, thereby, if possible, identifying their common interest and 
working out mutually acceptable solutions. Since the different policies pursued by different 
countries reflected competing values, it was important to create procedures for clarifying the 
common interests of the various trading countries and for establishing the impact of specific 
commercial policies. 
The ITO was not primarily designed to fulfil that function, and the GATT as it came into 
being was, of course, totally unequipped to do so.
157
 
As Dam and many other commentators have noted, the GATT did in fact evolve into an 
institution that was much less legalistic, more flexible and more consensus-oriented than 
the US had envisioned, especially when it came to the settlement of disputes and the 
enforcement of legal obligations.
158
 Remarkably, however, the de facto "softness" of the 
GATT's legal obligations never fed back into the process of how the law was made, or into 
the form that GATT commitments were given in the first place: the conviction that all trade 
law should be formally binding "hard" law persisted throughout the operation of the GATT, 
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 See only Hudec 1970; Winham 1987, 20, has argued that  
the unusual origins of GATT have lent to it an air of impermanence and pragmatism, which have 
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and has only been reinforced by the establishment of the WTO, with its strengthened 
dispute settlement procedures.
159
  
Thirty years after Dam's observations, Abbott and Snidal have renewed the 
argument for a "soft law track" in WTO lawmaking, which would allow countries to 
explore emerging issues without a commitment to enter into binding obligations with 
respect to them. Instead, the regulation of these issues would be approached through non-
binding guidelines which might gradually develop into more substantive rules.
160
 As 
Abbott and Snidal explain, a  
soft law strategy works through deliberation to develop common understandings of 
appropriate behaviour and common recognition of the value of a norm beyond immediate 
bargaining payoffs. Because normative arrangements are at first only loosely binding, states 
can participate in the process with little fear of becoming enmeshed in onerous, unwanted 
requirements.
161
  
Under such an approach, Abbott and Snidal suggest, it would become "illegitimate for a 
state to tie its acceptance to narrow individual gains";
162
 the approach would thus overcome 
or at least mitigate the logic of payment.  
In the context of the extension of trade lawmaking to cover behind-the-border 
measures with significant implementation costs, Finger has pointed to the dangers of using 
reciprocity to create binding legal obligations. He contrasts GATT/WTO lawmaking in this 
context with the approach of the development banks, where "legal obligation comes in 
specific project lending documents". As he argues "[t]o build behind-the-border 
institutions, such country-specific and project-specific legalities are better suited to the one-
off problems and trial-error rhythm of what is needed than is [the] WTO's generic approach 
to legal obligation".
163
 He concludes that reciprocity, the "old diplomat's economics", is 
"not adequate for the new subjects the WTO has taken on".
164
 
In sum, Dam, Abbott and Snidal, and Finger investigate the link between the 
legalism of the GATT/WTO and the dynamics of lawmaking. Their analyses suggest that if 
a more flexible approach to the legal status of negotiating outcomes were taken, reciprocity 
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would be perceived as less necessary, and recognised as less suitable, for international trade 
lawmaking.  
C. The Evolution of the Reciprocity Discourse 
The evolution of the reciprocity discourse since the early years of the GATT has been 
marked by three broad trends. First, the gradual adoption of formula approaches for tariff 
reductions since the Kennedy Round has increased the importance of a more "diffuse" form 
of reciprocity in the negotiations.
165
 At the same time, bilaterally tailored "specific" 
reciprocity retained a key role in multilateral trade lawmaking, for example in the 
negotiation of exceptions to tariff formulas and in supplemental bilateral bargains to 
address perceived imbalances resulting from the application of multilateral formulas. The 
persistence of these bilateral elements testifies to how deeply the principle of payment had 
become ingrained in multilateral trade lawmaking over the first two decades of the GATT 
(a). 
Second, the increasing preoccupation with non-tariff "barriers" to trade and the 
expansion of the GATT and later the WTO into new areas, such as regulatory standards, 
trade in services, and intellectual property protection, posed new problems for the 
conceptualisation of reciprocity. In response, the contracting parties devised a range of 
techniques for measuring reciprocity, from counting the elimination of a particular practice 
by its predominant user as "payment" to quantifying non-tariff barriers, thus making them 
amenable to the traditional reciprocity calculus. In some contexts, the mutually beneficial 
effects of common rules were recognised without explicit reciprocity calculations. The 
expansion of trade lawmaking into new areas was problematised by the reciprocity 
discourse in characteristic ways: the addition of new agreements to the GATT increased 
longstanding concerns about "free riding" by countries which refused to participate and 
thereby avoided "payment" for concessions in the new areas. This problem was addressed 
through a radical development in the Uruguay Round whereby the adherence to agreements 
in new areas by itself was framed as a "concession" that was demanded in return for market 
access. This development, as well as later attempts to remedy its problematic consequences, 
brought some of the more distressing effects of the reciprocity discourse, in particular the 
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disconnect between the 'currency' status of an issue or position and its substantive merits, 
into sharp relief (b). At the end of this section, the role of reciprocity in accession 
negotiations will be briefly addressed (c). The third major trend, the emergence of the 
discourse of "special and differential treatment" for developing countries, will be discussed 
in a separate section.   
a) Reciprocity in Tariff Negotiations 
Discontent with the bilateral item-by-item negotiating method for tariff negotiations that 
had been adopted for the GATT arose already after the first two tariff negotiations in 1947 
and 1949. As noted above, the low-tariff countries
166
 found themselves almost without 
"currency" to pay for tariff cuts by their trading partners and started to argue for negotiating 
methods that would lead to a greater "equilibrium" between the tariff rates imposed by 
different countries.
167
 In the course of these discussions, proposals for the use of a 
multilateral reduction formula resurfaced in the form of a French plan presented in 
September 1951, which envisaged a linear reduction of the weighted average of tariffs in 
each major sector of the economy, with special waivers for less-developed and low-tariff 
countries.
168
 As Curzon has characterised the proposal, "[t]his was not a timid scheme to 
reduce tariffs from time to time and on a quid pro quo basis, but a universal call for freer 
trade where those not responding had to ask for a special waiver."
169
 The French plan only 
partially addressed the problems of low-tariffs countries. It dispensed with the need for 
currency, as the principle of payment would be replaced by what the French called "the 
principle of equal participation in a common effort".
170
 However, it did not achieve a 
levelling of tariffs, as relative disparities between tariffs would remain unaffected. Only 
later would the potential of formula approaches to achieve what was perceived as greater 
"equity" in outcomes, i.e., a greater "equilibrium" between tariff levels, become an issue.  
Although the French plan was discussed in the GATT for many years, and 
eventually came to be known as the "GATT plan", it was not adopted for either the 1956 
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Review Session
171
 or the Dillon Round in 1960-1961 due to the opposition of the United 
Kingdom and the United States, the latter still "prisoner",
172
 as a matter of domestic law, to 
the methodology prescribed by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. Frustrated by the 
lack of progress in the GATT, the European countries instead used the formula approach to 
achieve rapid tariff reductions among themselves in the course of founding the European 
Economic Community and the European Free Trade Area.
173
 The formation of the EEC 
gave new impetus for the use of tariff reduction formulas in the GATT not only by 
providing a successful precedent,
174
 but also by prompting the United States, which was 
now for the first time faced with a market larger than itself, into revising its trade 
legislation in a way that permitted horizontal as opposed tariff reductions.
175
 
The United States felt the pressure to adopt a new approach to tariff negotiations 
particularly acutely in the Dillon Round. In this Round, the US negotiators found their 
authority to offer tariff concessions so severely curtailed by the elaborate safeguards set up 
under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
176
 that they repeatedly directed desperate 
appeals to the US President, complaining about their lack of "bargaining strength"
177
 and 
"negotiating power"
178
 and asking for additional authority to offer tariff reductions and 
bindings. Impatient with product-by-product negotiations, the European Communities and 
the UK had unilaterally offered to reduce their tariff on manufactured products by 20 per 
cent across the board.
179
 The Europeans had adopted what Secretary of State Rusk 
described as a "flexible and statesmanlike view" in not expecting the US to "make 
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reciprocal concessions to the same extent".
180
 In a rare example of wider considerations 
factoring into the reciprocity calculus, the Europeans reportedly  
recognized that the United States had put up with quantitative limitations on their part 
during the post-war years …[,] that the United States was having balance of payments 
difficulties … [and] wished to minimize discrimination against the United States resulting 
from the establishment of the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association.
181
  
Even so, US officials expressed apprehension about the meagreness of the US offer, 
warning the President that  
we have so hamstrung our own negotiators that they do not have the authority to make the 
concessions needed to satisfy even the modest requirements of reciprocity which the 
European nations are expecting.
182
 
In the end, the round was concluded with the amount of trade covered by concessions 
clearly balanced in favour of the US.
183
 
In the first round for which the use of a horizontal tariff reduction formula was 
agreed multilaterally,
184
 the question of how to preserve or modify the principle of 
reciprocity under the formula approach soon took centre stage.
185
 During the first meeting 
of a Working Party
186
 set up to study the procedure for tariff reductions, it was 
acknowledged "that the linear approach must lead to a departure from the rigid balance-of-
benefits theory that had governed the negotiations under the item-by-item approach."
187
 
What the participating countries expected instead was "a general 'across-the-board' balance 
between concessions granted and received".
188
 Beyond this commitment to "balance", 
tensions soon surfaced between those countries that wanted to introduce an element of 
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"equity" into the formula and those who insisted on preserving the principle of payment in 
its pure form. This was the first time in GATT history that the meaning of reciprocity, and 
in particular the principle of payment, was contested in a major way.  
Initially, it was just individual European low-tariff countries which pointed out that 
"it would hardly be reasonable" to apply the same linear reduction to countries with high 
and low tariffs.
189
 At the third meeting of the Working Party, however, it was the EEC that 
presented an informal proposal that would have achieved a harmonisation of tariffs, rather 
than merely a reduction.
190
 Under the EEC proposal, participants would agree on certain 
notional tariff rates, in effect tariff floors, for different kinds of products, and would reduce 
the difference between their existing rates and the notional rate by an agreed percentage.
191
 
The effect of this formula would have been to reduce high tariffs the most, whereas tariff 
rates at or under the floor would not have to be reduced at all. Low-tariff countries would 
thus not have to "pay" anything for the tariff reductions by high-tariff countries. As Curzon 
reports, the EEC stressed "the equity of this procedure".
192
  
In response, the US made it clear that "proposals based on linear unequal cuts were 
unacceptable".
193
 In its view, the objective of the negotiations should not be "the 
establishment of uniform conditions of competition", but rather the "maximiz[ation of] 
trade benefits", which would be achieved by equal linear cuts.
194
 The US insistence on 
equal linear cuts reflected continuing adherence to the principle of payment: from its 
perspective, what mattered was that the parties pay equal amounts, rather than that the 
formula achieve some form of equity of outcomes, such as a harmonisation of tariff levels. 
The relevant consideration, from the US's point of view, was that "the reduction of a high 
rate of duty might lead to a greater increase in trade than the same percentage reduction in a 
lower rate of duty"
195
 – reductions by a high-tariff country under equal linear cuts were thus 
potentially "more valuable" than the same reductions by a low-tariff country.
196
 It is worth 
noting that for the first time in the history of the GATT, the US stance on reciprocity was 
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not compelled by domestic legislation – the Trade Expansion Act authorising the Kennedy 
Round negotiations merely called for "mutual" trade benefits.
197
 A participant in the 
negotiations noted, however, that 
the broad statutory standard was applied by the U.S. negotiators more rigorously than was 
legally – though perhaps not politically – necessary. For a number of reasons, including 
practice in prior negotiations, public and Congressional expectations, and the normal 
competitiveness of a negotiation, a notion of equivalency of tariff reduction was applied.
198
 
 
The debate about tariff "disparities", i.e., the comparative treatment of high and low 
tariffs, took up a large part of the negotiations about the modalities for tariff reductions in 
the Kennedy Round. Despite numerous proposals, the EEC could not convince the other 
contracting parties, in particular the US, to adopt an automatic formula to deal with tariff 
disparities. The compromise solution envisioned that tariff disparities would be addressed 
on an ad hoc basis when they were "meaningful in trade terms". The tension between the 
competing principles of equal payment in the form of equal linear cuts, and equity of 
outcomes, demanding a harmonisation formula, would remain one of the principal ways in 
which the meaning of reciprocity in trade negotiations would be contested for some time.    
In other contexts, the principle of reciprocity as it had been traditionally 
conceptualised remained unperturbed. Agricultural products were exempted from the 
formula approach and were addressed, in a limited way, through request-and-offer 
negotiations. Moreover, the parties were allowed to table lists of exceptions to the formula 
governing tariff reductions in industrial products. While the contracting parties had early on 
recognised the "risk … that the negotiations for exceptions could easily develop into a kind 
of inverted item-by-item negotiation",
199
 they failed to agree on a method to address 
exceptions in a general or automatic manner. The resulting product-by-product negotiations 
reportedly led negotiators "to view the reciprocity principle in a traditional manner".
200
  
The participants in the tariff negotiations of the Tokyo Round encountered 
essentially the same issues.
201
 The tension between the objectives of equal payment and 
tariff harmonisation resurfaced and gave rise to a number of increasingly sophisticated 
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formula proposals.
202
 In a major departure from the Kennedy Round, all proposals now 
contained an element of tariff harmonisation. Even the US proposal, though envisaging 
linear cuts for all tariffs above what the GATT Secretariat had calculated as the average 
tariff rate in major developed countries, conceded the principle of harmonisation for duties 
below that rate (6.67 percent).
203
 The greater openness towards tariff harmonisation 
displayed by the US reflected a shift in what the US regarded as the objective of trade 
negotiations. In the Kennedy Round, the US had insisted that trade negotiations should aim 
to "maximize trade benefits", rather than to establish "uniform conditions of 
competition".
204
 In the Tokyo Round, by contrast, the US government had concluded "that 
tariff and non-tariff barrier liberalization in the MTN must result in substantially equivalent 
competitive opportunities among the developed countries", which could be achieved in the 
context of tariff negotiations "by application of the principle of equal access in duty 
rates."
205
 Accordingly, the tariff reduction formula proposed by the US sought to "ensure 
more equitable access among developed country markets."
206
  
The discussions following the presentation of the US proposal brought the 
increasingly contested meaning of reciprocity to the fore. Some countries, such as Canada 
and Australia, continued to conceptualise reciprocity as the principle of payment, 
emphasising the "reciprocity and balance of the tariff bargain".
207
 With only a few major 
export items, these countries had little to gain from across-the-board reductions in industrial 
tariffs, at least as they had been proposed by the US, and hence insisted on "payment" 
either through a reduction of non-tariff barriers to their agricultural exports
208
 or through 
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greater-than-formula cuts on tariffs affecting their exports.
209
 Other parties, in particular the 
EEC, used the opening presented by the new-found US concern with competitive 
opportunities to redefine reciprocity as referring to the "level of tariff protection" in 
different countries.
210
 The EEC saw the "built-in equilibrium" in its harmonisation formula 
not in equivalent tariff reductions, but in what it described as the "better balance of profiles 
of the various tariffs of developed countries" that the formula would secure.
211
 This 
patently new reading of reciprocity was supported by Switzerland, which argued that "there 
is no real reciprocity in the level of tariff protection which the various participants in the 
negotiation enjoy at present".
212
 It followed, according to the Swiss, that "one can rightly 
wonder whether each of them should be expected to offer mathematically the same 
contribution"
213
 – a direct challenge to the principle of payment.214 
As it happened, the formula that Switzerland subsequently proposed
215
 was 
ultimately adopted as a compromise solution between the predominantly linear US formula 
and the strongly harmonising EEC proposal.
216
 The Swiss formula represented a deviation 
from the market model of reciprocity to the extent that equity considerations had led the 
participants to value small reductions in low tariffs as equivalent to larger reductions in 
high tariffs. However, it did not constitute a fundamental break with the principle of 
payment in tariff negotiations. For one thing, several countries refused to go along with the 
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harmonisation formula. Canada claimed that it would be getting "virtually nothing" in 
return for the "substantial and meaningful tariff reductions" that it would have to undertake, 
and that the formula would hence "fall far short of meeting the test of reciprocity and of 
mutual advantage".
217
 It dismissed the economic rationale of the idea of harmonisation, 
which on its view merely had "certain presentational advantages".
218
 Canada ended up 
presenting an offer based on its own formula.
219
 Other countries, including all developing 
countries, followed the traditional item-by-item technique.
220
 But even among those parties 
who applied the Swiss formula in their initial offers, the primary role of the formula was to 
set the baseline for the calculation of the "balance" in bilateral bargains, in the sense that 
deviations from the formula had to be "paid for" with extra concessions.
221
 In the 
bargaining phase that followed the agreement on the formula, the negotiations retained 
many of the features that had characterised the traditional bilateral item-by-item procedure. 
These features, and chiefly among them the principle of payment, had become deeply 
ingrained.  
The Tokyo Round negotiations on agricultural market access were preceded by a 
heated debate within the US government on the conception of reciprocity that should be 
adopted for the agricultural negotiations. The US Department of Agriculture suggested that 
reciprocity should be assessed against a benchmark of "minimum interference with the flow 
of world trade". Reciprocity would be attained when all countries were "equally near" this 
"goal".
222
 The Department argued that  
it is this idea, and not any technical formula for measuring the value of concessions granted 
in exchange for concessions received (formulas which are bound to be obsolete by the time 
staged concessions have taken full effect), which should govern U.S. views toward 
reciprocity in the proposed multilateral trade negotiations.
223
 
The Department recognized that "trade-offs are an essential part of the negotiating 
procedure" and that, under its proposed approach, the negotiating outcome would not be 
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"fully balanced in this sense".
224
 In particular, "[c]ountries with a substantial degree of 
border protection still remaining would be expected to give more than countries which are 
already quite liberal in their trade policies."
225
 The Department of Agriculture's approach, 
then, mirrored the interpretation of reciprocity that would be advocated by the EC and 
Switzerland, and partly embraced by US negotiators, in the negotiations on industrial 
tariffs.  
The US Department of Commerce resisted this approach for agricultural 
negotiations principally on the grounds that a conception of reciprocity based on "equality 
in approaching '… the goal of minimum interference with the flow of world trade'" was 
"not one which can be either clearly defined or which is likely to be accepted by other 
countries since they would stand to lose more than ourselves by agreeing to this 
concept."
226
 In the end, the Tokyo Round negotiations on agricultural market access, which, 
at the insistence of the EC, were conducted separately from the negotiations on industrial 
tariffs, took place on the basis of the traditional request-and-offer technique – a minimum 
compromise that reflected the fundamental disagreements between the US and the EC in 
this area.
227
 
Concurrently with the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, and in light of the worsening 
trading position of the United States, the conception of reciprocity as equal market access 
was gaining currency in US domestic discourse.
228
 In marked contrast to the multilateral 
tariff harmonisation agenda that was increasingly accepted in the GATT, the proponents of 
"reciprocity legislation" in the US advocated a unilateral approach, whereby the US would 
use the threat of trade retaliation to force liberalisation upon countries which, in its 
judgment, were not providing "reasonable" access to US exports.
229
 This "aggressive 
unilateralism"
230
 had a profound influence on the multilateral trading system: in 
conjunction with the coercive structure of the Uruguay Round "single undertaking",
231
 it 
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would provide the coercive backdrop against which developing countries would accept new 
commitments on trade in services, intellectual property rights and investment in the 
Uruguay Round.
232
  
In the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations the hardened US stance manifested itself 
in its insistence, against virtually unanimous opposition, to return to the bilateral request-
and-offer approach,
233
 and in its increasing impatience with countries who refused to 
reciprocate concessions.
234
 The negotiations about modalities for tariff reductions had seen 
an unprecedented number of formula proposals, many with a strong harmonisation element, 
and some contemplating supplementary request-and-offer negotiations to go beyond 
formula reductions. However, given that the US made it clear that it "would not alter its 
previous position" that a request-and-offer approach should be followed,
235
 the agreed 
procedures for tariff negotiations merely stipulated that each participant would provide the 
Secretariat with its offers for the reduction, elimination, and binding of its tariffs by a 
certain date.
236
 
The Uruguay Round tariff negotiations saw several proposals of new methodologies 
for measuring reciprocity which were not formally adopted. Australia presented a 
methodology for the calculation of an "effective rate of assistance" covering both tariffs 
and non-tariff measures, which could be "used as a means of ensuring that 'concessions' 
made as part of the negotiations are reasonably balanced".
237
 As an alternative to the 
formula approach that would accommodate the request-and-offer method, the US suggested 
that the modalities for the tariff negotiations should contain a "statement of results", for 
example in the form of an agreement on an average reduction of levels over a certain time 
                                                 
232
 Winters 1990, 1301: "curbing US unilateralism in general was one of the major objectives of nearly all 
participants in the [Uruguay] Round". 
233
 See MTN.GNG/NG1/13, para. 5; Paemen/Bensch 1995, 111-112, offer a discussion of the reasons for the 
United States' preference for returning to the request-and-offer method, arguing that the United States wanted 
to avoid the transparency associated with formula approaches in order to be able to maintain its tariff peaks on 
textile products. Paemen and Bensch also note that during the negotiations on modalities "all sides had been 
urging a systematic approach. Only the Americans came out clearly against the idea"; Paemen/Bensch 1995, 
113.  
234
 MTN.GNG/NG1/11, reporting the US position:  
It did not intend to make concessions to participants which did not fulfil the basic requirement of 
providing [tariff and trade] data, and it would not make offers on products which would indirectly 
benefit such participants. 
235
 MTN.GNG/NG1/14, para. 9. The US agreed to examine offers made on the basis of a formula.  
236
 MTN.GNG/NG1/17.  
237
 MTN.GNG/NG1/14, para. 8; see also Paemen/Bensch 1995, 105, who characterise the Australian proposal 
for "an integrated approach to market access" as "sheer heresy", noting that "five groups" were discussing 
what the Australians saw as "an indivisible whole".  
60 
 
period.
238
 This approach was adopted in the separate negotiations on agricultural market 
access: tariffs on agricultural products were to be reduced on average by a certain 
percentage, with a specified minimum reduction for each tariff line.
239
 The trade ministers 
of the major trading powers informally agreed on a similar average reduction for industrial 
products, and used this as a yardstick to ensure that "each participating country had made 
an appropriate contribution to the tariff reduction exercise".
240
  
In the Doha Round "non-agricultural market access" (NAMA) negotiations, WTO 
Members agreed to reduce their tariffs pursuant to a Swiss formula. For the first time in the 
history of international trade lawmaking, developed countries would apply the formula to 
all non-agricultural products without exception. In the negotiations on agricultural products, 
by contrast, a new approach was developed: Both tariffs and domestic support were 
subjected to reduction commitments in accordance with a tiered formula, which mandates 
different reductions depending on the 'tier' into which a tariff falls (e.g. 0-20, 20-50, 50-75, 
over 75 for tariffs of developed countries).
241
 This formula allowed a particularly fine 
calibration of reduction commitments, since both the tiers and the percentage reductions for 
tariffs or domestic support bindings falling within the tiers can be individually adjusted. 
According to a Canadian negotiator, the tiers for the developed countries were designed so 
as to capture the key tariff and domestic support bindings of the US and EU in particular 
tiers.
242
 However, the properties of the formula are proving not to be the only, or even 
primary, factor influencing the perception of reciprocity in the Doha agricultural 
negotiations: Developed countries are allowed to schedule a specified percentage of tariff 
lines as "sensitive products", which are subject to lower reduction commitment, while 
developing countries can, in addition, schedule a number of "special products" on which 
tariff bindings do not have to be reduced at all. As in previous tariff negotiations on 
industrial tariffs, the reciprocity dynamic is likely to play out primarily in bilateral 
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bargaining over exceptions. The US has already indicated dissatisfaction after consulting 
with India and China about their prospective "special" products. According to the US, these 
consultations confirmed its "worst fears" – an indication that the emerging economies will 
designate key US exports, such as soy and poultry, as "special" products.
243
 The logic of 
reciprocity is also evident in the latest Chair's text on the agricultural negotiations, which 
notes that the membership would expect "payment" from Canada and Japan to allow them 
to designate additional tariff lines as "sensitive".
244
   
In the Doha Round, questions of reciprocity in the negotiations on industrial tariffs 
have taken centre stage, emerging as the key obstacle to the conclusion of the Round. The 
Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration had called for a number of sectoral negotiations on 
non-agricultural market access, with participation being non-mandatory.
245
 The aim of the 
developed countries, in particular the United States, was to use these sectoral negotiations 
to extract higher than formula concessions from the three major emerging economies, 
namely China, India, and Brazil. One rationale that the developed countries gave for their 
demands was that, given their already low level of industrial tariffs and the further cuts 
envisioned by the Doha Round formula, they would "lose all leverage to obtain future 
industrial tariff reductions from emerging economies" and that the Doha Round thus 
represented "the last opportunity towards a harmonisation of tariffs with emerging 
economies".
246
 The elimination of selected tariffs under the "product basket approach" 
would dispense with the need to pay for additional tariff reductions in the future, and thus 
solve the problem of the developed countries lack of currency in this area. Beyond this 
pragmatic rationale, the developed countries also offered a more principled rationale, 
namely the aim to "rebalance the disparity in the contribution between developed and 
emerging countries" so that the latter would "catch up" with the former in terms of 
industrial market access.
247
   
The emerging economies, on the other hand, objected that sectoral tariff reductions 
would have to be "balanced and proportionate", and that the emerging economies would be 
making "disproportionate efforts" by undertaking the proposed elimination of selected 
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industrial tariff, given that they were starting from a much higher level than the developed 
countries.
248
 In effect, the emerging economies were arguing that the extreme 
harmonisation demanded by developed countries would violate the principle of payment. 
They pointed out that developed countries had the opportunity to "pay" for additional cuts 
in industrial tariffs by undertaking further reductions in agricultural subsidies, invoking the 
principle that "those who ask for more have to pay more".
249
 
 
b) Redefining the "Currency": Non-Tariff "Barriers" and 
Domestic Regulation 
The second trend in the evolution of the reciprocity discourse was the increasing centrality 
of the attempt to address what were conceptualised as non-tariff "barriers" to trade. This 
expansion of the trading system was to some extent driven by the reciprocity discourse 
itself. First, non-tariff barriers had to be addressed in order to safeguard the value of 
concessions that had been "paid for" in tariff negotiations – this was the original rationale 
for including rules on non-tariff barriers, such as quantitative restrictions, in the GATT. 
Second, extending trade lawmaking to cover non-tariff barriers had the advantage of 
increasing the amount of 'currency' with which participants could pay for concessions, i.e., 
it increased opportunities for pay-offs.  
On the other hand, the extension of trade lawmaking to non-tariff barriers also 
presented challenges to the reciprocity discourse. Non-tariff barriers were widely perceived 
to be less "bargainable" than tariffs.
250
 Even in tariff negotiations, participants always 
retained complete freedom to assess the value of concessions offered by their counterparts 
and to decide when an appropriate balance had been reached; in other words, "agreement 
defined reciprocity, not the other way around".
251
 However, certain widely accepted metrics 
for measuring reciprocity did emerge. Thus, reciprocity was usually captured by measuring 
"the amount of existing trade covered by the tariff item and the extent to which the 
percentage duty is reduced".
252
 The underlying goal, as a US official who participated in 
tariff negotiations put it, was to negotiate "with a view to producing a dollar's worth of 
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increased exports for every dollar's worth of increased imports".
253
 In accounts from tariff 
negotiations up until the Uruguay Round, there are numerous examples of attempts by 
participants to explicitly calculate the level of reciprocity.
254
  
By contrast to tariffs, many non-tariff barriers are not easily quantifiable, and 
therefore call for a more qualitative, and hence more "subjective", assessment of 
reciprocity.
255
 While this problem is usually traced to the Kennedy Round, it had 
accompanied multilateral trade lawmaking from the outset.
256
 One way of integrating non-
tariff barriers into the reciprocity logic is to prohibit a particular type of barrier, which will 
then count as a "payment" by those countries which have been the predominant users of 
that kind of barrier. Thus, during the GATT/ITO preparatory negotiations, the US was 
initially prepared to offer a 50 per cent across-the-board cut in its tariffs to pay for the 
abolition of quantitative restrictions (as well as the British imperial preferences) by its 
trading partners. A more recent example of the legal status of a particular practice being 
conceptualised as the unit of payment is the use of "zeroing" in anti-dumping duty 
calculations: Reinstating this practice as legal would be perceived as a concession for 
which the US as the predominant user would have to "pay".
257
 These examples suggest that 
the integration of non-tariff barriers into the reciprocity discourse is relatively easy where 
the question is simply one of the legality/illegality of a practice, and the benefits and costs 
of the practice are relatively clearly distributed rather than diffuse.  
Another approach to the regulation of non-tariff barriers that was considered during 
the preparatory negotiations would have disciplined non-tariff barriers, in particular 
quantitative restrictions and subsidies, by providing that the production volumes and prices 
of the protected products must not exceed certain specified amounts, which were to be 
expressed as percentages of production in a base period and in relation to world market 
prices, respectively.
258
 The British, who wanted to use this approach to subject protection 
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for agricultural production to multilateral rules, argued for their proposal with reference to 
substantive goals – sheltering a section of the market to provide stability to agricultural 
production while ensuring that the most efficient producers could capture increasing shares 
of the market when demand increased.
259
 The British proposal did not foresee that the 
production volumes and price differentials would be subject to reciprocal bargaining; 
instead, they would be permanently fixed, with uniform parameters for all countries. 
However, the idea of disciplining non-tariff barriers indirectly by employing indicators of 
their protective effect would eventually be used to subject such measures to much the same 
reciprocity calculus as tariffs.  
A third approach to dealing with non-tariff barriers that was mentioned in the 
preparatory negotiations and that was implicitly encouraged by the design of the GATT 
was tariffication, i.e. the conversion of non-tariff barriers, in particular quantitative 
restrictions, into tariffs
260
 – a technique that would eventually be used in the Uruguay 
Round agricultural negotiations.   
Finally, the question arises how the reciprocity discourse can accommodate 
situations in which the benefits and costs of rules are diffuse, making it impossible to frame 
an agreement on such rules as a bargaining trade-off. As Winters has pointed out:  
Trading rules are constitutional issues, affecting all contracting parties directly and therefore 
have to be negotiated multilaterally. … [S]ince the outcome is essentially qualitative, 
reciprocity is difficult to achieve; unlike tariff negotiations, where concessions can be fine-
tuned, constitutional talks offer little scope for marginal adjustments or for side-
payments.
261
  
This non-bargainability of rules on certain non-tariff barriers could represent an opportunity 
to move beyond the principle of payment in international trade lawmaking, and there 
appear to have been examples of negotiations on non-tariff barriers in which this has in fact 
been the case: the negotiations of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) during the Uruguay Round are sometimes cited as an 
example of negotiations which were dominated by experts looking for the best solution in 
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light of common interests, approximating the "rational appraisal of beneficial policy" that 
Jackson has juxtaposed to reciprocal bargaining.
262
  
More often than not, however, the reciprocity discourse has encouraged the framing 
of issues "as a bargaining problem with divided interests rather than as an issue of common 
concern",
263
 and has led to a search for "cross-sectoral trade-offs", which, according to 
Winters, tends to "imbue … the whole process with an air of crisis".264 This subsumption of 
the regulation of non-tariff "barriers" to the logic of payment has greatly magnified the 
general tendency of the reciprocity discourse to disconnect the "currency" status of a 
particular measure from its economic or moral merits: While some of the policies which 
can be conceptualised as non-tariff "barriers" to trade do have the regulation of trade as 
their primary objective, many such policies are primarily directed toward achieving other 
regulatory goals, and may only have an incidental, and sometimes relatively minor, effect 
on trade.
265
 When such policies are conceptualised as "non-tariff barriers" and come to 
appear through the lens of the reciprocity discourse as simply another method of payment, 
the other regulatory goals that they pursue tend to be marginalised. Essentially, the 
reciprocity discourse forces trade negotiators to "commodify" a diverse range of regulatory 
policies, values, principles, and objectives, to establish what they are "worth",
266
 and to 
"make comparisons of relative value" between them.
267
 As Winham notes, "such 
comparisons can easily appear repugnant to a domestic constituency."
268
       
In sum, the challenges to the reciprocity discourse posed by negotiations on non-
tariff "barriers" can be resolved along a spectrum marked by the following extremes: On 
one end, the non-tariff "barriers" can be assimilated to traditional trade barriers, in 
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disregard of their potential non-trade objectives and effects. On the other end, such 
negotiations can be used to transcend the logic of payment in international trade 
lawmaking. As I will argue in the following, the history of trade negotiations does not 
exhibit a clear trend towards either of these extremes.    
The first round of trade negotiations since the original GATT/ITO negotiations 
which explicitly took up the regulation of non-tariff "barriers" was the Kennedy Round.
269
 
The resolution of Ministers adopted to launch the Round left no doubt about the central role 
that reciprocity should play in the negotiations, specifying that  
in the trade negotiations it shall be open to each country to request additional trade 
concessions or to modify its own offers where this is necessary to obtain a balance of 
advantages between it and the other participating countries. It shall be a matter of joint 
endeavour by all participating countries to negotiate for a sufficient basis of reciprocity to 
maintain the fullest measure of trade concessions.
270
 
A Sub-Committee on non-tariff barriers was established, and the participants were invited 
to bring forward matters on which they wished to negotiate, and to suggest "how they are to 
be dealt with".
271
 In response, Britain proposed that it should be left to the participants "to 
take account of the progress made in the liberalization or removal of [non-tariff barriers] 
when it comes to their assessment of the balance of reciprocity".
272
 Other participants 
suggested a division between issues that could be resolved through bilateral discussions of 
specific measures and questions of general relevance "which could require the drawing up 
of new rules or codes of conducts", such as safeguards, anti-dumping procedures, and 
customs valuation.
273
 A distinction was thus early on established between two scenarios 
considered above: the abolition of a practice used by a particular state and the drawing up 
of general rules to regulate the practice. The differentiation between these scenarios would 
occur based on whether the negotiating objective was "the removal of a particular measure 
or its modification, or, say, the multilateral adoption of new rules of codes of conduct".
274
 
Arguably, these choices had different implications regarding the conceptualisation of 
reciprocity.  
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 TN.64/NTB/2; for the terms of reference of the Subcommittee on Non-tariff Barriers, see TN.64/3. 
272
 TN.64/NTB/2. 
273
 See TN.64/NTB/5; N.64/NTB/14; TN.64/22, para.4.  
274
 TN.64/NTB/17, 2. 
67 
 
Among the non-tariff barriers identified by participating governments were customs 
valuation methods, such as the wine-gallon assessment and the American Selling Price 
(ASP) in the US,
275
 preferential procurement policies,
276
 technical standards, and import 
restrictions imposed for sanitary reasons.
277
 On several subjects deemed to be suitable for a 
systemic approach, the contracting parties established negotiating groups.
278
 In the end, 
only two agreements on non-tariff barriers were included in the Final Act of the Kennedy 
Round: an agreement eliminating the ASP method for customs valuation (subject to 
approval by the US Congress)
279
 and an Anti-Dumping Code.   
The ASP Agreement represented a clear example of how the principle of payment 
could be applied to non-tariff barriers. US negotiators insisted that the ASP Agreement had 
to be "separate and self-balancing".
280
 As they explained to their European counterparts, if 
the Agreement was tied to the general Kennedy Round package, the US Congress would 
feel that it was put under undue pressure and might reject the entire Kennedy Round 
agreement.
281
 The ASP Agreement thus had to pay for itself. This was achieved by trading 
the elimination of the ASP system of customs valuation through conversion of the 
respective tariff lines into ad valorem tariffs, as well as a reduction in the new ad valorem 
rates, on the part of the US, for the abolition of various non-tariff barriers
282
 as well as 
additional tariff reductions on chemical products on the part of European countries.
283
 The 
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agreement explicitly stipulated that the non-tariff measures would be modified or 
eliminated "in return for the additional concessions provided for herein by the other parties 
to this Agreement".
284
 In this case, the application of the principle of payment was 
facilitated by the fact that the non-tariff measures at issue were practices that were used 
predominantly by one or a few countries and the abolition of which held clear and specific, 
rather than diffuse, benefits for other countries.  
The negotiations of the Anti-Dumping Code exhibited a similar dynamic. While the 
US, Canada and Western European countries shared a general interest in harmonising their 
anti-dumping procedures,
285
 the Code clearly embodied an exchange of concessions.
286
 The 
US agreed to a higher threshold and to a time limit of 90 days for its practice of 
withholding appraisements of imports.
287
 In return, the other parties "were forced to accept 
reciprocal limitations on their own freedom of action in anti-dumping proceedings".
288
 In 
particular, by agreeing to be bound by the code, Canada accepted GATT Article VI on a 
definite basis and thus had to introduce an injury test as a prerequisite for the imposition of 
anti-dumping duties.
289
 Similarly, the United Kingdom had to introduce basic due process 
into its anti-dumping procedures, including notifying importers and exporters of the 
initiation of an investigation, and giving the affected parties an opportunity to present their 
views.
290
 
The Tokyo Round featured much more comprehensive negotiations on non-tariff 
measures than the Kennedy Round, resulting in seven multilateral "codes" in addition to 
bilateral agreements. The principles of the Tokyo Round already reflect changing attitudes 
to reciprocity. The formulation is now: "the negotiations should be conducted on the basis 
of mutual advantage and mutual commitment with overall reciprocity".
291
 While this 
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formulation owes a lot to the United States' new-found interest in achieving "equity" in 
competitive opportunities, it captures the more diverse ways in which reciprocity is realised 
in the non-tariff field. The Tokyo Round codes span the entire spectrum in this respect: 
where numbers were involved, as in the government procurement code, reciprocity was 
measured quantitatively;
292
 where there were established interests and entrenched positions, 
general rules embodied specific trade-offs (subsidies, to some extent customs valuation); 
where there was primarily a shared interest in developing rules, questions of payment 
receded into the background, and reciprocity was only discussed with respect to the degree 
of adherence to the common code (standards).   
The starting point of the negotiations on subsidies and countervailing duties, on the 
one hand, and on customs valuation, on the other hand, was similar. In both areas, the 
United States maintained measures that were inconsistent with GATT rules, but that the 
United States was allowed to maintain under the grandfather clause of the Protocol of 
Provisional Application. Thus, US countervailing duty law did not contain a requirement to 
prove "material injury" to domestic producers before countervailing duties could be 
applied, in contravention of GATT Article VI.
293
 Similarly, the ASP system of customs 
valuation, which had already been at issue in the Kennedy Round, was in "flat 
contravention" of GATT Article VII.
294
 From the perspective of the United States' 
counterparts, principally the EC, the United States should not have expected to be 
compensated with reciprocal concessions for remedying these anomalies.
295
 Just as in the 
Kennedy Round, however, the United States insisted on being "paid" both for the 
elimination of the ASP and the introduction of a material injury requirement. Interestingly, 
the subsequent negotiations on these two issues took on very different dynamics.  
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With respect to the subsidy/countervail negotiations, Rivers and Greenwald observe 
that,  
[b]efore a negotiation can begin in earnest, there must be either a consensus among the 
countries involved in the negotiations as to the policy objectives to be achieved or, failing 
that, agreement on a neutral framework within which conflicting policy differences can be 
compromised.
296
 
On the subject of subsidies and countervailing duties, Rivers and Greenwald assert, 
"consensus on negotiating objectives was impossible."
297
 The parties were hence left with 
the option of finding a "neutral framework" for solving their differences. The reciprocity 
discourse, of course, provides just such a framework
298
 – policies are assimilated into units 
of payment, and the discussion shifts from their substantive merits to their value as 
payment. In the case at hand, the US used the leverage that it derived from other countries' 
interest in the introduction of a material injury test in its countervailing duty law to "buy" 
an increase in discipline on the use of domestic subsidies by the code signatories – 
something that its counterparts did not care for.
299
   
The negotiations on the ASP system of customs valuation took a very different 
course. In the Kennedy Round, the parties had attempted to eliminate the ASP through an 
explicit exchange of concessions – the European countries had agreed to eliminate non-
tariff barriers affecting the United States in return. This agreement, which was buried in a 
groundswell of protectionist sentiment in the United States, did not even make it to a vote 
in the US Congress.
300
 In the Tokyo Round, EC negotiators chose a new approach. Instead 
of limiting themselves to the narrow issue of the elimination of the ASP (and how to pay 
for it), they focused on the larger goal of creating a uniform system of customs valuation 
that would be applied by all GATT contracting parties – a goal that they shared with the 
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Americans.
301
 While the Europeans initially favoured their own system of customs 
valuation, which was already being applied by approximately 100 countries,
302
 they were 
prepared to abandon that system in order "to create a new, uniform system from the ground 
up".
303
 It is possible to read this development as a simple trade-off, in that "the EC gained a 
major benefit by the reform of U.S. practices, but paid for this benefit by rewriting 
European customs practices as well."
304
 It is more plausible, however, to see it as an 
instance where the negotiators managed to transcend the logic of payment and instead to 
consider the issues on their merits.
305
 This was facilitated by the fact that, in contrast to the 
subsidy/countervail negotiations, the major participants agreed on the policy objective.
306
 In 
the process, what had been the major bone of contention in the Kennedy Round, namely the 
question of the ASP, became a minor side issue in the Tokyo Round.
307
   
The negotiations on standards from the outset exhibited a similar dynamic to the 
negotiations on customs valuation. An extensive inventory of non-tariff measures compiled 
by the GATT secretariat had revealed such a "prevalence of standards-related issues" that 
negotiators were encouraged to approach the issue "in terms of a general problem rather 
than [one of] isolated and unconnected examples"
308
 – in other words, as a question that 
was ill-suited to individual trade-offs, and that needed to be considered in a principled 
manner.
309
 Even before the Tokyo Round was formally launched in 1973, a working group 
                                                 
301
 Winham 1986, 187:  
The EC concession (or initiative, if one prefers) succeeded in turning a difficult zero-sum problem of 
bargaining into a much broader debate over reform in which both parties had common interests. The 
EC initiative redefined the nature of the problem… 
See also Sherman 1980, 124: 
The elegant strategy for dispatching ASP adopted by the European negotiators was to call for a 
uniform international code on customs valuation. ASP was such an inappropriate system that no one 
could suggest seriously that it be applied universally under an international agreement. Thus, the 
valuation Code was designed largely to give ASP a decent burial, in a form that was so integral to 
the agreed-upon package that the United States could not leave the issue unresolved once again. 
302
 GATT 1979, 69. Some of these countries, among them Japan, had only recently introduced this system.  
303
 Sherman 1980, 120.  
304
 Winham 1986, 372.  
305
 Sherman 1980, 127:  
the negotiators for each country were aware that whatever valuation rules they devised for their 
imports would also be applied by others to their exports. This realization made possible the degree of 
disinterested objectivity necessary to reach a successful result. 
306
 Sherman 1980, 127: "genuine national differences of interest in the area of customs valuation are, at best, 
difficult to discern." 
307
 Sherman 1980, 124: "the Tokyo Round negotiations on valuation rarely mentioned ASP." 
308
 Winham 1986, 103.  
309
 For background material prepared by the GATT Secretariat, see MTN/NTM/W/5, paras. 3-6. 
72 
 
on standards had agreed on the basic principles that should govern the code
310
 and was able 
to present an already well-developed draft to the Tokyo Round negotiating group on 
Technical Barriers to Trade.
311
 Progress had been such that some delegations, and in 
particular the US, argued that the Code should be seen as "self-balancing" and should be 
implemented in advance and independently of other parts of the round.
312
 This was resisted 
by the EC, which felt that the code "provided insufficient reciprocity for European 
interests"
313
 – not with respect to its substance, but rather with respect to the extent to 
which the authorities of different parties would be bound by it. In particular, the EC was 
concerned that in federal systems, where regulatory authority was partly vested in the 
constituent states, a large proportion of standardization activity and conformity assessments 
would escape the coverage of the agreement.
314
 These concerns remained alive throughout 
the Tokyo Round,
315
 and at the conclusion of the round the EC reserved the right to review 
the implementation of the code to ensure that its suppliers enjoyed "conditions of total 
reciprocity".
316
   
 The negotiation of the code on government procurement was reportedly a 
"relatively uncontentious" affair and posed few difficulties in terms of reciprocity, since 
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"total procurement" provided an easily quantifiable "metric for reciprocity".
317
 The 
agreement followed the model of the GATT in that it combined multilateral rules regulating 
procurement procedures with individual schedules stipulating the coverage of the 
agreement for each individual party. Reciprocity in coverage was established in bilateral 
negotiations.  The multilateral rules, for their part, embodied a  
tradeoff in which the Americans accepted the EC lead on outlining tendering procedures, 
and the EC accepted a greater measure of transparency than its member governments were 
comfortable with.
318
  
 
In sum, the participants in the negotiations on the Tokyo Round codes clearly 
sought to establish some form of reciprocity in every single code.
319
 At the same time, there 
is evidence that the parties also assessed reciprocity on the basis of the overall Tokyo 
Round "package". At the outset of the negotiations, the EC already anticipated that 
reciprocity would be "harder to assess over non-tariff barriers than over customs duties", so 
that "a broad spread of solutions [would] be needed to make up a worthwhile and well-
balanced package."
320
 One indication that overall reciprocity was central was the EC's 
reluctance to accept the standards code by itself – instead, "the finalization of the code had 
to await the conclusion of the Tokyo Round 'package'."
321
 Winham has speculated that the 
Europeans wanted "to use the standards negotiation as a bargaining chip in higher-priority 
areas such as customs valuation."
322
 
The next negotiating round, the Uruguay Round, witnessed the most comprehensive 
attempt yet to reduce or discipline what were conceptualised as non-tariff "barriers" to 
trade. In order to capture reciprocity for these purposes, negotiators not only made use of 
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the entire repertoire of techniques employed in previous trade negotiations, but also 
developed the unprecedented idea of a "grand bargain",
323
 whereby the acceptance of entire 
agreements – most prominently, the assumption by developing countries of commitments 
on intellectual property rights, investment, and trade in services – was conceptualised as 
"payment" for concessions by developed countries in other areas, particular on agriculture 
and textiles.
324
  
As I will argue below and in Chapter 2, it is doubtful whether the developed 
countries' side of the "grand bargain" in effect motivated its acceptance by developing 
countries at the end of the Uruguay Round. While the round was on-going, few authors 
expected developing countries to sign up to the new agreements. Thus, Winham anticipated 
that “in addressing the new issues developed countries may again be forced (as they were in 
the Tokyo Round code) to sacrifice universality to achieve liberalization in specific 
areas.”325 Emmert speculated that, since developing countries might be reluctant to block 
the conclusion of new codes, they would "adopt the code by consensus and will then simply 
refuse to become contracting parties."
326
 It is highly plausible to assume that, had it not 
been for the unpalatable alternative of the US's aggressive unilateralism, especially on the 
protection of intellectual property rights,
327
 as well as the coercive structure of the Uruguay 
Round "single undertaking", which forced developing countries to accept the entire 
Uruguay Round package if they wanted to become members of the WTO and thus retain 
their access to developed countries' markets,
328
 the "grand bargain" would never have been 
concluded.
329
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In the event, however, the "grand bargain" language provided a convenient way of 
re-describing the unprecedented result of the Uruguay Round in the familiar terms of the 
reciprocity discourse, allowing commentators to portray the result as an unremarkable 
extension of the logic of cross-sectoral trade-offs. According to this "contract story", the 
developed countries "'bought' TRIPS not by agreeing to keep their markets open (which is 
the dynamic behind the coercion story) but by agreeing to liberalize their markets 
further".
330
 Thus, Jeffrey Schott, an influential commentator on trade issues based at the 
Institute for International Economics in Washington D.C., has asserted that, 
[i]n the end, developing countries were willing to trade their support for the TRIPS accord 
for improved access to industrial markets in agriculture and light manufacturing products.
331
   
Relying on Schott and other sources,
332
 the most comprehensive negotiating history of the 
Uruguay Round notes matter-of-factly that 
developing countries' reservations against incorporating substantive obligations with respect 
to intellectual property in the GATT were exchanged for increased market access to 
developed countries for, inter alia, agriculture and textiles.
333
 
 
While the supposed gains that developing countries made in agriculture and textiles 
are also mentioned by most authors who emphasise the more coercive aspects of the way 
the Uruguay Round was concluded, the primary effect of describing the results of the 
Uruguay Round in terms of reciprocity is arguably to create the impression of continuity 
and balance where there were none, for at least three reasons. First, as I will show in 
Chapter 2, the developing countries, and Brazil and India in particular, never accepted the 
premises of the "bargain". Throughout the Uruguay Round, they maintained that the GATT 
had no jurisdiction to address intellectual property rights and services, and when they 
agreed to negotiations on services, it was under the proviso that there could be no trade-offs 
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between goods and services.
334
 Second, the developing countries regarded the integration of 
textiles into the trading system as a right to which they were entitled anyway, since textile 
trade was regulated in explicit derogation from GATT rules.
335
 The same was true, to a 
lesser extent, in agriculture, where key components of the European and North American 
domestic support schemes operated under the cover of waivers granted early in the 
GATT.
336
 Third, even though the developing countries, some more so than others,
337
 were 
interested in the liberalization of agricultural trade, the driving force behind this issue had 
always been the US. While other countries did have some input in the early stages of the 
negotiations, the final shape of the Agreement on Agriculture was famously hammered out 
between the US and the EC in a series of bilateral accords and was "presented to the rest of 
the membership as a fait accompli."
338
 It is hard to see how the modest liberalization 
achieved by the Agreement, which stayed far behind the US's own demands in this area,
339
 
could plausibly be seen as a "concession" to developing countries, especially on the part of 
the US.
340
  
In sum, the Uruguay Round single undertaking is best understood as an "offer" the 
developing countries could not refuse. In relation to the overall result of the Uruguay 
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subjects … in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral demands"; MIN.DEC, 3. 
335
 Paemen and Bensch, employing the language of the reciprocity discourse, note:  
That the industrialised countries were able to 'sell' as a genuine concession a commitment they would 
have been obliged to fulfil anyway, sooner or later, throws a particularly harsh light on the respective 
strengths of North and South in the area of international trade. 
Paemen/Bensch 1995, 41; on the developing countries' position on "rollback" generally, see ibid. 45.  
336
 The Punta del Este Declaration explicitly stipulated with regard to quantitative restrictions, one of the 
primary instruments used in this area, that "no GATT concessions [shall be] requested for the elimination of 
these measures"; MIN.DEC, 4.  
337
 India, for example, had few offensive interests in agriculture; see Winters 1994.  
338
 Howse 2001, 361; see also Paarlberg 1997; De Zeeuw 1997.  
339
 See only the US's original proposal to eliminate all border barriers, export subsidies, and production 
subsidies in agriculture within ten years; MTN.GNG/NG5/W/14.  
340
 Paemen and Bensch, two EC negotiators, describe the trade-offs involved in the final stages of the 
Uruguay Round as follows:  
the European Community's hopes for substantial reductions in the high U.S. tariffs on textiles, 
ceramics and glass had come to nought. The Community negotiator observed that 'Generally 
speaking, the imbalance to the advantage of the U.S. is the European Community's quid pro quo for 
the adjustments made to the Blair House agreement'. One politically sensitive area had been traded 
off against another. The Americans and Europeans had swapped agriculture for textiles. 
Paemen/Bensch 1995, 245. (reference omitted) 
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Round, reciprocity was not an operative negotiating rule; rather, the reciprocity discourse 
provided an interpretative framework that could be used after the fact to give a veneer of 
acceptability to what would otherwise appear as a blatantly coercive outcome.
341
 If one 
wanted to capture the unprecedented nature of the Uruguay Round single undertaking in 
terms of the reciprocity discourse, one would have to emphasise not so much what the 
developed countries gave, but what they threatened to take away. As Hudec put it at the 
time, the single undertaking "completely restructure[d] the developed-developing country 
bargain, proposing to pay for all the new developing country concessions simply by 
agreeing not to destroy the market access they already ha[d].”342 
The reciprocity discourse also shaped the way in which WTO members would later 
approach the legacy of the Uruguay Round. Thus, even though one can plausibly argue that 
the adoption of the TRIPS Agreement was the wrong policy for developing countries,
343
 
and indeed for the majority of "developed" countries as well,
344
 the reciprocity discourse 
can only conceptualise this policy failure as an "imbalance", as if the developing countries 
had simply "overpaid". From this perspective, what was needed was a "rebalancing" of the 
system, a new bargain that would be skewed in favour of the developing countries.
345
 And 
it was precisely this purpose that the Doha "Development" Agenda launched in 2001 was 
supposed to serve.  
Even besides the fact that, given the ahistorical tendencies of the reciprocity 
discourse, such a "rebalancing" is unlikely to happen,
346
 this framing of the Uruguay Round 
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 If the conception of the Uruguay Round result as a "bargain" is hard to sustain in light of the positions that 
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 Hudec 1992, 76. (emphasis added) 
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total government budget. 
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legacy is problematic in that it cuts short the critical engagement with past negotiating 
results: instead of revisiting, revising and potentially even scrapping an agreement, the 
reciprocity discourse allows the winners to "bank" their gains – "a deal is a deal"347 – and 
encourages the losers to seek compensatory gains in future negotiations. The reciprocity 
discourse, then, can only evaluate the results of negotiations in distributive terms that 
obviate questions about the substantive merits of the policy in question. For the most 
part,
348
 it was in these terms that the post-Uruguay Round debate about TRIPS would play 
out: developing countries framed their grievances about TRIPS as "implementation" issues, 
and asked for longer transition periods and technical assistance.  
Apart from the overall North-South "bargain", questions of reciprocity also arose in 
numerous other contexts in the Uruguay Round. Besides the tariff negotiations on 
manufactured goods and agriculture discussed above, I will briefly survey the methods 
employed to achieve reciprocity in three areas: non-tariff barriers and subsidies in 
agriculture, services, and government procurement.  
The bulk of the traditional non-tariff "barriers" – most prominently, quantitative 
restrictions and subsidies– that the Uruguay Round was supposed to address were to be 
found in the area of agriculture. The negotiators early on decided to quantify the protection 
provided by these barriers, which would subsequently allow them to subject their reduction 
to the traditional reciprocity calculus. Thus, the protective effect of domestic subsidies was 
calculated with the help of an Aggregate Measurement of Support (AMS), which was then 
subjected to reciprocal reduction commitments. Similarly, export subsidies were quantified 
in terms of volume and budgetary outlay, and subject to reduction commitments. All border 
measures, such as quantitative restrictions and sui generis regimes such as the EC's variable 
levy system, were to be "tariffied", i.e. converted into tariffs, and then reduced. 
The negotiations on trade in services posed a number of conceptual challenges.
349
 
As Brazil noted at the outset of the negotiations: 
Nowhere can one find generally accepted definitions of services, of what services can 
actually be traded across borders as well as, consequently, of what can, with precision, be 
described as international trade in services.
350
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 Finger 2002, 306.  
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 There was one significant exception – access to essential medicines – which I will briefly address below.  
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 See Drake/Nicolaïdis 1992; Lang 2009; Lang 2011, chapter 9.  
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 MTN.GNS/W/3, para. 22.  
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These conceptual challenges also extended to the question of how to measure reciprocity in 
the services context. In early 1991, the contracting parties requested the GATT secretariat 
to "prepare an informal note identifying considerations that participants may wish to take 
into account when evaluating offers from a national perspective".
351
 The note is instructive 
not only for its suggested approach to the services negotiations, but as an analysis of how 
reciprocity functions in other areas of negotiations.  
The note starts out by noting the disconnect between the reciprocity metric 
traditionally applied in tariff negotiations and the economic effects of the tariff reductions 
at issue:  
The procedures adopted in tariff negotiations do not normally centre on the implications of 
tariff reductions for changes in economic welfare, nor are they based on the extent to which 
trade flows are likely to change as a result of the offered changes in tariff schedules.
352
 
Instead, the note suggests that reciprocity calculations in tariff negotiations have served to 
"provid[e] negotiators with a focal point", i.e.,  
something tangible enabling parties to set objectives, evaluate the position of others, assess 
negotiating progress and identify acceptable compromises with respect to a particular 
yardstick.
353
  
In the secretariat's view, the choice of "changes in trade-weighted tariff levels" as the "focal 
point" for tariff negotiations "appears to have been driven largely by data availability".
354
  
The secretariat noted some parallels between the services negotiations and past 
"negotiations on 'difficult-to-quantify' non-tariff measures". In the negotiations on 
government procurement, for example, the "value of past procurement" provided a focal 
point even though it is "unrelated to trade per se". The secretariat noted that, if negotiators 
were hoping to adopt a quantitative approach to reciprocity in the services context, then "a 
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 MTN.GNS/W/118, para. 1.  
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 Ibid. para. 6; the Secretariat notes the extreme difficulty of establishing the effects of tariff reductions, 
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require a multicountry, multicommodity general equilibrium approach that is capable of taking into 
account intersectoral linkages (and thus effective rates of protection), use recent and credible 
estimates of demand, supply and substitution elasticities, and incorporate all relevant government 
policies, not just tariffs. Even this only provides an indication of the general equilibrium effect 
induced by what is offered. Dynamic effects, such as induced shifts in comparative advantage, are 
not taken into account.  
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quantifiable counterpart to the more traditional trade-oriented 'focal point' may have to be 
found".
355
 
The solution proposed by the secretariat departed in several ways from traditional 
notions of reciprocity as "payment", and appeared to reflect the lessons of several decades 
of the use of reciprocity in trade negotiations. To begin with, the secretariat sought to 
dissuade negotiators from focusing on the principal suppliers of a particular service, noting 
that establishing principal suppliers was not only difficult in light of the available data, but 
was also undesirable because it might neglect both "those countries that currently do not 
export (or import) significant amounts of a service but have the potential for doing so", and 
"small countries for which a specific activity might be of great importance"
356
 – both of 
these effects of the principal supplier rule had been perennial concerns of developing 
countries throughout the history of multilateral trade lawmaking. Instead, the secretariat 
suggested measuring the value of an offer by "determining the total value of output in the 
offered sectors as a proportion of total service sector output or GDP".
357
 Crucially, in 
evaluating offers on the basis of this "coverage ratio", "the size of a country's economy" or 
service sector would be "taken into account".
358
 Moreover, in keeping with the GATT 
contracting parties' increasing embrace of equality of competitive opportunities as a 
yardstick for reciprocity, the approach would give "credit to countries that … do not impose 
any barriers in certain sectors" and would therefore not be "biased against countries with 
more liberal or open regimes".
359
 The secretariat acknowledged that this conception was 
based on the premise that the participants would value "standstill" commitments, i.e., 
commitments not to impose new restrictions, as much as "rollback" commitments, i.e., 
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commitments to dismantle existing restrictions.
360
 Only if this premise was accepted would 
the secretariat's conception of reciprocity have dispensed with the need to use restrictions 
on services trade as "currency" in trade negotiations. Instead, an objective and dynamic 
benchmark, based on the size of a countries service sector or GDP, would serve as the 
baseline for formulating expectations of a country's liberalisation commitments. The 
secretariat itself was apparently sceptical that this view would be accepted, noting that 
"rollback … will, other things being equal, be preferred by trading partners to standstill".361 
It appears that in the end no universal approach to measuring reciprocity was 
adopted. The negotiations on the sectoral coverage of the GATS proceeded through the 
request-and-offer method. In some cases, the participants tried to establish cross-sectoral 
linkages; thus, the Europeans tried to link commitments on audiovisual services, on which 
they were in the defensive, to maritime transport services – a sensitive issue for the US –, 
while the US tried to link audiovisuals to the plurilateral negotiations on civil aircraft.
362
 In 
other cases, the participants, and in particular the US, sought reciprocity within a particular 
sector. The US Treasury Department even contemplated implementing its commitments on 
financial services on a conditional MFN basis, in order to induce other countries to open 
their financial services markets.
363
 As negotiators were unable to solve these issues in time, 
the negotiations on maritime transport services, financial services, and telecommunications 
continued after the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.    
Aggressive pursuit of reciprocity also marked the renegotiation of the Tokyo Round 
Government Procurement code. Given that the structure of the entities engaging in public 
procurement varied widely among member states, it ultimately "proved impossible to 
restore equilibrium in the offers".
364
 As a result, the annexes to the Uruguay Round 
Government Procurement Code contain numerous "reciprocity clauses",
365
 whereby 
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individual parties exclude other specified parties from access to certain types of 
procurement.
366
   
In the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, one aspect of the TRIPS Agreement – the 
regulation of access to essential medicines – received an extraordinary amount of public 
attention; it is remarkable in the present context because the treatment of this issue did not 
only result in a change of the TRIPS's legal text – the first and only amendment to the 
Uruguay Round agreements so far – but also decisively escaped the confines of the 
reciprocity discourse. The issue related to the possibility that the TRIPS Agreement might 
frustrate the poorest developing countries' access to essential medicines.
367
 In particular, the 
TRIPS Agreement allowed the production of generic medicines under a compulsory licence 
only if the production was "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the 
Member" granting the compulsory license.
368
 Countries without manufacturing capacity for 
pharmaceuticals would thus not be able to access generic medicines under this provision, 
since other countries would not be able to grant compulsory licences primarily for export. 
Developing countries, aided by non-governmental organisations, were able to raise public 
awareness of this issue to an extent that the developed countries were forced to address it 
outside the context of a new trade round. Moreover, the developing countries managed to 
reframe the issue in a way that made it appear highly inappropriate to address it within the 
context of a reciprocal bargain.
369
 As Morin and Gold explain:  
Unlike usual WTO bargaining in which it is appropriate to try to secure benefits narrowly 
for one's constituents, in the case of access to medicines, such conduct would have been 
seen as inappropriate. … While it is socially acceptable for a state to claim that a new free 
trade agreement better positions its domestic industry to be globally competitive, it would 
be inappropriate to brag that a decision increases the price of medicines in developing 
countries and increases the profit margin of pharmaceutical firms.
370
   
                                                 
366
 See, for example, the General Notes attached to the Annexes of the European Community, which exclude 
the suppliers and service providers of Canada, the US, Japan, Korea and Israel from certain types of 
procurement "until such time as the EC has accepted that the Parties concerned give comparable and effective 
access for EC undertakings to the relevant markets"; WT/Let/438. 
367
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 Morin/Gold 2010, 568; on the "reframing" of the issue accomplished by developing countries and civil 
society, see also Sell 2003, 146-162; Odell/Sell 2006. 
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What is most remarkable about this episode in the present context is how unique and 
"deviant"
371
 it was. In the Doha Round, there has only been one other instance in which a 
group of countries has been able to frame an issue in a way that made it inappropriate for 
the reciprocity discourse.  
In March 2003, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali submitted a proposal in which 
they called for the phasing out of subsidies for cotton production.
372
 The moral stakes on 
this issue appeared similar to the access to medicines issue: on one side, there were millions 
of poor West African farmers and their families who depended for their livelihood on 
cotton farming and who were suffering from low prices for cotton on the world market; on 
the other side, there were 25,000 American farmers who were being subsidised with 
billions of dollars every year and were thus able to sell their production on world markets 
below their costs of production. After putting up considerable resistance, especially at the 
Ministerial Meeting in Cancún, the US eventually agreed to eliminate all export subsidies 
on cotton and reduce domestic support for cotton production more expeditiously than for 
other agricultural commodities.
373
 However, the treatment of cotton remains tied to the 
overall agricultural negotiations in the Doha Round. This not only means that the reduction 
commitments on cotton will most likely not be implemented until the Round as a whole is 
concluded; it also means that, while the developed countries are not specifically asking for 
payment from the four West African countries who sponsored the initiative, they will be 
able to insist on compensatory gains as part of the overall Doha Round "package". 
While the conclusion of the Doha Round remains uncertain, the shape of an 
eventual "package" is now reasonably clear. Initially, it appeared as though the developed 
countries were aiming for a rerun of the Uruguay Round: At the Doha Ministerial 
Conference and for the first two years of the Doha Round, the developed countries insisted 
on conducting negotiations on the so-called Singapore issues: investment, competition, 
transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation.
374
 Mindful of their 
experience in the Uruguay Round, the developing countries staunchly resisted such 
negotiations; the compromise reached at Doha envisioned that negotiations on these issues 
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would commence after a subsequent ministerial conference "on the basis of a decision to be 
taken, by explicit consensus, at that Session on modalities of negotiations".
375
 At the next 
Ministerial Conference, developing countries succeeded in making it clear that there was no 
consensus to proceed with the Singapore issues, but when the EU finally offered to drop 
three of the issues, it was too late to reach a consensus and the Conference ended in failure. 
Some observers speculated that the EU insisted on negotiations on the Singapore issues in 
order to make the developing countries pay for concessions that it was expected to make on 
agriculture.
376
  
Once the Singapore issues – except for trade facilitation, which, arguably, turned 
out to be largely self-balancing
377
 – were off the table, the attention of the developed 
countries shifted to the relatively high tariffs on manufactured products that most 
developing countries, including the large emerging economies, maintain. As noted above, 
the developed countries have been seeking greater-than-formula reductions in certain 
product sectors as a payment for further reductions in agricultural support. The response 
from the developing countries – "those who ask for more have to pay more"378 – is best 
interpreted as a demand for larger reductions in agricultural support than the developed 
countries have so far agreed to.  
D. Socialisation into the Bargain: Reciprocity and Accessions 
Due to the limited progress of the Doha Round, accession negotiations have over the past 
decade become the "cutting edge" of lawmaking in the multilateral trading system.
379
 Both 
under the GATT and the WTO Agreement, states or separate customs territories can accede 
"on terms to be agreed" between the acceding government and the members of the trade 
regime.
380
 Accession negotiations are governed by the principle of payment: the acceding 
government has to pay an "entrance fee",
381
 buy a "ticket of admission"
382
 as a "quid pro 
quo"
383
 for the advantages that membership confers, among them the market access that 
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GATT/WTO members have granted each other in the course of past negotiating rounds and 
that is extended to the new entrants through the most-favoured nation principle.
384
 Existing 
GATT/WTO members do not grant any new concessions in accession negotiations.  
There is no necessary relation between the level of obligations of existing members 
and the obligations which the acceding government is asked to take on. Members are free to 
engage in bilateral negotiations with the acceding government and to demand concessions 
of interest to them, irrespective of whether they have undertaken comparable commitments 
themselves. Already during the GATT years, the Secretariat noted that the "'entrance fee' 
which an acceding country has to pay under this procedure is likely to vary considerably" 
depending on the benefits that a country is likely to derive from accession to the GATT.
385
 
Since the founding of the WTO, the "price [has been] constantly going up",
386
 resulting in 
increasingly unbalanced obligations between old and new members. Except in the case of 
acceding Least-developed countries (LDCs), there are no rules or other checks limiting 
what existing members can demand from an acceding country.
387
 In line with the market 
logic of the reciprocity discourse, the membership can drive the price as high as the demand 
for membership allows; considerations of equity play no role.
388
  
What gives the accession process a wider significance for WTO lawmaking is that it 
appears to be singularly effective at socialising new members into the "you get what you 
pay for" mind-set of the reciprocity discourse. Anecdotal evidence suggests that those who 
have recently undergone accessions are among the most active – and most demanding – 
members of accession working parties.   
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E. Conclusion 
Reciprocity, in one form or another, forms the basis of a wide range of social 
arrangements.
389
 At the same time, reciprocity can take many forms, from a very specific 
and concrete to a more diffuse kind.
390
 As I have shown in the present section, the 
conception of reciprocity that is embodied in the reciprocity discourse of multilateral trade 
lawmaking is of an exceedingly specific and narrow kind, in that it is modeled on 
transactions between commercial actors in a market. Pursuant to the market metaphor of 
multilateral trade lawmaking, the participants in trade negotiations are expected to "pay" 
for any benefits that they receive. The market metaphor is deeply embedded in the thinking 
and acting of trade negotiators; it is arguably a metaphor "they live by".
391
 
In the first part of this section, I have tried to show that this was by no means an 
inevitable development. The negotiating method that most clearly embodies the principle of 
payment – bilateral tariff bargaining – was not one that any of the officials negotiating the 
new international trading order in the late 1940s was hoping to adopt. Even US trade 
officials, who had developed this method in the framework of the Reciprocal Trade 
Agreements programme, recognised the multilateral negotiation of a horizontal formula for 
tariff reductions as superior in a number of respects. The US Congress, however, forced 
their hands. Bilateral tariff bargaining was thus adopted for the multilateral trade regime at 
the insistence of the legislature of a single state, and against the better judgment of virtually 
all officials who had held extensive negotiations on this issue for several years.  
In the second part of this section, I have traced the ramifications of the adoption of 
the principle of payment for the multilateral trade regime. I have argued that the principle 
of payment detracts from the idea of free trade as a political or cultural value, and that it 
imbues trade policies with a negotiating "value" that is unrelated to their economic effects 
or to other public policy merits that they may reflect. This effect is exacerbated in the case 
of policies which primarily pursue regulatory objectives unrelated to trade; when such 
measures come to be seen through the lens of the reciprocity discourse as simply another 
method of payment, the other goals that they pursue tend to be marginalised. This effect 
was particularly striking in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round, where the reciprocity 
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discourse provided a convenient framework for re-describing what was arguably a grave 
policy mistake committed under coercive circumstances – the adoption of the TRIPS 
Agreement by the developing countries – as a "grand bargain" in which one side had 
simply overpaid.  
I have also shown how the reciprocity discourse, by privileging those who have 
most to pay with, precludes considerations of equity in multilateral trade lawmaking. The 
principal supplier rule, designed to minimize unpaid-for concessions, preserves the right of 
each party to sell trade concessions only to the highest bidder, without regard for the 
significance that a product may have for the economic and trade prospects of an exporting 
country. Moreover, the reciprocity discourse is fundamentally ahistorical; the balance of 
past trade concessions is rarely, if ever, taken into account.      
In the third part of the section, I have traced the evolution of the reciprocity 
discourse both in tariff negotiations and in negotiations on non-tariff barriers. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, a conception of reciprocity that took into account the equity of outcomes 
appeared to gain some ground on the traditional conception of reciprocity as equal 
payment, particularly in the tariff context. Thus, harmonization formulas for tariff reduction 
became widely accepted. Despite this change, however, the strict conception of reciprocity 
maintained a strong hold on the imagination of trade negotiators, as was reflected in 
negotiations on exceptions from the horizontal formula, and in efforts to restore a rough 
bilateral balance through withdrawals of concessions at the end of negotiations.      
The extent to which the conception of reciprocity as payment has become 
entrenched has also been apparent in negotiations on non-tariff barriers, which were often 
marked by a search for trade-offs even in negotiations on general rules of conduct. Only 
rarely, as in the case of the Customs Valuation Code in the Tokyo Round, did the 
negotiators manage to take a broader view of the issues and transcend the logic of payment. 
In other contexts, such as the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, where no such consensus on 
fundamental objectives was possible, the reciprocity discourse served as a framework for 
designing a code embodying an explicit trade-off. These two examples exemplify the 
opportunities, as well as the dangers, inherent in the reciprocity discourse. It may well have 
been that, in the case of the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, the reciprocity discourse 
allowed negotiators to tackle an issue through explicit trade-offs that they would otherwise 
not have been able to resolve. The danger is, however, that the reciprocity discourse will 
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lead negotiators to think about an issue in terms of reciprocal payments even where 
common interests could be identified; thus, the attempt to resolve the problem of the ASP 
system of customs valuation through the negotiation of a comprehensive customs valuation 
code embodying common interests was only undertaken after the attempt in the Kennedy 
Round to solve the issue through an explicit exchange of concessions had failed. In fact, the 
reciprocity discourse works as a disincentive for countries to advance proposals with 
diffuse benefits, because it is likely that whoever sponsors such a proposal will be asked to 
"pay" for it, even though all would gain from its implementation.  
The ahistorical and morally agnostic character of the reciprocity discourse has come 
to haunt the developed countries in the Doha Round: The discourse does not provide them 
with any principled basis for insisting that the emerging economies should "catch up" with 
them in terms of their WTO commitments by participating in the officially "non-
mandatory" NAMA sectorals. Instead, it is the emerging economies that have been able to 
rely on the reciprocity discourse to reject the developed countries' demands as "unbalanced" 
and "disproportionate" and in violation of the principle of payment. If lawmaking in the 
trading system were founded on a more principled basis, the trading system might have 
been better able to cope with a fundamental change such as the rise of the emerging 
economies.  
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II. The Discourse of "Special and Differential Treatment" 
The discussion in the first part of this chapter has given particular attention to one area of 
international trade lawmaking – tariff negotiations. This focus was justified by two 
considerations. First, tariff negotiations were the area of operation of the emerging trading 
system in which the dynamic of exclusion and inclusion that marked the founding of the 
GATT was most stark: the principles and practice of tariff negotiations were practically 
dictated by the constraints of US domestic politics. Second, since tariffs were the primary 
area of negotiating activity in the first two decades of the GATT, the conception of 
reciprocity as payment, the key element of the US method of tariff negotiations, came to 
fundamentally shape ideas of how international trade lawmaking in general "works". 
The preferences of the US, and to a lesser extent the UK, however, also manifested 
themselves in the political choices embodied in the structure and substantive provisions of 
the draft for the ITO Charter and the GATT.
392
 First, the preferences of these countries for 
some protective instruments over others were reflected in the relative degrees of stringency 
with which the drafts treated different forms of government action in relation to trade: some 
practices were allowed, others disciplined, and yet others outlawed. Second, the drafts 
included specific exemptions from general rules that were designed to accommodate the 
practices of the "nuclear" countries.
393
 The imprint that the preferences of the US and UK 
had left on the drafts, both in terms of the general rules that they established and in the 
exceptions that they made, did not escape the other participants in the preparatory 
                                                 
392
 As Wilcox noted, the trade programme pursued through the ITO and the GATT had been "an American 
program at every step of the way":  
It was our charter that the Preparatory Committee adopted as the basis of its deliberations in London 
in the fall of 1946. It was our work that laid down the pattern to which the experts meeting in 
London have generally agreed. The ITO is recognized everywhere as an American project. (Wilcox 
1947, 6)  
393
 See Wilcox 1949, 492-493; Wilcox notes that eight of the exceptions in the Charter have "real 
significance", and that "[f]our of them were included at the instance of the United States", while the other four 
"were designed to meet the needs of countries in balance-of-payments difficulties and of countries whose 
economies are in the process of reconstruction or development" (491). As Wilcox further explains, the two 
groups of exceptions are not treated equally: 
The four exceptions in the first group become effective without any sort of finding or approval by 
any international agency. Those in the second group do not come into operation until numerous 
obstacles have been surmounted, conditions fulfilled, criteria satisfied, procedures followed, and 
permissions obtained. Once this has been done, they impose a series of additional obligations that 
must be assumed. And finally, they provide in one way or another for the limitation of the period 
during which the exception may be enjoyed. (493) 
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negotiations to the ITO and the GATT,
394
 and was heavily contested especially by the 
"under-developed" countries among them, which preferred different protective instruments 
over those privileged by the US/UK draft.  
In the present section, I will first show how these different policy preferences of 
developed and "under-developed" countries, which were in large part motivated by 
different views on the necessary and appropriate role of the state in international trade,
395
 
came to be reflected in the GATT as "rules" and "exceptions", respectively, laying the roots 
for the conceptualisation of "developing" countries' concerns as "exceptional" or "special" 
(A). I will then discuss the first efforts in the early decades of the GATT to address the 
problems that the "less-developed" countries encountered in their trade. As I argue, these 
problems were initially conceptualised as structural problems of the trading system, and 
were addressed through a range of initiatives that relied on lawmaking techniques alien to 
the reciprocity discourse (B). In the wake of the perceived failure of this attempt at 
addressing the imbalances in the trading system in a comprehensive manner, developing 
countries sought to accommodate the principle of payment by arguing for a different 
principle of exchange, namely "special and more favourable treatment" (C). Finally, I 
examine what the principle of "special and differential treatment" meant in relation to non-
tariff measures (D). Section E concludes.        
A. Establishing the Baseline: The GATT/ITO Preparatory 
Negotiations  
One of the aims that the US was pursuing with its proposals for an international trade 
organisation was to restore the role of private enterprise in international commerce.
396
 As 
                                                 
394
 The US and UK were of course aware of this. The British negotiators remarked during the exploratory 
talks that some draft provisions of the GATT "appeared to be tailored" to US circumstances; FRUS 1945, 
140; the comparative treatment of countries with different kinds of market access barriers was a recurrent 
theme in the negotiations. For example, in early 1945 the US Ambassador to the UK reported that the British  
think that our ideas are tilted in favor of countries whose main obligation would be to reduce tariffs 
as against countries whose obligations would involve extensive action not only on tariffs but also on 
preferences and quantitative restrictions (FRUS 1945, 1) 
Cf. Irwin/Mavroidis/Sykes 2008, 70, 121, fn 82; and Curzon 1965, 131, who notes that the exceptions to 
quantitative restrictions "reflected very much the United States preoccupations in this field".  
395
 See also Dam 1970, 12-14:  
Views on the role and organization of international trade differed profoundly between deficit and 
surplus countries, developed and underdeveloped countries, market-economy and planned-economy 
countries, and so forth. 
396
 Wilcox 1947, 11-12:  
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Clair Wilcox put it, the purpose of the ITO was not "to confer upon an international agency 
the power to regiment world trade but to employ such an agency as a means of liberating 
trade from the forms of regimentation imposed on it by national governments."
397
 In the 
US's Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment, which it published in 1945 
and which became the starting point for the preparatory discussions, "release from 
restrictions imposed by governments"
398
 was listed as the first problem which an ITO 
would have to address.  
The US vision of a preeminent role for private enterprises in international trade did 
not mean that the US was pursuing the complete removal of governmental interference with 
trade. As the US acknowledged in its Proposals, "[n]o government is ready to embrace 'free 
trade' in any absolute sense".
399
 However, the US vision of a preeminent role for private 
enterprise shaped its views of what type of state intervention should be permitted. Chiefly, 
this vision manifested itself in the US's preference for the use of price-based instruments, 
such as tariffs, over volume-based instruments, such as quantitative restrictions. As Wilcox 
declared, the US's "traditional system of employing tariffs as the means of controlling 
imports" was "consistent with the preservation of private enterprise. The import quota 
system is not."
400
 At the preparatory negotiations in Geneva, Wilcox made the point more 
forcefully:    
Of all forms of restrictionism ever devised by the mind of men, Q.R. is the worst. Beside it 
protective tariffs appear to be a liberal method of controlling trade. In the case of a tariff the 
total volume of imports can expand with the expansion of trade. There is flexibility in the 
volume of trade. Under a quota system the volume of trade is rigidly restricted, and no 
matter how much more people may wish to buy or consume, not one single more unit will 
be admitted than the controlling authority thinks fit.
401
 
                                                                                                                                                    
Ever since the war our Government has sought to remove controls and restore the freedom of private 
enterprise. … If the American program for world trade were to fail, its failure would hasten the 
spread of nationalization among the other countries of the world. 
397
 Wilcox 1947, 3; Irwin/Mavroidis/Sykes 2008, 16; see also Wilcox 1946, 3-5, on the  
principle … that the foreign trade of the United States should be carried on by private enterprise. 
Indeed, we should prefer this pattern, by and large, for international trade in general.    
398
 US Proposals 1945, 2. 
399
 US Proposals 1945, 2; Wilcox 1946, 11: it was a "misapprehension" that the US government was  
seeking to establish free trade. This, of course, is not the case. Free trade would require the complete 
elimination of all protective barriers. Politically, it would be impossible; economically, it would be 
unwise.  
400
 Wilcox 1947, 10-11.  
401
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 20; see also Wilcox 1947, 9-10, where he concludes that  
in the absence of the American program [i.e. the ITO/GATT], the world would be headed straight 
toward the strangulation of its commerce through the imposition of detailed administrative controls.  
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This outlook was not shared by all other governments, not even Britain, the US's first and 
most influential interlocutor. At the time, there was a strong movement towards state 
planning in order to achieve full employment, and some elements in the UK government, 
notably John Maynard Keynes, regarded the American plans as a dangerous return to 19
th
 
century laissez-faire.
402
 As the US Ambassador reported, there was a  
feeling among some of the British tendencies that the United States will be a drag on post-
war social change. Congressional utterances and actions and stress in American public 
utterances on the virtues of private enterprise have led to suspicion of future American 
policy among many in liberal and labor and even left wing conservative circles. In 
international trade questions, the issue is somewhat clouded by lack of a clearly conceived 
progressive policy and failure to grasp the importance of reconciling planning with an 
advantageous territorial division of labor.
403
 
Ultimately, the strong value attached to free trade in Britain's political culture, the 
accommodation achieved through the lenient treatment of state trading, the exemption of 
the British imperial preferences from the most-favoured nation obligation, and the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Paemen and Bensch 1995, 75, comment that,  
[i]n the eyes of the General Agreement, which makes no pretence of being anything other than an 
ideological text, customs duties constitute the "decent" sort of protection.  
402
 Irwin/Mavroidis/Sykes 2008, 15; see FRUS 1944, 6, for British concerns about the possibility of a post-
war depression in the US:  
Keynes felt that the vast majority in American business and congressional circles had not yet grasped 
the fundamental principle of full employment policy and would reject the measures necessary to 
apply them. … The British group … would welcome evidence of greater activity in the formulation 
of domestic plans for maintaining full employment in the United States …    
403
 FRUS 1944, 8-9; this argument was made in the context of the US position on state trading, with regard to 
which the US Ambassador reports:  
Some British economists in Government stress that the subject should not be considered as if the 
Soviet Union were the only important case involved.  
With regard to the "lack of a clearly conceived progressive policy", an economist in the Labour party later 
admitted that "the Labour Party's research and thinking had been weakest on the international economic side 
and [that] the proposal for state purchases of imports had not been thought through"; FRUS 1945, 39-40; see 
also Crowley/Haddon-Cave 1947, 35, who note that, at the time of the preparatory discussions, "no attempt 
ha[d] yet been made to include the problem of international trade" into the "comprehensive reorientation of 
economic theory" that had occurred in the 1930s under the influence of Keynes. See, however, the US 
Ambassador's description of the international outlook of the Labour Party: 
… British Socialism and Trade Unionism … are essentially international in outlook. … As regards 
trade matters this outlook may have appeared to some to be obscured at times by Labor's belief in 
planning on a national scale … Indeed, Labor's views on trade differ substantially from those of 19th 
and early 20
th
 century advocates of free trade who linked it indissolubly with private enterprise. … 
But these differences must not be allowed to obscure the fact that … British Labor could not without 
reversal of its whole political convictions become the advocate of exclusive economic blocs, or of 
deliberate discriminations on nationalistic and imperialistic grounds. Nor could it take the initiative 
in erecting or raising barriers to economic intercourse with the workers of other lands. … In any 
event, it is clear that Labor's basic outlook and its political strength make it a more reliable 
instrument of UK co-operation in realizing the objectives of art. VII as a whole than can be found in 
any other political party in UK. (FRUS 1945, 201-202)  
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exception for quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes, reconciled the 
British with the American plans.  
At the first preparatory conference in London in 1946, the US was for the first time 
confronted with the polar opposite vision of the role of the state and private enterprise in 
trade, in the form of the Indian comments on the US's Proposals.
404
 At the outset, the 
Indian delegation noted that, in its view, the American and British experts who had 
developed the Proposals  
were concerned almost exclusively with the problems of their respective countries and the 
scheme which has emerged from their talks represents a compromise between the interests 
and policies of the U.K. and the U.S.A.
405
  
The delegation then went on to sketch its vision of the role of a future independent Indian 
state in India's trade:  
[R]apid and large-scale development of the entire economy under the direction or control of 
the State, on the basis of a detailed plan, may be expected to become a normal feature of 
India's economic life. … For the success of such a policy, it is essential that trade, both 
external and internal, should be carefully regulated.  
To India, it was important that an international trade organisation allow the Indian state to 
take     
measures needed to ensure that India's external trade fits in with the requirements of the 
development plans. These plans may be expected to lay down targets for production and to 
indicate a programme of development for each industry or section of an industry. It would 
be obviously impossible to carry out such plans if exports and imports were left to the 
discretion of the individual trader, subject to such control as may be indirectly exercised 
through tariffs.
406
 
 
The two visions of the role of the state in international trade put forward by the 
United States and India resulted in contradictory views on the comparative merits of price-
based and volume-based instruments in the control of international trade. To India, the very 
inflexibility and rigidity of quantitative restrictions that was abhorred by the United States – 
at least when it came to industrial products – made them the most efficient means of 
directing its foreign exchange to the most important uses.
407
 Tariffs, by contrast, not only 
                                                 
404
 Cf. Brown 1950, 75.  
405
 E/PC/T/5 – E/PC/T/W.14, 7 
406
 E/PC/T/5 – E/PC/T/W.14, 9-10.  
407
 E/PC/T/5 – E/PC/T/W.14, 10:  
94 
 
made such direction much more difficult, but also imposed heavy burdens on all 
importers.
408
 India hence regarded tariffs as inefficient and wasteful, and planned to use 
them only in rare cases.
409
  
At the second preparatory conference in Geneva in 1947, the conflict over which 
protective devices would be allowed boiled to a head again. The Indian delegate compared 
the treatment of the four major protective instruments – tariffs, subsidies, state trading, and 
quantitative restrictions – in the Charter: 
On tariffs, we have fixed no ceiling whatever, nor have we imposed any restrictions on a 
country's freedom of action in this respect, except to the extent determined by obligations 
which it has voluntarily undertaken. On subsidies, too, we have not attempted to set any 
limit, and it is of interest to note that, where serious prejudice to the interest of any Member 
is caused by subsidisation, the Charter provides for no more than a discussion between the 
parties concerned. When we come to State Trading, our generosity seems to know no 
bounds – it is almost staggering in its lavishness.  
Quite otherwise, Mr. Chairman, is our position with respect to Quantitative Restrictions. 
Article 25 bans it altogether with certain exceptions enumerated in later paragraphs of that 
article and in Article 26. But the use of Quantitative Restrictions for protection purposes is 
covered by no exception, and a country desiring to employ it in the interests of its 
programme of economic development is left to have recourse to the provisions of that 
omnibus Article, Article 13.
410
 
Article 13 of the ITO Charter, which would be incorporated into the GATT as Article 
XVIII, allowed developing countries
411
 to modify or withdraw tariff concessions or impose 
other restrictive measures inconsistent with the GATT for the purpose of infant-industry 
protection, subject to notification and consultation requirements and the payment of 
adequate compensation.
412
 This provision redefined quantitative restrictions from a 
                                                                                                                                                    
unless non-essential imports are reduced to a minimum and essential imports are regulated in 
accordance with some order of priorities, the development plans may be completely stultified. 
408
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 30. 
409
 E/PC/T/5 – E/PC/T/W.14, 10:  
Tariffs are uncertain in their effects and under a system of a planned trade their use will be restricted 
to a minimum. 
410
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 25; on the treatment of tariffs, see also Senate Hearings 1947, 5:  
Nobody can say under this charter, or in this organization, how much or how far tariffs should be 
reduced. That remains within the province of each individual country. There is an obligation to 
negotiate. 
The obligation to negotiate was not included in the GATT. Dam 1970, 25, notes that, as a result,  
[n]othing in the General Agreement require[d] any contracting party to take a single step in the 
direction of reducing tariffs.  
411
 The actual language used is a "contracting party, the economy of which can only support low standards of 
living and is in the early stages of development" (GATT Article XVIII, para. 4 (a)).  
412
 Article XVIII also allowed parties to impose quantitative restrictions for balance-of-payment purposes in a 
manner that prioritises imports essential to their development.  
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protective instrument on par with tariffs and subsidies to an exceptional measure, which 
could only be resorted to under certain circumstances and with prior approval of the 
organization. The Indians complained:    
Where is the equity in laying down the same procedure for waiving a negotiated obligation 
and for permission to use a recognized instrument of economic development [i.e. 
quantitative restrictions, N.L.]?
413
 
 
The Indians thus objected to the definition of their preferred instrument of trade 
regulation as an exceptional measure, while protective instruments that were of marginal 
interest to them – tariffs and subsidies – were to be regarded as normal414 ways of 
regulating trade, subject only to negotiated reductions or consultation requirements.
415
 The 
Indian position was not necessarily more protectionist that the US position. Wilcox 
acknowledged that "the question at issue is not whether protection is to be provided, but 
only how it may be provided".
416
 And Jackson concludes his review of the discussions at 
the second preparatory conference thus:  
The issues at Geneva in 1947 did not … seem to be free trade versus protectionism, or 
internationalism versus national sovereignty. Each of the groups in the debate desired 
international control of some things and not of others. Both sides desired to use certain types 
of trade protective measures but wanted to limit or restrict others. The controversy seemed 
to be over which trade restrictions would be subjected to greater international control and 
which not.
417
 
In fact, India went to some length to argue that the preference of the ITO Charter for 
protective instruments other than quantitative restrictions was not justifiable on the merits, 
as tariffs could be "equally destructive of international trade", and subsidies and state 
trading could be "manipulated by governments as arbitrarily as Quantitative 
                                                 
413
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 29.  
414
 On the concept of normalcy as a heuristic device for understanding trade law, see Tarullo 1985; Tarullo 
1987.  
415
 See the US statement at E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 15: 
The matter which is now at issue before us is the freedom of the so-called underdeveloped countries 
to take protective measures. One might assume, to listen to some discussions, on this matter, that the 
Charter provided no liberty at all in this regard. This is not the case. Under the London and New 
York Drafts, an undeveloped country is free first to use subsidies and second it is free to impose a 
new tariff on any commodity which it has not bound against the imposition of a tariff, or to raise a 
tariff on any commodity which it has not bound against increase in the course of a trade agreement.  
416
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 15. 
417
 Jackson 1969, 637. (original emphasis) 
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Restrictions".
418
 The amendment which it introduced with respect to quantitative 
restrictions for protective purposes allowed new or intensified quotas only "where such 
restrictions are no more restrictive in their effect than other forms of protection permissible 
under this Charter".
419
 The amendment also accommodated concerns that quantitative 
restrictions might be used to circumvent tariff concessions, providing that such restrictions 
would not be applied "to any product in respect of which the importing Member country 
has assumed an obligation through negotiations with any other Member or Members 
pursuant to Chapter V".
420
 India further suggested that quantitative restrictions could be 
made subject to negotiations, akin to tariffs.
421
 The proposals of India and other countries 
which preferred quantitative restrictions to tariffs as a protective instrument, such as New 
Zealand,
422
 would thus have led to a multilateral trading system in which both tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions would have been the object of continuous negotiations, presumably 
with safeguards that commitments on one protective instrument would not be undermined 
by the use of the other.   
Instead of being the subject of negotiations, the use of quantitative restrictions, to 
the extent that it was allowed, would be subject to surveillance. As the US chief negotiator 
Wilcox assured his domestic audience, the exceptions allowing use of quantitative 
restrictions by less-developed countries "do not come into operation until numerous 
obstacles have been surmounted, conditions fulfilled, criteria satisfied, procedures 
followed, and permissions obtained".
423
 And, sure enough, developing countries would 
later describe balance-of-payments consultations as a "painful routine which had an 
inquisitorial character and was biased against the developing countries".
424
  
What this discussion goes to show is that the initial confrontation between 
"developed" and "developing" countries in the trading system did not take the form of 
                                                 
418
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 27. 
419
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 28; see also the examples provided by India for when the use of quantitative restrictions 
would be justified; ibid. 30 and Brown 1950, 76.  
420
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 28. 
421
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 31. 
422
 New Zealand made an impassioned plea for quantitative restrictions along the lines of the argument 
presented by the Indian delegation; E/PC/T/A/PV/26, 21-27.   
423
 Wilcox 1949, 493; Wilcox added:  
Once this has been done, they impose a series of additional obligations that must be assumed. And 
finally, they provide in one way or another for the limitation of the period during which the 
exception may be enjoyed. 
424
 CG.18/6, para. 15. 
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demands for "special" treatment by the latter, but rather represented a substantive clash of 
views on the comparative merits of different protective instruments – views that were 
informed by different visions of the appropriate role of the state in international trade, and 
that did not necessarily correlate with a more or less protectionist orientation. India, 
arguably the most vocal and engaged "less-developed" participant in the preparatory 
negotiations, did not seek "exceptions" to the rules; rather, it tried to shape the rules 
themselves, and to correct what it saw as an arbitrary lack of evenhandedness in a draft text 
profoundly shaped by the preferences and perspectives of the United States and Britain. It 
was a US decision to accommodate the Indian perspective through "exceptions" to the 
general rules, rather than to change the basic design of the trade policy disciplines 
embodied in the ITO and the GATT – a fact that was resented by the Indians. This move by 
the US – to safeguard its preferred policy while accommodating "less-developed" countries 
through exceptions – foreshadowed the "special" treatment that developing countries would 
later be accorded in the trading system. It is therefore deeply misleading to state, as Hudec 
does, that the developing country members of GATT "began by seeking to be excepted 
from the obligations in the GATT's code of behaviour".
425
 Hudec constructs this picture by 
treating the structure of the GATT, and in particular its preference for tariffs as a protective 
instrument, as axiomatic, self-evident, and natural ("The GATT code of behavior rested on 
three central principles"
426
), rather than as the product of a very specific political agenda.   
In practice, the prohibition of quantitative restrictions did little to constrain the use 
of quotas by developing countries for the first five decades of the trading system.
427
 While 
few countries went through the trouble of invoking the exception for economic 
development, they could always avail themselves of the exception for balance-of-payments 
                                                 
425
 Hudec 1987, 4. 
426
 Hudec 1987, 3. 
427
 The developed countries started to progressively tighten the screws on the balance-of-payments exception 
in the late 1970s (see the discussions in the Consultative Group of 18: CG.18/1, paras. 19-24; CG.18/2, paras. 
12-20; CG.18/3, paras. 4-25; CG.18/4, paras. 15-19; CG.18/5, paras. 14-20) and in the Uruguay Round. 
According to Paemen/Bensch 1995, 65, the developed countries saw  
[b]etter discipline in the area of BOP restrictions [as] the bridge-head for a wider effort to integrate 
the developing countries more fully and to encourage them to observe the rules of the General 
Agreement. 
During the Uruguay Round, the US was planning to challenge India's balance-of-payments restrictions 
through dispute settlement proceedings after the Round was concluded, which it eventually did in 1996; 
interview with Craig Thorn; for the Panel and Appellate Body reports, see WT/DS90/R and WT/DS90/AB/R; 
for India's complaints about efforts to restrict the use of the balance-of-payments exception during the 
Uruguay Round, see SR.43/ST/16, 3-4, and MTN.TNC/MIN(90)/ST/46, 3.  
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purposes, which had been inserted at the insistence of Britain and, except for reporting 
requirements, did not impose any of the conditions and burdens which saddled the 
economic development exception. This meant, however, that developing countries which 
reserved a greater role for state planning in their international trade operated from the outset 
under an "exceptional" regime, with little means, and in some cases little incentive, to 
participate in the "normal" activity of tariff negotiations. Commenting on the increasing use 
of restrictions for balance-of-payments purposes by developing countries in the 1950s, 
Hudec has noted that   
[i]t began to look as if emergency restrictions were going to be a permanent feature of 
developing-country trade regimes, making other GATT obligations irrelevant.
428
  
What Hudec fails to mention, of course, is that it had been the US-UK design which 
defined quantitative restrictions as "emergency restrictions" in the first place.   
Much greater practical problems for developing countries' trading positions were 
created by the specific exemptions from general rules that were designed to accommodate 
the practices of the "nuclear" countries. The US's aversion to state planning and quantitative 
restrictions did not extend to the area of agriculture, and an exception to the prohibition of 
quantitative restrictions for agricultural and fisheries products, taken almost verbatim from 
the US's reciprocal trade agreements, was included in all drafts of the ITO Charter and in 
the GATT. In conjunction with the lack of a ceiling on tariff levels and the lenient 
treatment of subsidies in the GATT, the lack of restraint on agricultural protectionism 
frustrated the attempts of many developing countries to increase their export earnings in 
order to finance their economic development.
429
 When these problems crystallised in the 
first decade of the GATT, they were initially conceptualised as a structural problem of the 
trading system, to be addressed through the removal of obstacles to the trade of "less-
                                                 
428
 Hudec 1987, 29. 
429
 The paradigmatic case was Cuba and sugar: during the preparatory negotiations, the Cuban delegation 
spoke at length about the problems created by the US sugar quota and the high levels of subsidisation. Its 
pronouncement on the treatment of subsidies in the draft ITO Charter are particularly memorable:  
[T]he subsidy is another form of restriction, and Article 30, instead of recognising that the system of 
subsidies is an artificial way of producing, of trading, on the contrary recognises this evil. If we are 
so fond of the liberty of commerce, we should have done with the subsidies the same thing as I 
propose for the quotas: eliminate all the subsidies and quotas. It is a very strange thing that the 
subsidy is something normal, correct, when it is used by a strong financial nation. To give public 
money to foster or maintain a product that is good for nothing, or that is raised by very artificial 
methods, to compete with the products of other nations that are produced in a natural form, 
according to the benefits of sun and soil, is not bad. So that kind of subsidy, which is absolutely 
artificial and … immoral, is legal, and is in accordance with the Charter. (E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 40-41)   
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developed" countries within the framework of a "programme for expansion of international 
trade".   
B. Before Some Countries Became "Special": The Cooperative 
Approach to International Trade Lawmaking 
After one decade of the GATT's operation, it became evident that different countries were 
benefiting unevenly from the kind of trade liberalisation that had been achieved under its 
auspices. Noting "the failure of the trade of less developed countries to develop as rapidly 
as that of industrialized countries", the Contracting Parties of the GATT commissioned an 
expert examination of trends in international trade, which became known as the Haberler 
Report.
430
 Under the impression of the Haberler Report, the Contracting Parties launched an 
Action Programme for the "expansion of international trade", which was to be 
accomplished by a "three-pronged attack on outstanding trade barriers":
431
 a new round of 
tariff negotiations; an attempt to address agricultural protectionism; and an effort to remove 
obstacles to the expansion of the trade of less-developed countries. The Contracting Parties 
set up three committees to implement the three elements of the programme.
432
 Committee I 
was tasked with preparing another round of tariff negotiations, which would ultimately 
become the Dillon Round.
433
 Committee II was to address the problem of agricultural 
protectionism by collecting data and studying the effects of agricultural trade barriers and 
by developing procedures for consultations with individual countries on their agricultural 
policies.
434
 Committee III was to concern itself with obstacles to the expansion of the 
export trade of less-developed countries.
435
  
The Programme on Expansion of International Trade marked an important juncture 
for lawmaking discourses in three respects. First, while the objective of the programme was 
framed as the "expansion" of trade, which could simply have meant more reciprocal trade 
barrier reduction (the work of Committee I), the programme also had a significant 
"systemic" component: it took into view the overall balance of benefits provided by the 
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 L/775. The report is GATT 1958.  
431
 GATT 1960, 7.  
432
 For the terms of reference, see L/939. 
433
 See L/885.  
434
 See the reports: L/1192; L/1326; L/1461; in December 1961, the Contracting Parties tasked Committee II 
to carry out further consultations with parties upon request; W.19/20. For a discussion of the work of 
Committee II, see Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996, 38-41. 
435
 See the reports: L/1063; L/1162; L/1321; L/1554; the principal findings and recommendations of 
Committee III are contained in L/1557.  
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trading system, and sought to redress the perceived imbalance of benefits – between 
agricultural importers and exporters (Committee II), and between developed and less-
developed countries (Committee III), respectively – outside the context of reciprocal trade 
barrier reductions. The conceptualisation of agricultural protectionism as "disturb[ing]" the 
"balance" of benefits under the agreement,
436
 as "prejudic[ing]" the "integrity of the GATT 
concept of reciprocal rights and obligations"
437
 and as "undermin[ing] the whole concept of 
a multilateral trading system"
438
 testify to a concern with the equity of the trading system 
that goes beyond the logic of payment.  
Second, while the first prong of the programme could build on the established 
principles and practices for tariff negotiations, the second and third prongs required new 
lawmaking techniques.
439
 In the initial discussions, the Contracting Parties had little 
conception what these would be; they merely expressed the view "that there should be 
some attempt to overcome those obstacles to the expansion of trade which arose from 
national agricultural policies", as well as "other obstacles to the expansion of the export 
trade of under-developed countries".
440
 The record notes that there appeared to be "general 
agreement" that these were matters to which the Contracting Parties "should now address 
themselves".
441
 
As I will show below, the procedures that they eventually developed differed 
markedly from the market logic of the reciprocity discourse, revolving around the analysis 
and discussion of actual and potential trade flows, as well as the objectives and effects of 
particular policies. The information gathered in this process provided the basis for appeals 
for "moderation" in the use of agricultural trade barriers, and for an "enlightened attitude on 
the part of the highly-developed countries in opening their markets to the products of the 
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 The programme was not exclusively a lawmaking initiative, but also had a compliance component, since 
many of the obstacles to trade identified by Committees II and III were inconsistent with GATT law even as it 
stood at the time; see L/1557, 3, where Committee III notes that  
many of these restrictive measures [applied by industrialised countries, N.L.], particularly 
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less-developed countries".
442
 In short, the lawmaking aims of the second and third pillar 
were to be attained through analysis, discussion and persuasion (what I will in the 
following call the "cooperative" approach), rather than payment.  
Third, the programme came at an important juncture in the history of trade 
lawmaking in that it provided the backdrop against which the "developing" countries 
(re)defined their relationship with the GATT and its "developed" members.
443
 It was the 
first time in GATT history that the Contracting Parties devoted systematic attention to the 
problems that the "less-developed" countries encountered in their trade.
444
 In addition, the 
"less-developed" countries increasingly organised themselves as a group.
445
 In 1959, they 
submitted a first joint "note" to the Contracting Parties
446
, and in 1963 they started a series 
of informal weekly meetings.
447
  
Due to these three factors – its systemic concerns, the pioneering of the cooperative 
approach to lawmaking, and the less-developed countries' increasing articulation of their 
interests – the fate of the programme for the expansion of international trade would shape 
the role of developing countries in multilateral trade lawmaking in a lasting way. As I will 
argue below, the perceived failure of the programme marked the end of the attempt to 
address the problems of developing countries as a structural problem of the trading system 
to be addressed through a cooperative approach, and channelled developing countries' 
energies towards seeking accommodation with the reciprocity discourse, by arguing for a 
principle of "special and more favourable treatment". While this discourse is widely 
perceived and portrayed as an exception to reciprocity, its actual operation replicated and 
reinforced the market logic of the reciprocity discourse. 
                                                 
442
 GATT 1961, 12-13; see also GATT 1962, 14:  
There is a need to alleviate the present paradoxical situation whereby the industrialized countries, on 
the one hand, extend massive financial assistance to the less-developed countries to facilitate their 
economic development and, on the other, impede access to their markets for the exports which result 
from this development. 
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 See also Hudec 1987, Chapter 3.  
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trade situation of developing countries". 
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 Curzon 1965, 231; Hudec 208:  
In the early 1960s the developing countries formed a functioning 'caucus,' capable of formulating 
and negotiating specific demands upon GATT and upon its developed country members. In virtually 
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the developing country point of view.  
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Between September 1959 and October 1960 Committee II undertook a "programme 
of consultation and confrontation"
448
 on the agricultural policies of all individual members 
of the GATT. Each contracting party was requested to submit documentation on its current 
agricultural policies, on the non-tariff barriers employed in conjunction with these policies, 
as well as detailed information on all measures affecting selected commodities which 
"enter[ed] importantly into world trade". This information was then subject to 
"examination" by the Committee, and other countries would "express … their anxieties" 
about the actual or potential trade effects of these policies.
449
 The aim of the work of 
Committee II was to facilitate, in the words of the GATT Secretariat, a "new modus vivendi 
for trading conditions in agricultural and food products".
450
 What was hoped for was not so 
much the "wholesale abandonment of agricultural protectionism", but rather "some degree 
of moderation in the application of agricultural policies and a change in their direction and 
technique".
451
  
Committee III was tasked with examining "the broad problem of the difficulties 
which confront the less-developed countries in expanding their export trade with the rest of 
the world."
452
 In March 1959, Committee III adopted a work programme, which consisted 
of three parts.
453
 First, the less-developed countries were asked to provide lists of products 
in which they had an actual or potential export interest. Second, and on this basis, the major 
obstacles to the expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed countries were to be 
studied. This second part would include an examination of trade barriers and other 
measures maintained by developed countries, identification of the comparative advantages 
of the less-developed country in question,
454
 the potential for less-developed countries to 
"improve their own production and marketing techniques" and to remove obstacles to 
exports. Third, the Committee would review the action "taken, or to be taken" by the 
                                                 
448
 GATT 1961, 12. 
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 For the work programme, see COM.III/1, 1.  
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 In the words of the work programme:  
Study of the possibility of channelling expansion of existing industries or starting of new industries 
by less developed countries into directions where such countries will be economically efficient 
producers – e.g., in regard to a few such industries selected on the basis of raw material availability, 
feasibility of labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive techniques, etc. – thus avoiding relatively 
inefficient use of capital. (COM.III/1, 2)  
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contracting parties to accomplish the objective of expanding the export earnings of the less 
developed countries.    
Over the following years, the Committee conducted a "detailed examination" of 
over thirty products and product groups that less-developed countries had identified as 
being of special export interest to them.
455
 The Committee extensively documented the type 
and severity of restrictions on importation of these products maintained by industrialised 
countries, estimated the effects of removing these restrictions,
456
 and issued 
recommendations to this effect. Finally, the Committee reviewed individual industrialised 
countries' progress in modifying or eliminating these restrictions, and urged further action 
where progress had not been forthcoming.     
Overall, the way in which Committee III approached its subject matter differed 
fundamentally from lawmaking governed by the reciprocity discourse. Under the 
reciprocity discourse, lawmaking begins with each country individually drawing up a list of 
"requests" and "offers"; under the cooperative approach adopted by Committee III, the first 
step was to establish a shared understanding of what was inhibiting the achievement of a 
common objective, namely, the increase of the export earnings of the less-developed 
countries.
457
 To build this shared understanding, Committee III relied on information 
provided by both its less-developed and its developed members, as well as data provided by 
the GATT Secretariat. The reports of the Committee reflect a remarkable degree of 
consensus about the major obstacles to the exports of the less-developed countries; open 
disagreements, such as on the question whether a reduction in revenue duties on tropical 
products would lead to a substantial increase in consumption of those products, were 
extremely rare. 
Under the reciprocity discourse, the next step is to match requests and offers – 
whether a participant achieves its lawmaking objectives depends to a large extent on its 
                                                 
455
 The products included: coffee, tea, cocoa, oilseeds and vegetable oils, tobacco, lead, copper, timber, 
cotton, cotton textiles, and jute manufactures, bicycles, sewing machines, electrical fans, diesel engines, 
electrical motors, vegetable or chrome tanned hides and skins, finished leather and leather goods, iron ores, 
aluminium, alumina and bauxite, and sporting goods; see L/1063, para. 2; L/1321, paras. 4-33; L/1162, para. 
10; L/1321, Annexes A-E.   
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 This point was particularly controversial in the case of internal taxes on products such as coffee, tea and 
cocoa on which there was no domestic production; see L/1063, paras. 10-12; L/1162, Document 3 
("Explanatory Notes on the Measurement of Price Elasticities"); L/1321, paras. 5-7 and Annex F. 
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 L/1162, para. 3:  
the Committee intended that the studies should be conducted objectively in the spirit of the common 
interest of all contracting parties in moving rapidly towards the basic objectives of Committee III.    
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individual bargaining power. If the participant does not have anything to offer that its 
counterparts are prepared to pay for with the concessions that it is interested in, it will not 
achieve its objectives. Under the cooperative approach, by contrast, lawmaking relies on 
collective pressure rather than individual bargaining power – collective pressure not in the 
sense that the less-developed countries united against the developed countries, but rather in 
the sense that all members of Committee III, including the major industrialised countries to 
whom the appeals of the Committee were addressed, subscribed to these appeals and 
thereby committed to take action in pursuit of the shared objective and to submit to a 
subsequent review of their progress.
458
 In many ways, the modus operandi of the 
Committee anticipates what would be celebrated as a major innovation when it was 
introduced three decades later in the course of the Uruguay Round – the Trade Policy 
Review Mechanism. The Trade Policy Review Mechanism, which subjects WTO Members' 
trade policies to collective examination and confrontation, has been hailed as a "a small 
step towards making individual members responsible to a greater collectivity" and "as a 
subtle change from GATT as a contract between individual signatories towards GATT as 
an international institution."
459
 Arguably, the work of Committee III, which over time 
started asking "increasingly embarrassing questions" and making "steadily more specific 
recommendations",
460
 represented a more radical departure from the bilateral-contract 
conception of the GATT than the comparatively tame Trade Policy Review Mechanism. 
A third fundamental difference between the reciprocity discourse and the 
cooperative approach is the role that law plays under the two approaches. Reciprocity only 
works with hard, binding law: only a legally binding commitment is a concession worth 
paying for. As I will discuss more extensively in chapter 4, the reciprocity discourse is 
inextricably bound up with the conception of GATT as a contract embodying a balance of 
concessions. In the work of Committee III, by contrast, the question of whether an obstacle 
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 With respect to an appeal directed to the industrialized countries in the second report of Committee III  
to examine their tariff rates, their fiscal duties, their quantitative restrictions and all other 
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to the trade of the less-developed countries was legal or illegal under the GATT was seen as 
largely irrelevant. The Committee clarified early on that it 
did not consider the extent to which certain of these restrictions … were of a temporary 
nature nor, of course, did it consider whether particular restrictions were in accord with the 
General Agreement.
461
 
The Committee further clarified that it would address itself "not only to measures applied 
inconsistently with the General Agreement, but to all types of barriers affecting trade in 
these products".
462
  
While the Committee's refusal to investigate the legality of measures maintained by 
developed countries may in part have been due to the sensitivity of this issue – such 
investigations might have jeopardized developed countries' cooperation in the Committee –, 
it is more plausible to see it as owing to the fact that the legality/illegality question was 
simply irrelevant in light of the Committee's mandate to examine all measures that could be 
taken to increase the export earnings of the less-developed countries. In light of the 
Committee's single-minded focus on this objective, the question – all-important in the 
framework of the reciprocity discourse – of whether a measure was being maintained 
illegally and hence its elimination had already been paid for, simply had no particular 
purchase.
463
   
A fourth difference between the programme and negotiations governed by 
reciprocity is the way in which the subject matter of negotiations is delineated and framed. 
Under the reciprocity discourse, negotiations tend to be organized by reference to different 
types of trade barriers, such as tariffs; this produces a uniform currency of payment and 
thus makes the payments of individual participants comparable. The starting point of the 
analysis under the cooperative approach, by contrast, was a specific product or sector, such 
as tropical products. The cooperative approach thus brought all trade restrictions and other 
policies affecting the trade in these products into view. Moreover, it also highlighted the 
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 A similar non-legalistic attitude was evident in a lawsuit brought by Uruguay against the developed 
countries of the GATT at around the same time (1961), listing 576 measures maintained by developed 
countries that were inhibiting Uruguay's exports; see L/1647; Hudec characterises the complaint as 
"showpiece litigation – an effort to dramatize a larger problem by framing it as a lawsuit"; Hudec 1987, 47. 
With one exception, Uruguay did not bother to specifically allege that any of these measures was inconsistent 
with the GATT; its point was that "whether or not these barriers were legal, the GATT was not working if it 
could not do better than this"; Hudec 1987, 47.   
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interaction between different protective instruments, for example, differential tariff rates for 
raw materials and processed products, and thus revealed effective protection that was not 
apparent when tariff lines were considered in isolation. While a focus on individual 
products and sectors is evidently useful where the aim is to achieve a particular substantive 
goal, it is ill-suited to the imperatives of reciprocity, as it blurs the currency of payments 
and diminishes the opportunities for cross-sectoral payoffs.    
Committee III compiled a voluminous record of trade restrictions maintained by the 
industrialised countries and other obstacles to the exports of less-developed countries. The 
initial results of the programme were less than had been hoped for. As the GATT 
Secretariat put it,  
[b]y late 1961, Committee III had carried its work as far forward as it could … It had clearly 
identified the barriers which impede an expansion of the less-developed countries' exports. 
It had strongly urged the importing countries concerned, particularly industrialized 
countries, to take the steps necessary to reduce or eliminate these barriers. The results of 
these appeals were disappointing.
464
 
The less-developed countries saw "no improvement"
465
 in their trading position, which had 
even deteriorated in some respects.
466
  
The Committee nonetheless pressed forward with an approach focused on 
persuading the developed countries to give up their trade barriers. In December 1961, the 
Contracting Parties adopted a "Declaration on Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed 
Countries", in which they recognised "the need for a conscious and purposeful effort" to 
increase the export earnings of less-developed countries, and the industrialised countries 
acknowledged their "particular responsibility" in "reduc[ing] to a minimum" any 
restrictions on the exports of less-developed countries.
467
 The Declaration listed in detail 
the trade restrictions that Committee III had identified in this regard.  
Over time, the appeals of the Committee became more urgent, and the less-
developed countries' proposals became more concrete. In 1963, the less-developed 
countries suggested a "Programme of Action" that set specific dates for the elimination of 
particular barriers to trade maintained by developed countries. They also submitted a 
                                                 
464
 GATT 1962, 16; see also Dam 1970, 234: "the response to the work of Committee III was essentially 
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proposal for duty-free access for tropical products to developed country markets.
468
 For the 
first time, these proposals were openly resisted. The EEC and the less-developed countries 
associated with it endorsed the action programme only in the most tentative terms, instead 
advocating a "deliberate effort to organize international trade in products of interest to the 
less-developed countries" as well as the authorization of preferences in favour of 
developing countries.
469
 It was no secret that the EEC took this position in order to protect 
the preferential treatment that its associated states enjoyed in the European market.
470
   
The 1963 Ministerial meeting spawned a number of new committees and working 
parties: the contracting parties decided to set up an "action committee" to review the 
implementation of the action programme;
471
 a committee on legal and institutional issues to 
study ways of putting the work of Committee III on a more permanent institutional basis;
472
 
and a working group to study the question of preferences.
473
 The work of the Committee on 
the Legal and Institutional Framework of the GATT in Relation to Less-Developed 
Countries resulted in the addition of a new Part IV on "Trade and Development" to the 
GATT.   
Part IV has been described as "merely a slightly more impressive statement of the 
urgent but non-binding texts that the Action Programme had been issuing over the 
preceding five years, giving them a permanent form in the text of the General 
Agreement."
474
 Given the non-legalistic impetus of the work of Committee III, it was 
indeed somewhat ironic for this work to result in new legal text. However, true to the spirit 
of the cooperative approach to trade lawmaking, the three articles of the chapter, entitled 
"Principles and Objectives", "Commitments", and "Joint Action", primarily record the 
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 Hudec 1987, 56.  
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demands of the less-developed countries and the intentions of the contracting parties to 
work together towards their achievement, and do little to codify commitments undertaken in 
response to those demands.
475
 In Dam's words, the chapter represents an effort  
to move away from a legality-illegality approach in the assessment of developed country 
performance toward multilateral efforts to achieving "solutions satisfactory to all … 
concerned".
476
 
 
The major practical effect of Part IV was that, through its provisions on consultation 
and joint action, it put the work of Committee III, and hence the cooperative approach to 
trade lawmaking – analysis, consultation, confrontation, recommendations – on a 
permanent institutional basis. Article XXXVIII.2(f) mandated the establishment of such 
"institutional arrangements as may be necessary" to further the objectives of the Part and to 
"give effect" to its provisions. To this end, the contracting parties established the 
Committee on Trade and Development in February 1965.
477
 The Committee on Trade and 
Development essentially took up the work of Committee III where the latter left it off.
478
  
Overall, it would be inaccurate to say that the cooperative approach to trade 
lawmaking proved completely ineffectual in inducing developed countries to change their 
trade policies.
479
 However, several factors severely limited the scope of those changes. 
First, the cooperative approach violated the principle of payment. Committee III had noted 
that "for both fiscal and developmental reasons, less-developed countries cannot rely solely 
on the traditional methods of tariff negotiation involving exchange of concessions" and had 
recommended that "contracting parties, particularly industrialized countries, should 
examine this problem and consider the feasibility of giving relief through unilateral action, 
independently of the next round of multilateral tariff negotiations."
480
 In practice, the 
developed countries, even though they were, as members of Committee III, themselves 
responsible for this recommendation, proved to be extremely reluctant to do so. 
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One observer has argued that the developed countries  
were still too accustomed to viewing the GATT as a passive organization in which barriers 
to trade were reduced only by quid pro quo negotiations, to be willing to take extensive 
unilateral steps toward the reduction of barriers to less-developed-country exports.
481
  
Apart from habits of mind, the fact that, in their negotiations amongst each other, 
developed countries would still be operating under the reciprocity discourse, made them 
reluctant to follow the recommendations of the Committee III. As several observers have 
argued,  
the developed countries were loath to reduce any customs duties except in the context of the 
Kennedy Round for fear of losing credit for their concessions in the final balancing of 
bindings.
482
  
In some instances, the trade negotiators of developed countries simply had no authority to 
grant unilateral concessions. Thus, US negotiators reported that, in the Dillon Round, they 
had "made a gesture" in taking account the needs of the less-developed countries "by 
accepting agreements balanced in their favour in terms of strict trade coverage." However, 
the United States had been "unable within the framework of policy laid down under 
existing legislation … to accede to their wishes for completely unreciprocated 
concessions."
483
  
Even when the US Congress gave the authority for a major unreciprocated 
concession in the 1962 Trade Expansion Act – the elimination of tariffs on tropical 
agricultural and forest commodities –, US negotiators found themselves unable to use this 
authority as it was conditioned on comparable action by the EEC.
484
 The EEC, in turn, was 
not willing to make a similar move, most likely in an effort to protect the preference 
margins enjoyed by its associated countries in the EEC market.
485
 In general, the 
parochialism of the EEC, and in particular France, which manifested itself in resistance to 
the 1963 Programme of Action,
486
 in the EEC's refusal to match the US Tokyo Round offer 
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on tropical products,
487
 and later in France's boycott of Part IV and the consultations of the 
Committee on Trade and Development,
488
 was a second major factor that explains the 
meagre results of the cooperative approach;
489
 its effects were compounded by the 
reluctance of other developed countries to act without the EEC.
490
    
As a result of these factors, Committee III did by and large not succeed in 
decreasing tariff barriers to the exports of less-developed countries.
491
 Neither was there 
much movement on internal fiscal charges – as noted above, the developed countries 
doubted that reductions in such charges would result in substantially increased imports of 
the products in question and were for the most part not willing to change their tax systems. 
It was only with regard to quantitative restrictions that the Committee recorded major 
progress;
492
 even this progress, however, "had been mainly the result of the emergence 
from balance of payments difficulties of a number of contracting parties in fulfilment of 
their obligations under the General Agreement".
493
 The hard core of quantitative 
restrictions that were maintained for other than balance-of-payments reasons – mostly on 
imports of agricultural products – would prove exceedingly intractable,494 and would 
remain a focus of the work of Committee III and the Committee on Trade and Development 
for years to come.
495
  
In the final analysis, then, it appeared that "[t]rade policy toward the less developed 
countries [was] more talked about than acted on", as a task force on foreign trade policy for 
the incoming Nixon administration put it in 1969.
496
 As a consequence, the developing 
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countries became increasingly disillusioned with the cooperative approach to trade 
lawmaking. One representative stated in the Consultative Group of Eighteen in the late 
1970s that  
[i]t was an illusion to believe that procedures and institutions were an effective substitute for 
clearly spelled out, equitable and precise rules. The Committee on Trade and Development 
had, in the absence of such rules, demonstrated its inability to steer trade policy in the 
directions contemplated in Part IV and became largely a forum for the ritual repetition of 
well-worn and familiar phrases.
497
 
Another representative expressed the view 
… that the Committee on Trade and Development had so far had a negligible impact on the 
policies of the developed countries. Evidence was lacking of a serious commitment to Part 
IV of the General Agreement, in particular its standstill provisions. The Committee had now 
been exploring for years the question of how the situation could be improved.
498
 
 
C. When Some Countries Became "Special": The Birth of "Special 
and Differential Treatment" 
The studies undertaken in the course of the programme had brought the limitations of the 
"orthodox pattern"
499
 of trade lawmaking, i.e., lawmaking governed by reciprocity, in 
addressing the obstacles to the trade of less-developed countries into sharp relief. These 
limitations were of three kinds.  
First, trade lawmaking at the time was still largely limited to tariff negotiations. The 
majority of the obstacles that developing countries faced, however, were restrictions other 
than tariffs – most prominently, quantitative import restrictions, internal fiscal charges, and 
subsidies and price support schemes for agricultural production. The developing countries, 
as well as agricultural exporters who were similarly disadvantaged by this limitation 
"argued strongly that, to make the forthcoming negotiations meaningful and more equitable 
for them, these measures should also be negotiable in the course of the tariff conference."
500
 
Apart from token attempts to integrate internal taxes into the tariff negotiations, however, 
these barriers remained non-negotiable.  
Second, the less-developed countries argued that their capacity to pay for 
concessions was in any case limited, since they needed tariffs for "revenue and 
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developmental purposes".
501
 They further pointed out that "capital goods account[ed] for 
the greater part of their import bill and the duties on these good [were] in any case very low 
to negligible".
502
 Moreover, many of their imports were "tied" to loans from particular 
countries, so the tariffs had "little practical significance".
503
  
A third major limitation on the less-developed countries' capacity to expand their 
exports through tariff negotiations was the principal supplier rule: since they were "not yet 
principal or even substantial" suppliers of the goods the exports of which they were most 
interested in expanding, namely manufactured or semi-manufactured goods, they were not 
automatically entitled to negotiate on these products.
504
 This problem persisted in the 
Tokyo Round, where developing countries complained that developed countries,  
having received our requests for concessions, have replied that they could not take them into 
consideration on the pretext that we were neither a principal supplier nor a major supplier, 
thus disregarding the importance for our economy of the products in respect of which we 
had made requests for concessions.
505
 
Given the low volume of their exports in these products, they also felt that it would be 
unjustifiable for them to be made to "pay compensation" for market access in these 
products.
506
  
In sum, and put in terms of the market metaphor, the less-developed countries faced 
three problems in the negotiations: what they needed to buy was largely not for sale, they 
had in any case little means to pay for it, and, even if it was on sale, they were not 
necessarily entitled to buy it.
507
   
Due to these limitations, the reciprocity discourse had held little promise for the 
less-developed countries. However, confronted with the failure of their attempt to achieve 
significant reductions of trade barriers through the cooperative approach to trade 
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lawmaking, the developing countries were left with little choice but to seek accommodation 
with the reciprocity discourse in the forthcoming major trade rounds, namely, the Dillon 
and Kennedy Rounds.  
Developing countries had already achieved some recognition of their difficulties in 
participating in tariff negotiations on the basis of reciprocity. As early as the GATT/ITO 
preparatory negotiations, a Joint Committee on Industrial Development had recommended 
that the "uneven" state of "the comparative development of Member countries" should be 
taken into account "in any tariff negotiations".
508
 Moreover, Article XXVIII bis of the 
GATT, which had been added during the 1955 review negotiations, recognised  
the needs of less-developed countries for a more flexible use of tariff protection to assist 
their economic development and the special needs of these countries to maintain tariffs for 
revenue purposes.
509
 
 
In the early 1960s, this recognition began to crystallise into the principle that 
developed countries would not expect "full reciprocity" from developing countries. What is 
crucial to understand, though, is that the concessions for which developed countries would 
not expect full reciprocity from developing countries were not concessions resulting from 
negotiations between developing countries and developed countries; because of the 
principal supplier rule, such negotiations rarely took place.
510
 Rather, the concessions for 
which developed countries would not demand "full reciprocity" from developing countries 
were concessions that developed countries granted each other and that incidentally 
benefited developing countries.
511
 In other words, the principle of "less-than-full 
reciprocity" did not refer to concessions that had been requested by and granted to 
developing countries; it only meant that developed countries would not demand "full 
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compensation" from developing countries for incidental benefits that the latter might derive 
from tariff bargains concluded among developed countries.
512
    
The incidental nature of the benefits that developing countries could hope to derive 
from what would eventually become known as the principle of "special and differential 
treatment" became particularly obvious in the first round in which a participant – the EEC – 
tabled an offer based on a linear across-the-board reduction – the Dillon Round. The EEC 
made it plain that this offer "did not involve reciprocity on the part of less-developed 
countries".
513
 The EEC further announced that  
in the course of the multilateral negotiations the Community would endeavour to exchange 
with the other industrialized countries tariff concessions on products which are of particular 
interest to less-developed countries.
514
 
This statement makes it clear that the EEC's offer of "non-reciprocity" did not mean that it 
would grant concessions on products of interest to developing countries directly to those 
countries on non-reciprocal terms. The developing countries were reduced to hoping that 
products of interest to them would be the subject of bargains among the developed 
countries.  
Unsurprisingly, the amount of tariff reduction achieved on products of interest to 
developing countries would remain paltry, and far below what was accomplished on the 
exports of developed countries. As the developing countries noted at the outset of the 
Kennedy Round,  
in past tariff negotiations under the GATT, products of special interest to less-developed 
countries had tended to be excluded from the tariff concessions made by the developed 
countries, with the result that … tariffs on products of special interest to them tended to be 
disproportionately high.
515
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In the Kennedy Round itself, developing countries did not fare much better. While the use 
of a 50 per cent horizontal reduction by most developed countries should have greatly 
increased the scope of incidental benefits, developing countries could do little to prevent 
developed countries from exempting products of interest to them from the linear reduction. 
As the Chairman of the Committee on Trade and Development noted in a report: 
Developed participants have already indicated that they may ultimately be forced to 
withdraw offers on particular products. Their principal suppliers of these products are, 
almost without exception, other developed countries. In certain instances, even though a 
developing country is not the principal supplier of the product in question, developing 
countries taken together have a trade interest of great importance to them. In the great 
majority of cases, the current trade interest of the developing countries of the products in 
question is small but there is already some indication that relatively more advanced 
developing countries will be affected if withdrawals are made to restore the balance 
between developed participants since they have a larger interest in products predominantly 
traded between these countries.
516
 
In some cases, concessions of great value to developing countries were not offered in the 
first place because the developed country in question did not expect to receive adequate 
reciprocity for them from other developed countries. In the Kennedy Round negotiations on 
agriculture, for example, the US hesitated to table offers that it believed the developing 
countries might "find very attractive" because it could not be sure that it would be able to 
"reach any commensurate arrangement with [its] commercial equals" and would thus be 
forced to withdraw those offers.
517
 
It is telling that official pronouncement on "non-reciprocity", which became a 
standard feature of negotiating plans starting in the early 1960s, were consistently couched 
in terms of the "attitude" or "expectations" of developed countries, rather than the rights 
and aspirations of developing countries. Thus, at a Ministerial Meeting in 1961, ministers 
agreed that "a more flexible attitude should be taken with respect to the degree of 
reciprocity to be expected" from the less-developed countries.
518
 The "Declaration on 
Promotion of the Trade of Less-Developed Countries" adopted at the same meeting 
similarly encouraged the contracting parties to "adopt a sympathetic attitude on questions 
of reciprocity".
519
 The working party negotiating procedures for the Kennedy Round tariff 
negotiations agreed that "the developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from 
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less-developed countries."
520
 The same wording of the principle was adopted by ministers 
for the Kennedy Round.
521
 Part IV of the GATT, added in 1965, provided that  
[t]he developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by 
them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to the trade of less 
developed contracting parties.
522
 
In all these formulations from the formative phase of the principle of special and 
differential treatment, it is clear that the agency is with the developed countries – it is the 
developed countries that, in an act of charity and magnanimity, agree to moderate their 
expectations, not the developing countries that gain some kind of entitlement. The 
developing countries are little more than passive beneficiaries; they are free to articulate 
their wishes for tariff reductions, but the developed countries are equally free to reject or 
ignore them.
523
   
In the final analysis, then, the principle of special and differential treatment did not 
represent much of a deviation from the principle of payment: while it suggested that 
developing countries should receive certain trade benefits at a discount, it did not in any 
way oblige the developed countries to sell anything at all at the reduced rates. The principle 
thus left intact a fundamental element of the market metaphor of trade lawmaking: the 
freedom of the seller to decide what to sell and at what price. At most, the principle of 
special and differential treatment modified the exchange rate between concessions by 
developed countries on one hand and developing countries on the other hand. By 
designating this modification of the exchange rate as "special", though, the principle 
actually affirmed the rule of "full payment"
524
 as the "normal" modus operandi of trade 
lawmaking.
525
 Starting in the 1970s, the developed countries further reinforced the idea that 
"less-than-full reciprocity" was no more than a temporary aberration by introducing the 
concept of "graduation", pursuant to which the developing countries would "gradually 
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accept the same obligations of reciprocity as they progress toward higher stages of 
development".
526
 
It is important to draw attention to the ways in which the principle of special and 
differential treatment differed from the cooperative approach. Through the cooperative 
approach, developing countries had sought to impose specific obligations on developed 
countries to eliminate barriers to the exports of less-developed countries; the focus of this 
approach was on the realisation of the common goal of expanding the export earnings of 
these countries, and it directed attention to the products and measures that would have to be 
addressed in order to achieve that goal. The principle of special and differential treatment, 
by contrast, was a principle of exchange, a variation of, and parasitic on, the principle of 
reciprocity; any benefits to developing countries' trade deriving from its application were 
incidental to exchanges between developed countries, and therefore accidental.   
Since its emergence in the 1960s, the principle of special and differential treatment 
in tariff negotiations has evolved in ways that has arguably satisfied the aspirations of 
neither the developed nor the developing countries. The developed countries' hope that 
developing countries would "graduate" to full reciprocity has largely remained unfulfilled; 
while there has been increasing differentiation of tariff reduction commitments among 
developing countries, the developed/developing country distinction has remained an almost 
impermeable boundary, and the principle of special and differential treatment, instead of 
being temporary, has if anything been further entrenched. Developing countries' hope, on 
the other hand, that the principle could give rise to a "right" to tariff reductions on non-
reciprocal terms and to the formulation of "specific rules" pursuant to which tariff 
reductions for the benefit of developing countries would be undertaken has also come to 
little.
527
 While special and differential treatment has become a pervasive feature of 
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reduction modalities – virtually every reduction coefficient in the draft modalities for 
NAMA and agriculture in the current Doha Round is substantially higher for developed 
countries than for developing countries
528
 –, the principle still means little more than that 
developing countries will do essentially the same as the developed countries, just less so 
and more slowly. 
There is one aspect of the Doha Round negotiations, however, that represents a 
significant departure from the principle of special and differential as it has been 
traditionally understood: the commitment to grant duty-free and quota-free treatment to all 
exports from LDCs.
529
 This commitment, adopted by Ministers at the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Meeting in 2005, is not merely an undertaking not to demand reciprocity from 
LDCs; rather, it implies an obligation on the part of developed countries ("developed-
country Members shall") to provide secure and unhindered market access, and a 
corresponding right on the part of LDCs to access those markets. This commitment, once it 
is implemented, will thus achieve full liberalisation for all exports of a sub-group of 
developing countries – the same objective that the cooperative approach sought to attain for 
the key exports of all developing countries.  
 
D. Special and Differential Treatment in Agreements on Non-Tariff 
Measures 
While differentiated reduction coefficients have provided a straightforward way of 
embodying the principle of special and differential treatment in formula-based reduction 
modalities, agreements on non-tariff measures are more complicated in this respect. The 
most simple way of according special treatment to developing countries in this area is to 
exempt them from obligations, either by allowing them not to sign up to agreements or by 
providing exemptions from specific obligations. Up until the Uruguay Round, this was 
indeed the situation with regard to most non-tariff barriers. While developing countries 
during this period had little influence on the development of the rules on non-tariff barriers, 
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allowing the developed countries to set the standard in this area as well, they also faced 
little pressure to conform to this standard. They thus enjoyed "special" treatment, as it were, 
by default.  
The Uruguay Round single undertaking, which forced the developing countries to 
sign up to virtually all Uruguay Round agreements, changed the picture radically. All of a 
sudden, the default position was that the developing countries had the same obligations as 
the developed countries; the specific exemptions and privileges provided in the Uruguay 
Round agreements thereby acquired a practical significance that those contained in the 
Tokyo Round codes never had. While these exemptions and privileges took a number of 
forms,
530
 the only form of special treatment that developing countries enjoyed with respect 
to some of the most demanding obligations in the Uruguay Round agreements were 
transition periods of up to ten years for implementing them.
531
 The device of transition 
periods had, of course, a close kinship with the idea of "graduation" in the tariff field – the 
notion that, in the end, all countries should be subject to the same obligations, and that the 
obligations applying to developed countries should provide the standard in this respect. 
Again, then, special and differential treatment was to be no more than a temporary 
aberration from the norm derived from developed countries' practices.   
One can of course wonder whether it would not be beneficial for developing 
countries to gradually apply the same rules as the developed countries. Answering this 
question would require a detailed analysis of the history and substance of the Uruguay 
Round agreements that I cannot undertake here. What is reasonably clear, though, is that at 
least some of the Uruguay Round agreements posed two distinct kinds of problems for the 
developing countries, and that the shallow and temporary form of special and differential 
treatment which the developing countries were granted in the Uruguay Round did little to 
help them address those problems. The first kind of problem arose in the case of 
agreements the implementation of which was manifestly not in the interest of most 
developing countries – many have argued that this was the case of the TRIPS Agreement. 
Evidently, no form of special and differential treatment short of a complete exemption from 
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the obligations of such an agreement would solve this problem.
532
 Developing countries 
confront a problem of a different type in the case of agreements the implementation of 
which might well yield benefits for them, but would involve one-off costs that would 
exceed, at least in the short and medium-term, any benefits that might possibly flow from 
doing so.
533
 Transition periods can at best mitigate this problem. Another form of special 
and differential treatment, however, involving the provision of technical assistance and 
capacity building, might transform this latter type of agreement into a "win-win" 
proposition. I want to suggest that the type of special and differential treatment provisions 
that are being envisaged for the Trade Facilitation Agreement currently under negotiation in 
the Doha Round may potentially accomplish this.     
On first sight, the negotiations on trade facilitation could appear to repeat the old 
pattern whereby legal disciplines are modelled on practices that the developed countries are 
already following anyway, but will require costly adaptation from developing countries. 
Reportedly, however, the developing countries have had substantial input in the 
negotiations and have identified significant grievances that they hope an eventual 
agreement will address.
534
 Moreover, there are few if any doubts that developing countries' 
trade will benefit from streamlined customs procedures. At the same time, it is widely 
acknowledged that implementing the agreement will tax the scarce resources, both human 
and financial, of many developing countries. What is innovative about the special and 
differential treatment section of the draft text on trade facilitation is that it is designed to 
tackle this problem head on.
535
  Instead of simply allowing developing countries to opt out 
of commitments, the draft text establishes a link between the obligations of developing 
countries on the one hand and their implementation capacity on the other hand, effectively 
making the provision of technical assistance by developed countries a pre-condition for the 
respective obligations of developing countries to take effect.
536
 In addition, developing 
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countries are given wide discretion to determine their own technical assistance needs and 
implementation schedule. The draft agreement has been hailed for "placing emphasis – and 
onus – on the creation of enhanced capabilities as opposed to mere temporary carve-
outs"
537
 and thereby "putting every Member in a position to actually implement the 
envisaged measures".
538
  When the agreement is eventually implemented, developing 
countries could thus benefit from the lower transaction costs of their trade without having 
to bear undue implementation burdens. The draft agreement on trade facilitation could thus 
be seen as an example of the cooperative approach to trade lawmaking, in which all parties 
contribute towards a common goal: the developed countries contribute resources and 
expertise, while the developing countries assume a commitment to implement legal 
obligations.  
 
E. Conclusion 
Developing countries have been active participants in the trade regime from the outset; for 
several decades now, the majority of the members of the trade regime have been 
developing countries. One may hence wonder why it is that developing countries have been 
accorded "special" treatment throughout the history of multilateral trade lawmaking. Why 
has addressing the concerns and interests of developing countries never become the 
"normal" approach, the default option, in multilateral trade lawmaking? 
One answer could be that the developing countries have never been prepared to do 
what multilateral trade lawmaking is all about, namely, assume legal commitments to 
reduce barriers to trade. This answer is strongly suggested by Hudec's influential account in 
Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System. As I have argued in the present section, it 
is an answer that is deeply misleading. Instead, I suggest that developing countries' interests 
have been conceptualised as "special" in the trading system so as to allow the developed 
countries to pursue their preferred design of the trading regime and their preferred method 
of making trade law relatively unperturbed. Granting "special" treatment to developing 
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countries has allowed the developed countries to accommodate them within the system 
without changing the fundamental features and default characteristics of that system.   
In the first part of this section, I show how this strategy worked with respect to one 
fundamental feature of the US design: the preference for price-based over volume-based 
protective instruments that was to be embodied in the ITO and the GATT. This preference 
stemmed from the conviction of US officials that trade should be the domain of private 
enterprise, with minimal interference by the state. Tariffs, on this view, allowed the laws of 
supply and demand to do their work, while quantitative restrictions replaced these laws 
with administrative discretion. The officials of developing countries such as India held the 
diametrically opposite conviction: they saw it as essential that the state have the ability to 
channel the limited foreign exchange at its disposal to imports needed for its economic 
development, such as capital goods. To achieve this end, quantitative restrictions were 
ideally suited, whereas tariffs were ineffective and wasteful. This conflict between 
developing countries and the US did not have anything to do with an unwillingness of the 
former to reduce barriers to trade and to assume legal commitments in this respect. It was 
simply a question of whether the protective instruments preferred by the developing 
countries would be treated on an equal footing with the protective instruments preferred by 
the US – both could have been subject to continuous negotiation and bindings, as suggested 
by India.
539
 Instead, however, the US and its developed partners chose to enshrine the 
preference for tariffs as a fundamental feature of the GATT by confining quantitative 
restrictions to exception provisions.  
The developed countries chose a similar strategy to preserve another feature of their 
design as the default rule for the trading system: the principle of reciprocity. When the 
developing countries became aware of the trade barriers that were preventing an expansion 
of their export earnings in the late 1950s, they chose what Dam has called "a GATT-type 
barrier-lowering approach"
540
 to address the problem: Working with the developed 
countries in Committee III, they sought to identify the products most essential to their 
export prospects, to analyse the barriers maintained by the developed countries which 
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prevented an expansion of their exports, and to persuade the developed countries to 
dismantle these barriers. While the developed countries cooperated in the work of 
Committee III, they did not, for the most part, implement the recommendations of the 
Committee. Instead, they were only prepared to reduce trade barriers in the framework of 
reciprocal negotiations, which, due to the principal supplier rule, they held primarily among 
themselves. It was within this framework of reciprocal negotiations that they accorded the 
developing countries a "special" status, by not asking them to reciprocate incidental 
benefits that they might derive from concessions granted by the developed countries to each 
other.  
Just as the developing countries in the preparatory negotiations had not been asking 
for "exceptions" to the rules, but had rather been advocating different rules, the developing 
countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s were not asking for "special" treatment within 
the framework of reciprocal negotiations, but were rather trying to pursue trade barrier 
reduction in a different framework altogether. This new framework, which I have called the 
cooperative approach to trade lawmaking, differed from the reciprocity discourse in 
fundamental ways. It was only after the failure of the cooperative approach that the 
developing countries resigned themselves to their "special" position in the reciprocity 
discourse and gradually embraced the discourse of special and differential treatment – a 
discourse that preserved key elements of the market metaphor of trade lawmaking, such as 
the freedom of the seller to decide what to sell and at what price, and merely modified the 
exchange rate between concessions granted by developed and developing countries, 
respectively.   
 Special and differential treatment, then, has principally been a tool to 
facilitate the participation of developing countries in a trade regime shaped by the 
preferences and practices of developed countries. Just as the term "special" is inextricably 
linked to a conception of what is "normal", the concept of "special and differential 
treatment" is premised upon an acceptance that what the developed countries do in the 
trading system is "normal", and that the developing countries should aspire to eventually do 
the same. The extremely shallow differential treatment – in the form of transition periods – 
that developing countries were granted in some of the key Uruguay Round agreements has 
brought this expectation of "graduation" into sharp relief. Even when an enduring 
recognition of the "special" status of developing countries appears more secure than ever, 
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as it currently does (except for the big emerging economies), it remains true that the pursuit 
of "special and differential treatment", premised as it is on the implicit acceptance of the 
"normality" of the dominant rules and practices, is something different from an attempt to 
define a new "normal" – for example, an approach that addresses, as a matter of course, the 
interests of all WTO members, without the need for special accommodations. An approach, 
in other words, that obviates the need to distinguish between "normal" and "special" in the 
first place.  
It should be encouraging, then, that the heading of Section II of the Doha Round 
draft text on trade facilitation – "Special and Differential Treatment Provisions for 
Developing Country Members and Least Developed Country Members" – does not capture 
very well what Section II in fact does. For the provisions of the section do not water down 
or exempt developing countries from the obligations contained in Section I; instead, the 
provisions of Section II reflect a collective endeavour to put developing countries in a 
position to implement those obligations with the help of "tailor-made approaches that 
involve… each country in the determination – and enhancement – process of its respective 
capacity".
541
 To the extent that the trade facilitation agreement represents an effort by the 
developing and the developed countries to work together and each do what is necessary for 
the achievement of a common objective – i.e., reducing the transaction costs of trade –, it 
could signal a revival of the cooperative approach to trade lawmaking.  
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III. The Discourse of "Development" 
In the second part of this chapter, I have shown how the demands of "less-developed" 
countries were absorbed into the market logic of the reciprocity discourse through the 
discourse of special and differential treatment. The idea of "development", however, 
presented a challenge to the reciprocity discourse in international trade lawmaking in a 
much wider sense. In particular, the development discourse tells a story about the 
temporality, teleology, and relationality of the trading system that is at odds with the 
reciprocity discourse. By the US, the trading system was primarily understood in relation to 
the past: as an attempt to overcome the "economic warfare" of the interwar years and the 
parochialism of the colonial era through legal rules, non-discrimination and reciprocal 
liberalisation. The forward-looking element of the American design – progressive 
liberalization of tariff barriers – was to be achieved indirectly, incidentally to reciprocal 
exchanges of "concessions".
542
 The development discourse, by contrast, sought to orient the 
trading system towards a future goal, and was directed against both the trading patterns of 
the colonial era and the indifference towards outcomes of the reciprocity discourse (A). The 
development discourse thus imbued the trading system with a progressive narrative and a 
social aim that was absent from the reciprocity discourse, and which challenges and 
subsumes the objective of trade liberalisation. The discourse tied liberal trade to the goal of 
development, with the consequence that the attainment of development came to appear as a 
precondition for the realization of liberal trade (B). Finally, the development discourse 
redefined the relationship between the participants in international trade lawmaking, with 
the result that development became the primary principle of differentiation within the 
trading system (C).  
A. Temporality: The History and Future of the Trading System 
The participants in the preparatory negotiations of the ITO and the GATT located the 
founding of the trading system on a number of historical trajectories. American officials 
construed the founding of the trading system as part of the move out of an international 
state of nature to a global rule of law, exemplified by the founding of the United Nations.
543
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Order in international economic relations was seen as essential not only to the maintenance 
of international peace.
544
 American officials also regularly evoked the imagery of 
"economic war"
545
 and a state of nature
546
 to describe what international economic relations 
had been like in the past – and would be like in the future if nations did not agree to 
multilateral rules along the lines proposed by the United States.
547
 When the US introduced 
the world to its post-war plans, American officials characterised the aim of their Proposals 
as the achievement of a "release" from "restrictions" (imposed by governments and private 
cartels) and from "fear" (of disorder in commodity markets and irregularity in production 
and employment).
548
 This "release" would be achieved by the adoption of binding legal 
rules, combined with provisions for the progressive reciprocal liberalisation of trade 
barriers.   
The chief manifestation of the international economic anarchy targeted by the US 
were the numerous trade restrictions adopted in the course of the Second World War, and 
the principal elements of the American design for the new international economic order 
closely tracked those of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme, which had been the 
American response to that founding trauma of modern trade policy, the escalation of 
protectionism in the wake of the Great Depression. However, the US initiative also sought 
to overcome another aspect of international economic relations that American officials 
perceived as a thing of the past: the colonial model of trade policy and in particular one of 
its primary manifestations, the British Imperial Preferences.
549
 This aim figured less 
prominently in the US's public pronouncement, but was a central topic in US negotiations 
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with the British, both prior to and during the negotiations of the GATT. Apart from the 
considerable commercial interest that the US had in the abolition of the Imperial 
Preferences, the US was motivated by an aversion to the parochialism of colonial 
preferences, which it sought to replace with the principle of non-discrimination in the form 
of the MFN clause. In sum, for the US, the founding of a multilateral trading system 
represented a step out of a dark past marked by "economic war", "restrictions", "fear" and 
colonial preferences into a future characterised by the rule of law, reciprocal liberalisation, 
and non-discrimination.   
As soon as the discussion about the founding of a multilateral trading system was 
opened to a wider range of countries, namely, at the 1946 Preparatory Conference in 
London, a discourse emerged that located this founding event on a different historical 
trajectory, and appraised its significance in different terms. For the discourse of 
"development", the founding of the trading system was an undertaking that had the 
potential to promote and assist, but also to hinder and obstruct, the "development" of the 
trade regime's "under-developed" members. Rather than portraying it as a triumph over the 
sins of the past, this discourse was oriented exclusively towards the future – with a mixture 
of hope and suspicion. However, this discourse did not simply interpret the "past" 
differently. Rather, it did not admit of a "past" in the first place, even though the "past" of 
"development" – that which came before development – would appear to be if anything 
more consequential (and sinful) than the "original sin" of protectionism against which the 
US defined its project. Hudec has observed (and reinforced) this contrast between the 
discourse of development and the US project:  
GATT legal policy towards developing countries owes nothing to the past. There was no 
Golden Age that pointed the way. Before 1939, the organizing principle for rich-poor 
relationships had been colonialism. Most of the countries in Africa and Asia were colonies 
de jure. A goodly portion of those in Central and South America were colonies de facto. 
This colonial past was not what the post-1945 world was looking for. The world required a 
clean start – a completely new departure. … 
Not only was there no Golden Age to point towards as a goal but, perhaps more important, 
there had been no past failures that could serve as a lesson about what not to do – nothing 
resembling the lesson that developed countries had been taught by the beggar-thy-neighbour 
policies of the 1930s. Individual governments no doubt had ideas – even convictions – about 
what would work and what would not work, but there was no collective experience.
550
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Hudec's statement is both correct and deeply misleading. It is correct in that the 
development discourse does not admit of a "past of development". It is deeply misleading 
in that it suggests that this construction of an absence somehow reflects an underlying 
reality, namely that "there had been no past failures that could serve as a lesson about what 
not to do" and that "there was no collective experience".
551
 By all accounts, trade had been 
a central aspect of colonial relations.
552
 And even though the development discourse 
admitted of neither a past nor a present of colonialism, echoes of the colonial experience 
are evident both in what the development discourse embraces and in what it rejects.  
The development discourse treats colonialism as the antonym of development. This 
is sometimes made explicit, for example when the Pakistani delegation informed the GATT 
membership that "[t]he process of economic development in Pakistan commenced 
simultaneously with independence."
553
 This construction could be seen as an expression of 
the idea that as long as a people remains under colonial rule, it has no agency to pursue, and 
no voice to articulate, its ambition for "development". In the context of the GATT, it was 
only when the colonial power declared to the GATT that the respective "customs territory" 
possessed or would acquire "full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial 
relations" that the former colonial subject was set free to become a "developing" country.
554
 
Tellingly, the GATT recognises that a contracting party "in the early stages of 
development" may have "just started [its] economic development".
555
 Another indication of 
the co-extensiveness of independent statehood and incipient development is the frequent 
reference to "less-developed" countries as "young" countries, with a "short history", during 
the preparatory negotiations.
556
 
This antonymous construction of colonialism and development, however, does not 
explain why the development discourse did not problematise the colonial past of almost all 
"developing" participants in international trade lawmaking in a way similar to the way in 
which the US narrative dramatised the protectionism of the inter-war years. As Trebilcock 
and Howse have noted, in the post-war period the  
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specialization patterns of many developing countries could with justification be viewed as 
the historically contingent product of colonialism – developing countries served as ready 
sources of raw materials on the one hand, and as markets for the finished products of the 
colonial powers on the other. This suggested not only the artificiality of existing 
comparative advantage in developing countries, but also its foundation in fundamentally 
unjust power relationships.
557
 
It would have been perfectly conceivable, even plausible, for the development discourse to 
construct colonialism as a past trauma giving rise to a moral obligation on the part of the 
colonial powers to assist the newly independent countries in escaping the trading position 
entrenched under colonial rule. What the development discourse appears to do instead, 
however, is to substitute the image of a generic state of "underdevelopment" for the varied 
colonial – and, for that matter, pre-colonial – histories of "developing" countries. As a 
result, the distinctive impact of colonial rule is not a part of the story that the development 
discourse tells.
558
 
Some authors have argued that this move is facilitated by the ahistoricism of the 
concept of "development" itself. In Tarullo's view, the notion that "[n]ations develop from 
predominantly agricultural to predominantly industrial economies" is based on the 
"adolescence myth": "As adolescents grow into adults, so developing nations are expected 
to grow into developed nations". This construction of development as a "natural 
phenomen[on]", Tarullo argues, 
robs the world of its history and recalls the definition proffered by Barthes of myth as 
'depoliticized speech.' It is natural to be underdeveloped while growing towards 
development; the history of imperialism is incidental.
559
 
 
Rist offers a similar analysis of the internal logic of the development discourse. In 
contrast to the "colonizer/colonized opposition", which suggests "hierarchical 
subordination", the development/underdevelopment dichotomy 
introduced the idea of a continuity of substance, so that now the two terms of the binomial 
differed only relatively. 'Underdevelopment' was not the opposite of 'development', only its 
incomplete or … 'embryonic' form; an acceleration of growth was thus the only logical way 
of bridging the gap. The relationship more or less established itself in a quantitative mode, 
with a fundamental unity assumed between the two phenomena. In this comparison, 
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moreover, each nation was considered for itself: its 'development' was very largely an 
internal, self-generated, self-dynamizing phenomenon, even if it could be 'assisted' from 
outside. Once more, the naturalization of history empties history of its content. The 
historical conditions that would explain the 'lead' of some countries over others cannot enter 
into the argument, since the 'laws of development' are supposedly the same for all … Not 
only does this bracket out the effects of conquest, colonization, the slave trade, the 
dismantling of craft production in India, the breaking up of social structures, and so on; it 
also presents things as if the existence of industrial countries did not radically alter the 
context in which candidates for industrialization have to operate. The world is conceived not 
as a structure in which each element depends upon the others, but as a collection of formally 
equal 'individual' nations.
560
 
 
A number of authors have investigated how these features of the concept of 
"development" suited the interests of the former colonial powers by obscuring their share of 
responsibility for the economic state of the "developing" countries and legitimising 
continued Western intervention in the name of "development assistance".
561
 These authors 
have pointed to striking continuities between the colonial "civilizing mission" and post-
colonial "development aid". These continuities also formed part of the founding process of 
the trading system. The discussions on development at the 1946 Preparatory Conference 
occasionally echoed colonial themes, for example when the Lebanese delegate explained 
the "non-economic" motivation for "development" thus:   
Higher standards of life for the population do not only mean more food and clothing, but 
also better education and better enjoyment of the higher elements of culture. This cultural 
aspect is as important, if not more important, than the purely material aspect of raising the 
level of consumption. The relation between manufacturing industry and culture is very 
intimate. Manufacturing industry advances science and enables man to control nature, while 
agriculture leaves man in a state of dependence on nature, thus fostering fatalism and a 
generally unprogressive mentality. While manufacturing frees man materially and 
intellectually, agriculture keeps him in a sort of slavery to forces which, especially in the 
less-developed countries, are beyond his control.
562
 
There are a number of indications, however, that, even though the development discourse 
did not openly address and define itself against the colonial past, in the context of 
international trade lawmaking it was primarily designed to emancipate the "less-developed" 
countries from their position under colonial rule. 
A first indication of this emancipatory function of the development discourse was 
that, in international trade lawmaking, it was initiated and promoted by the "less-
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developed" countries themselves.
563
 While the lineage of the concept of "development" 
may be Western, the "less-developed" countries appropriated the concept in the context of 
the founding of the multilateral trading system and deployed it as a counterweight to the US 
narrative about the purpose of the trading system, namely to lift international economic 
relations out of the state of nature, release world trade from public and private restrictions 
and provide a forum for reciprocal liberalisation.  
In the late 1940s, the attitude of the Western states towards the development 
discourse ranged from cooption (in the case of Canada and Australia, which did not 
consider themselves to be fully developed, and to some extent by the UK and France, 
which analogised the needs of post-war reconstruction to development) to more or less 
open hostility. In the early discussions between Britain and the US, the idea of 
"development" had played almost no role. Britain had at one point invoked the "principle of 
colonial trusteeship" to argue for lenient treatment of export taxes in the Charter (which 
would facilitate the establishment of processing industries by its colonies).
564
 Influenced by 
discussions with India and Australia, Britain had also anticipated that "countries in an early 
stage of industrial development" would insist on the flexible use of tariffs for revenue 
purposes and for the protection of infant industries, and would be suspicious "that the 
developed countries were trying to restrict local development to gain or retain the market 
for their own manufactures".
565
 In response, the US had indicated that it would be prepared 
to agree to an infant-industry exception "if formidable pressure was brought to bear at a 
trade conference in favor of" such an exception and "if adequate safeguards could be 
established".
566
 While the US agreed that a corresponding provision should be drafted, it 
preferred to "hold back such provisions" as a bargaining chip.
567
 The Proposals published 
by the US in November 1945 did not contain any mention of an infant-industry exception, 
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or, for that matter, of "development". At the outset of the 1946 Preparatory Conference, 
India commented on these discussions:   
Under pressure exerted by countries of the British Empire, the U.K. made a half hearted 
attempt to assert the right of undeveloped countries to apply tariffs 'for a limited period 
under adequate safeguards for the protection of infant industries.' The U.S.A., however 
forgetful of its own history, was not prepared to concede even this limited 'right'.
568
  
 
US negotiators continued to exhibit considerable scepticism towards the relevance 
of the concept of "development" for the trading system throughout the Preparatory 
Conference, especially when it came to the "freedom of the so-called underdeveloped 
countries to take protective measures".
569
 When demand for specific provisions on 
development did in fact materialise, the US reacted by submitting a "tentative and non-
committal draft chapter" on development, which it subsequently portrayed as a 
considerable concession. The infant-industry provision, Clair Wilcox noted, could "be 
regarded only as one of extreme generosity".
570
 And with regard to the US's agreement "to 
co-operate in the economic development of other countries and specifically to impose no 
unreasonable impediments on the exportation of capital materials, equipment and 
technology which are needed for that development", Wilcox reminded the other 
participants that "[t]here never was before, in the history of the world, such a 
commitment".
571
 The US obviously regarded the development discourse as a threat to its 
narrative that the Charter would overcome the dark past of untrammelled protectionism. If 
the less-developed countries' amendments allowing quantitative restrictions for protective 
purposes were adopted, Wilcox warned,  
the restrictions of the Fifties and the Sixties will make the restrictionism of the Thirties look 
like absolute free trade. … We all know that the folly of the past brought as to tragedy. 
What reason is there to suppose that even greater folly in the future would bring us to a 
better future?
572
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The US would not accept, Wilcox concluded, "a Charter that was in its very terms a 
sanctification of autarchy, an incitement to resume economic aggression, a guarantee of 
economic war."
573
 
Not only did the development discourse challenge the West's conception of the 
historical meaning of the trading system's founding. It was also emancipatory in that it was, 
without ever mentioning colonialism by name, at its core directed against the division of 
labour and the trade patterns instituted under colonial rule. In particular, this meant 
achieving the industrialisation of the predominantly agrarian countries of the South. At the 
Preparatory Conference, this transformative agenda produced anxiety among those of the 
"industrial" countries evidently still wedded to a colonial mind set. The Belgian delegate 
lamented, for example, as follows: "I must say that, in accepting the industrial development 
of the rest of the world, we have to display a considerable amount of fortitude".
574
  
The South's agenda also clashed with the selective legalism of the US proposal, 
which Lebanon described in the following terms:  
It is evident that there is, throughout the Charter, a conflict … in the means for achieving 
two of its purposes, namely (1) the purpose of the removal of trade barriers, and (2) the 
purpose of the promotion of the industrial development of the undeveloped countries. But it 
is worth noting that to achieve the first purpose, strict and definite obligations are placed 
upon the Members, which restrict their liberty of action in the achievement of the second 
purpose. On the other hand, the Charter does not provide for equally strict and definite 
obligations to give positive assistance for economic development.
575
 
Cuba formulated the fear shared by many of the "under-developed" countries, namely that 
by adopting the Charter  
we would be freezing the actual economic status of the different countries of the world. The 
agricultural countries would continue to be agricultural. The monopoly countries would 
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continue to be monopolies, and the more developed countries would continue selling 
typewriters and radios, etc. to those nations that were trying to produce the primitive 
tools.
576
     
In a speech dripping with sarcasm about the wisdom of the "experienced civilized 
nations"
577
 – a rare echo of colonial imagery –, the Cuban delegate complained that 
"economic development has become here some sort of wicked word that is looked at with 
great apprehension by many Delegations."
578
 By contrast to the US narrative about the need 
to exit the state of nature in international economic relations, Cuba suggested that the 
"young nations" might prefer "the liberty of the jungle" which was sometimes "more 
healthy than the very sophisticated and civilized world".
579
 While such rhetoric openly 
mocking the categories of colonial thinking was rare at the Preparatory Conference
580
, 
many "less-developed" countries shared Cuba's apprehension about the selective legalism 
of the Draft Charter, which circumscribed the less-developed countries' use of protective 
instruments, while imposing no binding obligations on the developed countries in respect to 
the formers' development.  
The themes of the debate about the historical significance of the trading system at 
the preparatory conference have been taken up again and again throughout the history of 
the trade regime. Warnings against a fallback into 1930s-style protectionism have become 
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standard fare in multilateral trade negotiations.
581
 To provide only a few examples: In the 
early 1960s the US Under-Secretary of State alerted his colleagues to the potential fallout 
of a possible collapse of the Dillon Round in the following terms: 
Without overstating the consequences of such an event I think it could very well mean the 
destruction of the GATT and a return to anarchy in our international commercial 
relations.
582
  
In discussions about the launching of a new round of trade negotiations in the mid-1980s, 
the United States framed the issue in similar terms: 
The contracting parties faced a choice between two alternatives: pursuit of individual 
interests by seeking immediate relief for trade problems through protectionist solutions, as 
had been done in the 1930s; or reconfirmation of belief in GATT principles, and the start of 
a common effort to negotiate the structural improvements, access to markets and new 
disciplines so urgently needed to solve international trade problems.
583
 
This statement was echoed by the representative of Japan, who  
called on both developed and developing contracting parties to reaffirm their resolve that the 
tragedy of the 1930s, arising from protectionism embodied in economic blocs, should never 
be repeated.
584
  
 
The notion that the place of the trading system in history is best understood in 
relation to the events of the 1930s – originally first and foremost the US view – has to some 
extent become the official GATT and WTO philosophy. In a speech to the United Nations 
in the 1970s, GATT Director-General Olivier Long stated: 
I imagine that few people would argue that the world would be better off without any 
generally-accepted rules for trade. The law of the jungle applied to international trade in the 
1930's, and the world paid dearly for the fact. For the past generation the GATT has 
provided the rule of law that was lacking in world trade during the Great Depression 
years.
585
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Pascal Lamy, who recently left his post as the WTO's Director-General after serving two 
terms, used to have a picture of Senator Smoot and Representative Hawley in his office to 
remind him of the purpose of his work.
586
 
On the part of the developing countries, the fear which they had expressed at the 
preparatory conference, namely that the trading system might end up "freezing the actual 
economic status of the different countries of the world", has stayed very much alive. While 
the developed countries have tended to consider continuous trade negotiations necessary to 
maintain the commitment to liberal and rules-based trade, the developing countries have 
tended to favour a more transformative agenda. Apart from their long-standing efforts to 
reduce barriers to their exports maintained by developed countries, the transformative 
impetus of the developing countries' participation in trade lawmaking is particularly evident 
in two projects:
587
 their decade-long fight against tariff escalation; and their campaign, 
which stretched from the 1960s to the 1980s, for international action to promote structural 
adjustment in developed countries.  
Tariff escalation refers to the differentiation of tariffs in relation to the degree of 
processing, whereby low or no tariffs are imposed on the raw materials, higher tariffs are 
imposed on semi-finished products, and the highest tariffs apply to the finished product. 
This tariff structure, traditionally maintained by many developed countries, made it difficult 
for developing countries to move up the value chain, as it encouraged companies to export 
raw materials from developing countries for processing in developed countries, rather than 
to process the product in the developing country.
588
 The effect of tariff escalation on the 
composition of the developing countries' exports was noted in the GATT as early the 
1960s,
589
 and a proposal to address tariff escalation in reduction modalities was made – and 
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rejected – as early as the Kennedy Round.590 The problem has persisted throughout the 
operation of the trading system, and is for the first time comprehensively addressed in the 
Doha Round Modalities for Agriculture, which provide separate modalities for the 
reduction and, in some cases, elimination, of tariff escalation.
591
     
In contrast to tariff escalation, which concerned an issue plainly at the core of the 
trade regime's competence, structural adjustment was not an easy fit for the GATT's 
traditional repertoire of instruments and techniques,
592
 and the contracting parties struggled 
for a long time to define the GATT's role in relation to this issue. Structural adjustment was 
first discussed by a group of experts in the 1960s,
593
 it was the subject of reporting 
requirements in respect to the textiles sector,
594
 and again became a hotly debated issue in 
the early 1980s.
595
 A key puzzle in these discussions was the fact that a number of trade 
instruments that could serve to facilitate adjustment, such as safeguards and subsidies, 
could just as well be used to delay adjustment.
596
 The question was thus how these 
instruments were used – a question that ultimately went to the role of the state in the 
adjustment process, and the relationship between the state and the economy more generally. 
The developing countries were hoping that developed country governments, prodded by 
multilateral pressure, would take a more proactive role in promoting adjustment to import 
competition in their economies. In the end, the GATT's activities on structural adjustment 
were largely limited to information exchanges and consultations; no obligations directly 
concerned with structural adjustment were ever negotiated. However, a number of 
agreements negotiated in the Uruguay Round, and in particular the Agreement on Textiles 
and Clothing and the Agreement on Safeguards, have made it more difficult for countries to 
prevent or delay structural adjustment. At least in the textiles sector, then, the developing 
countries' ambition has thus, at last, been largely fulfilled.   
                                                                                                                                                    
An expansion of exports of these items [leather goods and leather footwear, N.L.] was unfavourably 
affected … by the practice of granting relatively less liberal tariff treatment to semi-manufactures 
and to the finished product than to unprocessed materials.  
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Tariff escalation and structural adjustment have of course not been the only 
initiatives that developing countries have pushed over the history of the trading system; 
they do, however, exemplify what I take to be the basic orientation of developing countries 
towards the historical significance of the trade regime: an orientation that is marked by the 
expectation that the trade regime will usher in a fundamental change in the international 
division of labour. The developing countries' worst fear has not been 1930s-style anarchy, 
but a trade regime that would, as Brazil put it in the Uruguay Round,  
freeze an inequitable international division of labour and represent an unacceptable 
limitation to our legitimate aspirations of also becoming producers and suppliers of high-
technology goods and services.
597
 
This orientation is quite far removed from the idea that the incremental and gradual 
liberalisation of trade is necessary so that countries can from time to time reaffirm and 
revitalise their commitment to a rules-based trading system, thereby banishing the 
temptation of protectionism and realising a few efficiency gains on the side (to somewhat 
caricature the US view).
598
 
Both the rule-of-law narrative and the development discourse, then, employ a 
technique of "temporal othering" to define the identity of the trading system; the rule-of-
law explains the significance of the trading system "by means of casting as Other [the 
system's] own past, whose repetition in the future it seeks to avoid".
599
 The development 
discourse, by contrast, casts as Other the present, which it seeks to overcome in the future.  
Despite their different orientations – towards the past and the future, respectively – 
the two discourses are similar in one respect: they both produce a constant sense of 
restlessness. Neither ever declares victory. The development discourse carries the 
connotation of a perpetually unfulfilled promise; development is aspired to, but never quite 
achieved. The rule-of-law narrative, in turn, imparts a sense of fragility; it is animated by a 
constant fear of backsliding and complacency.   
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B. Teleology: The Aims of the Trading System 
The different stories that the US and the proponents of the development discourse told 
about the historical significance of the trading system were intertwined with different views 
on the objectives of the trading system. The primary objectives advanced by the US 
narrative were an expansion of world trade, to be achieved through reciprocal liberalisation 
and the elimination of discrimination, which would also support world peace. At the 
insistence of Britain, the US had included the objective of full employment in its 
Proposals. This objective, however, was primarily construed as a precondition for the 
expansion of trade, and where the objectives of full employment and trade expansion came 
into conflict, the latter objective was given priority. Thus, the Proposals stipulated that 
"[d]omestic programs to expand employment should be consistent with realization of the 
purposes of liberal international agreements" and should not include measures  
which are likely to create unemployment in other countries or which are incompatible with 
international undertakings designed to promote an expanding volume of international trade 
and investment in accordance with comparative efficiencies of production.
600
  
 
Development was not among the US objectives for the ITO.
601
 In the context of the 
employment provisions of the Proposals, it was only the "attainment of approximately full 
employment by the major industrial and trading nations" that was considered key to the 
realisation of the ITO's objectives in the international economic arena.
602
 While the 
Proposals referred to the United Nations' pledge, in Article 55 of the UN Charter, to 
promote "higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and 
social progress and development",
603
 the US considered the attainment of these objectives 
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 US Proposals 1945, 9-10; according to Gardner, the provision on employment remained at the level of 
general principles "since neither Government had any well-developed views on how the employment problem 
could usefully be handled in any international agreement"; Gardner 1969, 148. One concern of the British was 
that the US would not take decisive steps, in the form of countercyclical policies, to avert another depression; 
the commitment in the Proposals (9) that signatory nations "will take action designed to achieve and maintain 
full employment" would thus have had some significance to them. See also Gardner 1969, 147, on the role of 
full employment in British public opinion. For a contemporary discussion, see Smithies 1947. 
601
 See the "purposes of the Organization" listed in US Proposals 1945, 11; cf. Senate hearing 1947, 4, on the 
ITO chapter covering "economic development":  
This chapter did not appear in the original United States draft … It was added because a number of 
the underdeveloped countries felt that provisions dealing explicitly with this subject are a necessary 
and proper part of an International Trade Charter. 
602
 US Proposals 1945, 9. (emphasis added) 
603
 US Proposals 1945, 9.  
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to be the responsibility of the UN's Economic and Social Council. Curiously, the preamble 
of the GATT made reference to the first two of these objectives ("raising standards of 
living" and "ensuring full employment") but omits the latter (promoting "conditions of 
economic and social progress")  – presumably reflecting the US view that trade expansion 
was the primary goal of the trading system.
604
  
The development discourse which emerged at the Preparatory Conference took 
issue not so much with the US objectives of trade expansion as such as with what was 
perceived as a single-minded focus on trade liberalisation as the way to achieve it.
605
 
Several countries argued that the development of the less-developed countries held the 
greatest potential for an expansion of international trade, by creating demand for 
investment goods and by increasing the purchasing power of the population in less-
developed countries.
606
 And while the development discourse prioritised "development" 
over "liberalisation" as an objective, it did not establish a clear relationship between the 
two, thus opening the relationship to continuous redefinitions and renegotiations over the 
course of the history of international trade lawmaking – in response to changing economic 
conditions, intellectual currents, international power relations, and indeed changing 
conceptions of "development" and "liberalisation" itself.
607
  
The difference between the objectives that the US and other developed countries 
associated with the trade regime, and the way the purpose of the trade regime is portrayed 
in the development discourse, is best illustrated by considering how the developing 
countries sought to shape the second constitutional moment of the trading system – the 
Uruguay Round negotiations on an agreement on trade in services – in a way that would 
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make it fundamentally different from the first. From the outset of the services negotiations, 
Brazil tried to establish the principle that these negotiations should not be "an exercise to 
liberalize trade in services at any costs", and that "trade liberalization [was not] an end in 
itself".
608
 Brazil recalled that, in trade negotiations on goods, the principle of special and 
differential treatment had been "conceived as an afterthought to the GATT, as a right to 
derogate on an ad hoc basis from the general rules".
609
 The negotiations on trade in 
services, by contrast, would have "to start from a totally different standpoint":  
The objective of development will be … the kernel of the exercise. We are mandated … not 
to further the best theoretical possible allocation of resources at the world level, a result 
which in the end might work mainly for the advantage of a few more advanced States or of 
transnational corporations. … Development shall have to be … not a basis for derogation to 
possible general rules, but an integral part of any set of rules we may eventually devise.
610
 
India spelt out some of the practical implications of this approach: 
If the objective of development of developing countries is to be achieved, the enumeration 
of sectors of trade in services will have to be first tested in terms of whether, and to what 
extent, expansion of trade in such services would promote development of developing 
countries. It is not enough to generalize that international competition is good and that it 
would lead to maximization of welfare all around. … the aim of development has to be 
understood as seen by the developing country concerned, and not in terms of some 
mysterious handiwork of an invisible hand operating through idealized market processes.
611
  
India, too, rejected the way in which development had been addressed in the GATT: 
We believe that we should not base our approach on assumptions borrowed from familiar 
areas of trade in goods supplemented by carving out exceptions in terms of special and 
differential treatment for developing countries. The objective of development should not be 
considered as an adjunct or an afterthought. The approach to the multilateral framework 
itself should be such as to ensure the achievement of this objective and it is here that one 
intensely feels the inadequacy of the GATT model.
612
 
The contrast drawn here between the trade regime's approach to trade in goods, which was 
informed by the US objectives of trade expansion, and what the developing countries hoped 
would be its approach to trade in services, brings the differences between the developed 
countries' views and the development discourse into sharp relief.
613
 For the latter, trade 
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liberalisation, and even trade expansion, is no more than a means to an end.
614
 The 
developing countries' commitment to trade lawmaking stands and falls by their perception 
of whether the law at issue would contribute to their development.
615
  
In one respect, however, the US narrative and the development discourse 
converged: They both established a powerful connection between "developed country" 
status and trade liberalisation. While the development discourse allows discursive room for 
debates about the necessity and wisdom of trade liberalisation for "developing" countries, it 
associates, by negative implication, as it were, "developed" country status with liberal 
trade.
616
 Once a country is "developed", there is no discursive refuge for trade protection. 
This tightening of the discursive breathing space arguably constitutes a powerful 
disincentive for "developing" countries to "graduate" to "developed" country status.  
C. Relationality: Differentiation in the Trading System 
Entangled with the contestation of the historical trajectory and telos of the trading system 
was the question of the relationship between the members of the trade regime. At the time 
when the GATT and the ITO Charter were negotiated, "development" was a relatively new 
concept; in fact, according to some authors, it was not "invented" as an issue of 
international concern until Truman's proclamation of his "Four Points" in 1949.
617
 
Unsurprisingly, the differentiation between more or less "developed" countries remained 
very fluid at this time; in the trading system, the very desirability of such a differentiation 
remained contested.  
Pre-war trade agreements provided no precedent for a differentiation between 
countries according to their "stage" of development. The agreements concluded by the 
United States with less-developed countries under the Reciprocal Trade Agreements 
                                                 
614
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programme, sixteen in all, made no distinction between the contracting parties.
618
 
According to Evans, it was under the influence of this tradition that the drafters of the 
GATT "went to some lengths to avoid making any formal distinction between different 
classes of members".
619
 In accordance with the market metaphor, countries were to be 
regarded as formally equal.
620
  
During their bilateral discussions, British and US officials mostly described less-
developed countries as "countries in an early stage of (industrial) development", without 
however establishing a legal category.
621
 During the Preparatory Conference, the attributes 
"undeveloped",
622
 "non-developed",
623
 "underdeveloped",
624
 "less-developed",
625
 
"developing",
626
 "inadequately developed relative to their potential",
627
 "less 
industrialized",
628
 and "young" country, as opposed to "more" or "highly developed", 
"advanced", and "industrialized" country were used virtually interchangeably. But not only 
was the terminology unsettled; the concept of "development" itself was fluid, and many 
countries were unsure in which category they fell. Australia, one of the chief proponents of 
provisions on "economic development" in the Charter, saw itself as "an under-developed 
country in relation to the potential resources of our country", but admitted that there were 
"countries even less developed than we are".
629
 Canada cautioned that "there are very few 
economies which can be said to be fully developed, certainly ours is not."
630
 Belgium found 
the entire distinction dubious, pointing to the heterogeneity, in terms of size and factor 
endowments, of the countries "lump[ed] together" under the categories of 
"underdeveloped" and "industrial" countries, respectively, though it did not hesitate to 
describe itself as "an industrial country with … a highly developed population".631 Britain 
thought the distinction to be "totally unreal", and counselled against portraying the issue at 
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hand – the prohibition of quantitative restrictions – as "a definite division between two 
classes of countries".
632
 
The original GATT did not contain the term "less-developed contracting parties";
633
 
instead, the "economic development" exception was made available to countries described 
in terms of elaborate criteria, namely a "contracting party, the economy of which can only 
support low standards of living* and is in the early stages of development*", with ad notes 
further defining the key terms.
634
 Presumably, these criteria would have made it possible, 
whenever a contracting party invoked the provision, to examine whether it met all the 
criteria, instead of having to rely on the self-designation of the respective party.  
In practice, however, this was not attempted. In the context of tariff negotiations, 
the contracting parties early on found it "extremely difficult, not to say impossible" to solve 
the problem of the definition of "under-developed countries" by "means of general 
provisions", and recognised that this was a problem that "cannot be dealt with otherwise 
than on a case basis".
635
 Attempts to "define developing country status in terms of objective 
economic criteria" were made in UNCTAD over several years, but were ultimately 
abandoned.
636
 The principle of self-selection prevailed. At the same time, given the 
discretionary nature of most special and differential treatment, the extent to which a country 
would enjoy the benefits of developing country status depended heavily on the developed 
countries' recognition of that status.  
The case of South Africa is perhaps the best illustration of the melange of 
economic, ideological and even emotional factors that make up the meaning of "developed" 
vs. "developing" country status. During the Preparatory Conference, South Africa was 
clearly uncomfortable with the distinction.
637
 It tentatively put itself in the "under-
developed" country category – on the basis that Australia, which saw itself as an under-
developed country, had "done things in its development which we have not yet dreamed of 
in South Africa" – but then proceeded to employ this status not to make demands on the 
developed countries, but rather to lecture its fellow "under-developed" countries about the 
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advantages of the American design for the ITO.
638
 The desire of the representative to be 
regarded as a peer by the developed countries – he switched in the course of his statement 
from describing South Africa as an "under-developed" country to characterising it as a 
"not-fully-developed country"
639
 – was unmistakable. It was precisely this aspiration that 
the US invoked 46 years later, when it rejected South Africa's request to be re-classified as 
a developing country as it was emerging from apartheid.
640
 "South Africa", the US 
representative stated, "had never been viewed as a developing country and had itself taken 
pride in its capabilities as a world-class trader". Given that South African "ranked among 
the top 30 trading nations of the world" and was widely seen as a "predominantly 
manufacturing economy", the US government was "not disposed to recognize South Africa 
as a developing country" in the GATT context.
641
 It appears that, for South Africa under 
white rule, being seen as a developed country was partly a point of pride; the African 
National Congress, by contrast, saw no shame in South Africa being classified as a 
developing country.  
Given these ideational connotations of "developing country" status, it should 
perhaps not be surprising that, for a country to decide to change its status, it will often take 
more than the mere fact that it has ascended in the economic league tables. Despite the 
phenomenal growth experienced by many formerly poor countries over the past decades, 
the most important trend with respect to the relations between the members of the trading 
system has not been the "graduation" of developing countries to developed country status, 
but rather an increasing differentiation within the developing country category.  
This differentiation has its origins in the Tokyo Round: the Tokyo Declaration was 
the first major policy document to call for "special attention" to be given to the "particular 
situation and problems of the least-developed among the developing countries".
642
 It is not 
entirely clear who was the driving force behind this development. Winham portrays it as 
part of the developed countries' "graduation" agenda:  
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The industrialized members of GATT took the position that a distinction should be made for 
levels of development among the less-developed countries, while the backers of the Group 
of 77, sensing that such a distinction might be used to deny them preferential treatment, 
strongly resisted the attempt to develop a relative notion of development.
643
 
Other evidence contradicts this view, however.
644
 Thus, the report of the Preparatory 
Committee consistently notes that it was "[d]elegations from developing countries" who 
"proposed that the negotiations should also provide for special consideration of the 
problems" of not only the least-developed, but also the land-locked developing countries.
645
 
Moreover, US officials internally characterised the debate about special treatment for least-
developed countries as "basically a LDC problem" on which "[t]he LDCs themselves could 
not agree".
646
 
While the initiative for further differentiation thus likely originated among the 
developing countries themselves, it held attractions for both sides of the "graduation" 
debate. For the more advanced developing countries, it was a superior alternative to full 
graduation: While they might have to forego some preferential treatment, the fundamental 
distinction between them and the developed countries was preserved. For the developed 
countries, in turn, increased differentiation, while inferior to full graduation, opened up the 
opportunity to ratchet up obligations on the advanced developing countries to an extent that 
would be unfeasible if the same obligations also applied to the least-developed countries.      
In the Doha Round Modalities for Agriculture, differentiation has been taken to new 
heights.
647
 Apart from the three "generally recognized categories of Members – LDCs, 
developing countries, and developed countries",
648
 the Doha Round Agricultural Modalities 
contain differentiated obligations for five groups of countries: recently acceded members 
(RAMs), very RAMs, small low-income RAMs with economies in transition, net food-
importing developing countries (NFIDCs), and small vulnerable economies (SVEs). The 
criteria by which this increasing differentiation occurs do not exhibit a readily discernible 
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pattern or trend. Very RAMs and small low-income RAMs with economies in transition are 
identified ad hoc in the modalities themselves;
649
 NFIDCs are identified in a list maintained 
by the Committee on Agriculture.
650
 Apart from the LDCs, which are recognized as such by 
the Economic and Social Council of the UN on the basis of a number of economic and 
social criteria,
651
 only the SVEs are explicitly identified on the basis of objective economic 
benchmarks.
652
 While the modalities state that the SVE designation is "not meant to create 
any sub-category of Members", it is highly likely that the separate treatment of SVEs in the 
Agricultural Modalities will serve as a precedent for future negotiations.   
One of the effects of the increased differentiation of the developing country 
category is that, by and large, WTO Members that remain in the developing country 
category without being part of any other subgroups comprise those countries that would 
probably fall within a hypothetical “emerging economies category”, were they not so 
virulently opposed to giving up the developed/developing country distinction.
653
 Arguably, 
the trend towards differentiation has thus also changed what it means to be "just" a 
"developing country", without additional qualifications.  
 
D. Conclusion 
The development discourse has played a paradoxical role in multilateral trade lawmaking: 
on one hand, the idea of development has naturalised the subordinate and dependent 
position of the poorer members of the trading system. By positing a generic state of 
underdevelopment from which the "developing" countries were "just" emerging, it not only 
obscured the colonial past, but also borrowed imagery that had informed the colonial 
project. On the other hand, the idea of development contained a powerful emancipatory 
claim, namely, the ambition of the "less-developed" countries to escape the trading 
positions entrenched under colonial rule, and to attain the levels of productivity and 
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material well-being of the industrialised countries – an aspiration that had for the most part 
been stymied under colonial rule.  
In its emancipatory ambition, the development discourse clashed with the views 
held by the US and most other developed countries about the historical significance, the 
aims, and the relationships between the members of the multilateral trading system. Where 
the US saw the historical mission of the trade regime in overcoming the protectionist past, 
the developing countries viewed the regime as an endeavour that could prove its worth only 
in the future – and that could easily turn out to be more harmful than the "liberty of the 
jungle" if it was unduly restrictive of the "young" countries' development. Where the US 
saw trade expansion, to be achieved by unshackling trade from governmental restrictions, 
as the core objective of the trading system, the developing countries considered trade 
merely as a means to an end. They saw little use in a trade organization that protected 
established trade flows but did not play an active role in transforming the international 
division of labour. Finally, while the US did not want to introduce the issue of development 
into what it saw as a "commercial" agreement – it would have preferred to leave the United 
Nations to deal with what it regarded as a complicated political issue – the developing 
countries always understood and defined their position in relation to the trade regime and 
its members in terms of development; as a result, the perceived degree of development, 
rather than ideological or geographical divisions, has been the primary principle of 
differentiation among the trade regime's members throughout its history. In sum, the 
meaning and purpose of the trade regime have been contested in fundamental ways from 
the very beginning.  
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Chapter 2: Practices 
In her article “Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves”, Amy 
Cohen explores the complementarities between the perspectives of two literatures: the 
micro perspective of the negotiation literature, which draws on practical experience in 
business negotiations and alternative dispute resolution to identify and promote “effective” 
negotiating strategies and attitudes, and the macro perspective of the New Governance 
approach to social organisation, a mode of governance that seeks to avoid both the rigidity 
and unresponsiveness of the state and the unpalatable distributive consequences of a self-
regulating market. The institutional designs of the New Governance approach, Cohen 
argues, are ultimately dependent on precisely the kinds of individuals – flexible, strategic, 
un-dogmatic, and collaborative – that the negotiation literature seeks to mould. Cohen 
describes the negotiating “skills” that the two literatures promote as “technologies of the 
self” that enable individuals to redefine their interest in terms “cognisable” within a pre-
existing order. As Cohen puts it, “one of the greatest benefits – but simultaneously greatest 
costs – of these skills is that they are purposefully designed to shape individual interests in 
ways that are strategically adaptive to existing social and power relations”.654 
Cohen's investigation of the relationship between institutions and selves provides a 
useful entry point to the analysis of the lawmaking practices in the multilateral trading 
system.
655
 Throughout the trading system's history, trade lawmaking has for the most part 
taken place in “clubs” of varying sizes and composition. Whether a participant in trade 
lawmaking found itself on the inside or the outside of the club depended in large part on its 
negotiating attitude, and, more specifically, on whether and to what extent it was ready to 
engage in reciprocal bargains with the dominant traders. It was by constituting a club – the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – which operated outside, and would later have 
operated within, the larger International Trade Organization that the major trading powers 
first established the principle of payment as the uncontested foundation for tariff 
negotiations. Over the course of the GATT's history, the club dynamic was employed to 
extend the reciprocity principle to ever new areas of negotiation. Whoever was not prepared 
to engage in “give and take”, whatever the merits of the issue in question, was simply 
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excluded from effective participation in the negotiations. Over time, the institutional tool of 
the club thereby fostered bargaining attitudes in line with the reciprocity discourse
656
 and 
frustrated alternative, more principled approaches to multilateral trade lawmaking. The 
institutional features of trade negotiations were thus employed to mould the selves of the 
participants in trade lawmaking in a way that would make them more accepting of, 
compliant with, and ultimately invested in lawmaking on the basis of the principle of 
payment.  
In the present chapter, I will focus on the practices of participation in multilateral 
trade lawmaking. For reasons of space, I cannot analyse here a number of other practices 
that play a vital role in multilateral trade lawmaking, in particular, practices of 
representation,
657
 decision-making,
658
 and chairing.
659
     
I. Practices of Participation  
When US and British officials started negotiating about the structure of the post-war 
trading order, they envisaged a universal international organisation that would be the 
counterpart of the United Nations in the economic sphere.
660
 This “impulse to 
universality”661 was reflected in the US's ambition to negotiate a charter for an international 
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trade organisation through “United Nations machinery”662 and in the persistence with 
which it sought the cooperation of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China, in this 
endeavour. The US also agreed to add chapters on employment – and later and more 
hesitantly, development – to its draft charter in order to widen the appeal of the 
organisation.
663
  
As I have described in the previous chapter, however, during the discussions on the 
procedures for tariff reductions the US, UK and Canadian negotiators also began to 
consider an alternative paradigm of participation for the multilateral trading system: the 
club. Economic theory defines clubs by reference to the characteristics of the goods that the 
members of the club share. Put simply, a 'club good' is a good that is best shared with some, 
but not too many, others. As a consequence, the club members seek to exclude those whose 
participation would pose higher costs than benefits. To say that states adopt a club approach 
to multilateral trade lawmaking, then, is to say that they seek to manipulate the circle of 
participants depending on how they weigh the costs and benefits of the participation of 
additional states.
664
 In the present section, I will first discuss what the major trading nations 
perceived these costs and benefits to be, i.e., what it was that prompted them to see 
participation in multilateral trade lawmaking as a 'club good'. I will also explore how these 
countries attempted to reconcile the club approach with their ambition to establish a 
universal organisation (A). I will then trace how the club dynamic manifested itself in the 
practices of participation in multilateral trade lawmaking throughout the history of the 
GATT (B). Next, I will argue that a fundamental recalculation of the costs and benefits of 
the participation of developing countries in the trading system led the major developed 
countries to conclude the Uruguay Round with the establishment of a new club with very 
different characteristics from the GATT, namely, the WTO (C). In the WTO, the club 
dynamic of participation survives in at least three different incarnations: overtly, in 
accession negotiations; formalised in negotiations in “variable geometry”; and disguised, in 
the increased differentiation of obligations.  
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A. The Club Within: GATT and the ITO 
There can be no doubt that the US design for the post-war trading order was originally of a 
universal nature. During the Second World War, the US leveraged the aid that it was 
granting its allies to secure their commitment to enter into discussions on the post-war 
international economic order with the US and other governments. The US originally 
negotiated the wording of Article VII of its mutual aid agreements with Britain, but copied 
it verbatim into all later mutual aid agreements, among them those with the Soviet Union 
and China. Article VII of the mutual aid agreements committed the parties to  
agreed action … open to participation by all other countries of like mind, directed to the 
expansion, by appropriate international and domestic measures, of production, employment, 
and the exchange and consumption of goods.
665
 
 
Even before the first exploratory discussions on the post-war economic order 
pursuant to Article VII took place between the United States and Britain, the British 
government suggested that the Soviet Union and China be notified that such consultations 
were planned and that they be kept “generally informed on the upshot of the discussion”.666 
US officials agreed; they were concerned not to  
give the impression that the United States and Great Britain were coming to previous 
agreements on the matters [i.e. monetary and commercial policy] before other governments 
were brought in and acquainted with the progress of the discussions.
667
 
 Referring to Article VII of its mutual aid agreements, the US further informed the British 
that  
the United States [was] in a somewhat different position than that of the United Kingdom in 
respect to the Soviet Government and the Chinese Government, in that the United States 
ha[d] exactly the same commitments to those Governments that it ha[d] to the United 
Kingdom Government.  
The US government had therefore decided  
to extend invitations [to hold exploratory talks] to the Soviet Government and to the 
Chinese Government identical to those which ha[d] been extended to the United Kingdom 
Government.
668
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In the following months, the US reiterated its desire to enter into exploratory 
discussions on commercial policy with the Soviet Union. At the tripartite conference of 
foreign ministers in Moscow in October 1943, the US presented a memorandum on the 
“Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation”, in which it suggested the  
conclusion of a general convention to which all of the important countries of the world 
would be parties, which would lay down the rules and principles that should govern trade 
relations between nations.
669
  
The US also proposed the establishment of a “Commission comprising representatives of 
the principal United Nations”, i.e. the US, the UK, the USSR and China, and “possibly 
certain others of the United Nations”, such as “Canada, the Netherlands and Brazil”, to 
discuss and set up the necessary procedures. The US further presented a memorandum 
summarising the results of the exploratory discussions between the US and the UK that had 
already taken place,
670
 and stated that it was “particularly important that similar 
conversations be arranged soon between Soviet and American experts”.671 Later in 1943, 
President Roosevelt personally raised the issue with Churchill and Stalin at the Teheran 
Conference,
672
 and again urged the “establishment of United Nations machinery for 
postwar economic collaboration” in separate letters to Churchill and Stalin in February 
1944.
673
 The US repeated these requests in April and May 1944.    
While the exploratory talks with the Soviet Union and China never took place, the 
persistence with which the US attempted to initiate discussions especially with the Soviet 
Union is evidence of its expectation that the international economic arrangement of the 
post-war era would be firmly anchored within the framework of the United Nations, in 
which the Soviet Union was anticipated to play a key role. The US also sought the 
inclusion of the Soviet Union in the inner circle of the negotiations “as a means of working 
out a solution of problems of [the] state trading system”674 – a further indication of the 
universal scope ultimately desired for the proposed organisation. Consistent with its 
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ambition to pursue the establishment of a post-war international economic order through 
“United Nations machinery”, the US introduced a resolution calling for an “International 
Conference on Trade and Employment” at the First Session of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations held in February 1946.
675
 The resolution established a 
Preparatory Committee to elaborate a draft convention and appointed nineteen states as 
members of the Committee. One month before the first session of the Preparatory 
Committee in October 1946, the United States published a Suggested Charter for an 
International Trade Organization of the United Nations. Consistent with the “impulse to 
universality”, the proposed organisation was to have low barriers to entry: no more was 
supposed to be required of new members than to accept the obligations of the charter.
676
  
The Suggested Charter, however, also embodied a different paradigm of 
participation with respect to one central issue: tariff negotiations. As described in the 
previous chapter, it was in the context of their discussion of alternative methods of tariff 
reductions that US, UK and Canadian negotiators first considered the idea of holding 
negotiations initially among a “nucleus of important trading nations”.677 Three rationales 
for the “nuclear group”,678 or “club”,679 approach emerged during the discussions. First, 
given that the US insisted on using the method of bilateral requests and offers to negotiate 
tariff reductions, the three states considered it more practicable to conduct tariff 
negotiations initially among a small group of countries. Recognising the limited negotiating 
capacity of its partners, including the UK and Canada,
680
 the US granted that  
the number of countries should be kept small since the greater the number engaged in 
simultaneous negotiations the more difficult the negotiating problem, particularly for 
countries other than the United States.
681
  
 
                                                 
675
 See E/PC/T/117/Rev.1, para. 1; for the text of the resolution, see Brown 1950, 59.    
676
 See Suggested Charter 1946, Article 2; see also Senate Hearings 1947, 3: "Chapter II, relating to 
membership, looks toward world-wide participation in the organization". 
677
 The idea is first mentioned by the US negotiator Harry Hawkins; FRUS 1945, 59. 
678
 FRUS 1945, 72.  
679
 The term "club" was first used by a Canadian negotiator; FRUS 1945, 65.  
680
 The impracticability of conducting multiple bilateral negotiations simultaneously had been one of the 
primary objections of the UK and Canada to the bilateral request and offer method of tariff negotiations; see 
supra text at fn 86.  
681
 FRUS 1945, 88; see also Canada's remark that  
[i]t seemed obvious that this [i.e., bilateral tariff negotiations] could not be done if too many 
countries were involved, but it might be achieved among a relatively small nucleus of countries, say 
8 to 12 of the major trading nations. (FRUS 1945, 71) 
155 
 
Second, the club approach would allow the “nuclear” countries to agree on the 
procedure for tariff reductions, as well as disciplines on non-tariff barriers, without having 
to take into account the views of other countries. States which the nuclear countries feared 
would not be constructive or sufficiently ambitious could simply be excluded (unless their 
inclusion was essential for political or economic reasons). The Canadians argued, for 
example, that  
a general conference of all countries might be dangerous, since the views of the many small 
countries might unduly weaken the bolder measures which the large trading nations might 
find it possible to agree upon. … [J]udging from past experience, the presence at a general 
international conference of the less important, and for the most part protectionist-minded, 
countries, would inevitably result in a watering down of the commitments which a smaller 
number of the major trading nations might find it possible to enter into.
682
  
There were some differences of opinion between the US and Canada regarding the extent to 
which legal disciplines on non-tariff barriers, rather than just bilateral tariff bargains, 
should be definitely agreed among the smaller circle of countries. With a view to their 
ambition for an ultimately universal organisation, the Americans had “reservations” as to 
the “desirability of actually concluding the arrangements among the nuclear group prior to 
the holding of a general international trade conference at which the views of other countries 
would be obtained.”683 The Canadians, by contrast, were adamant “that the arrangements 
among the nuclear group should not be kept open and thereby made subject to changes at 
the general conference.”684 These differences in detail notwithstanding, the proponents of 
the nuclear approach clearly saw it as a way to shield certain elements of the proposed 
trading arrangements – the procedure and level of ambition of the tariff negotiations in the 
case of the US, in the case of the Canadians the rules on non-tariff barriers as well – from 
the scrutiny and influence of outsiders.    
A third, and related, rationale for the nuclear approach was that it would, at a later 
stage, present the opportunity to force those outsiders into the arrangement on the nuclear 
group's terms. The proponents of the approach expected that, given its members' share in 
international trade, the nuclear group would exert a pull on outsiders to join the 
arrangement, even though the latter would have had no part in its creation and little say 
about its terms. Harry Hawkins, who first brought up the idea of an agreement among a 
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“nucleus of important trading nations”, assumed that “other countries might be more or less 
obliged to adhere” to it.685 The Canadians were greatly preoccupied by the question of how 
to achieve the “compulsion of outsiders”; they were concerned that the bilateral method of 
tariff reduction was not well suited for use “as a weapon to force” “reluctant countries” to 
participate in the agreement.
686
 One approach discussed between the US and Canada to deal 
with this question was to require new members “to negotiate their way in by entering into 
bilateral agreements with each of the countries making up the nuclear group”, under the 
threat that tariff concessions which the members of the nuclear group had negotiated with 
each other might otherwise be withdrawn after a “probational period”.687 As will be 
discussed below, it was this approach that the US ultimately proposed in its Suggested 
Charter.  
The three motivations for the club approach – the greater practicality of negotiating 
and reaching agreement among a smaller group of countries, the ability to shape the content 
of this agreement more decisively than would otherwise be feasible, and the possibility to 
compel outsiders to join the agreement largely on the insiders' terms – have shaped the 
practices of participation in multilateral trade lawmaking throughout the history of the 
trading system, though the relative prominence of these three motivations has varied. 
Another key factor has been the considerations that went into selecting members of the 
club. Here, too, the discussions between US, the UK and Canada in 1945 foreshadowed 
things to come.   
From the outset of the discussions on the composition of the nuclear group, the US, 
UK, and the British Dominions (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa) were 
treated as the “very minimum for such a nucleus”.688 The inclusion of the Dominions 
primarily reflected their close political and economic ties with the UK. The UK had been 
“anxious to have the Dominions keep in agreement with Britain and the United States at 
each stage of the economic talks”,689 and the four countries had therefore had considerable 
indirect (or in the case of Canada, direct) input into the exploratory talks between the US 
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and the UK.
690
 The same was true for India, even though it had not yet gained 
independence from Britain at the time. In the case of India, however, the US initially 
resisted its inclusion into the nuclear group, partly on the basis that “the strongly 
protectionist sentiment in India ma[de] it unlikely that India could be persuaded to join 
[the] nuclear group in expeditious tariff reduction.”691 Individual UK officials harboured 
similar concerns. Keynes, in particular, feared that it might “not be practicable” to get some 
of the developing countries, “particularly India”, “to enter into a convention that will go as 
far as United States and United Kingdom will be prepared to go.”692 In the end, India was 
included at the insistence of the British.
693
 
A list of “nuclear” countries proposed by the US Secretary of State in August 1945 
as reflecting the “combined political and economic judgment of the [State] Department” 
further included the other members of the “Big Five” (the Soviet Union, China, and 
France), as well as “major trading nations of Europe, Latin-America and the Orient”, the 
including the Netherlands, Belgium and Brazil.
694
 The State Department felt that the 
“[d]efinition of the nucleus by some easily understandable objective standard” was 
“important in justifying [the] exclusion of other countries”695 and that the inclusion of the 
Big Five, as a shorthand for political importance, and major trading nations from different 
parts of the world (economic importance and representativeness) constituted such a 
standard. Another consideration for the State Department was the opportunity to influence 
– through inclusion in the nuclear group – the trade policies of states in which these policies 
were perceived to be in flux. Thus, the Department saw the inclusion of China as providing 
an opening to “influenc[e] along liberal lines the direction of Chinese commercial and 
industrial policies which are presently in process of development.”696 Similarly, the fact 
that Belgium and the Netherlands were planning a customs union and would therefore have 
to renegotiate their trade agreements with other countries militated for their inclusion, in 
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order to ensure “that this revision … take place along lines harmonious with [the US'] 
general commercial policy.”697  
The considerations which determined whether a country would be invited to be part 
of the nuclear group thus included the following: economic influence, as measured in 
shares of world trade, and perceived political importance; strong political ties to one or 
more of the core members of the group; representativeness in terms of geography and 
trading profile;
698
 and the opportunity of influencing trade policies at times of political 
transition. Countries which were either not significant in trade terms, which were expected 
to oppose the core countries' plans or not to show sufficient ambition in reducing trade 
barriers, were to be excluded – unless they had an ally among the core countries, as was the 
case for India and Australia. The list proposed by the State Department would be reflected, 
with a few additions, in the membership of the Preparatory Committee as well as, later, the 
original membership of the GATT.
699
    
The Suggested Charter published by the US in September 1946 envisaged the 
following reconciliation of the club approach to the tariff negotiations with the universal 
ambit of the ITO. The GATT and the ITO Charter would be negotiated on separate 
institutional tracks.
700
 While the preparatory negotiations for the Havana conference, at 
which the ITO Charter was to be concluded, were sponsored by the UN's Economic and 
Social Council, the GATT would be, as the Suggested Charter explained, an “arrangement 
for the concerted reduction of tariffs and trade barriers among the countries invited by the 
United States to enter into negotiations for this purpose”.701 Once the ITO Charter came 
into force, the exclusive character of the GATT would be temporarily preserved within the 
ITO in the form of an “Interim Tariff Committee”, which would originally consist of all 
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ITO members which were also parties to the GATT.
702
 The sole task of this Committee 
would be to decide whether an ITO member had complied with its obligation, under Article 
18 (1) of the Suggested Charter, to enter, upon request, into “reciprocal and mutually 
advantageous negotiations” with other members “directed to the substantial reduction of 
tariffs (or of margins of protection afforded by state trading) on imports and exports”.703 If 
the Committee determined that a member had failed to fulfil this obligation “within a 
reasonable period of time”, it could authorise  
the complaining Member, or in exceptional cases the Members of the Organization 
generally, … notwithstanding the provisions of Article 8 [General Most-Favored-Nation 
Treatment], … to withhold from the trade of the other Member any of the tariff reductions 
which the complaining Member, or the Members of the Organization generally … may have 
negotiated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article.
704
    
ITO members which were not original parties to the GATT could only join the Committee 
when, “in the judgment of the Committee”, they had undertaken tariff reductions 
“comparable in scope or effect to those completed by the original members of the 
Committee”.705 In other words, they had to “negotiate their way in”, as the US and Canada 
had envisaged during their exploratory discussions.
706
 Only when two thirds of the ITO's 
members had become members of the Interim Tariff Committee would the Committee 
cease operation and its functions be transferred to the ITO membership as a whole.
707
 
The Interim Tariff Committee, then, was to be the club within. Its members would 
have controlled admission, with wide discretion in deciding whether the prospective entrant 
had earned the privileges of membership,
708
 and would have been able to wield the ultimate 
power in the trade context – the power to authorise the suspension of tariff concessions – 
against any member who refused to engage in tariff negotiations to the satisfaction of its 
trading partners. Although the obligation to engage in tariff negotiations was to be couched 
in general terms (“Each Member … shall …”), it was clearly directed at those outside the 
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club who had not already undertaken such negotiations (and had been excluded from the 
club in the first place partly on the basis of their presumed unwillingness to engage in 
them). The ostensible institutional “reconciliation” of the GATT with the ITO, then, was 
from the start conspicuously informed by the third rationale for the club approach: the 
ability to force others to join the club on the members' terms.   
The US draft of this arrangement survived the sessions of the Preparatory 
Committee in London and Geneva relatively unscathed
709
 – perhaps unsurprisingly, since 
all members of the Preparatory Committee could expect to become original members of the 
GATT and thus of the (Interim) Tariff Committee.
710
 At the Havana conference, however, 
the arrangement faced a backlash from the prospective outsiders. They were particularly 
aggrieved that the draft charter did not provide for an appeal of the decisions of the Tariff 
Committee (either to the Executive Board, the Conference, the International Court of 
Justice, or through dispute settlement proceedings).
711
 During the negotiations, the UK 
negotiator acknowledged that the  
Tariff Committee's special membership and consequent independent character and function 
had caused confusion and even the suspicion that the Tariff Committee would be an 
exclusive club unaccessible to countries with no basis to carry out the undertakings 
contained in Article 17 [the obligation to carry out tariff negotiations], and that the club's 
exclusiveness would enable the members to exercise unduly powerful influence over the 
work of the Organization.
712
 
Canada likewise recognised the “fear of some countries” that, under the arrangement 
envisaged by the draft charter, “powerful countries might force substantial tariff reductions 
on weaker ones, and that in the case of refusal, the latter would be kept from participation 
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in the Organization.”713 However, both the UK and Canada tried to reassure the opponents 
that these fears were unfounded, pointing to the experience of negotiating the GATT at the 
second session of the Preparatory Committee. The UK claimed that “most countries could 
find a basis for tariff agreements”, and even countries which had not negotiated tariff 
agreements might still be admitted to the Tariff Committee.
714
  
The US was less apologetic. The US negotiator explained that  
the central objective of the Organization was the reduction of tariffs and other obstacles to 
international trade. Only countries which had carried out the negotiations required by 
Article 17 should be members of the Tariff Committee – some countries present at the 
Conference had already done so and shown what could be done. Experience between the 
two World Wars showed the danger of adopting resolutions at international conferences 
which lacked any provision making for their implementation. Article 81 was one of the 
articles in the Charter which ensured this practice was not to be repeated and his delegation 
regarded it as of the highest importance.
715
 
At the first meeting of a sub-committee set up to study the question, the official set out the 
US position in even stronger terms, emphasising 
that the Organization was not to be a goodwill mission occupied in merely passing 
resolutions but it was to be an organization tied to action. The question before the Sub-
Committee was not one of two international organizations – The Trade Organization and the 
Tariff Committee – but was one of two steps in a process towards obtaining the benefits of 
the Charter. One stop in this process was acceptance of the Charter; the other was the 
negotiations under Article 17, the conclusion of which gave automatic membership in the 
Tariff Committee. In connection with the second step it was correct that the necessary 
determination should be made only by Members which had carried out the negotiations 
themselves.
716
 
 
What is striking is the peculiar meaning with which the US imbued the concepts 
“doing” and “action” in these statements. From an impartial perspective, the problem with 
the countries against which this remark was directed would not appear to be that they did 
not want “action”; rather, it was that they wanted “action” that was different from the 
“action” envisaged by the US. By framing its demand that other countries engage in a 
particular practice, namely reciprocal tariff negotiations, as a generic call for “action” and 
for something that “can be done”, the US signalled that the way it imagined trade 
lawmaking was the only way to do it. And against the backdrop of the club dynamic, this 
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was not mere rhetoric. What the club approach allowed the US to do was to actually make 
their “action”, i.e. reciprocal tariff negotiations, the only game in town. As I will argue 
throughout this chapter, it was this ability to marry institutional power to the imagery of 
“action” and “ambition” that would allow the US and the other major trading countries to 
gradually entrench the conception of trade lawmaking as necessarily based on reciprocity.  
The controversy between the prospective insiders and outsiders about the authority 
and composition of the Tariff Committee was ultimately resolved through a compromise. 
The US had managed to establish a somewhat dubious parallelism between the Tariff 
Committee and the proposed Committee for Economic Development.
717
 The compromise 
consisted in eliminating both the Tariff Committee and the Economic Development 
Committee from the charter.
718
 Even without its institutional embodiment, however, the 
club dynamic of the relationship between the GATT and the wider ITO membership was 
preserved. This was accomplished by reversing the burden of proof in cases where a GATT 
member considered that a non-GATT member had failed to carry out tariff negotiations to 
the former's satisfaction. Under the original draft, the GATT member would have had to 
refer the matter to the Tariff Committee, which would have had to authorise the suspension 
of tariff concessions. Under the Havana Charter, a GATT member could unilaterally 
suspend tariff concessions towards any ITO member that had not acceded to the GATT two 
years after the ITO Charter had come into force unless the Organisation decided, by 
majority vote, to “require the continued application” of concessions on the basis that the 
ITO member in question had been “unreasonably prevented” from acceding to the 
GATT.
719
 While this arrangement made it easier for an individual member to suspend 
concessions in response to unsatisfactory negotiations, it allowed all ITO members a say in 
whether this suspension was justified.  
Although the ITO Charter never came into force, the controversy about the Tariff 
Committee is informative in that it sheds light on what kind of institution the major trading 
powers intended the GATT to be. The club character of the GATT was to be the guarantor 
of the principle of reciprocity, which the Havana Charter stated in the following terms: 
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No Member shall be required to grant unilateral concessions, or to grant concessions to 
other Members without receiving adequate concessions in return.
720
 
The most-favoured nation principle – which pursuant to Article 16 of the Havana Charter 
operated among all ITO members – harboured the danger that tariff concessions that GATT 
contracting parties had granted to one another would go permanently unrequited. The 
provisions concerning the Tariff Committee in the drafts of the Charter, and on the right to 
withdraw tariff concessions unilaterally in the final version of the Charter, were designed to 
allow GATT members to exact a payment for these concessions from other ITO members. 
More fundamentally, they gave GATT members the leverage to establish the principle of 
payment as the uncontested foundation for tariff negotiations. Whoever was not prepared to 
pay for tariff concessions could simply be excluded from the club.  
 
B. The Self-Perpetuating Club: Participation in GATT Negotiations  
The stillbirth of the ITO dispensed with the need for complicated derogations from the 
most-favoured nation principle: since the most-favoured nation rule now only applied 
among GATT members in the first place, derogations were no longer necessary to allow 
them to enforce the principle of payment vis-à-vis outsiders.
721
 Instead of being “the club 
within” a larger organisation, the GATT was now a club, period. The interaction between 
those inside and outside the GATT would henceforth be exclusively governed by the 
accession procedure of GATT Article XXXIII, which provided that governments could 
accede to the agreement “on terms to be agreed” between the government in question and 
the contracting parties to the GATT. The contracting parties took utmost care to ensure that 
every one of them could individually insist on receiving adequate payment in the accession 
process: When in 1948 the quorum for admissions of new members was changed from 
unanimity to a two-thirds majority of the contracting parties (at the request of the ITO 
                                                 
720
 ITO Charter, Article 17(2)(b). 
721
 In fact, the possibility for such a derogation was temporarily preserved even in the GATT. In 1948, GATT 
Article XXV was amended to reflect the obligation to conduct tariff negotiations under Article 17(1) of the 
ITO Charter. In contrast to the compromise included in Article 17(4) of the ITO Charter, whereby a GATT 
member could unilaterally decide to withhold tariff concessions from an ITO member that it deemed had not 
complied with this obligation, a contracting party could only withhold tariff concessions towards another 
contracting party of the GATT after having been authorised to do so by the contracting parties acting jointly, 
and not at all if it had directly negotiated any tariff concessions in its schedule with the contracting party in 
question. This provision was never utilised and was deleted at the 1955 Review Session – a further indication 
that the obligation to enter into tariff negotiations was directed against those ITO members who remained 
outside the GATT. See GATT/1/47/Rev.1; GATT/1/SR.2, 3; and Jackson 1969, 542.    
164 
 
negotiators, who hoped to minimise the risk that ITO members might be “unreasonably 
prevented” from joining the GATT722), the contracting parties added GATT Article XXXV, 
which allowed individual contracting parties not to apply tariff concessions, or the entire 
agreement, to a new contracting party as long as it had not entered into tariff negotiations 
with that party.
723
 The new article was perceived as necessary because a two-third majority 
of the contracting parties could otherwise have “oblige[d] a Contracting Party to enter into 
a trade agreement with another country, without its consent.”724  
It was not primarily due to the provisions on accession, however, that the image of 
GATT as a “club” became ingrained in the imagination of observers and a steadily 
increasing subset of its contracting parties over the following decades.
725
 In fact, the large 
majority of countries acceding to the GATT over the following decades were developing 
countries that had emerged from colonial rule and that could join the GATT by simply 
succeeding into the obligations which their former colonial masters had assumed with 
respect to their territories.
726
 The perception that the GATT operated as a club arose instead 
from the way in which the practices that determined who participated in and benefited from 
trade negotiations reproduced and perpetuated the club dynamic within the framework of 
the GATT itself. As I will argue below, there were four such practices: the practice of 
negotiating tariff concessions primarily, and often exclusively, with the principal supplier 
of a product (i); the practice of excluding certain product categories and types of trade 
barriers from negotiations (ii); the practice of concluding agreements on tariff formulas and 
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non-tariff barriers among small groups of countries constituting a “critical mass” (iii); and 
the practice of conducting negotiations in an often informal and secretive way (iv). These 
practices reproduced and perpetuated the club dynamic not so much because they de jure 
excluded any countries from most-favoured nation treatment; rather, they de facto excluded 
a large number of GATT members, largely but not exclusively developing countries, from 
meaningful participation in multilateral trade lawmaking and from the benefits of trade 
liberalisation.  
Before I discuss these practices in more detail, I will briefly recall the three major 
motivations for the club approach that had been made explicit in the preparatory 
discussions to the GATT: the greater practicality of negotiating and reaching agreement 
among a smaller group of countries, the ability to shape the content of this agreement more 
decisively than would otherwise be feasible, and the possibility to compel outsiders to join 
the agreement largely on the insiders' terms. In the academic literature, the first factor is the 
most popular explanation for why the core GATT countries continued to operate as a de 
facto club in many respects. Many scholars emphasise the ease with which agreement could 
be reached among the likeminded core of the GATT countries. As Robert Hudec 
memorably put it, the GATT was   
a place where the leading countries could go off to do business by themselves, 
unencumbered by the complexities of a larger organization … [a] place (one might almost 
say a club) where likeminded people could get together and do their work in peace.
727
  
As I will argue in the following, however, the other two factors are very much part of the 
explanation as well, and did significantly increase in importance over time. Thus, by 
contenting themselves with "do[ing] business by themselves", the "leading countries" could 
not only reach agreement more easily. They were also able to keep doing things their way. 
During the first two decades of the GATT, this mostly meant sticking to reciprocity and the 
principal supplier rule as the basis for tariff negotiations and limiting the scope of 
negotiations to tariffs on manufactured products. What stands out about the club dynamic 
of GATT negotiations during this time is that it was self-perpetuating, in the sense that 
negotiating principles like reciprocity and the principle supplier rule automatically 
excluded those who were not able or willing to play by the "leading countries'" rules from 
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the benefits of trade liberalisation, hence providing them with a strong incentive to 
participate in trade negotiations on the insider's terms.  
This changed somewhat during the late 1960s and 1970s, as the focus began to shift 
from tariff negotiations to the negotiation of codes elaborating GATT provisions and 
formulating rules on the use of non-tariff measures. The major trading nations largely 
continued to "do business by themselves" and thereby managed to decisively shape the 
content of the codes. This was achieved by concluding agreements among a critical mass of 
(mostly developed) countries, and by conducting the negotiations in a secretive and 
exclusionary manner. In relation to the codes, however, the ability of the core to compel the 
adherence of outsiders proved to be limited by the unconditional most-favoured nation 
clause of the GATT. Towards the end and in the aftermath of the Tokyo Round, this 
limitation led to increasing frustration on the part of developed countries, in particular the 
United States. As will be discussed in the next section, it was the increasing failure of the 
club approach to achieve the compulsion of outsiders, combined with a fundamental 
recalculation of the costs and benefits of the participation of developing countries in the 
trading system, that led the developed countries to adopt a radical new strategy for the 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round: The constitution of a new club with the primary purpose 
of achieving the compulsion of outsiders.  
In the following, however, I will first describe the four practices that governed 
participation in multilateral trade negotiations, and that reflected and sustained the club 
dynamic of those negotiations, over the period from the early GATT until the Uruguay 
Round.  
 
a) Who Can Negotiate: The Principle of Payment and the Principal 
Supplier Rule 
The principle of payment, which governed GATT negotiations from the outset, played a 
central role in ensuring that trade negotiations continued to exhibit a club dynamic. Only 
those nations with something to “sell” – i.e., access to a lucrative market – were in a 
position to demand concessions from their negotiating partners.
728
 As Winham has put it, 
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influence in a tariff negotiation is a direct function of the size of a nation's trade. Nations 
with smaller trade flows simply are not in a position to offer many concessions to other 
countries and hence have little standing in a negotiation where the modus operandi is 
reciprocal exchange. … the fact that GATT negotiations have traditionally been tariff 
negotiations has probably increased the tendency of developing countries to regard GATT 
as a rich man's club.
729
 
By making effective participation in trade negotiations dependent on market size, i.e., on a 
country's ability to “sell” something of interest to other countries, the principle of payment 
reduced the role of small and less economically developed countries in trade negotiations.   
Even if an economically less powerful country was willing and able to offer 
concessions in tariff negotiations, its ability to demand concessions from its trading 
partners was limited by the principal supplier rule.
730
 This rule explicitly entitled 
participants in trade negotiations to reject requests for tariff concessions when the country 
requesting the concessions was not the principal supplier of the product in question.
731
 As a 
result, it pushed any country that did not already have major export volumes of particular 
products to the sidelines of trade negotiations, limiting their potential to profit from trade 
negotiations to the accidental benefits from tariff reductions agreed between the major 
trading powers.
732
 
The club dynamic produced by the principle of payment and the principal supplier 
rule was self-perpetuating: the exchange of concessions among the major trading countries, 
whose markets were attractive to each other and who tended to be the principal suppliers of 
the bulk of each other's imports, expanded the trade among these countries, making it more 
difficult for others to break into the core of the club. At the same time, these negotiating 
practices had a powerful assimilating effect: any country that hoped to benefit from trade 
negotiations had to be prepared to play by the rules of the game, thereby perpetuating these 
rules. As a result, the GATT confined “its active membership to willing liberalisers”.733   
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b) What Can Be Negotiated: Limitations on Products and Policies 
The major trading nations further limited the scope for effective participation in trade 
negotiations by circumscribing the subject matter of negotiations to those products and 
trade policy instruments that were of most interest to them. This involved not only the 
effective exclusion of entire sectors, such as agricultural products and textiles, from 
meaningful liberalisation commitments; it also encompassed the drawing of ever finer 
distinctions within product categories – in other words, the definition of subdivisions of 
products solely for purposes of tariff classification – in order to ensure that the benefits 
from a negotiated tariff concession did not spill over to countries which supplied a similar 
product but had not paid for the concession.  
The special status accorded to agricultural products and textiles in trade negotiations 
within the framework of the GATT up until the Uruguay Round is well known.
734
 In 
addition to the special treatment of agriculture, for example in relation to quantitative 
restrictions, that was already enshrined in the GATT itself, the United States and European 
countries obtained waivers which left them with virtually complete freedom to protect their 
agricultural markets.
735
 The protective instruments imposed for this purpose, among which 
the otherwise outlawed quantitative restrictions featured prominently, were largely 
excluded from the scope of GATT negotiations up until the Uruguay Round. 
Developing countries faced a similar problem with regard to tropical products, 
which were often their major export items. By contrast to agricultural commodities that 
could also be produced in temperate zones, tropical products did not face high market 
access barriers, but their consumption was often subject to internal taxes for revenue 
purposes, which were similarly excluded from the scope of trade negotiations under the 
GATT.
736
   
But product selection also occurred in sectors that were at the centre of the 
negotiations. Here, the desire to “concentrate … concessions on products exported only by 
                                                 
734
 See Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996; Aggarwal 1985; Gowa and Kim note that even the trade of Italy 
and Japan, two states that are commonly perceived as belonging to the core of the GATT, did not profit as 
significantly from the GATT as the trade of what they call the "privileged group" (Britain, Canada, France, 
Germany and the United States), because "both countries specialized in precisely those products [agricultural 
goods and textiles] that privileged group members succeeded in exempting from GATT rules". Gowa/Kim 
2005, 455-456. 
735
 Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996. 
736
 See Chapter 1, section II.B. 
169 
 
participants … sometimes required that new product categories be developed.”737 The 
contracting parties achieved this by introducing new subdivisions into their tariff schedules. 
This so-called "tariff specialisation", i.e. the "detailed classification of products for duty 
purposes", had long been recognized as a way "to evade most-favoured-nation 
obligations"
738
 – or, at the very least, to minimize their effects.   
The tension between tariff specialization and the MFN principle broke into the open 
in a number of trade disputes over the course of GATT history. These disputes demonstrate 
the importance that the GATT's contracting parties attributed to their ability to use tariff 
specialisation as a means of excluding contracting parties that had not paid for a concession 
from the benefits of that concession.  
One example is the Japan/Canada – Dimension Lumber case.739 Canada argued that 
certain types of lumber falling under different headings in the Japanese tariff were “like” 
products, and that the different tariff treatment of these products – some of which were 
predominantly found in the United States, some predominantly in Canada – was therefore 
inconsistent with Japan's MFN obligations. While the tariff lines at issue had not been 
created for the purposes of negotiations, but reflected unilateral decisions by Japan in light 
of its import and protection needs,
740
 the arguments of Japan highlight the important role 
that Japan attributed to tariff specialization for limiting the benefits from tariff concessions 
to those who pay for them. Thus, Japan argued that, if contracting parties were permitted to 
reclassify products in other contracting parties' tariff schedules on the basis that these 
products were “like”, such reclassifications “could be used to undermine negotiated tariff 
concessions”, as complainants could reclassify items “in order to gain an unbargained-for-
concession”.741 By “attempting to build a case by establishing within existing sub-positions 
of the Japanese Tariff sub-groups of goods with a degree of similarity …, so as to find 
allegedly 'like products' that receive different tariff treatment”, Canada was, in Japan's 
view, “forcing Japan into a concession that had not been negotiated.”742 Japan warned of 
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dire consequences for a system of tariff negotiations based on payment if this approach was 
accepted, noting that  
any moves to introduce tariff sub-classifications based on “end-use” criteria, would have the 
result that negotiators, when considering a concession-request on a given tariff position, 
would have to examine for “likeness”, with the product covered by the requested position, 
all other products covered under any other tariff position, and, if there existed such “like” 
products, the negotiators would then have to decide whether, or not, they would be in a 
position, and willing, to grant the concession, bearing in mind reciprocity obligations and 
other relevant desiderata and requirements.
743
  
 
Other countries took the opposite view and warned of the “dangers of allowing 
widespread abuse of the MFN clause through 'breaking out' a tariff line into numerous 
specialized and essentially arbitrary categories”.744 In this controversy, the conflict between 
the MFN rule and the principle of payment that had given rise to the principal supplier rule 
reappears in the guise of the tension between the prohibition to discriminate between like 
products and the imperative to concentrate the benefits of tariff concessions on those who 
are paying for them.  
The panel in Japan/Canada – Dimension Lumber recognised tariff differentiation as 
a “legitimate means of trade policy”, in that it was a “legitimate means of adapting the tariff 
scheme to each contracting party's trade policy interest, comprising both its protection 
needs and its requirements for the purposes of tariff- and trade negotiations.”745 Robert 
Hudec reads these “rather opaque references to the needs of tariff negotiations” as owing to 
the above-mentioned tension, noting that  
it was no doubt awkward for the panel to acknowledge, in the face of all the fanfare 
proclaiming the MFN obligation to be a “cornerstone” of GATT policy, that governments 
do need a bit of freedom to discriminate in tariff negotiations.
746
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Other authors have confirmed the importance of the product selection facilitated by 
tariff differentiation for the success of tariff negotiations. Hufbauer et al. note that, in tariff 
negotiations, “the legal devotion to an unconditional most-favored-nation approach often 
exceeded its economic substance”. They speculate that, “[i]f 'product selection' had not 
been available as a way around a strict MFN approach, there would perhaps have been 
much less tariff cutting."
747
 Product selection was indeed highly successful in concentrating 
the benefits of trade liberalization among those who actively participated in tariff 
negotiations. As Finger reports,  
[t]he participating countries with whom the United States exchanged concessions at the 
Geneva 1947, Geneva 1956, Dillon and Kennedy rounds supplied in each case just under 70 
percent of dutiable U.S. imports. At the first of these rounds, judicious selection of products 
managed to internalize 84 percent of U.S. concessions, and by the Dillon Round product 
selection had become a fine art, internalizing 96 percent of U.S. concessions.
748
   
 
In sum, product selection, both in its blatant (exemption of entire sectors) and more 
subtle (tariff differentiation) forms, played a significant role in concentrating the benefits of 
trade negotiations among the core countries. The exclusion of most policies other than 
tariffs from the ambit of negotiations for most of the GATT's history proved to be 
particularly problematic for developing countries and agricultural exporters, who were 
unable to achieve reductions in the major trade barriers facing their exports.  
c) Who Needs to Agree: Critical Mass Approaches to Lawmaking 
The dynamics described in the previous two sections were most characteristic of trade 
negotiations in the first two decades of the GATT's operation. The Kennedy Round in the 
1960s brought two major changes. First, negotiations on non-tariff barriers started to play a 
more prominent role. For a number of reasons, these negotiations were not subject to the 
self-perpetuating club dynamic that had characterized tariff negotiations. Thus, in 
negotiations on non-tariff barriers, there were no conventions akin to the principal supplier 
rule that would have restricted who could request concessions from their trading partners. 
Moreover, even though the participants were still primarily interested in the practices of 
their major trading partners, in negotiations on non-tariff barriers all countries potentially 
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had something to offer, namely their consent to multilateral rules – at least in those areas 
where multilateral solutions, instead of bilateral accommodations, were sought.
749
 As 
Winham has observed: 
Once non-tariff measures and other issues came onto the agenda of GATT negotiations – 
which occurred mainly at the Tokyo Round – developing countries were less inhibited by 
their trade profiles and were more able to make an impact on multilateral trade negotiations. 
In the negotiations over trade rules or codes of behaviour, large and small nations start on a 
footing of greater equality than they do in a tariff negotiation based wholly on the respective 
trading performances of the participants. Economic power and interest are still the principal 
variables in current GATT negotiations, but the correlation between bargaining position and 
trade performance has diminished and there is consequently greater scope for negotiating 
skill and perseverance on the part of individual national delegations.
750
 
Second, even the dynamics of tariff negotiations changed in the Kennedy Round, at 
least superficially. The Kennedy Round was the first negotiating round in which tariff 
reductions were supposed to be achieved in accordance with a multilaterally agreed 
formula, rather than through bilateral bargains. This held out the prospect that less 
economically powerful countries would not only profit from tariff reductions on a wider 
range of products, but would also have a say in the design of the reduction formula.  
These developments ran counter to the club dynamic that had characterized past 
GATT negotiations: from the perspective of the core GATT countries, these changes posed 
precisely those dangers that the club approach was designed to avoid. First, the active 
participation of a wider range of countries in the negotiation of rules and tariff formulas 
would make reaching agreement more difficult; second, in order to reach consensus under 
these circumstances, the core countries might have to make substantial concessions to other 
countries; and, third, if agreement could not be reached and the core countries decided to 
implement agreements among themselves, the MFN obligation would make it hard to 
prevent the outsiders from benefitting from the agreement; this, in turn, would make it 
difficult to force them to join it on the insiders' terms. As I will show in the following, the 
core countries found mechanisms to replicate the club dynamic under the changed 
circumstances in a way that addressed the first two concerns, but did little to remedy the 
third. Thus, the use of a critical mass approach to negotiations on non-tariff barriers and 
tariff formulas prevented potentially non-cooperative countries from blocking agreement 
                                                 
749
 See Chapter 1, Section I.C.b) for a discussion of negotiating approaches to non-tariff barriers.  
750
 Winham 1990, 814. 
173 
 
and from influencing the substance of the agreement in ways that would be unacceptable to 
the core. Moreover, the concentration of negotiating activity among a small group of core 
countries that used to come about automatically through the principal supplier rule was 
increasingly institutionalised in the form of exclusive negotiating arrangements (see next 
section). None of these instantiations of the club approach, however, allowed the core to 
internalize the benefits of their agreements to the same extent as had been possible under 
the traditional protocol of tariff negotiations. 
Aside from the rules for the entry into force of the GATT itself,
751
 one of the 
earliest examples of the use of a critical mass approach in negotiations on non-tariff 
measures was the adoption of binding declarations containing additional obligations with 
regard to subsidies. The original version of the GATT contained only reporting and 
consultation requirements in Article XVI; this provision had been agreed under the 
assumption that the much more stringent obligations contained in the ITO Charter would 
come into force soon.
752
  
When the ITO Charter failed to enter into force, the contracting parties decided, at 
the Review Session in 1955, to amend Article XVI to include more specific obligations on 
export subsidies. The new paragraph 4 of the provision envisaged that contracting parties 
would cease to grant any form of export subsidies on non-primary products “as from 1 
January 1958 or the earliest practicable date thereafter”. This was supplemented by a 
standstill provision, whereby contracting would not extend existing subsidies or introduce 
new subsidies in the meantime, i.e., up until 31 December 1957.
753
 An Interpretive Note 
clarified that the  
intention of paragraph 4 is that the contracting parties should seek before the end of 1957 to 
reach agreement to abolish all remaining subsidies as from 1 January 1958; or, failing this, 
to reach agreement to extend the application of the standstill until the earliest date thereafter 
by which they can expect to reach such agreement.  
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 See GATT Article XXVI.6, which stipulates that the agreement  
shall enter into force, as among the governments which have accepted it, on the thirtieth day 
following the day on which instruments of acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on behalf of governments signatory to the Final Act the territories of 
which account for eighty-five per centum of the total external trade of the territories of the signatories 
to the Final Act adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 
United Nations Conference on Tarde and Employment. Such percentage shall be determined in 
accordance with the table set forth in Annex H. (emphasis added)  
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 Jackson 1969, 368-370; Irwin/Mavroidis/Sykes 2008, 156-158. 
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 GATT, Article XVI(4).  
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Since the contracting parties failed to reach agreement on the abolition of all export 
subsidies on non-primary products by late 1957, they adopted, on 30 November 1957, a 
declaration extending the standstill provisions of Article XVI (4) for one year.
754
 Paragraph 
4 of the Declaration stipulated: 
This Declaration shall enter into force on the day on which it will have been accepted by the 
Governments of Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
and the United States of America.
755
 
The Declaration and a Proces-Verbale extending it for another year entered into force on 11 
May 1959 for those governments which had signed them.
756
 In 1960, the contracting parties 
finally adopted a “Declaration Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI, Paragraph 
4”, which contained a similar provision regarding the “critical mass” of countries that had 
to accept it in order for it enter into force. Thus, paragraph 2 of the Declaration read: 
This Declaration shall enter into force, for each government which has accepted it, on the 
thirtieth day following the day on which it shall have been accepted by that government or 
on the thirtieth day following the day on which it shall have been accepted by the 
Governments of Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America, whichever is later.
757
  
 
Gallagher and Stoler have noted the implications of this declaration: 
At a time when forty-two governments were [contracting parties] to the GATT, only 
seventeen signed the declaration. The new obligations applied to the seventeen signatories, 
but rights under Article XVI:4 accrued to all forty-two [contracting parties]. Clearly, this 
apparent lack of reciprocity did not stop the seventeen from signing on because they must 
have considered that they collectively constituted a critical mass of [contracting parties] 
likely to engage in meaningful export subsidies on industrial products.
758
 
 
The declarations on the extension of the standstill provision and the bringing into effect of 
the prohibition on export subsidies on industrial products implemented on a critical mass 
basis obligations that were envisaged in the (amended) GATT itself. The Kennedy Round 
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 L/774; see also Jackson 1969, 373. The Declaration was extended twice: see L/935 and L/1121.   
755
 L/774, para. 4. See also L/892, reporting on the status of acceptance of the Declaration.  
756
 L/985.  
757
 Giving Effect to the Provisions of Article XVI:4, Declaration of 19 November 1960, BISD, 9
th
 Suppl. 
1961.  
758
 Gallagher/Stoler 2009, 384. (footnotes omitted)  
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Anti-Dumping Code, however, marked a new departure: the negotiation of a legally 
separate agreement adding to GATT obligations but bypassing the amendment procedures 
of the GATT. The resort to “codes” during the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds is often 
attributed to the difficulties of amending the GATT.
759
 It should be noted, however, that the 
amendment provisions of the GATT themselves foresaw that the GATT could be amended 
by a critical mass of contracting parties. Pursuant to Article XXX, amendments to the 
GATT (except to Part I and Article XXIX, as well as Article XXX itself, which required 
unanimity) would “become effective, in respect of those contracting parties which accept 
them, upon acceptance by two-thirds of the contracting parties and thereafter for each other 
contracting party upon acceptance by it.”760 However, the core countries must have found 
the threshold of two-thirds of the contracting party too high, and therefore opted for the 
negotiation of separate “codes”, which could be brought into force by fewer parties.761  
The “Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade”, as the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code was formally known, did 
not even stipulate a minimum threshold for acceptances for its entry into force: Article 13 
simply provided that it would “enter into force on 1 July 1968 for each party which has 
accepted it by that date.”762 Of course, among the states which had negotiated the code – 
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 See e.g. Curzon/Curzon 1980, 143:  
the GATT started out with 23 contracting parties. It now has 83. They are incapable of agreeing 
unanimously to change even a comma in the original agreement. How, then, is GATT to change? 
The answer is to draw up codes … and to create a network of new rights and obligations among the 
countries which accept them. 
760
 GATT Article XXX.  
761
 See Jackson 1969, 81; and Winters 1990, 1295:  
Amending the GATT requires the agreement of two-thirds of the members and so the new provision 
were embodied in an interpretive Anti-dumping Code, which the industrial country contracting 
parties signed separately from their 'regular' GATT membership. This plurilateral approach 
represented a major innovation in the development of multilateral trading rules.  
The precedential effect of the Anti-Dumping Code for negotiations on other non-tariff barriers is also noted 
by Dam 1970, 175. 
762
 Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, Article 13.  
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principally OECD countries
763
 – acceptance was informally contingent upon the acceptance 
by the other participants (as well as the successful conclusion of the Round as a whole).
764
  
The second agreement on non-tariff barriers negotiated during the Kennedy Round, 
regarding the elimination of the American Selling Price system of customs valuation, was 
explicitly concluded among a limited group of countries, namely Belgium, France, Italy, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Economic 
Community, and would enter into force only if accepted by all those governments.
765
  
In both cases, the limited circle of parties who needed to agree made it easier to 
reach an agreement, and allowed those parties to shape the content by themselves. It 
appears that in each case the benefits were sufficiently concentrated among the participants 
so that unrequited accidental benefits accruing to non-participants were not a major 
concern.
766
 While the Anti-Dumping Code remained open to signature by additional 
parties,
767
 the only obvious incentive would be the opportunity to participate in the 
Committee set up pursuant to Article 17 of the Agreement. However, Jackson notes a more 
subtle way in which the Code could affect non-parties. Given that  
the code is worded as an 'interpretation' of Article VI of GATT, its provisions could, over 
time, be accepted as the definite interpretation of GATT, thus binding all GATT parties.
768
  
Again, the outsiders would thus ultimately join the insiders on the insiders' terms.
769
 Such 
multilateralisation by stealth only had prospects of success as long as participation in the 
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 The following countries initially notified their interest to be represented in the group that negotiated anti-
dumping policies during the Kennedy Round: Canada, the EEC, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom and the United States; see TN.64/NTB/39. There is also a documentary record of 
participation by Denmark (TN.64/NTB/W/10/Add.6), Australia (TN.64/NTB/W/10/Add.8), New Zealand 
(TN.64/NTB/W/10/Add.9) and Finland (TN.64/NTB/W/10/Add.10). Evans notes that the "principal 
participants" were all members of the OECD, which had previously studied the anti-dumping policies of its 
members; Evans 1971, 260. 
764
 On the exchange of concessions embodied in the Anti-Dumping Code, see supra text at fn 286.  
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 ASP Agreement, Article 12.  
766
 Jackson 1969, 410:  
Because of the MFN clause in Article I of GATT, it obligates parties to that code, even in their 
actions toward GATT contracting parties who are not code parties – an interesting circumstance of 
nonreciprocity.  
See also L/3149. 
767
 Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code, Article 13.  
768
 Jackson 1969, 410.  
769
 In a similar vein, Gallagher and Stoler argue that the critical mass approach to the bringing into effect of 
GATT Article XVI:4 proved to be "a successful path to disciplining export subsidies" on the basis of, inter 
alia, "its plurilateral extension through the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code and, eventually, to all WTO 
members at the end of the Uruguay Round." Gallagher/Stoler 2009, 384.    
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codes was not openly politicised – which may have been true for the Kennedy Round, but 
was certainly no longer true for the Tokyo Round.   
In the early 1970s, the “tight little club of the 1950s was gone",770 and the 
negotiation of codes with participation of a critical mass of countries became the dominant 
modus operandi of the Tokyo Round.
771
 At the same time, the limits of implementing the 
club approach through the use of critical mass became more evident in the Tokyo Round: at 
the conclusion of the Round, the developed countries found themselves confronted with 
rival codes and amendments proposed by developing countries, with demands that only 
codes adopted by the Trade Negotiations Committee with a two-thirds majority could enter 
into force, and (at least partially successful) resistance against the conditional-MFN 
elements of the codes. Moreover, the negotiation of the one code on which the co-operation 
of developing countries was essential, the safeguards code, ended in failure.
772
 
The Tokyo Round was from the outset driven by the United States, in conjunction 
with the European Community and Japan.
773
 In 1973, the United States issued joint 
statements with the EC and Japan, respectively, declaring their intention to initiate a new 
round of trade negotiations.
774
 While the other developed GATT parties welcomed this 
initiative, developing countries were more sceptical and “made it clear that their association 
with the undertaking was conditional upon the details to be applied to their participation 
including the techniques and modalities to be worked out for the negotiations.”775 In an 
internal memorandum, US negotiators reported criticism of the draft declaration launching 
the Tokyo Round by some developing countries, noting that “such discordant notes”, if 
repeated at the Tokyo Ministerial, would be “regrettable”, but  
should not interfere with the basic objective which is approval of the declaration by the 
countries which are planning meaningful participation in the forthcoming negotiations. 
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 Hudec 1988, 1507. 
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 See Winters 1990, 1296: "the practice of separate but parallel Codes was re-affirmed and plurilateralism 
accepted" 
772
 For background, see Winham 1986, 197-200; for an account of the failure of the negotiations, see ibid. 
240-247.   
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 FRUS 1973-1976, 591: In 1971 "the European Community and Japan, at our urging, agreed that 
multilateral trade negotiations should begin in 1973". 
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 GATT 1979, 49; Winham 1986, 93; see L/3669 and L/3670; Oxley 1990, 159, comments:  
The driving forces of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations had been the United States and the other 
three quadrilaterals. The objectives for the Tokyo Round were prepared following discussions among 
the United States, Japan and the European Community. They announced that the negotiations were 
to begin and everyone else was invited to participate. 
775
 MIN(73)W/2, para. 2.  
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There is no requirement for any country to participate, and the election not to participate by 
a few developing countries will not affect the approval of the declaration.
776
 
 
In effect, the entire Tokyo Round thus proceeded from the outset on a critical mass 
basis.
777
 This allowed the developed countries, and particularly the US and the EC, to 
“essentially negotiate[e] among themselves”778 (see next section) and thereby to realise the 
first two benefits of the club approach – facilitating agreement and shaping the content of 
that agreement decisively. At the same time, they became more reluctant than they had 
been in the Kennedy Round to forego the third element of the club approach – forcing 
outsiders to join the agreement on the insiders' terms – by extending the benefits of that 
agreement to non-participants, as required by the unconditional MFN clause of the GATT. 
Hence, for the first time in the history of the GATT, formal conditional MFN was openly 
considered as an element of the new “codes”.779 The report of the preparatory commission 
for the Tokyo Round negotiations noted the suggestion by “some delegations” that “the 
negotiations on certain non-tariff measures should be conducted on the basis that the 
benefits would accrue only to countries that are parties to the resulting arrangement.”780 
The EC in particular had openly embraced conditional MFN as the basis for the code 
negotiations.
781
 From the outset, the developing countries announced their opposition to 
this development.
782
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 FRUS 1969-1976, 682.  
777
 Hufbauer/Erb/Starr 1980, 67, note with respect to the negotiations on non-tariff barriers in the Tokyo 
Round: 
From the beginning of the Tokyo Round it was clear that not all GATT members would accept this 
extension of international discipline.  
778
 At a meeting of the Consultative Group of 18 held in 1978, one participant noted that  
the developing countries did not know what to expect from the Tokyo Round since the developed 
countries were essentially negotiating among themselves (CG.18/8, para. 17) 
779
 See Hudec 1992, 74:  
the U.S. and the EC both declared during the course of the negotiations that they would refuse to 
give the benefits of the newly drafted codes to those countries that would not sign them. This 
signaled the beginning of conditional MFN treatment.  
Hufbauer/Erb/Starr 1980, 67 (footnote omitted): 
… the major nations that were willing to accept meaningful international measures demanded that 
such discipline apply equally to their trading partners. In order to ensure this international quid pro 
quo, the Tokyo Round established the principle of conditional MFN as the centerpiece of its work – 
the six Codes governing nontariff barriers. 
780
 MIN(73)W/2, para. 23; a statement to this effect was included in all drafts of the report; see 
Prep.Com/W/6, para. 14; Prep.Com/W/6/Rev.1, para. 18; Prep.Com/W/6/Rev.2, para. 20.   
781
 EC Overall Approach 1973, 8: 
The solutions arrived at [on non-tariff barriers, N.L.] should be accepted by as many countries as 
possible if the existing imbalance between the various contracting parties is not to be worsened. It 
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During the preparatory phase of the Tokyo Round, negotiations had already 
substantially advanced on a “Standards Code”.783 The working group that drafted the code 
had worked “on the hypothesis that benefits under the Code would accrue as of right solely 
to other adherents, without these benefits having to be extended to contracting parties 
which did not adhere to the Code”.784 This hypothesis did not extend only to the Code 
itself, but also to “multilateral schemes for assuring conformity to mandatory or quasi-
mandatory standards” contemplated under the code. In the first draft considered by the 
working group, the hypothesis was inter alia reflected in a provision stipulating that such 
schemes  
should not include any provisions which would prevent individual members from accepting 
assurances of conformity provided by non-participating countries, except where the non-
participation of such countries is due to unwillingness to accept the obligations of 
membership. 
The provision was accompanied by a note that “[t]his somewhat tortuous phraseology is 
designed to make these schemes as 'liberal' as possible, but at the same time to discourage 
attempts to obtain the benefits of membership without accepting the corresponding 
obligations.”785 While the provision was later dropped, it indicates the spirit in which the 
negotiations proceeded.  
The draft standards code that was ultimately forwarded to the Tokyo Round 
negotiating group on technical barriers to trade contained an explicit “critical mass” 
provision stating that it would enter into force after an as yet unspecified number of 
contracting parties (“[x]”), “including those listed in Annex 2”, had ratified it.786 Annex 2 
was still “[to be added]” at this stage, but there proved to be little enthusiasm for doing so 
                                                                                                                                                    
should therefore be made clear that any advantages which might derive from solutions comprising 
obligations going beyond the present GATT rules would be reserved for countries which in practice 
abide by these solutions (conditional application of the most-favoured-nation clause. 
Winham notes that "while this went against the usual American support for the principle of non-
discrimination, it was an approach that gained wide acceptance in the subsequent NTM negotiations"; 
Winham 1986, 82. On the US position, see Kolligs 1990, 555 and fn 7.   
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 MIN(73)W/2, para. 23: "Delegations from developing countries have stressed that all concessions resulting 
from the negotiations should be extended to them unconditionally." 
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 See MTN/NTM/5, para. 7.  
784
 COM.IND/W/108, para. 8; the report of the Working Group, including the draft code, is also attached to 
MTN/NTM/5.  
785
 Spec(71)39, 19.  
786
 MTN/NTM/W/5, Appendix 1, Article 22(a)(i) of the Draft Code; at the time, Annex 2 was still "to be 
added". 
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in subsequent negotiating sessions.
787
 The provision does not appear in the final version of 
the Code. By all indications there was an informal understanding between the US and the 
EC that both would ratify the code, and they were presumably unwilling to jeopardize the 
entry into force of the code by making it contingent on the accession of other parties.
788
  
This solution to the “critical mass” question was facilitated by the fact that, by its 
terms, the code provided benefits only to those who were “Parties” to it,789 which created 
an incentive for other contracting parties to join. In the case of the standards code, these 
benefits were not primarily substantive – thus, many of the provisions of the code merely 
elaborate the national treatment obligation to which the parties were subject in any case 
with respect to all GATT contracting parties pursuant to Article III:4 of the GATT – but 
procedural: the code created new notification requirements which only applied with respect 
to other parties to the code, and only parties were members in the Committee established 
pursuant to the Code.
790
  
While the Standards Code was thus, like all other Tokyo Round codes, “conditional 
in important procedural respects”,791 the Subsidies and Government Procurement codes 
"fully embrace[d] the conditional MFN principle in their substantive elements"
792
 in that, 
by their terms, they provided substantive benefits to signatories that were not enjoyed by 
other contracting parties to the GATT. Thus, while GATT Article III:8 exempts 
government procurement from the scope of the national treatment obligation of the GATT, 
the Government Procurement Code provided for national treatment of “products and 
suppliers of other Parties” with respect to government procurement covered by the 
agreement.
793
 Similarly, the Subsidies Code imposed more stringent disciplines than the 
GATT on the use of subsidies which cause injury to the domestic industry – or serious 
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 See MTN/NTM/W/12, 7:  
The Sub-Group noted that it would, at some stage, have to discuss the provisions in the text relating 
to minimum participation and key countries. 
788
 Thus, explicitly including a country in the list of "critical mass" countries would give that country leverage 
by allowing it to block the coming into force of the code. Conversely, excluding a country from the list of 
"critical mass" countries might have taken the pressure off that country to join the code, which would 
contravene the third element of the club approach.   
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 Earlier drafts of the Code use the term "adherents" instead of "Parties"; see e.g. COM.IND/W/108, Annex.  
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 Hufbauer/Erb/Starr 1980, 68, note that each of the Tokyo Round codes "establishes a committee of 
signatories to resolve substantive and technical question relating to Code operation." 
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 Ibid. 68. 
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 Ibid. 69 
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 Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code, Article II.  
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prejudice to the interests – of “another signatory”.794 Moreover, Article 1 of the Subsidies 
Code stipulated that the imposition of countervailing duties “on any product of the territory 
of any signatory imported into the territory of another signatory” had to be in accordance 
with the provisions of GATT Article VI as well as the code. The most significant practical 
effect of this provision was that the United States could impose countervailing duties on 
subsidised imports from other signatories only after determining that these imports were 
causing “material injury” to its domestic industry – a requirement of GATT Article VI from 
which the United States was exempt with respect to the contracting parties of the GATT 
because its countervailing duty law, which did not require such a determination, predated 
the adoption of the GATT.  
The developing countries resisted both aspects of the club approach adopted by the 
US and the EC in the Tokyo Round – critical mass negotiations and unconditional MFN – 
from the outset. Their first line of defence was to prevent the adoption of agreements on a 
critical mass basis within the framework of the Tokyo Round negotiations. At a meeting of 
the Trade Negotiations Committee in July 1978, Yugoslavia, speaking “on behalf of the 
developing countries”, stated:    
At this stage we are requesting that a rule be established for the decision-making process in 
the MTN according to which no adoption of a negotiating document would be accepted 
unless the large majority of participants declared themselves in favour of it. We cannot 
proceed on the basis that a group of a few countries may consider it appropriate for others to 
be kept out of arrangements if they are not in a position to accept their conceptual 
approach.
795
 
The developing countries were clearly concerned that the critical mass approach 
was allowing the developed countries to develop the law without feeling the need to bring 
the developing countries on board. While the developing countries found it “understandable 
for there to be, in the process of negotiation, many stages and many bilateral and 
multilateral consultations”, they saw these “as a technique for reaching universally 
acceptable solutions”,796 not as a way for small groups of countries to conclude agreements 
among themselves.  
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 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, Article 8.  
795
 MTN/W/35, 1. Developing countries were also concerned that the code approach circumvented the 
amendment provisions of the GATT. Thus, Yugoslavia noted that "whenever amendments are made in the 
General Agreement, the CONTRACTING PARTIES have to approve them according to the existing rules." 
For background, see Steinberg 2002, 357.  
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 MTN/W/35, 4. 
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The developing countries kept up their resistance to the critical mass approach until 
the very end of the Tokyo Round negotiations. They attempted to amend the final drafts of 
the codes to the effect that they would only be open for acceptance “after being adopted by 
the Trade Negotiations Committee”.797 This would have given developing countries a 
chance to prevent those codes which did not adequately reflect their interests from entering 
into force at all – and would thus have given them leverage to effect changes in the codes. 
An alternative proposal advanced at the conclusion of the negotiations, which would have 
had a similar effect, was that the codes “should enter into force when two thirds of the 
participants in the MTN have accepted them.”798  
The question of whether an agreement among a subset of GATT contracting parties 
could only be concluded with the consent of all contracting parties went to the heart of the 
matter of what kind of institution the GATT was. On the developing countries' view, the 
Trade Negotiations Committee “could only proceed on the basis of consensus”;799 the 
addition of any new body of law to the GATT framework required a positive consensus of 
the membership, even if only a subset of members would subscribe to it. In contrast to this 
collectivist conception of the GATT, the developed countries took the view that  
the MTN was not a general diplomatic conference, that no agreement was being forced on 
any government but that on the other hand the Committee could not prevent a number of 
countries from entering into an agreement if they wished to, unless the provisions of the 
agreement were contrary to the GATT.
800
   
These governments, then, viewed the GATT as a collection of bilateral or plurilateral 
contracts. Subsets of members who wished to enter into such contracts were free to do so as 
long as they “were not imposing anything on other governments but simply moving to 
higher levels of discipline”.801 Apart from consistency with the GATT, there was no 
substantive constraint on the content of bilateral or plurilateral agreements, such as would 
exist if they were subject to approval by the contracting parties as a whole. It was 
unsurprising that the developed countries should take this view, as it was only under this 
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 See MTN/P/5, 2(d); see also MTN/NTM/65, para. 12 (proposal to amend Article 15.1 of the Standards 
Code); MTN/NTM/66, para. 10 (proposal to amend Article 19:2(a) of the Subsidies Code); MTN/NTM/67, 
para. 5 (proposal to amend Article 22:1 of the Customs Valuation Code); MTN/NTM/69, para. 12 (proposal 
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 MTN/P/5, para. 14. 
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conception of the GATT that the conclusion of critical mass agreements, and thus the 
realization of the first two benefits of the club approach – the greater ease of reaching 
agreement among a small group and the opportunity to shape the content of that agreement 
decisively – could be realised.  
The developed countries' view prevailed – by default, as there was no consensus to 
add the language suggested by the developing countries to the draft codes. As one of the 
developing countries complained, a “precedent” was “now set for various groups of 
countries to put up Agreements amongst themselves and to seek the umbrella of the 
MTN.”802  
The developing countries' second line of defence was directed against the third 
element of the club approach – the attempt of the developed countries to force the 
developing countries to join the codes on the formers' terms by limiting the benefits of the 
codes to code signatories through conditional MFN. In this, the developing countries were, 
at least partially, successful.
803
 On 28 November 1979, the contracting parties adopted a 
decision entitled “Action by the Contracting Parties on the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations”, in which they “reaffirm[ed] their intention to ensure the unity and 
consistency of the GATT system”, noted that “existing rights and benefits under the GATT 
… including those derived from Article I” of non-signatories to the codes were “not 
affected” by the codes, and expressed their expectation that non-signatories would be 
regularly informed on developments regarding the codes and would be able to follow the 
proceedings of the code committees “in an observer capacity”.804 This decision made it 
clear that, the language of the codes notwithstanding, the contracting parties expected the 
benefits of the codes to be extended to all contracting parties on the basis of the MFN 
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 MTN/P/5, 62.  
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 In Steinberg's view, they were completely successful with regard to the Subsidies Code and the revised 
Anti-Dumping Code; see Steinberg 2002, 357 ("the developing countries received all of the rights to the 
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Government Procurement Code to extend the benefits of the code to non-signatories, see Kolligs 1990.  
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 L/4905.  
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obligation in GATT Article I.
805
 While there was no similar legal basis for the procedural 
rights of non-signatories envisaged in the decision, the contracting parties' administrative 
and budgetary control of the GATT Secretariat provided them with at least some leverage 
in this regard.
806
  
Despite these decisions at the GATT level, the United States' Congress, refused to 
implement the Subsidies and Government Procurement codes on an MFN basis.
807
 In the 
case of the Subsidies Code, the US was unwilling to extend the benefits of its new 
countervailing duty law to those who would not pay for it with increased discipline on their 
subsidy practices: The US implementing legislation denied the code's benefits not only to 
non-signatories of the code, but also to developing countries that made use of the flexibility 
provided by Article 14.5
808
 not to eliminate export subsidies on non-primary products.
809
 
To this end, the United States invoked the non-application clause of the agreement against 
developing countries which did not enter into commitments that the US found 
satisfactory.
810
 When the US subsequently proceeded to impose countervailing duties on 
industrial fasteners from India without applying an injury test, India requested consultations 
and eventually the establishment of a panel pursuant to Article XXIII of the GATT.
811
 In its 
panel request, India questioned whether the non-application clause could be “validly 
invoked by any Party with the objective of obtaining concessions from another Party to the 
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 Again, it is not clear that this applied to the Government Procurement Code.  
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consensus of the Contracting Parties"); see also Steinberg 1995, 21.  
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 See Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, Article 19.9; for the notification of the invocation of the non-
application clause with respect to India, see Let/1159, 27 August 1980. 
811
 For India's consultations request, see L/5028; for the panel request, see L/5062; for discussions of this 
episode, see Winham 1986, 359-360; Hudec 1987, 88-89; Kolligs 1990, 579; Steinberg 2002, 358, fn 97.  
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Agreement which are not envisaged in the provisions and go beyond the balance of rights 
and obligations contained in the Agreement.”812 In effect, India argued that the non-
application clause could not be used to force outsiders to join the Subsidies Code on the 
insiders' terms. India further argued that the United States' refusal to apply an injury test in 
the countervailing duty investigation of India's exports violated the MFN principle in 
Article I of the GATT. To support its argument, India relied inter alia on the contracting 
parties' above mentioned decision, which had confirmed that the GATT Article I rights of 
non-signatories were “not affected” by the codes.813 Eventually, the US gave in and agreed 
to apply the provisions of the Subsidies Code in relation to India.
814
  
d) Who Gets to Be in the Room: From the Bridge Club to the Green 
Room 
Throughout the history of the GATT, the club approach to trade lawmaking was 
implemented through exclusive negotiating arrangements. In the first two decades of the 
GATT's operation, the tariff or trade negotiations committee, i.e., the GATT body 
overseeing the negotiations, was itself an exclusive body whose membership was limited to 
those contracting parties who engaged in tariff negotiations on a reciprocal basis. Starting 
in the Kennedy Round, as membership of the trade negotiations committee became more 
inclusive, the core countries started to use other, more informal meetings to maintain 
control of the negotiations.  
The question of who could be a member in the trade negotiations committee 
overseeing a trade negotiation was for the first time openly contested in the Kennedy 
Round.
815
 At the Ministerial Meeting at which the decision to launch the Kennedy Round 
negotiations was taken, ministers from some developing countries raised the question of 
“how the membership of the Committee would be decided and whether the less-developed 
countries would be adequately represented”.816 The Executive Secretary, Eric Wyndham-
White, reminded the ministers that, “in past negotiations the tariff negotiations committee 
                                                 
812
 L/5062, para. 3(c); India referred in this respect to the Working Party report on the review of the operation 
of Article XXXV of the GATT, L/1545, which had concluded that non-application  
could not legitimately by used as a bargaining lever for gaining privileges and advantages over and 
above those provided for in the General Agreement.  
India noted that this conclusion had been "endorsed by the then US representative in unequivocal terms".     
813
 L/5062, para. 3(f). 
814
 Hudec 1987, 89; India's request to terminate the panel proceedings is in L/5062/Add.1.  
815
 See MIN(63)SR, 4-7.  
816
 Ibid. 4.  
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had been composed solely of the countries which took part in the negotiations” and that 
“[i]t would be inappropriate to provide for a trade negotiations committee which would 
include countries not participating in any way in the trade negotiations.”817  
It was clear to all involved that the kind of “participation” in trade negotiations that 
had been required in the past to entitle a contracting party to membership in the trade 
negotiations committee was a readiness to engage in reciprocal tariff reductions. This 
notion was becoming increasingly problematic, however. Over the years preceding the 
Kennedy Round, the GATT had been focusing increasingly on the trade problems of the 
less-developed countries, particularly within the framework of the programme for the 
expansion of international trade.
818
 One of the principles that had gained increasing 
acceptance in the run-up to the Kennedy Round was the principle of non-reciprocity for 
developing countries. In fact, the very resolution that provided for the establishment of the 
trade negotiations committee and that the ministers were debating at the 1963 Ministerial 
Meeting announced as one of the principles of the upcoming negotiations that  
every effort shall be made to reduce barriers to exports of the less-developed countries, but 
that the developed countries cannot expect to receive reciprocity from the less-developed 
countries.
819
  
As a result, it appeared to some developing countries that the notion of “participation” as 
readiness to engage in reciprocal concessions was becoming increasingly anachronistic. 
Thus, the Malaysian minister “enquired whether the less-developed countries could be 
considered as 'negotiating'” since they were not asked to offer reciprocal concessions, and 
the Indian minister, after noting the manifold ways in which the developing countries had a 
stake in the upcoming negotiations, stated that “[i]t could not be considered therefore that 
reciprocal action on tariff cuts would be the only contribution which various parts of the 
world hoped to make towards the expansion of world trade.”820 
In order to deal with the undeniable tension between the traditional understanding of 
“participation” in GATT negotiations and the GATT's newfound concern for the trade 
interests of developing countries, the United States, which had drafted the resolution under 
discussion, had come up with what the Indian minister described as “a somewhat complex 
                                                 
817
 Ibid. 5-6.  
818
 See Chapter 1, Section II.B.  
819
 MIN(63)9, A.8.  
820
 MIN(63)SR, 7.  
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procedure”,821 whereby a special committee of the trade negotiations committee would be 
set up in which “the less-developed countries together with the developed countries could 
discuss and agree on the terms for participation”.822 As the Executive Secretary noted, “the 
implications of the word 'negotiating' would be one of the interesting questions” which the 
committee “might consider”.823 In other words, the committee was to perform a 
gatekeeping function by setting conditions for the participation of developing countries in 
the Kennedy Round negotiations. The Executive Secretary attempted to frame the 
committee as an effort to facilitate the participation of developing countries in the Kennedy 
Round, noting that  
if these countries were in doubt because they could not form a judgement as to the 
conditions of participation, having regard to their development problems, it was at least 
reasonable to make provision whereby there could be some discussion of the question 
before they made up their minds whether or not they were going to participate actively in 
the negotiations, and therefore to seek membership of the Trade Negotiations Committee 
itself.
824
  
The obvious alternative, of course, would have been not to make participation in the trade 
negotiations subject to “conditions” which could potentially create difficulties for the 
developing countries in light of their “development problems”. India clearly saw this, and 
its proposal to delete the reference to the committee from the ministerial resolution, on the 
basis that “every country which would be participating in the negotiations would be doing 
so in a way consonant with its economic development needs”,825 was eventually accepted. 
The preparatory phase of the Kennedy Round, then, saw the last rearguard action to defend 
the trade negotiations committee as a body “tied to action” (to use the words of the US 
delegate at the Havana Conference
826
).   
However, that was not the end of the debate over “participation” in the Kennedy 
Round. The Executive Secretary, who was also Chairman of the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, continued to express his “understanding” that those contracting parties that had 
notified their intention to participate in the work of the Trade Negotiations Committee 
                                                 
821
 Ibid. 5.  
822
 Ibid. 5-6 (explanation given by the Executive Secretary). The establishment of the committee is foreseen in 
paragraph B 3(f) of the draft resolution contained in MIN(63)4. The final version of the resolution, from 
which the paragraph is deleted, is in MIN(63)9.  
823
 MIN(63)SR, 7.  
824
 Ibid. 7.  
825
 Ibid. 7.  
826
 See supra text at fn 716.  
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“intended to take an active part in the trade negotiations in the sense of being prepared to 
make a contribution”:827 However, membership in the TNC was formally open to any 
contracting party that requested to become a member, and there was thus no way to police 
the Executive Secretary's “understanding”. To remedy this problem, the core countries 
simply proceeded to de-couple the status of a “full participant” in the negotiations from 
membership in the TNC. The status of a “full participant” and the attendant privileges, in 
turn, remained “tied to action”, i.e., to a readiness to engage in (at least some) reciprocal 
reduction of trade barriers.  
In June 1963, the TNC decided to establish a Sub-Committee on the Participation of 
Less-Developed Countries to consider “any special problems relating to the participation of 
less-developed countries in the trade negotiations”.828 It soon became clear that this 
committee would be quite similar to the special committee that had been envisaged in the 
paragraph B 3(f) of the draft resolution considered at the 1963 Ministerial Meeting, and the 
reference to which had been deleted at the suggestion of India. The first hint that the new 
Sub-Committee on the Participation of Less-Developed Countries was a kind of 
reincarnation of the "gatekeeping committee" that the developing countries had thought had 
dispensed with during the preparatory negotiations, was a remark by United States that the 
committee would be “charged with establishing the basis for the participation of the less-
developed countries in the negotiations”. The United States added that this “could be done 
in a pragmatic way so that the basis for participation would be in line with ground rules as 
they evolved”.829 The US representative's reference to “evolving” ground rules spooked 
some of the developing countries;
830
 the latter considered the question of ground rules, as 
least as far as the principle of non-reciprocity was concerned, to have been settled.
831
  
Over the course of the discussions in the Committee, the link between 
“participation” and reciprocity, which the developing countries believed had been severed 
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 TN.64/SR.1, 1. 
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 TN.64/SR.2, 3. See the TN.64/LDC/ series of documents. 
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 TN.64/21, 6, para. 20.  
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 TN.64/21, 6, para. 26 (Brazil: "it would be difficult for the less-developed countries to express their 
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 TN.64/21, 14, para. 50 (India: "Ministers had agreed at their meeting of May 1963 that the developed 
countries could not expect to receive reciprocity from the less-developed countries; it was not open for the 
Sub-Committee to re-examine this matter."); para. 57 (Argentina: "the Ministerial Decision made it perfectly 
clear that less-developed countries would not be expected to give full reciprocity in the forthcoming trade 
negotiations.").  
189 
 
in the preparatory negotiations, began to re-emerge in the guise of a “contribution” that 
developing countries were expected to make to the trade negotiations in order to be 
considered as “full participants”. Thus, in response to questions, the Executive Secretary 
clarified that “a less-developed country could be said to be participating in the trade 
negotiations when it played its part drawing up the ground rules for these negotiations, and 
when it contributed to the negotiations.”832 The United States acknowledged that, given that 
the “ground rules” were still to be established, “it was hardly possible for less-developed 
countries to know exactly what their contribution to the negotiations should be.”833 The 
United States made it clear, however, that “participating less-developed countries should all 
make a contribution to the negotiations” and that “it would be difficult for the [US] 
delegation to make full use of the authority which it possessed if less-developed countries 
did not make some contribution to the negotiations as a whole.”834 In a similar vein, the EC 
representative clarified that the “notion of 'reciprocity' contained two elements”, namely “a 
contribution as such” and “the quantitative value of such contribution”; it “seem[ed] 
obvious”, the EC representative explained, that the principle of non-reciprocity “relate[d] 
more specifically to the value aspect”, leaving “the contribution aspect to be dealt with”.835 
In practical terms, “participation” in the Kennedy Round largely revolved around 
the question to what extent a country would be involved in the process of “justification”, 
“confrontation and negotiation” of the exceptions to the linear tariff reduction formula that 
most of the developed countries had agreed to apply.
836
 To a large extent, whether a 
country would benefit from the Kennedy Round tariff reduction exercise depended on its 
ability to ensure that the major developed countries did not exempt products of interest to it 
from the linear cut. In order to be able to do this, a country had to (a) know whether 
products of interest to it had been exempted by any of the linear countries and (b) had to be 
present in the meetings in which the exceptions lists were examined and discussed. It was 
participation in this basic sense – in the sense of being allowed to see the exceptions lists, 
to be in the room when they are discussed, and to participate in the discussion – that the 
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 TN.64/21, 14, para. 51.  
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 TN.64/21, 14, para. 52.  
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 TN.64/21, 16, para. 59.  
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 TN.64/21, 15, para. 58.  
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 See the "procedures for the justification and subsequent negotiation of exceptions" in TN.64/29, para. 2(c).  
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developed countries made contingent on the readiness of a less-developed country to 
“contribute” to the negotiations.  
The Executive Secretary, even though he clearly cared deeply about the less-
developed countries' “contribution”, was not willing to go quite as far. He acknowledged 
that “there was no logical connexion between the receipt of exceptions lists by the 
developing countries and indication by these countries of their own contributions, since the 
question of reciprocity did not arise”.837 He merely suggested that “for practical purposes, it 
was probably desirable … to establish dates for the two distinct processes 
simultaneously.”838 However, this did not sit well with some developed countries. They 
noted that, under the secretariat's plan,  
the less-developed countries would see the whole of the exceptions lists and enter into 
discussion on their contents before they had provided any indication of the extent of their 
own contribution to the Kennedy Round.
839
 
The developed countries considered this to be at odds with the fact that, with respect to the 
process of confrontation and justification, they had only agreed to the involvement of   
those developing countries which were participating. It would be difficult to infer that 
developing countries were in fact full participants before the extent of their contribution 
was known. It would therefore be preferable … for the developing countries to submit an 
indication of their contribution prior to their viewing the exceptions lists.
840
   
 
It is appropriate to take a step back at this point to appreciate the very particular 
meaning given to the term “participation” in this statement. Recall that in the preparatory 
negotiations, it had appeared that the developing countries had managed to overcome the 
association between reciprocity and participation; in particular, what they had achieved was 
that their “participation” – involvement, membership, presence – in the Trade Negotiations 
Committee was not made contingent on reciprocity. Instead of reintroducing conditions for 
“participation” at the TNC-level, what this statement does to re-define what “participation” 
means. In effect, this statement says to the developing countries: 'you may well be members 
of the Trade Negotiations Committee; you may well be present at its meetings; and you 
may well be involved in its discussions – but none of this means that you are participating 
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in the trade negotiations. Membership, presence, voice (elements that would seem highly 
indicative of what one would normally understand as political participation) do not count; 
what counts is whether you pay. This is a market, and you only participate – are a part of – 
a market if you buy and sell.'  
Some developing countries were not fooled by the word play, noting that the 
“procedural suggestions which had been made appeared to represent a reversion to the 
concept of reciprocity.”841 Nevertheless, it was on the basis of this understanding of what 
counts as “participation” that the process for the examination and justification of exceptions 
from tariff reductions was organized. At the centre of this structure was an informal body 
composed of the “linear” countries, i.e., those developed countries undertaking tariff 
reductions on the basis of a linear formula; this body met in January and February of 1965 
“to conduct the justification process”.842 Countries which had not submitted a linear offer 
were – with the exception of Canada – not entitled to attend these meetings. According to 
the “Plan for the participation of the less-developed countries in the trade negotiations”, the 
linear countries would subsequently inform those less-developed countries which had 
“formally notified … their readiness to table” at a specific date “a statement of the offers 
which they would make as a contribution to the objectives of the trade negotiations” which 
items of special interest to the less-developed countries were contained on the exceptions 
lists.
843
 On the same date, the developed countries would also make “suggestions as to the 
offers which participating less-developed countries might make”.844 As the next step, the 
less-developed countries which had indicated their intention to make offers were allowed to 
participate in an “examination of the lists of excepted items” that were of interest to 
them.
845
 Finally, “[l]ess-developed countries having tabled a statement of their proposed 
contributions would thereafter take part in the trade negotiations and would receive the full 
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 TN.64/LDC/27, para. 12. 
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 TN.64/SR.10, para. 5. The decision to conduct the "process of justification" in a "body consisting of the 
countries participating in the negotiations on the basis of the linear offer" is recorded in TN.64/29, para. 2(c).  
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 TN.64/41/Rev.1, A, para. 2(c). The Director-General would later report that "a number of items of 
particular interest to less-developed countries have been excepted from the linear cut"; FRUS 1964-1968, 785.  
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exceptions lists.”846 While the submission of a statement of offers thus in principle entitled 
a less-developed country to negotiate with the linear countries about the products on the 
latter's exceptions lists, the United States had obtained a guarantee that it was left “open to 
a developed country to decide whether a specific offer by a less-developed country 
constituted an acceptable basis for opening negotiations with that country.”847  
The disciplining effect of the definition of “participation” established by the 
developed countries in the Kennedy Round is evident in a document circulated by the 
GATT's Director-General – formerly the Executive Secretary – to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee “for the convenience of the Committee” in December 1965 (see Figure 1).848 
The document contains two simple lists of countries. The first records countries which had 
tabled offers on industrial or agricultural goods, or, in the case of less-developed countries, 
had submitted “statements of the offers they would make as a contribution to the trade 
negotiations”. The second lists countries which had “formally notified their intention to 
participate in the trade negotiations”, but had “not yet presented” their statements of offers. 
With respect to the first group of countries, the document states that these countries “had 
been recognized as full participants in the negotiations”.849 Countries in the second group, 
by contrast, “are to be regarded as full participants from the date on which they present” 
their statements of offers. This document represents perhaps the prime example of 
"hierarchical observation" of compliance with the reciprocity norm in multilateral trade 
lawmaking.
850
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 TN.64/41/Rev.1, A, para. 4. 
847
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Fig. 1: Observation of compliance with the reciprocity norm; excerpt from TN.64/73.  
 
While the group of “linear” countries was at the core of the tariff negotiations, much 
of the “action” in the Kennedy Round occurred among an even more select circle of 
participants referred to as the “Bridge Club”,851 a group consisting of the Executive 
Secretary and representatives of the United States, the EEC, the United Kingdom, as well 
as, occasionally, Japan and Canada.
852
 According to Curzon and Curzon, the “private 
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 Winham 1990, 811: the Bridge Club "effectively accounted for most of the actions of the round"; Winham 
1986, 272: "essentially all of the action of the negotiation occurred within this group." 
852
 Winham 1990, 811; Winham 1986, 65, fn 9; Curzon/Curzon 1973, 319, describe the membership of the 
"Bridge Club" as consisting of "the director-general, on the one hand, and the representatives of the United 
States, the EEC, and the United Kingdom, on the other". 
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meetings” between the Bridge Club members represented the “control center” of the 
Round.
853
 For example, when the Director-General drafted a report on the progress of the 
Kennedy Round for the attention of ministers of the participating countries,
854
 he “held a 
series of information meetings with the major Kennedy Round participants … before 
writing the report”, then gave the US, the EEC, Japan, and the United Kingdom an 
opportunity “to comment individually on the first draft”, and incorporated some of their 
“suggested amendments in the final version”.855  
What was true for the Kennedy Round – that the “main action of the negotiation 
often occurred away from the multilateral chambers”856 – was even more characteristic of 
the Tokyo Round. Most negotiations in the Tokyo Round had what Winham, arguably the 
foremost historian of the Tokyo Round, has described as a “pyramidal” structure whereby 
“agreements were initiated by the major powers at the top and then gradually 
multilateralized through the inclusion of other parties in the discussions.”857 As Winham 
has explained:   
Together, the EC and the United States conducted a largely bipolar negotiation, with each 
'superpower' effectively possessing a veto over the various Tokyo Round agreements. Other 
parties such as Japan, Canada, and smaller developed countries played important role in 
selected areas, but more often than not faced a fait accompli when the two major players 
reached bilateral agreement.
858
  
Formal bodies, such as the Trade Negotiations Committee, played even less of a role in the 
Tokyo Round negotiations than they had in the Kennedy Round.
859
  
The extent to which the negotiations had this pyramidal structure varied among the 
different negotiating areas and the different phases of the negotiations. In the “Tariffs 
Group”, for example, the participants extensively debated the merits and demerits of 
alternative tariff formulas,
860
 only to have the EC and the US proceed to agree bilaterally on 
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a formula which was "not even put before Group Tariffs for discussion or approval.”861 In 
the subsidies negotiations, the basic outline of an agreement was circulated in July 1978 by 
Canada, the EC, Japan, the Nordic countries and the US “for the information and 
consideration of other interested delegations”.862 The limited circle of participants in the 
subsequent negotiations was partly due to self-selection. As Hufbauer et al. report,  
only the United States, the EC, Japan and Canada took an active part in the early stages of 
the subsidies negotiation. Only with great effort were countries such as Mexico, India and 
Hungary involved in the negotiations. In fact, some countries – such as Singapore and 
Australia, which watched the negotiations closely – did not in the end associate themselves 
with the negotiated Agreement.
863
 
 
The negotiations on customs valuation similarly followed the pyramidal pattern.
864
 
Sherman attributes the developing countries' decision to propose an alternative code at the 
conclusion of the negotiations to “the fact that the LDCs, as well as some other trading 
nations, were not consulted until relatively late in the MTN proceedings, after the Code was 
nearing its final form.” 865 Indeed, at the TNC meeting held to conclude the round, the 
developing countries characterised the customs valuation code as a "draft negotiated among 
a certain number of developed countries".
866
 And while the pyramidal dynamic was 
reportedly not present in the negotiation of the Government Procurement Code,
867
 it was 
taken to an extreme in the negotiations on the revision of the Kennedy Round Anti-
Dumping Code and the Code on Civil Aircraft: Most participants in the Tokyo Round 
negotiations saw the texts of these codes for the first time at the TNC meeting that was 
called to draw up the Procés-Verbale to conclude the round. As Malaysia protested at the 
meeting,  
… developing country delegations … have constantly pointed out the need for transparency 
in the negotiations. Yet today we find texts of Agreements which have been negotiated 
amongst a few developed countries on subjects like Trade in Civil Aircraft of which an 
overwhelming majority of participants in the MTN were not aware until 7 April 1979. My 
country and many other developing countries are sizeable customers for civil aircraft and 
yet we have been kept out of the negotiations of this Agreement. … The so-called 
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Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT is another document that has surfaced 
at the final hour.
868
  
Malaysia was particularly frustrated by the fact that the developed countries had resisted 
the creation of a formal negotiating sub-group on anti-dumping, only to come up with a 
draft Anti-Dumping Code – a revised version of the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code 
which had been negotiated exclusively among developed countries
869
 – at the conclusion of 
the Round.
870
 
The discontent among the developing countries at that final TNC meeting of the 
Tokyo Round was palpable. Malaysia dismissed the draft codes before the TNC as "a series 
of documents purporting to be Agreements".
871
 The Chilean remarked that his country was 
"placed before a minimum compromise between the major trading nations".
872
 The 
developing countries attributed the unsatisfactory way in which the negotiations had 
proceeded to the lack of rules of procedure.
873
 Yugoslavia noted the "fact that at some 
stages of the negotiations the developing countries were not invited, and that transparencies 
were often absent".
874
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 Delegation. 
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The Indian delegate therefore expressed his delegation's  
total reservation with regard to the agreements reached among some delegations from developed 
countries in respect of Anti-Dumping and Civil Aircraft.  
The EC delegation contested the validity of this criticism, ibid. 48, stating that  
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In sum, exclusionary negotiating arrangements, in conjunction with a readiness to 
conclude agreements on a critical mass basis, allowed the developed countries, and in 
particular the US and the EC, to implement the club approach to trade lawmaking in the 
Tokyo Round. Negotiating mostly among themselves, and enlarging the circle of 
participants gradually by first including those most likely to assent to their approach and 
marginalising those most likely to oppose it, the two majors made it easier to come to an 
agreement in the negotiations, and managed to shape the results of the negotiations 
decisively. They thus accomplished the first two benefits associated with the club approach. 
However, the Tokyo Round also showed the limits of the club approach to multilateral 
trade lawmaking: in the area of safeguards, which was largely a North-South issue and 
where the developing countries would hence have had to be part of any agreement for it to 
be meaningful, no agreement could be reached. Moreover, as noted above, the MFN 
principle limited the extent to which the developed countries could deny the benefits of the 
codes to non-signatories, thus curtailing their ability to entice the latter to join those 
agreements on the signatories' terms.   
 
Exclusionary negotiating arrangements were also characteristic of the Uruguay 
Round, especially in its final stages. "Green Room" meetings had been introduced by the 
GATT's new Director-General Arthur Dunkel in the early 1980s.
875
 During the early stages 
of the Uruguay Round, Dunkel used the Green Room to “organize negotiations, appoint 
chairs for each of the groups, review proposals, maintain momentum, and make sure no 
significant delegation was left out.”876 Which delegations were invited to Green Room 
meetings depended partly on a country's significance in trade terms, and partly on the 
strength of individual representatives; India and Brazil, for example, were always there.
877
  
As the Uruguay Round progressed, much of the action shifted from the Green 
Room to bilateral negotiations between the US and the EC, sometimes with involvement of 
                                                 
875
 Hart 1995, 204; Blackhurst/Hartridge 2005, 464; the New York Times reported from the 1982 Ministerial 
Meeting:  
… in a suite of offices with olive green walls, members of the high-powered "chairman's group" held 
24-hour vigils and were dubbed the 'boys in the green room'. 
New York Times 1982.  
876
 Hart 1995, 216.  
877
 Oral History Interview with Warren Lavorel, 10:40-12:08; see also Blackhurst and Hartridge 2005, 463, 
who note that the selection of Green Room participants was "apparently arbitrary", but "well understood in 
fact". 
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the other two "Quad" countries (Japan and Canada). As Paemen and Bensch, two EC 
negotiators, have put it, even the influence of coalitions such as the Cairns Group  
gradually faded away. As the battle over agriculture between the European Community and 
the U.S. gathered pace, it became clear that there was no room for additional combatants.
878
  
The agriculture negotiations, where the EC and the US had managed to reach a bilateral 
agreement that left the other participants in the round little choice but to accept it as a fait 
accompli, subsequently became the model on which the EC and the US hoped to resolve 
other outstanding issues in the Round.
879
 Paemen and Bensch describe this "trigger 
strategy", which, as they note, "had proved so effective in agriculture", as follows: 
A bilateral Euro-American solution would be found to the problems … and endorsed by the 
two major partners, Japan and Canada. Thereafter, it could be 'multilateralised' in 
Geneva.”880 
Unsurprisingly, this strategy led to some discontent particularly among the developing 
countries. Paemen and Bensch report that, after the major industrialised countries reached 
an agreement on key elements of the Uruguay Round package at a G-7 summit in Tokyo,  
the developing countries were quick to point out that the package contained nothing at all 
for them. Whilst this may have been an exaggeration, it gave some indication of the genuine 
frustration felt by the other participants in the Uruguay Round. They had had to sit on the 
sidelines and watch while the United States and the European Community decided their 
fate.
881
 
In the final stages of the Uruguay Round, the US and the EC thus exploited the first two 
benefits of the club approach to the fullest extent: they negotiated mostly among 
themselves, which made agreement easier, and they could shape the content of the resulting 
agreement decisively. By themselves, however, exclusive negotiating arrangement did little 
for the third element of the club approach: the ability to entice outsiders to join the 
agreement on the insiders' terms. The solution that the developed countries eventually 
devised to deal with this problem is the subject of the next section.  
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 Paemen/Bensch 1995, 99. 
879
 See Paemen/Bensch 1995, 224: 
The USTR agreed to Leon Brittan's suggestion that intensive bilateral talks be resumed to try to find 
in advance Blair House-style Euro-American solutions to the major outstanding problems in the 
Uruguay Round context. 
880
 Paemen/Bensch 1995, 225.  
881
 Paemen/Bensch 1995, 231. 
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C. The Self-Transcending Club: The Single Undertaking and the 
Founding of the WTO 
The practices of participation discussed in the previous section – the negotiation of tariff 
concessions with principal suppliers; the exclusion of certain product categories and types 
of trade barriers from negotiations; the conclusion of agreements among a “critical mass” 
of countries; and informal and often exclusionary negotiating arrangements – allowed the 
major developed countries to realise the first two benefits of the club approach – the 
relative ease of reaching agreement among fewer participants, and the disproportionate 
influence on the content of that agreement of those participants – throughout the history of 
lawmaking in the GATT. By the end of the Tokyo Round it had become clear, however, 
that the developed countries' ability to realise the third benefit of the club approach – 
forcing outsiders to join the insiders on the insiders' terms – was increasingly limited. 
Towards the end of the next round of trade negotiations, the Uruguay Round, the United 
States conceived of, and the other Quad countries embraced, a radical solution to this 
problem. Under the scenario envisaged by the United States and ultimately put into 
practice, the major trading nations would leave the GATT and all the agreements concluded 
under its auspices, only to join a new agreement comprising a substantively identical, but 
legally distinct GATT, successor agreements to the Tokyo Round agreements, as well as 
new agreements negotiated in the course of the Uruguay Round. The central feature of the 
new agreement, which would distinguish it from the GATT framework, would be that any 
country which wanted to join it had to subscribe to all the agreements concluded in the 
Uruguay Round. The primary purpose of what was originally simply called the “GATT II” 
and ultimately became the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization was thus to realize the third element of the club approach: to compel countries 
which had been refusing to join the new agreements in the Tokyo Round and were planning 
to do likewise in the Uruguay Round, to join those agreements.  
In the early 1980s, nothing foreshadowed this development. While the United States 
was dissatisfied with the results of the Tokyo Round, and in particular with the fact that it 
ultimately had to implement them on an MFN basis, its initial reaction appeared to be to 
move in the opposite direction of a dramatic, all-or-nothing confrontation. Thus, US 
negotiators proposed to move away from major trade rounds and to instead “transform… 
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the GATT into a permanent negotiating forum”. 882 At a meeting of the Consultative Group 
of 18 shortly after the conclusion of the Tokyo Round, it was  
pointed out that non-tariff barriers to trade were likely to be the central problem ahead. If 
this turned out to be the case, such barriers might be taken up in negotiations subject by 
subject in a self-balancing manner rather than simultaneously in a new comprehensive 
round. Issues that had received insufficient attention in the Tokyo Round, such as 
agriculture, should be taken up immediately after the Round. … the past practice of periodic 
comprehensive negotiations should be replaced by a process of permanent negotiation.
883
 
In a similar vein, US representatives argued as late as 1985 that  
the issues for negotiation – most of which were contained in the 1982 Work Programme – 
would vary in their degree of ripeness and it would seem reasonable that if agreement could 
be reached on a given set of issues, they should be concluded, without waiting for 
agreement on the totality.
884
 
When the Uruguay Round negotiations were eventually launched, they unfolded 
from the outset in a more polarised atmosphere, especially between developed and 
developing countries, than had ever before been the case. In the Kennedy Round, the 
negotiations on non-tariff barriers had been an uncontroversial, if relatively unproductive 
affair. In the Tokyo Round, there was a broad consensus to negotiate on non-tariff measures 
such as standards, subsidies and countervailing duties, and customs valuation; disagreement 
centred on the substance of any new disciplines and on the opaque and exclusionary 
manner in which some of the negotiations proceeded. In the Uruguay Round, by contrast, 
there was from the outset a fundamental disagreement over whether negotiations on 
services, intellectual property rights, and investment measures should take place in the 
GATT framework at all.
885
 This was an entirely new level of discord, and it resulted in, by 
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 CG.18/28 of 17 July 1985, 5.  
883
 CG.18/7, para 19; ; see also CG.18/12, para 19:  
One member said that, given the necessary political will, and adequate policy guidelines, there was 
no reason why negotiations should not take place in GATT between major rounds. 
See further Hart 1995, 203, noting that after the Tokyo Round,  
work proceeded on unfinished business, some in the vain hope that it could be concluded on its own 
merit, others in the clear knowledge that it constituted preparatory work for a new, as yet undefined, 
negotiation.   
884
 CG.18/28, 5.  
885
 India and Brazil proposed the following amendment to the draft ministerial declaration:  
 "IV. Subjects for Negotiations 
 Services  
 Delete the title and its content." 
MIN(86)/W/11; see also India's statement at the Punta del Este Ministerial:  
We are firmly of the view that the issues of investment, intellectual property and services do not 
belong to GATT. … The proposal to hold negotiations on services in GATT is … untenable. … 
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GATT standards, brutal confrontations
886
 and tortured compromises throughout the round. 
The compromises on services and intellectual property rights were reached by holding out 
the prospect that these issues would be kept institutionally separate from the GATT – 
precisely the opposite of what ultimately happened.  
The compromise on trade in services is embodied in the Punta del Este Ministerial 
Declaration launching the Uruguay Round. Apart from the introductory paragraph 
providing for the establishment of a Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) and a 
concluding paragraph explicitly keeping open the question of the implementation of the 
negotiating results,
887
 the declaration is divided into two parts, the first part devoted to 
“Negotiations on Trade in Goods”, and the second part dealing with “Negotiations on Trade 
in Services”. The separation of the negotiations on trade in goods and trade in services was 
adopted to reassure the developing countries that there would be no substantive linkage 
between the two sets of negotiations.
888
 As Brazil reminded the other delegations at the first 
meeting of the GNS, “the premise of trade-offs between the area of goods and that of 
services has been excluded from the start of our deliberations.”889 Moreover, the final 
paragraph of the declaration made it clear that the integration of an agreement on trade in 
services into the GATT was not to be seen as a foregone conclusion; instead, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
Continued adherence to the multilateral trading system or commencement of the New Round cannot 
be made contingent upon induction of alien themes into GATT.  
MIN(86)/ST/33, 3-4; see further the proposal by India and Brazil for a decision to be adopted at the Punta del 
Este Ministerial inviting governments  
to give consideration to holding an intergovernmental meeting to examine, outside the GATT 
framework, what appropriate multilateral action is desirable on trade in services.  
MIN(86)/W/3; on the divisions between developed and developing countries at the outset of the Uruguay 
Round, see also Steinberg 1995 and Winham 1990, 797-798.  
886
 An early climax was the decision by the United States to call for a formal vote in order to break the 
developing countries' resistance to new negotiations; see Hart 1995, 202 and 207; Oxley 1990, 133. 
Moreover, the preparatory committee could not agree on a single draft declaration and decided to forward 
three competing drafts to the ministerial meeting; the Director-General's letter of transmittal, in which he 
appeared to express a preference for one of the draft declarations, prompted a sharp rebuke from India and 
Brazil; see PREP.COM(86)W/50  for the Director-General's letter of transmittal; L/6041 (India); and L/6042 
(Brazil).    
887
 The concluding paragraph of the Declaration (MIN.DEC) reads: 
 Implementation of Results under Parts I and II 
When the results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in all areas have been established, Ministers 
meeting also on the occasion of a Special Session of CONTRACTING PARTIES shall decide 
regarding the international implementation of the respective results.  
888
 See Oxley 1990, 138; Brazil went so far as to construct the legal fiction that the negotiations on goods and 
the negotiations on services had been launched at different meetings by different bodies and had established 
"two legally distinct negotiating processes"; MTN.GNS/W/3, paras. 4-5; for details, see infra text at fn 1281.   
889
 MTN.GNS/W/3, para. 5; see also ibid. para. 43; Oxley 1990, 188-189; Paemen/Bensch 1995, 55, quoted in 
supra fn 334.  
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declaration envisaged that the implementation of the negotiating results would be decided 
by the contracting parties once the negotiations had been concluded.  
The compromise on intellectual property rights started out differently, but 
ultimately assumed a similar form. Developing countries were, if anything, even more 
resolutely opposed to the inclusion of substantive obligations regarding the protection of 
intellectual property rights into the GATT framework than they were to the inclusion of 
services. However, they could live with negotiations to clarify and elaborate the existing 
GATT provisions touching on intellectual property rights, and to conclude an agreement on 
trade in counterfeit goods which had already been the subject of negotiations in the Tokyo 
Round. And this was all that they agreed to in the Ministerial Declaration.
890
   
Once the negotiations got under way, however, the developed countries essentially 
ignored the limited ministerial mandate and proceeded to table negotiating texts envisaging 
substantive minimum standards for the protection of intellectual property. Confident that 
they had the ministerial mandate on their side, the developing countries were “[n]ot willing 
to give an inch” and limited themselves to pointing out that it was the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) that had “responsibility for all matters of substance relating 
to rights.”891 As a result,  
for the first two years of negotiation, up to the Mid-Term Review Conference in Montreal, 
the Northern hemisphere participants in the TRIPs negotiations were talking about one 
thing, while those from the Southern hemisphere were talking about something entirely 
different. … For the latter group, the various documents churned out by the industrialised 
                                                 
890
 For a discussion of how the draft ministerial declarations were amended to reflect the developing countries' 
perspective, see Raghavan 1990, 126-130, comparing the Swiss-Colombian draft and the final version. See 
also Paemen/Bensch 1995, 119:  
In order to get the developing countries to accept the inclusion of intellectual property in the 
Uruguay Round, the Ministerial Declaration had explicitly limited the multilateral agreement to 
counterfeit goods, a subject which had already been addressed within the framework of the Tokyo 
Round. … As far as [the developing countries] were concerned, the Uruguay Round TRIPs 
negotiation did not go beyond adding one or two interpretative notes to GATT Articles IX (Marks of 
Origin) and XXd (General Exceptions), which refer to intellectual property, and the adoption of the 
text on counterfeit goods negotiated during the Tokyo Round. 
891
 Paemen/Bensch 1995, 119; see e.g. MTN.GNG/NG11/4, para. 11:  
Some delegations said that much of what was suggested in the United States paper and also in some 
of the other suggestions did not fall in the mandate of the Group, which did not call for the 
establishment of norms and standards for the protection of intellectual property. It was not the job of 
the Group to establish a new system for the protection of intellectual property rights in GATT. These 
were matters for WIPO and were extensively under consideration in the various parts of WIPO's 
current activities.  
The developing countries relied on the statement in the Ministerial Declaration acknowledging that the 
negotiations "shall be without prejudice to other complementary initiatives that may be taken in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with these matters." 
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countries were not worth the paper they were written on. They were utterly and totally 
irrelevant.
892
 
The Mid-Term Review in December 1988 did not advance matters. The developed 
countries' position that substantive standards should be included in the new agreement was 
reflected in the draft prepared by the sympathetic chair.
893
 This met with fundamental 
opposition from most developing countries, and especially India. At the meeting,   
the Indian negotiator reiterated time after time his total opposition to the approach adopted 
by the text. His view was that a discussion of intellectual property, and especially the 
contents of rights, was out of place in the GATT context. It was a matter for the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation.”894 
As a result, the document adopted at the meeting contains two bracketed texts on 
intellectual property rights reflecting diametrically opposed positions.
895
 Owing in part to 
the disagreement on intellectual property rights, the Mid-Term Review was widely seen as 
a failure and its results were put “on hold” until another high-level meeting scheduled for 
April 1989.  
At the April meeting, negotiators reached a compromise along similar lines as the 
comprise on services reflected in the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration. According to 
Paemen and Bensch, EC negotiators  
secretly told India and Brazil that the future agreement on TRIPs would not necessarily have 
to form part of the legal GATT texts. This represented a major concession … India, which 
tended to adopt a legalistic attitude in matters relating to the GATT, allowed itself to be 
persuaded.
896
 
This assurance is reflected in the following proviso in the document adopted at the April 
1989 meeting:  
Ministers agree that the outcome of the negotiations is not prejudged and that these 
negotiations are without prejudice to the views of participants concerning the institutional 
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 Paemen/Bensch 1995, 120.  
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 Ibid. 137.  
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 Ibid.; see also Devereaux/Lawrence/Watkins 2006, 62: At the mid-term review developing countries 
"continued to block any discussion of substantive standards." Somewhat disingenuously, Stewart states that 
Brazil and India "prevented attainment" of the mid-term objectives; Stewart 1993, 2268-2269. 
895
 MTN.TNC/7(MIN), 21-24. 
896
 Paemen/Bensch 1995, 143; see also Oxley 1990, 170:  
The developing countries were still very unhappy about having to deal with this subject. They were 
prepared to consider negotiations for new commitments but would not yet concede that they should 
be linked to the GATT system.   
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aspects of the international implementation of the results of the negotiations in this area, 
which is to be decided pursuant to the final paragraph of the Punta del Este Declaration.
897
 
With this proviso in place, the developing countries agreed to negotiations encompassing 
substantive standards of intellectual property protection within the framework of the 
Uruguay Round. The text held out the prospect that any results on substantive standards 
could be either implemented under the auspices of WIPO or in another manner that would 
keep it institutionally separate from the GATT.
898
 At the same time, it allowed the 
developing countries to finally engage in the negotiations on substantive standards; up until 
that point, these negotiations had been conducted almost exclusively by the developed 
countries, and the developing countries recognised the danger that they were losing the 
opportunity to influence the final result in this area.
899
 
In sum, the compromise between developed and developing countries that provided 
the basis for the negotiations on services and intellectual property rights in the Uruguay 
Round was that the decision on the form and institutional framework of the implementation 
of the negotiating results would be decided at the end of the negotiations – presumably, as 
was GATT practice, on the basis of consensus. Thus, the developing countries would be 
able to decide to join these agreements only if they were implemented in a form that was 
satisfactory to them, or not to join them at all. It was clear that what the developing 
countries wanted to avoid at all costs was that agreements in these areas would be 
substantively linked to trade in goods, so that failure to comply with commitments on trade 
in services and intellectual property rights would give developed countries a right to 
retaliate against the exports of developing countries (“cross-retaliation”).900 The 
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 MTN.TNC/11, 21. To recall, the final paragraph of the Punta del Este Declaration reads: 
 Implementation of Results under Parts I and II 
When the results of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations in all areas have been established, Ministers 
meeting also on the occasion of a Special Session of CONTRACTING PARTIES shall decide 
regarding the international implementation of the respective results. 
898
 It is clear that this remained India's position; see, e.g., MTN.GNG/NG11/W/37, 19-20: 
The protection of intellectual property rights has no direct or significant relationship to international 
trade. It is because substantive issues of intellectual property rights are not germane to international 
trade that GATT itself has played only a peripheral role in this area and the international community 
has established other specialised agencies to deal with them. It would therefore not be appropriate to 
establish within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade any new rules and 
disciplines pertaining to standards and principles concerning the availability, scope and use of 
intellectual property rights. 
899
 Omar Gad 2006, 106. 
900
 See India's statement at the Punta Del Este Ministerial, MIN(86)/ST/33, 4:  
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“institutional reservation” on the implementation of the results in services and intellectual 
property rights appeared to give them the right to reject any agreement that provided for 
cross-retaliation. In short, it held out the promise than they could join any agreement on 
their own terms. 
This, of course, would frustrate the third element of the club approach. It suggested 
that the developed countries could go ahead and conclude agreements on services and 
intellectual property rights among themselves, but they would not be able to compel 
countries like India and Brazil – precisely those countries at whose practices these 
agreements were primarily aimed – to join those agreements on the developed countries' 
terms.    
Faced with this scenario, US negotiators began to internally discuss various options 
for concluding the Uruguay Round in late 1989.
901
 Preoccupied with the prospect that many 
developing countries would “free ride” on the new agreements under negotiation in the 
round,
902
 US negotiators considered the option of asking for a waiver from GATT MFN 
obligation for those agreements which presented the greatest concern in this regard. They 
also contemplated different scenarios under which non-signatories would voluntarily 
renounce their right to insist that the signatories apply an agreement on an MFN basis – 
basically a formalisation of what happened in the Tokyo Round, at least with respect to the 
United States.
903
  
In the summer of 1990, US negotiators began considering more radical options to 
deal with the “free rider” problem.904 One of them was the “GATT II” approach, whereby 
                                                                                                                                                    
It is our belief that the developing countries in putting their signature to linkages between goods and 
services will be putting their signature to crippling economic retaliation which they can hope to ward 
off only by compromising their national policies to the dictates of mightier economic powers. Are 
we to forge this destiny for ourselves? Do we present these shackles when we go back home to our 
countrymen? 
901
 Interview with Richard Steinberg.  
902
 See Paemen/Bensch 1995 on the US position in the services negotiations:  
The Americans were becoming obsessed with the idea of "free-riding" … This was to be a constant 
concern throughout the negotiations on services and took precedence over the Americans' fear of 
alienating some of the developing countries.   
903
 As noted above, the United States had implemented the Tokyo Round codes on Subsidies and Government 
Procurement on a conditional MFN basis; apart from India (which was a signatory to the Subsidies Code, but 
against which the United States invoked the non-application clause), no GATT contracting party ever 
formally complained about this. 
904
 The following is primarily based on an interview with Richard Steinberg, as well as interviews with Craig 
Thorn, Jane Bradley, Rufus Yerxa, and Andrew Stoler (via email). Steinberg, who was working at USTR at 
the time, was chiefly responsible for developing options for concluding the round. Thorn, Bradley, Yerxa, and 
Stoler were involved in the internal discussions. By his own account, Steinberg's thinking on this issue was 
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the “Quad” countries – the US, the EC, Japan, and Canada – would withdraw from the 
GATT and join a substantively identical but legally distinct “GATT II” to which the new 
Uruguay Round agreements as well as the amended Tokyo Round codes would be annexed. 
The idea was that not joining the new GATT II and thus losing all rights to access the 
markets of the Quad countries would prove too costly for virtually all other contracting 
parties, thus forcing them to join the GATT II on the Quad countries' terms. The chief 
drawback of the approach as it was perceived at the time was that it would be too 
confrontational and would further deteriorate relations with the developing countries. US 
negotiators referred to this option internally as “the power play”.905  
An alternative option that was contemplated was to add the new agreements to the 
existing GATT through an amendment and to subsequently expel those contracting parties 
that refused to ratify the amendment from the GATT.
906
 The major downside of this 
approach was seen in the fact that it would be hard to secure the support of two-thirds of the 
contracting parties to bring the amendment into force, and even harder to convince a 
sufficient number of contracting parties to subsequently expel those who did not ratify the 
amendment. Also, this variant did not appear significantly less confrontational than the 
“GATT II” approach. Other ideas under discussion revolved around obtaining a waiver 
from the GATT's MFN obligation either for all Uruguay Round agreements as a package or 
for each agreement individually. What was clear to US negotiators even at this point was 
that an “a la carte”, or “menu”, approach to concluding the Uruguay Round, whereby each 
contracting party could choose which agreement to accept and at the same time enjoy the 
benefits of all agreements on an MFN basis, was unacceptable to them. Of course, this was 
                                                                                                                                                    
influenced by the Realist school in International Relations, which posits that, for international institutional 
arrangement to be sustainable, they must reflect the power relations between the participants in such 
arrangements. Steinberg had studied with Stephen Krasner, a proponent of the Realist school. Steinberg also 
recalls that the early 1990s were the heyday of the so-called "Washington consensus"; one of the tenets of the 
"Washington consensus" was that developing countries should embrace trade liberalization for their own 
sake. It thus appeared that forcing the developing countries to join the agreements negotiated in the Uruguay 
Round would ultimately be in those countries' own interest.   
905
 Steinberg 2002, 360.  
906
 The possibility to expel a contracting party that refuses to adopt an amendment was envisaged in GATT 
Article XXX:2, which provides, in relevant part: 
The CONTRACTING PARTIES may decide that any amendment made effective under this Article 
is of such a nature that any contracting party which has not accepted it within a period specified by 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES shall be free to withdraw from this Agreement, or to remain a 
contracting party with the consent of the CONTRACTING PARTIES. 
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precisely the scenario on the basis of which the developing countries had agreed to 
negotiate on services and substantive intellectual property rights.   
Meanwhile, the EC and Canada were pursuing a different idea, namely, to set up a 
new institution as an organisational umbrella for the GATT and the new Uruguay Round 
agreements. Canada, which was drawing on the ideas of Professor John Jackson,
907
 first 
suggested the establishment of a “World Trade Organization” in April 1990,908 and the EC 
followed up with a formal proposal for a “Multilateral Trade Organization” to the 
negotiating group on the "Functioning of the GATT System" (FOGS) in July 1990.
909
 As 
the EC explained at the first meeting of the FOGS group at which the question was 
discussed, it was not seeking to “undertake anything particularly revolutionary”; instead, its 
aim was “to establish a purely organizational treaty” which would provide an “umbrella-
type organizational framework” for the “implementation and administration of the results 
of the negotiations and perhaps legally separate multilateral agreements”.910 The EC noted 
the possibility of “a services agreement which in all likelihood would be separate from the 
GATT”.911 The EC explicitly cited the WIPO as “an example of the kind of common 
organizational umbrella for different international agreements which his delegation was 
looking [sic] in this regard.”912 This, of course, ran directly counter the US's thinking at the 
time. Sure enough, the US representative took a dim view of the rationales offered by the 
EC for establishing a new organisation.
913
 In particular, the US argued that  
legal structure was not and would not be the cause of the 'fragmentation' of the trading 
system. The fundamental problem was political; some countries refused to accept new 
obligations or clarifications of old obligations. The mere creation of an MTO could not 
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 See Jackson 1990; Jackson was hired as a consultant by the Canadians.  
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 Winham 1990, 821, quotes a press release of 11 April 1990. 
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 MTN.GNG/NG14/W/42. 
910
 MTN.GNG/NG14/18, 12-13, para 51.  
911
 Ibid. 
912
 Ibid. 13, para. 53. 
913
 Ibid. paras. 30-35; the document does not identify the United States representative explicitly; however, 
several clues make it clear that this is the US representative's statement, such as the interest that is expressed 
in "exploring the question of whether a new organizational and decision-making structure could enhance the 
efficient governance of the world's trade regime" and the warning that "in the past some governments, 
including her own, had found it impossible to obtain ratification by their legislative bodies of an MTO-
structure" and that "[a]ll participants should be interested in ensuring that those countries could avoid 
presenting their legislatures with a Uruguay Round package that included establishment of an MTO such that 
implementation of the Round were undercut by concern over possible developments with an MTO" (para. 
30).   
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force any country to accept an obligation which it was not otherwise willing to accept, and it 
could not therefore solve this problem.
914
 
 
To the US's surprise, the EC subsequently proved very receptive to the “single 
protocol” approach, as US negotiators had started calling "GATT II" idea,915 when the US 
first presented the idea to the other Quad countries later in July 1990.
916
 In discussions with 
the Quad countries in the following months, the US pressed the point that adopting the 
“single protocol” approach would not only take care of the problem of “free riders”, but 
would also limit the extent to which the Quad countries would have to make substantive 
concessions to the other participants in the Round, thus making it possible to avoid what 
US negotiators called “lowest common denominator” agreements.917 In effect, US 
negotiators were arguing that the “single protocol” allowed the Quad to go all in for the 
club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking: in their scenario, all that ultimately mattered 
was that the Quad countries reached agreement among themselves; all other countries 
would effectively be forced to join whatever the Quad agreed on the Quad's terms.  
In order to make the “single protocol” idea more palatable to the other Quad 
countries and, eventually, the rest of the contracting parties, US negotiators started linking 
it with the “single undertaking” principle contained in the Punta del Este Ministerial 
Declaration. The principle stipulated that  
The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the outcome of the negotiations shall 
be treated as parts of a single undertaking.
918
   
This was somewhat disingenuous – it was clear to everyone involved that “[i]t was never 
the intention at Punta Del Este to craft a process that would automatically obligate all 
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 MTN.GNG/MG14/18, 8, para. 32. 
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 In discussions with the other Quad countries, US negotiators sought to highlight the unifying effect of their 
approach, in that it would provide an elegant way of tying the results of the round together ("Single 
Protocol"), and to de-emphasise the more dramatic aspect of their proposal: that it envisaged doing so through 
a successor agreement to the GATT ("GATT II"). The latter aspect, they suggested, could be treated as a 
"technical issue"; interview with Richard Steinberg.  
916
 Interview with Richard Steinberg. 
917
 Interview with Richard Steinberg.  
918
 MIN.DEC, para. B(ii). The Tokyo Declaration had contained a similar principle, pursuant to which the 
negotiations were to be "considered as one undertaking, the various elements of which shall move forward 
together"; Tokyo Declaration 1973, para. 8. Regarding the meaning of this principle, US negotiators 
commented that it would allow "the U.S. to keep the agriculture issue as part of the negotiation and not to 
allow it to be separated and possibly lost"; FRUS 1973-1977, 684. In the debate about the implementation of 
the Tokyo Round results, the principle played no role. On the origins and wider significance of the "single 
undertaking" idea, see also Wolfe 2009. 
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GATT [contracting parties] to be bound by all of the agreements”.919 As Andrew Stoler, 
one of the US negotiators promoting the re-interpretation of the “single undertaking” 
concept in 1990, would later write,  
the single undertaking as it was expressed in 1986 in no way was interpreted as implying 
that all participants in the negotiations would need to take on all of the resulting obligations 
– especially those resulting from the services negotiations.920 
 
In the negotiations up until that point, the “single undertaking”, or principle of 
“globality”, as the Europeans liked to call it, had been repeatedly invoked in attempts to 
adjust the pace of negotiations in one area to the progress in another. In particular, the 
Europeans had championed it to whittle down the ambitions in the agricultural negotiations 
by linking them to other negotiating areas.
921
 When the negotiations in agriculture stalled 
during the Mid-Term Review, the Latin Americans had in turn relied on the principle to 
withhold their consensus to the results in other areas.
922
 Essentially, then, US negotiators 
were attempting to change the meaning of the “single undertaking” from the Tokyo-
Round/Punta del Este understanding as “the various elements of [the negotiations] shall 
move forward together” to a “single protocol” understanding as “accept everything or 
remain outside the multilateral system”.923 There is little doubt that “few countries would 
have accepted this interpretation of the single undertaking in 1986.”924  
                                                 
919
 Stoler 2008, 1.  
920
 Stoler 2008, 4; the "single undertaking" principle only applied to the goods part of the negotiations.  
921
 See in particular the discussion of the principle in Paemen/Bensch 1995, 58, 80-81 ("the principle of 
globality had been introduced to avoid excessive concentration on agriculture"), 97-98, 195 ("the principle of 
globality, the European Community's battle-cry throughout the Uruguay Round, was really a one-way 
instrument, designed to adjust the pace of negotiations in other sectors to that of agriculture"); see also Oxley 
1990, 158 ("The Americans interpreted globality as 'Eurospeak' for saying that little was to be allowed to 
happen in the negotiations on agriculture").   
922
 Winham 1990, 808-809, 813; Oxley 1990, 169; Paemen/Bensch 1995, 80 ("This 'principle of globality' 
would later be taken up by other participants and exploited for their own ends"); see also Oral History 
Interview with Julio Lacarte-Muró, 13:58-16:44; Ricupero 1998, 16: 
Developing countries were among the main proponents of the single undertaking provision in 
paragraph B (ii) of the Punta del Este Declaration. The Latin American members of the Cairns 
Group, in particular, wished to pre-empt a recurrence of the situation in earlier multilateral rounds 
where the initiatives to liberalize the agriculture sector had simply been permitted to die during the 
course of the negotiations. 
923
 Gallagher/Stoler 381; cf. Stoler 2008, 1: 
the Quad countries decided that they could take advantage of the creation of the Multilateral Trade 
Organization (later the WTO) to force other Uruguay Round participants to accept a different 
meaning of the single undertaking language  
Ibid. 4:  
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As it happened, the developing countries were no more prepared to accept the new 
meaning of the “single undertaking” in 1990. By November 1990, the US had held 
informal consultations on the idea with some developing countries, including India and 
Brazil. At a TNC meeting in December 1990, India made its position clear:  
We have entered into negotiations in the area of TRIPs with a clear reservation to the 
question of lodgement of the outcome. Nearly two years of negotiations on norms and 
standards have convinced us that there is no place in GATT for an agreement covering these 
aspects. They raise issues of policy spanning over diverse areas of technology, ethics, 
culture and economic development. GATT is concerned with trade policies and should 
remain as such. 
Negotiations for a multilateral framework on services have always been held in a separate 
juridical framework from GATT. 
…we are concerned at attempts to link agreements in the area of TRIPs and trade in services 
to the GATT through the concept of a single undertaking or the mechanism of a common 
dispute settlement machinery. We are not opposed to the idea of a new organization by 
whatever name it is called, as long as it is structured to service three distinct agreements. 
We reject any proposal which tends to link up three distinct agreements with a view to 
facilitating cross-retaliation.
925
 
In an UNCTAD meeting in March 1991, the Indian ambassador did not mince his words, 
stating that  
[t]he concept of a 'single undertaking' had been introduced at a 'very late stage' and was 
tantamount to 'breach of good faith'. It was not part of the basis of negotiations and had been 
introduced to force Third World countries to accept all the results of the Round or opt out of 
the system. It would be prudent to avoid such an approach. The provision of flexibility for 
the Third World had not only to be in terms of time derogation but in absolute terms so that 
they were not forced to accept obligations inconsistent with their development, financial and 
trade needs.
926
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
The Quad changed the meaning of the Uruguay Round's single undertaking at the end of the game. 
Ricupero 1998, 16, arguably misinterprets who was the driving force behind the reinterpretation:  
during the period between the Montreal and Brussels Ministerial meetings, the concept of single 
undertaking was altered, mainly at the initiative of the EC and Canada, but with ideas coming from 
the GATT Secretariat.  
Paemen/Bensch 1995, 257:  
the industrialised countries have invented the principle of the 'Single Undertaking', which states in 
effect that the results of the negotiations constitute a single entity – and that a country must decide 
whether to take it or leave it. 
924
 Stoler 2008, 4. 
925
 MTN.TNC/MIN(90)/ST/, 4; in informal consultations, Brazil had taken a similar position; interview with 
Richard Steinberg. 
926
 Raghavan 1991. 
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The Draft Final Act that was sent to the Brussels Ministerial Meeting in December 
1990 still reflected the developing countries position. Thus, it envisaged that the 
participants in the negotiations would  
… agree that the Agreements, Decisions and Understandings on trade in goods, as set out in 
Annex I, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services, as set out in Annex II, [the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, including Trade in 
Counterfeit Goods, as set out in Annex III{FN1}] [and institutional provisions as set out in 
Annex IV], [constitute [three] [four] distinct legal texts] and embody the results of their 
negotiations.
927
 
The section on intellectual property rights made the continuing disagreement between 
developed and developing countries explicit:  
The presentation of two draft agreements, the first on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights, including Trade in Counterfeit Goods and the second on Trade in 
Counterfeit and Pirated Goods, is a reflection of two basically different approaches to the 
question of the relationship of the eventual results to the GATT. Some participants … 
envisage a single TRIPS agreement encompassing all the areas of negotiation; this 
agreement would be implemented as an integral part of the General Agreement. Other 
participants … envisage two separate agreements, one on Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated 
Goods, to be implemented in GATT, and the second on standards and principle concerning 
the availability, scope and use of intellectual property rights. The latter agreement would be 
implemented in the 'relevant international organization, account being taken of the 
multidisciplinary and overall aspects of the issues involved'. It was agreed in the Mid-Term 
Review that the institutional aspects of the international implementation of the results of the 
negotiations on TRIPS would be decided by Ministers pursuant to the final paragraph of the 
Punta del Este Declaration.
928
 
At this time, the annex on institutional provisions was still largely a blank page.
929
  
 One year later, the GATT's Director-General, Arthur Dunkel, presented another 
version of the draft final act, the so-called “Dunkel Draft”. The US and EC had persuaded 
Dunkel to incorporate the “single protocol” idea into his draft.930 Article II of the proposed 
                                                 
927
 MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, 2 (square brackets in original); footnote 1 referred to the "institutional 
reservation" that had provided the basis for the Mid-Term Review compromise on intellectual property rights.  
928
 MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, 193. 
929
 MTN.TNC/W/35/Rev.1, 384.  
930
 See Steinberg 2002, 356: 
… the Dunkel Draft … was tabled by the GATT Director-General as the secretariat's draft. However, 
it was largely a collection of proposals prepared by and developed and negotiated between the EC 
and the United States, fine-tuned after meeting with broader groups of countries, and it embodied the 
secretariat's changes mostly on points of contention between the two transatlantic powers.  
According to an Uruguay Round negotiator from a developing country whom I interviewed, Arthur Dunkel's 
loss of credibility after proposing the Dunkel Draft was such that he had to eventually give up his post as 
Director-General, making way for Peter Sutherland.  
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Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization
931
 achieved all of the United 
States' objectives: it tied the results of the Uruguay Round together by providing that the 
agreements annexed to the MTO Agreement would constitute an “integral part” of the 
MTO Agreement; it stipulated that the agreements “shall have all members as parties”, thus 
eliminating any possibilities for “free riding”; and it constituted the MTO Agreement as a 
successor agreement to the GATT by providing that “[t]he General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, as it results from the Final Act of the Uruguay Round … is legally distinct from 
the Agreement known as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 
1947”; this would allow the Quad countries to withdraw from the original GATT and to 
terminate the market access obligations to GATT contracting parties which they had 
accumulated over the four decades of the operation of the GATT with respect to any 
country which refused to join the new organization; as a result, those who refused to join 
“would remain contracting parties to a de facto defunct agreement”.932  
The institutional provisions of the Draft Final Act were not finalised for another two 
years. Negotiations occurred primarily in the “Informal Group on Institutional Issues” 
chaired by Julio Lacarte between September and December 1993.
933
 According to Andrew 
Stoler, who was the US representative in the Lacarte group and who was, in his own words, 
“very much involved in the Quad discussions that eventually led to th[e] reinterpretation of 
the Punta 'single undertaking' and [in] forcing this down the throats of developing 
                                                 
931
 See MTN.TNC/W/FA, 92.  
932
 Ricupero 1998, 17; see also Steinberg 2002, 360; Stegemann 2000, 1243: not joining the new organization 
would mean  
giving up the cumulated market access rights as guaranteed by multilateral trading rules and as 
negotiated in all GATT rounds.  
Hudec 1992, 76:  
governments would have to decide between accepting everything or leaving the GATT.  
Stoler 2008, 4:  
In their decision to leave the old GATT and its MFN obligations behind, the Quad countries were 
able to force Uruguay Round participants into accepting obligations under all of the new system's 
agreements with the exception of the Government Procurement and Civil Aircraft Codes.  
Tarullo 2002, 170 and 177:  
… suppose that the entire Uruguay Round was in some sense a contract of adhesion imposed by the 
United States (and possibly the European Union), leaving many developing countries with the 
Hobson's choice of acceding to an unsatisfactory package of agreements or being left out of the 
trading system altogether. …  a smaller state … may … be faced with the choice of either signing on 
to the new agreements anyway or risk being left behind by the world trading system. This was quite 
literally true in the Uruguay Round, which substituted the 'GATT 1994' for the original GATT and 
thus ended the obligations of GATT members under the original agreement. Had a dissident state 
chosen not to accept the whole package of agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round, it would 
have been left with no multilateral trade rights.   
933
 Andrew Stoler, email communication; Paemen/Bensch 1995, 234. 
213 
 
countries”,934 the latter “did not give in until the Lacarte group successfully tied up all the 
ends”; thus, “the whole issue stayed alive until mid-December 1993 when it fell into place 
on the last couple of days of the negotiations.”935 In the end, the “single protocol” idea as it 
was first incorporated in the Dunkel Draft survived without substantive changes into the 
final version of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.
936
 
This was unsurprising – once the Quad countries had agreed to go ahead with the approach, 
there was simply nothing that the developing countries could do to prevent it from 
happening. That was the entire point.  
The WTO, then, came into being as the ultimate club. Once the Quad countries 
knew that they would leave the old club and found a new one, they also knew that all they 
had to do was to agree among themselves. While this was not exactly easy – disagreements 
on agriculture and services persisted until the very end – it was at least possible. The 
founding of the WTO also gave the developed countries the leverage to shape the results of 
the Uruguay Round decisively – a multilateral agreement on services, an agreement on 
substantive intellectual property rights, both linked to trade in goods through the possibility 
of cross-retaliation in dispute settlement – these were all points that the developing 
countries, and in particular India, had opposed categorically throughout the round.
937
 Even 
more so than the GATT, however, the WTO was supposed to be a self-transcending club: it 
was never the intention to keep other countries out and to limit its membership. Rather, the 
intention was to get everyone else to join, but on the insiders' terms. In a way, then, the 
WTO was the club to end all clubs.
938
  
                                                 
934
 Andrew Stoler, email communication. 
935
 Andrew Stoler, email communication. 
936
 See WTO Agreement, Article II.2 and II.4.   
937
 While India noticeably warmed to the services agreement in the course of the negotiations, there is not a 
single negotiating document from the Uruguay Round in which India goes on record as supporting either 
cross-retaliation between services, intellectual property, and goods, or a GATT agreement on substantive 
intellectual property rights.  
938
 Interestingly, both Richard Steinberg and Andrew Stoler, probably the chief architects of the Uruguay 
Round "single undertaking", are unhappy with the outcome. Stoler "regret[s] it all deeply" and now finds "the 
whole idea" to have been "a huge mistake". According to Stoler, it eventually turned out that "the one-size-
fits-all approach was not going to work and that the system was never going to be a one-tier system" (see the 
section on "Differentiation of Obligations" infra). At the same time, the single undertaking resulted in a large 
number of countries being "deeply involved in decision-making and often making sure that nothing happens 
in the WTO". Stoler's chief regret is to have "wrecked what had been a pretty good system in the GATT 
years". Andrew Stoler, email communication; interview with Richard Steinberg.   
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D. The Internalised Club: Lawmaking in the WTO 
The conclusion of the Marrakesh Agreement and the establishment of the WTO changed 
the framework for multilateral trade lawmaking in important ways. First, the establishment 
of the WTO held the promise that lawmaking would occur on a continuous basis, 
dispensing with the need for major negotiating rounds.
939
 The built-in negotiating agendas 
in the GATS Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture, as well as the decisions taken 
at the Marrakesh Ministerial to continue negotiations on unfinished business of the 
Uruguay Round, were concrete commitments in this respect.
940
 Second, the Marrakesh 
Agreement arguably transformed the institutions of the multilateral trading system from a 
forum for the conclusion of bilateral or plurilateral “contracts” into a something more akin 
to a legislative body. Whereas the GATT system had allowed subsets of contracting parties 
to agree to more ambitious obligations in areas in which they had a particular interest 
without the consent of the other contracting parties,
941
 the WTO Agreement gives the entire 
membership control over the conclusion of new plurilateral agreements.
942
 Moreover, by 
obliging all Members to join all WTO agreements (with the exception of the four 
plurilateral agreements, of which three are now defunct), the WTO system gives all 
members a stake in the development of the law in all areas, thus making them potentially 
more reluctant to let small groups of members take the lead in developing the law among 
themselves. As a result, it has become much more difficult for a subset of members to 
assume more ambitious obligations in the framework of the multilateral trading system – to 
some extent, then, the WTO has indeed ended all clubs.  
At the very least, the new lawmaking framework is markedly less hospitable to the 
club dynamics that flourished under the GATT. The only area in which this dynamic is still 
squarely at play in the WTO context is in accession negotiations, including accessions to 
                                                 
939
 See Steger 2007, 492-493; Moore 2005, 5 fn 5.  
940
 See GATS, Article XIX; Agreement on Agriculture, Article 20; see the Decision on Negotiations on 
Movement of Natural Persons; Decision on Financial Services; Decision on Negotiations on Maritime 
Transport Services; Decision on Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications; Decision on Professional 
Services; and the Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, all adopted at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting.   
941
 Recall the unsuccessful attempt by developing countries at the conclusion of the Tokyo Round to make the 
opening for acceptance of the Tokyo Round codes subject to a consensus decision of the TNC; supra text at 
fn 797.  
942
 WTO Agreement, Article X.9:  
The Ministerial Conference, upon the request of the Members parties to a trade agreement, may 
decide exclusively by consensus to add that agreement to Annex 4. … (emphasis added) 
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the single functioning plurilateral agreement in the WTO framework, the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (a).  
In regular negotiations, WTO members have developed negotiating techniques that 
superficially resemble the club approach in the sense that they allow the bulk of the 
negotiations to occur among relatively small groups of countries, thereby reducing the 
complexity of the negotiations and giving these countries a disproportionate influence on 
the outcome. Procedurally this is accomplished through negotiations in “variable geometry” 
(b); in terms of substance, it is made possible by exempting large swaths of the membership 
from new legal commitments, leading to an ever more sophisticated differentiation of 
obligations (c). In contrast to the times of GATT, however, this 'internalised' club is 
constrained: procedurally, by transparency and reporting procedures that have been put in 
place, and, substantively, by the need to keep other WTO members, who can now block an 
outcome that they perceive as unfavourable, on board.    
a) Accession Negotiations943 
Accession negotiations provide a unique opportunity to WTO members to realize the third 
element of the club approach: make outsiders join their agreement(s) on the insiders' terms. 
As discussed in chapter 1, except in the case of LDCs there are virtually no limits to what a 
WTO member can demand from an acceding country. Participants in the accession process 
have described its first stage – the examination of the conformity of the acceding country's 
trade regime with WTO rules – as "akin to having a complainant at a panel act as the sole 
panellist".
944
 The second stage of the accession process involves bilateral negotiations 
between the acceding country and interested WTO members. The key difference between 
these negotiations and the general lawmaking process in the WTO is that accession 
negotiations "offer… the applicant no possibility of imposing a marginal cost on the 
demandeur".
945
 Grynberg and Joy, who worked on the accession of Vanuatu to the WTO, 
have described implications of this constellation: 
Without any right or ability to impose costs on a demandeur negotiations must continue 
until the WTO members are satisfied that no further concessions are possible. Thus, 
irrespective of the size of the applicant, the bilateral negotiations will be protracted unless 
                                                 
943
 See also supra Chapter 1, Section I.D. 
944
 Grynberg/Joy 2000, 159.  
945
 Ibid. 160. 
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the applicant quickly concedes the vast bulk of the standardized demands of the large WTO 
members.
946
 
The accession process thus allows WTO members to impose their terms on an acceding 
country – a paradigmatic instantiation of the third element of the club approach.  
b) Variable Geometry 
The question of “who gets to be in the room” did not cease to be an issue in the WTO – to 
the contrary, in the first years of the existence of the WTO, there was considerable 
apprehension that the GATT practice of the major trading powers reaching agreement 
among themselves and presenting it to the rest of the membership as a fait accompli would 
continue – in other words, that the club dynamic of the GATT would survive. These 
concerns acquired new urgency after the collapse of the Seattle ministerial meeting, which 
was supposed to launch a new round of trade negotiations. While the meeting was wildly 
seen as having failed due to inadequate preparation and substantive disagreements,
947
 it had 
featured the same exclusionary dynamics that were known from the GATT days.
948
 In the 
wake of Seattle, WTO members began to discuss what came to be known as the agenda 
item of “internal transparency and effective participation of all members” in the WTO's 
General Council.
949
 The basic thrust of these discussions was that, while informal 
consultations between smaller groups of members were useful and, given the large 
membership of the WTO, indeed essential to build a consensus, the transparency of these 
consultations had to be increased, the non-participating members had to be informed about 
developments in these consultations on a regular basis, and all decision-making power had 
to be effectively reserved to forums in which the entire membership participated. As India 
put it at the time, if these conditions are met, the “green room meetings will by and large 
get de-glamorised”.950  
                                                 
946
 Ibid. 
947
 See WT/GC/M/53, para. 44, reporting the statement of the Director-General: 
While he believed most would agree that major issues of substance had played a greater role than 
process in preventing agreement in Seattle, getting the process right was important.  
See also JOB(00)/2331, 3, for the views of WTO members on this issue.  
948
 Keohane and Nye 2001, 269-270. 
949
 See WT/GC/M/55, 39-47; WT/GC/M/57, 24-32; WT/GC/M/61, 44-47; WT/GC/M/73, 21; WT/GC/M/74, 
19-32; WT/GC/M/75, 7-27; WT/GC/M/77, 62-78; for proposals submitted by delegations, see 
WT/GC/W/471; and WT/GC/W/477.  
950
 JOB(00)/2331, 14. 
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By most accounts, the consultations on internal transparency and effective 
participation in 2000 and 2002 quickly yielded substantial improvements in terms of 
making WTO negotiations more inclusive.
951
 The chairmen of WTO negotiating groups 
openly embrace negotiations in “variable geometry”952 or “concentric circles”,953 and by 
and large have taken their reporting commitments seriously; the procedural safeguards that 
crystallised in the consultations are reflected in how the WTO defines the terms 
“transparent”954 and “inclusive”955 for the purposes of WTO negotiations.  
At the same time, anything that smacks of a fall back into the club dynamic of the 
GATT era has met with a rather furious backlash. Thus, in the run-up to the Cancún 
ministerial in 2003, the United States and the EU presented a joint proposal on agriculture 
that was more lenient than most developing countries and agricultural exporters had hoped, 
most notably in continuing to allow agricultural export subsidies.
956
 With the conclusion of 
the agricultural negotiations in the Uruguay Round still fresh in their minds, the major 
developing countries coalesced in a new coalition, the G20, to resist the proposal. At the 
Cancún ministerial itself, the United States managed to have its response to a proposal for 
the expeditious reduction of subsidies on cotton inserted in the draft ministerial declaration; 
this contributed to the collapse of the meeting. In the subsequent negotiations, the US and 
the EU had to abandon their positions on both subjects; the next ministerial declaration 
                                                 
951
 See already WT/GC/M/59; for a sceptical view, see Jawara/Kwa 2004. 
952
 References to this concept in Chairs' reports are common; see e.g. TN/CTD/M/46, para. 6.  
953
 The WTO website defines "concentric circles" as follows: 
a system of small and large, informal and formal meetings handled by the chairperson, who is at the 
centre. The outer "circle" is the formal meeting of the full membership, where decisions are taken 
and statements are recorded in official minutes or notes. Inside, the circles represent informal 
meetings of the full membership or smaller groups of members, down to bilateral consultations with 
the chair. Members accept the process as they all have input and information is shared. … 
954
 The WTO website defines "transparent" as follows: 
sharing information, in this case so all members know what is happening in smaller group meetings. 
In WTO negotiations and other decision-making, ideas are tested and issues are discussed in a 
variety of meetings, many of them with only some members present. Members approve of this 
process so long as information is shared. They also want the process to ensure they can have input 
into it ('inclusive'). The final decision can only be taken by a formal meeting of the full membership. 
… 
955
 The WTO website defines "inclusive" as follows: 
ensuring all members have input into a process even when meetings involve only some of them. In 
WTO negotiations and other decision-making, ideas are tested and issues are discussed in a variety 
of meetings, many of them with only some members present. Members approve of this process so 
long as information is shared and they have input into it either by being present or being represented 
by a group coordinator. The final decision can only be taken by a formal meeting of the full 
membership. … 
956
 For sources on this episode, see supra fn 30. 
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envisaged the abolition of agricultural export subsidies by 2013 and contained an 
expeditious schedule for the reduction and abolition of subsidies on cotton.  
In sum, it is undeniable that participation in negotiations still has elements of the 
club approach. Small group meetings serve to make it easier to reach agreement. Moreover, 
the major trading nations are present and active in all small group meetings, which will 
translate into a disproportionate impact on the outcome of the negotiations. At the same 
time, their control of the negotiations has become much more tenable and their ability to 
force others to join their agreement is extremely diminished. Other WTO members are now 
much better informed of the progress of the negotiations and are effectively able to insert 
themselves into the negotiations and to block agreement whenever they want. Moreover, 
the number of major players has increased, and the US and the EU now share the stage with 
a number of other major participants, in particular India, Brazil, and China.    
c) Differentiation of Obligations 
WTO members have attempted to take advantage of the first two benefits of the club 
approach in WTO lawmaking by accepting an increased differentiation of obligations in the 
trading system. This increased differentiation has taken two forms.  
First, negotiating modalities, such as the NAMA and agriculture modalities in the 
current Doha Round negotiations, now contain highly differentiated rules for the 
undertaking of commitments.
957
 At least in part, this differentiation reflects an attempt to 
reduce the complexity of trade negotiations: thus, the agriculture modalities envisage very 
shallow commitments for large groups of members, most of which have very small shares 
in agricultural trade. Reportedly, these members were exempted from meaningful reduction 
commitments in part to allow the negotiations on the modalities to take place among the 
relatively few countries with substantial trade volumes.
958
 The differentiation of 
commitments in negotiating modalities has thus in part been motivated by the first benefit 
of the club approach: the greater practicality of negotiating among a smaller group. 
                                                 
957
 On the increased differentiation of negotiating modalities, see also infra text at fn 1049. 
958
 Interview with Joseph Glauber; according to Glauber, the chairman of the negotiations would simply ask 
the negotiating group whether anyone would mind if he exempted, say, the LDCs or the SVEs from a 
particular reduction commitment. Because of the small trade volumes involved, nobody would object, and the 
group would be exempted. As a result, many of the key reduction commitments in the agriculture modalities 
would ultimately only apply to a relatively small group of countries with significant trade volumes, and 
negotiations would thus mainly occur among those countries. On the increasing differentiation of the 
"developing country" country category in the WTO, see also supra text at fn 653. 
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Second, some WTO members have chosen to take on additional commitments, for 
example with respect to market access for information technology products
959
 and with 
respect to the regulation of telecommunications markets,
960
 on a critical mass basis. In 
order to be able to assume these commitments without having to seek the permission of 
non-participating countries, the participants in critical mass lawmaking have inscribed their 
additional commitments in their GATT and GATS schedules, instead of embodying them 
in an amendment to those agreements
961
 or in a new plurilateral agreement.
962
 The route via 
schedules allowed the critical mass countries to realise the first two benefits of the club 
approach: they could negotiate among themselves and did not have to pay attention to the 
interests of outsiders. At the same time, however, scheduled commitments have to 
implemented on an MFN basis; in other words, the scheduling option does not allow the 
critical mass countries to exclude non-participants from the benefits that the latter might 
derive from the additional commitments, as an amendment or a new plurilateral agreement 
might have done. Again, the insiders thus have little leverage to force outsiders to join their 
agreement.  
II. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have made two interconnected arguments. The first, and more general, 
argument is that the practices of participation in the trading system are best explained in 
light of the club approach to multilateral trade lawmaking. As I have shown, despite the 
ambition to universality that marked the US's push for an ITO, the developed countries 
early on began to see participation in multilateral trade lawmaking as a 'club good'. Three 
factors prompted them to take this perspective: the greater practicality of negotiating among 
a smaller group of countries; the ability of the insiders to shape the content of the 
agreement decisively; and the prospect that they might subsequently be able to force 
outsiders to join the agreement on the insiders' terms.  
                                                 
959
 On the Information Technology Agreement, see WTO 2012. 
960
 For the Reference Paper on basic telecommunications, see Lang 2011, 284-290; for the original proposal, 
see S/NGBT/W/18.  
961
 This would have required the support of at least a two-thirds majority of WTO members; see WTO 
Agreement, Article X:1. 
962
 This would have required a consensus decision by the WTO membership; see WTO Agreement, Article 
X:9. 
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While the club approach holds many attractions for the insiders and has been 
employed for a number of reasons, I have drawn particular attention to how the major 
developed countries have used it to establish and defend the principle of payment as the 
basis for multilateral trade lawmaking. My second, and more specific, argument, then, 
relates to this relationship between the club approach and the principle of payment. I have 
elucidated this relationship as one of mutual reinforcement. On one hand, the desire to 
enforce the principle of payment has often been the chief motivation for adopting the club 
approach to lawmaking in the trading system. As I have argued above, the club approach 
was pioneered not only to make bilateral request-and-offer negotiations practicable, but 
also to allow the "nuclear" countries to deny the benefits of the tariff concessions that they 
had granted each other to any ITO member that did not engage in tariff negotiations to the 
satisfaction of the nuclear countries. Similarly, the exclusionary negotiating arrangements 
adopted in the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations were in large part adopted to entice 
developing countries to make an appropriate "contribution" to the negotiations; thus, any 
country that had not been recognised – on the basis of its compliance with the reciprocity 
norm – as a "full participant" in the negotiations, was not allowed to see the list of products 
that the developed countries were planning to exempt from their horizontal tariff cut; such a 
country was thus unable to protest against the exemption of products of export interest to it. 
In the Tokyo Round, the developed countries' strategy to include the conditional MFN 
principle in the new codes on non-tariff barriers, although only partially successful, was 
similarly designed to force non-signatories to pay for the benefits of the codes. And finally, 
the Uruguay Round single undertaking and the establishment of the WTO were embraced 
by the Quad countries, and the US in particular, as "an opportunity not to be missed to rid 
the new system once and for all of free riders."
963
 The prominence of the club approach in 
multilateral trade lawmaking is thus in large part explained by the desire to enforce the 
principle of payment.  
The relationship also works the other way round, however. Thus, it is questionable 
whether the principle of payment would have become so deeply entrenched in multilateral 
trade lawmaking if the club approach had not be available as an enforcement tool. This 
interplay between the principle of payment and the club approach – with the former 
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providing the rationale for the latter, and the latter facilitating the enforcement of the 
former – has arguably shaped the practices of participation in multilateral trade lawmaking 
in profound ways.  
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Chapter 3: Techniques 
In his article “Nomos and Narrative”, Robert Cover argues that normative precepts only 
have meaning when they are embedded in narratives: “Every prescription is insistent in its 
demand to be located in discourse – to be supplied with history and destiny, beginning and 
end, explanation and purpose.”964 The nomos of trade law is shot through with multiple, at 
times complementary, at times conflicting narratives about what trade law seeks to achieve.
 
These narratives call for different lawmaking techniques which in turn produce different 
kinds of legal provisions.
965
 In the present chapter, I attempt to reconstruct five such 
narratives, and to analyse the techniques and provisions associated with them.
966
  
A first narrative revolves around the idea that the aim of trade law is the 
liberalisation of trade. This narrative is associated with legal techniques that “bind”, 
reduce, and gradually remove “barriers” to trade, such as tariffs. These reduction 
techniques involve fixing the kind and quantity of such trade barriers that a party is allowed 
to maintain at a particular point in time and establishing trajectories for their reduction and 
elimination over time. A second narrative sees the aim of trade law in ensuring the fairness 
of international trade. This narrative calls for legal techniques that “level the playing field” 
among different economic actors and their products. These levelling techniques ensure that 
these actors or objects are treated in accordance with, or face conditions that conform to, 
certain (variable) benchmarks, such as the treatment accorded to other similar actors or 
objects, or the “normal” operation of a system. A third narrative sees stability – of prices, 
trade volumes, or incomes – as a central concern for international trade law. This narrative 
supports legal techniques that allow states to individually or collectively manage 
international trade in pursuit of these objectives. Managing techniques are distinctive in 
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 Cover 1983, 5; for a recent application of Cover's insight, see Benjamin 2010.    
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 For a discussion of law as a "technique" more generally, see Kelsen 1941; Summers 1971. Summers 
identifies "five basic techniques" in domestic law, which he calls the "grievance-remedial", "penal", 
"administrative-regulatory", "public benefit conferral", and "private arranging" techniques (ibid. 736), which 
appear to be more or less congruent with tort law, criminal law, administrative law, public law, and contract 
law. The concept of technique used in the present chapter operates at a somewhat lower level of abstraction, 
as it focuses on individual provisions, not entire bodies of law.      
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 This chapter draws in part on the GATT Secretariat's compilations on "techniques and modalities" for trade 
negotiations. The most extensive such compilations were made in preparation for the Tokyo Round; see 
COM.IND/W/76; COM.AG/W/77; COM.AG/W/88. These documents do not link the techniques they 
compile to any narratives about the aims of trade law; the Agriculture Committee's Working Group 
specifically notes "the limitations on its work caused by the fact that it has not yet been possible to discuss the 
objectives of the future negotiations"; COM.AG/W/88, para. 5.   
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that they do not primarily regulate the use of a particular instrument, but tend to authorize 
or require the achievement of particular outcomes, leaving the choice of instrument more or 
less open. A fourth narrative – of necessity – aims to circumscribe the trade-restrictive 
effects of measures taken in the pursuit of “non-trade” policy objectives. This narrative 
gives rise to legal techniques that obligate states to design such measures in ways that 
minimise their trade-restrictive effects. Fifth, a variety of narratives, such as those of good 
governance and harmonisation, envisage a regulating role for international trade law. These 
narratives call for legal techniques that establish positive standards of behaviour. 
Regulating techniques take the form of procedural standards, minimum standards of 
treatment, or substantive standards.  
Of course, there is not always a single narrative that explains the purpose and logic 
(if any) of a particular legal technique or provision.
967
 While narratives are sometimes 
embedded in the legal text – in preambles, statements of principles, interpretative notes, and 
in the legal provisions themselves –, negotiators at times cannot agree on a single narrative 
that explains what they are doing; as a result, there may be competing narratives in the 
text,
968
 or no narratives at all – witness, for example, the missing preambles to the Uruguay 
Round agreements on anti-dumping and on subsidies and countervailing measures.
969
  
Moreover, the selection of narratives identified above could be criticised, at the 
same time, as too specific and too general. Thus, there is a sense in which the narratives of 
liberalisation, fairness, and necessity, are all part of a larger narrative about the efficiency 
gains that can be obtained from removing obstacles to trade. The rationale for choosing the 
lower level of abstraction is that it is at this level that the narratives give rise to distinct 
types of legal techniques. At the same time, the narratives of liberalisation, fairness, and 
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 For a compelling exposition of different narratives on the purpose and use of anti-dumping law, see Hudec 
1979, 205-208.  
968
 See the preamble to the Tokyo Round Subsidies Code: 
 … 
Recognizing that subsidies are used by governments to promote important objectives of national 
policy, 
 Recognizing also that subsidies may have harmful effects on trade and production, …  
969
 Cartland/Depayre/Woznowski 2012, 992: 
… the SCMA does not contain any preamble or explicit/implicit indication of its object and purpose 
because the drafters specifically decided that it would be impossible to agree on these matters and 
that therefore, the SCMA shall have no preamble or any identification of its object and purpose. 
See also Tarullo 2002, 118: 
there is no authoritative statement of the intention underlying 17.6(ii), like or unlike that offered by 
the United States 
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necessity, not to speak of stability and regulatory objectives such as good governance, are 
fundamentally indeterminate. Saying that a provision is explained by the desire to remove 
barriers to trade, provide for equal treatment of imports, or restrict regulation to what is 
necessary, only begs the questions of what constitute a “barrier” to trade, which concept of 
“equality” should be employed, what can count as “necessary”, and how these concepts are 
to be applied in a particular case.
970
 The justification for bracketing these questions in this 
chapter is that these are questions that negotiators, to some extent, bracket themselves. 
Even where the negotiators attempt to control the narratives that will ultimately give 
meaning to the law they make through preambles, interpretative notes etc., the extent to 
which they can in fact do so is heavily circumscribed.
971
 As Cover notes,  
there is a radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the 
organization of law as meaning. … Precepts must 'have meaning,' but they necessarily 
borrow it from materials created by social activity that is not subject to the strictures of 
provenance that characterize what we call formal lawmaking. … Even when authoritative 
institutions try to create meaning for the precepts they articulate, they act, in that respect, in 
an unprivileged fashion.
972
  
 
I treat the narratives analysed in this chapter as, in a sense, “good faith” narratives, 
i.e., I take them at face value, even though it may well be that negotiators sometimes use 
them strategically without actually believing that these they make much sense. The point is 
that these narratives are "out there" and can be employed by negotiators to explain the logic 
of proposed legal provisions. There are a number of counter-narratives that seek to reveal 
narratives analysed here as incoherent, if not disingenuous. For example, the law of anti-
dumping and countervailing duties, which is justified by its proponents on the basis of 
concerns about “fairness”, is widely seen as not “serv[ing] any useful purpose” and as 
simply a protectionist tool.
973
 The charge of “protectionism” is also regularly levelled at 
advocates of managing international trade in pursuit of objectives such as averting “market 
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 On the indeterminacy of these questions, see respectively Lang 2011, chapter 8; Tarullo 1987, 540; and 
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 Cover 1983, 17: 
The precepts we call law are marked off by social control over their provenance, their mode of 
articulation, and their effects. But the narratives that create and reveal the patterns of commitment, 
resistance, and understanding – patterns that constitute the dynamic between precept and material 
universe – are radically uncontrolled. (reference omitted) 
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 Cover 1983, 18.  
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 See only Sykes 1990, 699-700.  
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disruption” or assuring food security. Often, these are instances in which legal techniques 
and precepts that are motivated by the narratives of fairness and stability are seen through 
the lens of the liberalisation narrative, and are thus simply assessed in terms of whether 
they reduce or increase barriers to trade.
974
    
One aim of this chapter is to give a sense of the range of narratives and techniques 
that trade negotiators have developed. While the chapter cannot be completely exhaustive 
in this regard, it can be read as an inventory of the narratives and techniques of trade 
lawmaking. In addition, however, the chapter also advances three more specific 
propositions.  
First, the chapter seeks to show that the aims of trade law are and always have been 
contested in fundamental ways.
975
 While the objective of liberalisation has traditionally 
played a central role in trade lawmaking, it has always competed with other objectives, in 
particular the objective of stability. This competition began during the bilateral talks 
between the US and the UK preceding the GATT/ITO preparatory negotiations, and it 
continues today in debates about proposals by developing countries in the Doha Round. At 
the same time, yet other objectives – particular of a regulatory nature – have become much 
more prominent in recent decades.  
Second, the chapter seeks to show how what trade law can achieve is circumscribed 
by the techniques that negotiators have available. This proposition will be illustrated below 
primarily with two examples. The first and more specific example relates to agricultural 
subsidies; negotiators struggled for decades to discipline agricultural support, a hugely 
complex task due to the variety of instruments used to support agricultural production. The 
second and more general example relates to the relative rise and decline of different 
narratives in multilateral trade lawmaking. I argue that the decline of the stability narrative 
in multilateral trade lawmaking can be traced at least in part to the shortcomings of 
managing techniques.
976
 Commodity agreements – one type of managing technique – are 
almost universally perceived as an unmitigated failure, with the consequence that trade law 
is now seen as much less apt to deal with problems of commodity trade such as those 
brought to the fore by the food crisis of 2008. By contrast, the increasing comfort with 
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 See for example Finger's characterisation of safeguards as "legalized backsliding"; Finger 1995.  
975
 In this respect, the chapter picks up the more general discussion of the teleology of the trading system in 
Chapter 1 and shows how it plays out at the level of specific lawmaking techniques.    
976
 These shortcomings will also be explored in the last section of Chapter 4, on the "Function of Law".  
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regulating techniques that negotiators acquired in the course of the Uruguay Round led to 
an exponential growth of what were perceived as potential subject matters for trade law in 
the late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Third, the chapter aims to show how techniques frame the way in which a particular 
issue is perceived. I argue that a legal technique will always address a particular subject 
matter partially and selectively. A legal technique cannot account for all aspects and 
features of the subject matter that it seeks to regulate;
977
 "it has to reduce complexity".
978
 It 
will single out one particular aspect, perceive an issue through a particular lens, and 
construct a metric that only captures the issue along one dimension, and not others.  
One way of illustrating how techniques have this effect is to examine what the 
techniques discussed in this chapter direct our attention to. Imagine a policy adopted by a 
government. A reduction technique will lead us to quantify the policy or its effects along a 
particular dimension and to reduce this quantity over time. A levelling technique will lead 
us to compare it with a benchmark and to ask, for example, how the treatment accorded by 
the policy to one group of products or economic actors compares with the treatment of 
other similar products or economic actors, or with what would happen in the marketplace. 
A managing technique will lead us to examine the policy in light of a particular goal, and of 
conditions stipulated for the pursuit of this goal. A minimizing technique will lead us to ask 
whether the policy is the most efficient way of achieving an authorised aim. A regulating 
technique will lead us to assess the policy in relation to certain procedural or substantive 
standards.  
It is of course possible to combine various techniques; trade law provides numerous 
examples. Thus, a benchmark derived from a levelling technique can be used as a basis for 
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 See Luhmann 1995/2004, 225-226/219-220:  
The legal system cannot account for all social circumstances in its own complexity. Like any system 
in relation to its environment, it has to reduce complexity, and it has to protect the make-up of its 
own complexity with high walls of indifference. (slightly modified translation) 
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 Luhmann 1995/2004, 225/219. See also Jackson's description of the raison d'être of legal techniques: 
A desideratum of international techniques for dealing with problems that arise is to try to limit the 
complexity and scope of such problems so that they can be dealt with one by one. Legal norms, and 
compliance with them, can provide the framework – the woof and warp of international economic 
relations, so that particular problems that arise can be dealt with in relative isolation by judging them 
in the context of the legal norms associated with them. … To put this another way, what is necessary 
in international economic relations is the development procedures and techniques that will "chip off" 
bits and pieces of the amorphous complex totality of commercial relationships and find solutions to 
those chipped-off pieces so that they are not an issue in every new negotiation that occurs in the 
future. 
Jackson 1969, 767.    
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quantifying a measure, which can then in turn be subjected to a reduction technique.
979
 
Trade law has many procedural obligations (a regulating technique) that apply in addition 
to substantive obligations generated by other techniques. Reduction and levelling 
techniques are often used cumulatively as well. Obligations derived from different 
techniques can also be layered: Most famously, under GATT Article XX, a measure can be 
excused from violating obligations derived from other techniques if it passes muster from 
the perspective of a minimizing technique, combined with a relaxed version of a levelling 
technique (the Article XX chapeau).  
These possibilities for the cumulative and layered use of different lawmaking 
techniques mitigate, but do not eliminate, three effects – some might call them risks, others 
might consider them as desirable, or as inevitable trade-offs – of addressing an issue 
through these techniques: The first effect is the necessary partiality or one-dimensionality 
of techniques mentioned above; the second effect is the likelihood of entrenchment, i.e., the 
likelihood that an issue that has been addressed with a particular technique on one occasion 
will be seen through the lens of that technique, and addressed with the same technique, on 
future occasions as well.
980
 The third effect is abstraction, i.e., the possibility that 
negotiations become disconnected from the substance of the issue that they are purportedly 
addressing, and instead revolve around features of, or problems produced by, the technique 
that is being employed.
981
 
In sum, the chapter seeks to provide an inventory of lawmaking techniques, and to 
substantiate the propositions that the objectives of trade lawmaking have historically been 
contested in fundamental ways, that what trade law can achieve is circumscribed by the 
techniques that negotiators have available, and that lawmaking techniques frame the way in 
which a particular issue is perceived, which gives rise to the risks of partiality, 
entrenchment, and abstraction.        
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I. Reduction Techniques and "Liberalisation" Narratives 
Reducing the trade barriers erected during the interwar years was one of the central 
objectives of the United States in promoting the establishment of the post-war multilateral 
trade regime. The Proposals listed the “release from restrictions imposed by governments” 
as the first objective of the prospective ITO. The drafters of the Proposals acknowledged 
that “[n]o government is ready to embrace 'free trade' in any absolute sense”, but they 
maintained that “much can usefully be done by international agreement toward reduction of 
governmental barriers to trade”.982 This goal is also reflected in the preambles of the ITO 
Charter and the GATT, both of which are “directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs 
and other barriers to trade”.983 
Throughout the history of multilateral trade negotiations, liberalization, i.e., the 
reduction of tariffs as well as other barriers to trade, was among the principal goals of 
negotiations. The Ministerial Resolution on the Kennedy Round called for “a significant 
liberalization of world trade” through “substantial” tariff reductions.984 The Tokyo Round 
negotiations aimed to “achieve the expansion and ever-greater liberalization of world 
trade”, which was to be achieved “inter alia, through the progressive dismantling of 
obstacles to trade”.985 Similarly, the Uruguay Round negotiations aimed to “bring about 
further liberalization and expansion of world trade” and to achieve this “by the reduction 
and elimination of tariffs, quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff measures and 
obstacles”.986 
The central place accorded to objective of trade liberalisation is also evident in that, 
in moments of crisis, contracting parties used to reaffirm their commitment to further 
liberalisation. Thus, in the 1982 Ministerial Declaration the contracting parties  
Reaffirm their commitment to abide by their GATT obligations and to support and improve 
the GATT trading system, so that it may contribute vigorously to the further liberalization 
and expansion of world trade … 
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 US Proposals 1945, 2. See also France, GATT/CP.6/SR.6, 1: 
The complete elimination of all restrictions on international trade, though desirable from the long-
term point of view of productivity and costs, might in fact not achieve the desired purposes in the 
face of important structural differences between the economies of the world; if unbridled competition 
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 ITO Charter, Preamble; GATT, Preamble.  
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The goal of progressive liberalisation is embodied in specific articles of the GATT 
and the GATS. Thus, GATT Article XXVIII bis states that  
negotiations … directed to the substantial reduction of the general level of tariffs and other 
charges on imports and exports and in particular to the reduction of such high tariffs as 
discourage the importation even of minimum quantities … are of great importance to the 
expansion of international trade.  
The article provides that the contracting parties "may therefore sponsor such negotiations 
from time to time."
987
 Part IV of the GATS is entitled "Progressive Liberalization"; its 
article XIX stipulates that "Members shall enter into successive rounds of negotiations … 
with a view to achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization."
988
 Finally, the 
Agreement on Agriculture contains a provision on progressive liberalisation; it 
"recogniz[es] that the long-term objective of substantial progressive reductions in support 
and protection … is an ongoing process" and provides for the initiation of "negotiations for 
continuing the process".
989
  
Reduction techniques in international trade lawmaking essentially take two forms: 
the first is the outright prohibitions of particular types of trade restrictions, oftentimes 
qualified by exceptions – this was the approach taken to quantitative restrictions in the 
GATT, as well as to export subsidies on manufactured products. The second is the 
“binding” and gradual reduction of trade restrictions that a party is allowed to maintain.990 
The following discussion will focus on the second form of reduction technique, and 
especially on two sets of tools that trade negotiators use to put it into practice: schedules 
and reduction modalities, such as formulas.  
A. Schedules 
Schedules are a tool to individualise legal obligations. Whereas the general provisions of a 
trade agreement apply to all parties to the agreement, schedules that are annexed to the 
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 GATT, Article XXVIII bis.  
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 GATS, Article XIX.  
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 Agreement on Agriculture, Article XII.  
990
 GATT Article XXVIII describes the reduction technique as follows:  
negotiations may be directed towards the reduction of duties, the binding of duties at then existing 
levels or undertakings that individual duties or the average duties on specified categories of products 
shall not exceed specified levels. 
GATS Article XIX(1) provides that negotiations 
shall be directed to the reduction or elimination of the adverse effects on trade in services of 
measures as a means of providing effective market access. 
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agreement are customized for each party individually. Schedules provide a means of 
codifying highly differentiated legal obligations; they thus represent a way of legally 
accommodating diversity among the parties to the agreement. In the trade context, this 
diversity relates both to the form and the content of legal obligations that a party is willing 
to take on. With respect to form – taking tariff schedules as an example – schedules can 
reflect the tariff structure and valuation methodology of each individual party; with regard 
to content, they can codify a different level of obligation (“binding”) for each individual 
tariff line of a party. Figure 2 shows a model schedule prepared during the negotiations of 
the GATT.  
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Fig. 2: Model schedule; excerpt from E/PC/T/153. 
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In international trade lawmaking, schedules have primarily been used with respect 
to trade restrictions or other policy instruments whose outright prohibition is not seen as 
feasible or desirable, but with respect to which participants nonetheless want to take on 
individually customised legal obligations. Schedules serve as a tool to do so by “binding” 
such measures, i.e., by stipulating the quantity, form, and conditions under which they may 
be used. While schedules were initially used exclusively with respect to tariffs, they have 
been employed for a much wider range of legal obligations, such as commitments on trade 
in services and agricultural subsidies, since the Uruguay Round. Moreover, the agreements 
on government procurement negotiated during the Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds contain 
“annexes” – a different term for schedules – defining, for each party individually, the 
coverage of the agreements. Prior to the Uruguay Round, the use of schedules had also 
been considered for the gradual elimination of the remaining quantitative restrictions,
991
 
and scheduling has more recently been suggested as a way of gradually harmonising the 
rules of origin used by WTO members in their preferential trade agreements.
992
 In one rare 
case of post-Uruguay Round lawmaking, a number of WTO members have inscribed 
regulatory principles for basic telecommunications in the "additional commitments" section 
of their GATS schedules.
993
  
Schedules are linked to the general part of a trade agreement through a general 
provision in the agreement setting out the legal obligation associated with the entries in the 
schedule and making the schedules an integral part of the agreement.
994
 Even though they 
are an integral part of the agreement, schedules are usually easier to modify than the 
general part of the agreement. The commitments in the original GATT schedules were 
unconditionally binding for only three years, until 1 January 1951, after which a contracting 
party was free to “modify, or cease to apply” concessions listed in its schedule after 
reaching agreement on compensation with the contracting parties with which the 
concessions had been negotiated or which otherwise had a “substantial interest” in the 
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 The proposals foresaw that the quotas would be gradually enlarged until full liberalisation. In the Uruguay 
Round, quantitative restrictions on agricultural products were "tariffied", i.e., converted into their ad valorem 
equivalents and bound in tariff schedules. 
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 Choi 2010, 133-134.  
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 See the original proposal to this effect, which describes the advantages of using a schedule as compared to 
an amendment: S/NGBT/W/18.  
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 See GATT Article II; GATS Articles XVI, XVII, and XVIII: Agreement on Agriculture, Article 3. In early 
drafts of the GATT, the legal obligation was set out in the schedule itself; see E/PC/T/153, 5.  
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concession.
995
 Three years after the entry into force of the GATT, the contracting parties 
decided to “prolong the assured life” of the GATT schedules for another three years, until 1 
January 1954.
996
 At the review session in 1955, the contracting parties amended Article 
XXVIII of the GATT to the effect that the validity of GATT schedules would be extended 
automatically every three years, unless concessions were modified or withdrawn on the first 
day of any three-year period.
997
 The GATS, as the original GATT, allows WTO members 
to “modify or withdraw any commitments in its Schedule” after three years, subject to 
compensation.
998
 It would appear that GATT contracting parties and WTO members could 
at any time increase the level of obligation in their schedules. 
Where scheduled commitments are modified across the board as the result of a 
negotiating round, this is done by drawing up a new schedule rather than modifying the 
original schedule. The new schedule supersedes the old schedule in areas of overlap, but the 
old schedule remains in force.
999
 This possibility of adding new layers of obligations over 
time – without the need of amending the general part of an agreement – makes schedules a 
particularly suitable tool for implementing a gradual reduction technique.  
The scheduling technique has mostly been employed for legal obligations that can 
be expressed in a quantity.
1000
 This affinity between schedules and quantifiable obligations 
could be explained both with reference to the diversity and gradualness of the legal 
obligations embodied in schedules. With regard to the former, legal obligations expressed 
in quantities preserve a degree of comparability of the individually customised obligations 
in schedules – a property that is particularly important in light of the central role of the 
concept of reciprocity in multilateral trade lawmaking. With regard to the latter, legal 
obligations expressed in quantities lend themselves to gradual modification over time.  
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There is a strong affinity, then, between the tool of the schedule and the narrative of 
progressive liberalization. A legal obligation codified in the form of a number in a schedule 
has the feel of something temporary; the schedule freezes a level of obligation for a 
moment, but almost implicit in this momentary freeze is the expectation that the number 
will be further reduced. In some instances, an inscription in a schedule is merely a 
placeholder for a possible future commitment (such as an inscription of "unbound" for a 
particular mode of supply and sector in a GATS schedule), but even this non-commitment, 
by explicitly "holding the place" for a future commitment, suggests a particular form and 
direction of any potential lawmaking.  
There is also a strong affinity between the tool of the schedule and the idea of 
reciprocal liberalization. Inscribing a legal obligation in a schedule signals that it is 
"negotiating currency",
1001
 liable to be modified in exchange for reciprocal modifications in 
other parties' schedules. Schedules, moreover, are a powerful symbol of the idea that trade 
law embodies individual legal obligations. Each party to the GATT had, and each member 
of the WTO has, their individual schedule. It is only by virtue of having a schedule – and 
thus the ability to record individual obligations – that a party can participate in reciprocal 
exchanges of commitments.    
Overall, the tool of the schedule is so intimately linked with a particular lawmaking 
narrative (progressive liberalization), with a particular form of legal commitments 
(commitments expressed in a quantity), and with a particular form of lawmaking (through 
the reciprocal exchange of concessions) that it tends to entrench the use of reduction 
techniques in relation to any subject matter that is codified through schedules. In the current 
Doha Round negotiations, the clearest evidence of this tendency is the "taboo" of exceeding 
pre-Doha bindings: for many developed countries, any proposal that would allow WTO 
members to exceed their pre-Doha bindings is a sacrilege that they will find hard, if not 
impossible, to accept.
1002
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 Recall Low's and Subramanian's remark that the GATS, by allowing the scheduling of limitations on 
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 Interview with Joseph Glauber; see also Wolfe 2009b, 535: "Developed countries were offended by the 
principle of allowing tariffs to rise above the pre-Doha bound rates…". See already L/58, 5: 
Recourse to the escape clause would, in no circumstances permit the raising of a duty beyond the 
initial rate obtaining at the beginning of the exercise.  
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B. Modalities 
The codification of individualised obligations in schedules presents a challenge for 
negotiations, since negotiating every obligation individually is extremely time-consuming. 
Nonetheless, the “item-by-item” technique has been used for the negotiation of scheduled 
concessions on many occasions. The reason it was used in the tariff negotiations of the first 
five GATT negotiating rounds was that US negotiators did not have the authority to 
negotiate for horizontal tariff reductions.
1003
 In the tariff negotiations in the Uruguay 
Round, the US again insisted on using the technique.
1004
 The item-by-item technique has 
also been used for the negotiation of reductions in non-tariff barriers where the negotiation 
of general rules was not deemed necessary or feasible, and for the scheduling of initial 
commitments on trade in services in the Uruguay Round.  
However, since the very outset of multilateral trade negotiations, there have been 
attempts to replace item-by-item negotiations with negotiations on general “modalities” for 
the undertaking of commitments. Under this approach, rather than considering each item 
individually, all – or a specific subsection or percentage of – the items in a party's schedule 
are modified in accordance with more or less uniform, mutually agreed rules. The 
archetype of a modality is the tariff reduction formula, pursuant to which all tariff lines are 
reduced by a specified percentage. Another type of modality is the model schedule which 
can specify the form, or even the content, of commitments to be undertaken by individual 
parties.
1005
 In the following, I will briefly discuss the various reduction formulas that have 
been proposed and used throughout the history of trade lawmaking. I will then consider the 
impact of reduction modalities on the dynamics of trade lawmaking.   
a) Linear Reduction Formulas 
A linear formula for reducing tariffs was first considered in the bilateral negotiations held 
by the US with the UK and Canada, respectively, preceding the official preparatory 
negotiations to the GATT and the ITO.
1006
 As a US negotiator later recalled,   
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 See Chapter 1. 
1004
 In the Uruguay Round the constraint was not legal, but political: the item-by-item technique allowed 
negotiators to insist on bilateral reciprocity and at the same time to protect their tariff peaks.  
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 An example of a model schedule is the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services; 
S/CSC/W/34. 
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 See Anglo-American Discussions 1943, 223-224, Alternative B; DCER 11(II), 62-63. 
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[c]utting every tariff in the book by 50 percent across the board was a revolutionary idea. … 
previously they had been cut selectively on a product-by-product basis, carefully-drawn 
piecemeal cuts of 20 percent, 10 percent, 15 percent.
1007
 
As recounted in chapter 1, the US Congress refused to give authority for linear across-the-
board reductions at the time. While the EC and UK unilaterally presented offers based on a 
linear reduction of 20 per cent in the Dillon Round, it was not until the Kennedy Round that 
linear reductions were negotiated on a multilateral basis. The resolution adopted by 
ministers to launch the preparatory phase of the Kennedy Round provided that  
in view of the limited results obtained in recent years from item-by-item negotiations, the 
tariff negotiations … shall be based upon a plan of substantial linear tariff reductions with a 
bare minimum of exceptions which shall be subject to confrontation and justification.
1008
 
The resolution also stated that the "linear reductions shall be equal", but that in "cases 
where there are significant disparities in tariff levels, the tariff reductions will be based 
upon special rules of general and automatic application."
1009
 The background to this 
statement was a debate about the potential differential impact of equal linear cuts on 
countries with different tariff structures. In particular, countries with relatively low tariffs 
were arguing that they would experience a greater increase in imports as a result of the 
linear cut than countries with relatively high tariffs. As Cooper has shown, this argument 
relies on a number of (doubtful) empirical assumptions, in particular that "tariff levels are 
significantly correlated with import values or elasticities or both."
1010
 What the debate 
about tariff disparities in the Kennedy Round shows is that, notwithstanding the economics 
of the issue, there is an unease with modalities that preserve inequalities in the legal 
obligations of the parties.  
It was in preparation for the Tokyo Round that linear reduction modalities were first 
considered for the reduction of export subsidies on agricultural products.
1011
 One set of 
suggestions was to reduce, by 20 per cent per year, either the total amount of subsidy 
payments, the total amount of subsidy payments for each individual product, the average 
subsidy payment per unit of a product, or the difference between the domestic price and the 
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 Export subsidies on non-primary products had been prohibited as a consequence of a 1956 amendment to 
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world price for a particular product in a base year.
1012
 While the effort to discipline 
agricultural export subsidies did not come to fruition in the Tokyo Round, a linear formula 
for reductions of subsidised quantities ("21 percent from the base period level") and 
budgetary outlays for export subsidies ("36 percent from the base period level") "for each 
agricultural product or group of products" was adopted in the Uruguay Round.
1013
 
Similarly, domestic support for agricultural production, quantified through an Aggregate 
Measurement of Support, was subject to a linear 20 per cent reduction in the Uruguay 
Round.
1014
  
b) Average Reduction Formulas 
A variant of linear cuts applied to individual tariff lines is the linear reduction of the simple 
or trade-weighted average level of tariffs, across the board or in a particular sector. While 
the trade-weighted variant of this approach was considered in the bilateral negotiations 
between the US and the UK,
1015
 it was – as all other formula proposals – abandoned before 
the negotiations reached the multilateral stage. In multilateral trade negotiations, a proposal 
along similar lines was first advanced by France in the early 1950s. The so-called "French 
Plan" envisaged a 30 per cent reduction of tariffs "based on the weighted average level of 
customs protection afforded to each main branch of economic activity".
1016
 France's goal 
was to achieve a substantial reduction of tariffs while at the same time "preserv[ing] 
flexibility" by allowing countries not to reduce – or possibly even increase – tariffs on 
certain products by undertaking greater-than-formula reductions on others.
1017
 The proposal 
was extensively discussed by a working party; in light of the resistance by the United 
States, it was watered down to a proposal to use weighted average reductions as a 
benchmark to assess the equivalence of concessions in the run-up to the 1956 tariff 
conference. Not even in this version was it acceptable to the United States, which by law 
was limited to reducing duties by a maximum of 15 per cent.
1018
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The proposal to use weighted-average reductions resurfaced in the Tokyo Round, 
where Canada suggested using it in order to "provide a more flexible approach to 
exceptions", while ensuring "a broad and substantial reduction of tariffs". Canada 
highlighted as a particular advantage of this approach that it automatically factored both 
higher-than-formula and lower-than-formula cuts into the calculation.
1019
  
The first instance in which an average reduction was actually included in modalities 
was in the Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations. The Uruguay Round modalities for 
agriculture provided that tariffs be reduced, "on a simple average basis by 36 per cent with 
a minimum rate reduction of 15 per cent for each tariff line".
1020
 In the Uruguay Round 
negotiations on industrial tariffs, which were held on an item-by-item basis, an average 
reduction "at least as ambitious as that achieved by the formula participants in the Tokyo 
Round"
1021
 was used as a yardstick to measure the adequacy of tariff reductions undertaken 
pursuant to request-and-offer negotiations.
1022
 A similar use of an average reduction as a 
yardstick is envisioned in the Doha Round modalities for agriculture, which circumscribe 
the use of the Special Products exemption for developing countries by stipulating that the 
"overall average cut shall, in any case, be 11 percent".
1023
  
c) Harmonisation Formulas 
The first proposal for using a harmonisation formula for tariff reductions was made by the 
British in the US-UK talks preceding the formal preparatory negotiations for the ITO and 
GATT. The British negotiators sought to achieve a harmonising effect by combining a 
linear reduction with a ceiling and/or a floor.
1024
 Their concern with a linear reduction of 50 
per cent, as proposed by the Canadians, was that it "would not bring down the very high 
rates sufficiently while effecting a very substantial cut in the moderate rates".
1025
 The 
British favoured a 25 per cent reduction with a ceiling of 25 per cent (to "achieve a drastic 
scaling down of the very high rates") and a floor of 10 per cent under which tariff rates 
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would not have to be reduced.
1026
 An alternative that was briefly considered before it went 
the way of all formulas in the preparatory negotiations was the formula y = x/2 + 5, i.e., the 
new tariff rate (y) would be half the original (x) plus 5 per cent.
1027
     
In the preparatory phase of the Kennedy Round, the EEC proposed yet a different 
version of a harmonisation formula. Instead of reducing all tariffs by 50 per cent, as was 
favoured by the United States, the EEC suggested that the 50 per cent reduction should be 
applied not to the tariff rates as such, but to the difference between the tariff rate and a 
notional target rate, which would be zero for primary products, 5 per cent for semi-
manufactured products, and 10 per cent for finished products.
1028
 In the case of semi-
manufactures and finished products, lower tariffs would thus have to be reduced by less 
than higher tariffs, and tariffs at or below the floor would not have to be reduced at all. The 
EEC proposal was not adopted due to objections by the US.  
The US abandoned its categorical resistance against a harmonization formula in the 
Tokyo Round, which resulted in a range of proposals for such formulas.
1029
 The US 
proposal, designed to make full use of the US negotiators' authority to reduce tariff by up to 
60 per cent, combined linear and harmonization elements; thus, the US sought to apply a 
linear 60 per cent cut to tariffs above the average level of industrial tariffs of developed 
countries, as calculated by the GATT Secretariat (6.2 per cent), and a harmonizing 
coefficient based on the formula y = 1.5x + 50 to all tariff lines below that threshold.
1030
 
The EC's proposal was more strongly harmonising; it suggested the formula y = x applied 
four times, i.e., any tariff line would be reduced by a percentage equal to the tariff line, and 
this would be done four times.
1031
 Figure 3 shows a comparison of the US and the EC 
formula, provided by the US to highlight the greater reduction achieved by its formula.       
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Fig. 3: Comparison of Percentage Reductions in US and EC formulas, provided by the US; 
excerpt from MTN/TAR/W/15/Add.1.  
 
The formula proposed by Japan was similar to the formula briefly considered in the 
preparatory negotiations, in that it included a linear reduction plus an ad valorem constant 
(y = 0.3x + 3.5).
1032
 The formula that ultimately carried the day in the Tokyo Round tariff 
negotiations, however, was proposed by Switzerland. What came to be known as the 
"Swiss formula" has since become one of the most well-known tools of trade negotiators. 
Some commentators have suggested that its success is due to its simplicity, a factor that 
was also highlighted by the Swiss themselves (see Figure 4).
1033
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Fig. 4: Swiss Formula; excerpt from MTN/TAR/W/34. 
 
Another factor that certainly contributed to the adoption of the Swiss Formula in the 
Tokyo Round was the fact that it represented a compromise between the strongly-
harmonising EC formula and the predominantly linear US formula (see Figure 5).  
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Fig. 5: Swiss Formula in comparison with the formulas proposed by the US and the EC; 
excerpt from MTN/TAR/W/34/Add.1. 
 
While the different formulas discussed in the Tokyo Round certainly reflected 
different conceptions of reciprocity (see chapter 1) and were informed by a keen awareness 
on the part of participants of how different formulas would affect the structure and levels of 
their tariffs,
1034
 one is left with the impression that practical and aesthetic considerations did 
play a role as well. On this level, the Swiss formula was clearly superior to the US and EC 
formulas in particular. While the US tried to choose a non-arbitrary threshold for the 
transition from the harmonising to the linear part of its proposal, its mixed proposal 
inevitably remained somewhat clumsy. The EC formula, on the other hand, while appearing 
simple, required a number of laborious calculations to arrive at the final rate.
1035
 The Swiss 
formula represented an elegant compromise.  
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The Swiss formula subsequently came to be seen as the harmonization formula par 
excellence.
1036
 Its single coefficient allowed for easy and transparent adjustment of the 
desired degree of harmonization; in the Tokyo Round, the US, Switzerland, Japan, and 
Czechoslovakia used the coefficient 14, while the EC and a number of other developed 
countries used the coefficient 16.
1037
 In the Uruguay Round, Switzerland proposed a 
coefficient of 15.
1038
 In the Doha Round NAMA modalities, the flexibilities provided by 
the coefficient are used to the fullest extent: developed countries are to apply the formula 
with a coefficient of 8; developing countries can choose between the coefficients of 20, 22, 
and 25, whereby the lower two coefficients (implying relatively more stringent reduction 
commitments) are coupled with a number of exemptions.
1039
 Thus, a developing country 
that chooses a coefficient of 20 can apply lower than formula cuts to up to 14 per cent of its 
tariff lines or leave up to 6.5 per cent unbound or without reduction; a developing country 
that chooses 22 as the coefficient can do likewise for 10 per cent and 5 per cent of tariff 
lines, respectively; or a developing country can choose the coefficient 25 without the use of 
any flexibilities.
1040
   
d) Tiered Formulas 
A tiered formula is a formula that applies different reduction modalities depending on the 
"tier" into which a binding falls. Usually, though not always, the reductions required by a 
tiered formula will be steeper for higher tiers than for lower tiers. Tiered formulas thus tend 
to be variants of harmonisation formulas.
1041
 Indeed, the formula favoured by the UK in the 
preparatory negotiations – a linear formula with a ceiling and floor – can be understood as a 
tiered formula, in the sense that tariffs falling above the ceiling, between the ceiling and the 
floor, and under the floor were treated differently. It may well have served as an inspiration 
for the Canadian negotiators who proposed a very similar formula thirty years later in the 
Tokyo Round. Similarly to the old British approach, the Canadians suggested a ceiling: all 
tariffs over 20 per cent were to be reduced to 20 per cent; tariffs between 5 and 20 per cent 
were to be reduced through a linear formula either across the board or on a weighted 
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average basis. The key difference between the Canadian proposal and the old British 
approach was that, whereas the British had envisaged a floor under which tariffs would not 
have to be reduced, the Canadians wanted tariffs at or below 5 per cent to be eliminated
1042
 
– an extremely rare case of a formula in which (some) low rates would be subject to a 
higher percentage reduction (namely 100 per cent) than higher rates.  
Tiered formulas lend themselves particularly well to precise calibration: in the Doha 
Round draft modalities for agriculture, which envisage the use of tiered formulas for the 
reduction of both tariffs and domestic support commitments
1043
, the tiers in the formula for 
developed countries were reportedly designed so as to capture the key tariff and domestic 
support bindings of the US and EU in particular tiers.
1044
 
e) Modalities and the Dynamics of Trade Lawmaking  
Evans has described the change in GATT negotiations occasioned by the decision to 
negotiate tariff reductions through general modalities rather than item-by-item:  
A year and half elapsed between the tentative decision … to hold a new round of trade 
negotiations and the date when the Kennedy Round was officially opened. It was another six 
months before negotiations, in the traditional meaning of the term, could be said to have 
begun. The reason for this unprecedented period of gestation was, of course, the fact that for 
the first time the problem of reaching agreement on a rule for automatic tariff reductions had 
been injected into the preparatory phase.  
In all GATT tariff conferences before the Kennedy Round, the preliminary decisions 
required of the Contracting Parties had been simple and procedural. But this new factor 
insured that the conference rules would be as tightly negotiated as the ultimate concessions 
themselves. In fact, had they been possible, totally automatic tariff reductions would have 
shifted the entire bargaining process forward to the opening phase of the conference. The 
rules would no longer have been procedural; they would have determined the shape and 
content of the final agreement. The "negotiating conference" would then have been reduced 
to the dull task of verifying and recording results.
1045
   
Beginning with the Kennedy Round, the weight of trade negotiations has indeed gradually 
shifted from bargaining over individual concessions to the negotiation of the "modalities" 
in accordance with which such concessions are to be given. In all areas that are subject to 
reduction techniques, the Doha Round negotiations have so far been exclusively concerned 
with modalities, and it is to be expected that, once the negotiations on modalities are 
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concluded, the only element of suspense will be which of its tariff lines a member will 
designate as a "sensitive" or "special" product; the absolute number of tariff lines eligible 
for such designations has been specified in the modalities. Several veteran trade negotiators 
have criticised these abstract "negotiations about negotiations" and have argued that it 
would be more fruitful to focus on concrete trade problems.
1046
 Others consider the shift 
towards modalities as an inevitable development: With the growing membership of the 
GATT and later the WTO, negotiations on the basis of bilateral requests and offers simply 
became unworkable.
1047
 Negotiations on horizontal reduction modalities represented a way 
to reduce the complexity of trade negotiations. At the same time, modalities negotiations 
themselves have become ever more complex since they were first conducted in the 
Kennedy Round. Thus, in the Kennedy Round, when only a limited number of developed 
countries applied a linear tariff reduction formula, it was still possible for these countries to 
iron out perceived imbalances in their offers (mostly resulting from decisions by 
participants to exempt individual tariff lines from the linear offer) through bilateral and 
plurilateral negotiations without generally applicable rules. In the Doha Round, by contrast, 
WTO members are no longer willing to leave anything to chance: Not only the reduction 
formulas, but also the scope and form of exceptions to the formulas are now specified in the 
modalities. Moreover, whereas tariff formulas in the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds were only 
applied by a number of developed countries, the modalities now apply to all participants in 
the negotiations, and have to accommodate differences in levels of commitments that 
different groups of members are willing and able to undertake.  
In sum, modalities negotiations as they are taking place in the current Doha Round 
are best understood as an effort to ensure an adequate complexity of trade negotiations.
1048
 
In other words, they represent an attempt to come down somewhere between the extremes 
of the unmanageable complexity of bilateral item-by-item negotiations on one hand, and 
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the unacceptable – in view of the differences between countries – simplicity of a single 
formula applied to all products and countries on the other hand. As I argue, negotiators try 
to achieve this aim by combining the generality of modalities with a number of strategies 
of particularisation.   
The negotiation of modalities represents a move towards generality in at least three 
respects: First, modalities are not negotiated for individual members, but for entire 
categories of countries; second, and as a consequence, modalities will tend to be negotiated 
multilaterally rather than bilaterally; and thirdly, modalities are not usually negotiated for 
individual products, but apply across the board to all products in a particular area (subject 
to exceptions). This move to generality is partly offset through strategies of 
particularisation designed to accommodate the individual interests and circumstances of 
WTO members in the modalities. In the Doha Round Draft Modalities for Agriculture, for 
example, one finds at least four such strategies.  
 A first layer of differentiation is achieved through the distinction between different 
categories of members. Because the developed/developing country distinction is so deeply 
entrenched, this differentiation has exclusively taken place in the developing country 
category. As described in Chapter 1, the Draft Modalities establish distinct obligations for 
at least six sub-groups of developing countries, in addition to the general developing 
country category: RAMs, very RAMs, small low-income RAMs with economies in 
transition, NFIDCs, LDCs and SVEs.
1049
 Very rarely, provisions in the modalities apply 
only to a specific country.
1050
 These differentiations allow the participants in lawmaking to 
tailor obligations to the individual circumstances of countries.  
The formulas used to calculate reduction commitments provide a second layer of 
differentiation. As discussed above, formulas can be designed to affect countries with 
different structures and levels of bindings differently, and the tiered formula used in the 
Agriculture Modalities provides particular flexibility in this regard. Further differentiation 
is accomplished through exception provisions, which are formulated as percentages of tariff 
lines and thus allow Members flexibility to take account of their individual circumstances.  
And finally, the modalities at several points leave developing countries with 
discretion as to the methodologies that they choose to calculate and schedule their 
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commitments – a possibility that is also provided in the NAMA modalities, where 
developing countries can choose among several combinations of reduction coefficients and 
flexibilities. 
In sum, these strategies of particularisation produce modalities that are far removed 
from the one-size-fits-all approach of the early tariff formulas. Instead, they embody an 
intricate trade-off between generality and particularity. The way in which the balance 
between these two elements is struck also determines the effect that modalities have on the 
dynamics of trade negotiations, and in particular the risks of what I have called 
"abstraction".  
The generality of modalities has one clear advantage that British and Canadian trade 
negotiators did not tire of emphasising in their negotiations with the US as early as the mid-
1940s: general rules for the assumption of legal commitments make the commitments 
intelligible and evaluable in a way that the outcomes of bilateral bargaining are not.
1051
 This 
generality also has a flipside, however, in that particular, substantive trade concerns are not 
addressed directly, but have to be accommodated in a framework of general rules; this can 
lead negotiations to become divorced from the concerns that motivated particular 
lawmaking proposals. One example of this risk of abstraction is the fate of proposals on 
food and livelihood security advanced by the G-33 group of developing countries in the 
Doha Round agricultural negotiations. As Eagleton-Pierce notes, in the course of the 
negotiations  
the full heretical force of the G-33's critique, complete with attention to concerns about 
hunger and nourishment, has been partially sidelined or lost as the negotiations shifted into 
conventional bargaining over quantitative modalities … this was an inevitable process of 
legally translating the G-33's heterodox ideas into the existing WTO schemes of 
classification.
1052
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Intelligibility at one level – the comparability of commitments, the effect of commitments 
on tariff structures, the transparency of exceptions, etc. – thus comes at the expense of 
removing the negotiations further from the concrete trade problems that are at stake.  
The danger of abstraction also arises in another respect: because specific modalities 
apply to entire categories of countries, negotiators have to formulate proposals with a view 
not only to how they will affect their trade relations with their individual counterparts, but 
with all countries in their own and their counterparts' category. This can lead to a 
phenomenon called "shadow boxing" by a US negotiator, where countries find themselves 
in heated negotiations with other countries whose trade they are not actually interested in. 
The prime example for this constellation was the deadlock between the US and India over a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) for agricultural products at the 2008 Mini-
Ministerial: whereas the US was primarily concerned about the effects of the SSM on its 
soya exports to China, India wanted to use it mostly against developing country 
competitors such as Malaysia.
1053
 Such constellations can be diffused through further 
particularisation of the modalities.
1054
   
 
II. Levelling Techniques and "Fairness" Narratives 
Of the trade barriers that the multilateral trading system was designed to address, 
discriminatory measures were perceived as particularly pernicious. As the Proposals stated, 
it was especially when barriers “discriminate between countries or interrupt previous 
business connections” that they “create bad feeling and destroy prosperity”.1055 US officials 
decried preferential regimes – especially the British system of imperial preferences – as 
destructive.
1056
 The most-favoured nation rule, often described as the cornerstone of the 
GATT, was designed to eliminate discrimination among GATT contracting parties;
1057
 it 
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stipulated that any advantage or privilege that was granted to products imported from one 
contracting party had to be extended immediately and unconditionally to products from all 
other contracting parties.
1058
  
The MFN rule is an example of a levelling technique of trade lawmaking. Levelling 
techniques – designed to “level the playing field” between different producers and their 
products
1059
 – differ from reduction techniques in that they do not establish an absolute 
standard of treatment, say, a particular tariff binding that cannot be exceeded, but a relative 
standard. This relative standard can either be the treatment accorded to “like” or similar 
products, or a benchmark such as the “normal” operation of a market. In the first case, 
levelling techniques are directed against discrimination among producers or products; in 
the latter case, they purport to remedy the distortion of a market by foreign governments 
(through subsidies) or producers (through dumping).  
The “fairness” narrative and the “level playing field” metaphor are explicitly 
invoked in the context of claims of market distortion much more frequently than in the 
context of claims of discrimination.
1060
 One could argue that this is due to the fact that 
“discrimination” is in itself an evocative and forceful charge in a way that “distortion” is 
not, but one could also question the appropriateness of discussing these two subjects as part 
of a single narrative and/or legal technique. I believe that the concept of “discrimination” 
implies a denial of fair treatment: the purpose of the non-discrimination provisions is 
“ultimately about ensuring fair competitive conditions between imported and domestic 
products”.1061 Moreover, with respect to techniques, the issues implicated in the two areas 
are similar. Both establish a relative standard of treatment defined in relation to a 
benchmark, and both discipline, at some level, differential treatment.     
                                                 
1058
 GATT, Article I. 
1059
 For uses of the "level playing field" metaphor, see Cass/Boltuck 1996, 355 (section on "the level playing 
field as moral imperative"); Bhagwati/Mavroidis 2004, 120; York 1990 ("A Level Playing Field: Toward a 
Canada-U.S. Trade Law"); Zampetti 2006. See more recently, the evocations of the "level playing field" 
metaphor by US public officials in the context of the China-US-EU solar dispute; New York Times, 20 May 
2013 ("This is the moment for the administration to obtain a global agreement that levels the playing field for 
American producers"; "Our goal is to support a healthy global solar industry in conditions that foster the 
adoption of renewable energy and continued innovation and a level playing field for all"); Lamy 2013:  
…hence to the levelling of the global trade playing field, which must ultimately remain our 
collective goal. Because this is what fairness is about. …we need to make sure that the manner in 
which these measures are addressed contributes to levelling — and not scattering — the playing 
field. … new elements which require multilateral handling, so as to better level the trade playing 
field. 
   
1060
 Most references in the previous footnote are from the former context. 
1061
 Bronckers/McNelis 2000, 347.  
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In the following, I will briefly discuss levelling techniques directed against 
discrimination, and then address the much more challenging issues posed by levelling 
techniques directed against the distortion of markets.  
A. Discrimination 
The levelling technique directed against discrimination is primarily embodied in provisions 
stipulating that a party shall provide to imported products from one party “treatment no less 
favourable” than that provided to like products from another party (MFN treatment) or to 
like products of domestic origin (national treatment).
1062
 In some instances, the content of 
the non-discrimination provision is spelt out in more specific terms. Thus, GATT Article 
III.2 provides that imported products shall not be taxed “in excess of” like domestic 
products, and that directly competitive or substitutable products shall be “similarly taxed”. 
GATT Article XIII, in turn, explicates the implications of the obligation of non-
discrimination in the context of the administration of quantitative restrictions in 
considerable detail. Thus, non-discrimination in this context is not conceptualised as the 
identical treatment of all importers, but rather as treatment in accordance with 
circumstances that would prevail but for the government measure, in that import quotas or 
licences are to be assigned in proportion to the share of imports “which the various 
contracting parties might be expected to obtain in the absence of” the restriction.1063 The 
benchmark for “equal treatment” is thus provided by the conditions that would obtain in the 
marketplace. Similarly, GATS Article XVII explicitly links the non-discrimination 
discipline to competition in the marketplace, specifying that less favourable treatment can 
take the form of both formally identical and formally different treatment, and that such 
treatment  
shall be considered to be less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition in 
favour of services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or service 
suppliers of any other member.
1064
 
                                                 
1062
 See GATS, Articles II (MFN Treatment) and XVII (National Treatment); TBT Agreement, Article 2.1 
(MFN and National Treatment); TRIPS Agreement Article III (National Treatment). This language was first 
used in GATT Article III.4. The MFN provisions in GATT Article I and Article 4 of the TRIPS Agreement 
use different language, stating that "any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity … shall be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally"; the MFN provision in the GATS Article II is a mixture of the two ("no less 
favourable treatment shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally").  
1063
 GATT, Article XIII.2. 
1064
 GATS, Article XVII.3.  
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Disciplines on different treatment in the context of measures that are recognised as 
pursuing a legitimate policy objective tend to be less stringent, prohibiting “arbitrary and 
unjustifiable” discrimination in the way in which the measures are applied,1065 or “arbitrary 
or unjustifiable” distinctions in the level of protection deemed appropriate in different 
contexts.
1066
  
B. Distortion 
While eliminating discrimination in international trade has always been a relatively widely 
shared goal,
1067
 a second strand of the fairness narrative has been more controversial – that 
directed against the “distortion” of markets by governments and private enterprises. Even 
more than any other of the narratives discussed in this chapter, this strand of the fairness 
narrative was “almost entirely a U.S. contribution”.1068 Robert Hudec reconstructs it as 
follows:  
The United States concept of unfairness … grows out of the structure, and the ideology, of 
the United States private enterprise economy. Since investment resources are privately 
owned, it is the private enterprise that bears the loss of investment when its domestic 
production is displaced by foreign competition. It is the individual workers who bear the 
major cost of employment displacement. The ideology that justifies these private losses 
holds that those who prevail in a competitive marketplace are the more efficient producers, 
and therefore deserve the business they have taken because of superior efficiency. This 
normative role assigned to superior efficiency requires that there be a parallel normative 
condemnation of those other forms of business practice which permit competitors to gain 
market superiority without superior efficiency, i.e., the producer who is able to reduce his 
prices because he receives a cash subsidy from his government. Such competitive practices, 
unrelated to efficiency, must be classified as unfair competition. Producers and workers can 
be asked to bear the losses of fair competition only if they are protected from unfair 
competition.
1069
 
 
While the original GATT did little to rein in subsidisation and dumping,
1070
 it 
allowed contracting parties to counteract subsidisation and dumping with anti-dumping and 
                                                 
1065
 GATT, Article XX, TBT Agreement, Preamble, SPS Agreement, Article 2.3. 
1066
 SPS Agreement, Article 5.5.  
1067
 At the same time, discrimination – or "preferential" treatment – has been a pervasive feature of 
international trade; see Patterson 1966.  
1068
 Hudec 1996, 7. Commentators frequently highlight that "no international consensus exists on what 
constitutes unfair government support to industry"; York 1990, 7; Sykes 1990, 699.  
1069
 Hudec 1979, 206. 
1070
 The original GATT did not condemn dumping and only contained notification and consultation 
requirements regarding subsidies; see Original GATT, Articles VI and XVI.  
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countervailing duties. These provisions were modelled on US law.
1071
 While the GATT 
never defined the concept of a “subsidy”, an early amendment defined “dumping” as a 
practice “by which products of one country are introduced into the commerce of another 
country at less than the normal value of the products”.1072 “Normal” value, in turn, was 
defined by reference to the price at which the like product is sold “in the ordinary course of 
trade” in the exporting country or, failing that, the highest price at which it is sold in other 
export markets.  
In GATT Article VI, the central challenge of this type of levelling technique is 
already apparent: how to tell apart fair and unfair competition, a dumped product from a 
product priced in the “ordinary course of trade”, and a “bounty or subsidy” from other 
governmental action affecting the market. In short, it is the problem of how to establish a 
benchmark of “normalcy” against which the “distortion” presumptively caused by 
subsidisation or dumping could be measured. The most common source of such a 
benchmark has been "the market". As Tarullo notes, US laws purportedly providing "relief 
from unfair trade practices"  
do not make 'fairness' the standard for deciding whether to impose countervailing duties: 
neither the statute nor its administrators require a fairness analysis. … fairness rhetoric 
simply masks a market standard. … The market correction laws use both a market standard 
and, by implication, the efficiency principles on which a market standard is assumed to rest, 
as the measure of unfairness.
1073
 
In the multilateral context, trade negotiators during the GATT years largely left the 
task of defining a benchmark for "fair competition" to treaty interpreters: domestic 
investigating authorities and GATT panellists. There was one area, however, in which the 
problem of subsidisation was perceived as so pervasive as to require a legislative response: 
in the agricultural sector. The problems encountered by trade lawmakers in establishing a 
benchmark in this field foreshadowed the issues arising in the application of these kinds of 
legal obligations, which have caused some to call for the abolition of anti-dumping and 
countervailing duty law.  
                                                 
1071
 Tarullo 1987, 548-549: The US trade laws "were the models for GATT provisions that allowed nations to 
impose imports restrictions on products for which they had previously agreed to reduce tariffs"; ibid. 549, fn 
6: "United States law inspired many of these exceptions". 
1072
 GATT, Article VI.  
1073
 Tarullo 1987, 552-553. 
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At the beginning of systematic efforts to discipline subsidies and other support 
measures in the agricultural sector stood a recommendation in the Haberler Report to find 
some way to measure the degree of agricultural protectionism in individual countries.
1074
 
The Haberler Report suggested that the way to do so would be through “a comparison 
between the total return actually received by the domestic farmer for his production and the 
return which would correspond to the ruling world price.”1075 This proposal was quickly 
rejected by a group of experts
1076
 set up to study the issue, on the basis that the world price 
was itself affected by the distortions that were supposed to be measured.  
International prices in general are greatly influenced, and to an extent which cannot be 
determined, by support measures in certain exporting and importing countries, by export 
subsidies, and by various special arrangements between exporting and importing countries. 
Although the support measures and subsidies will be reflected in the calculations, their 
existence nevertheless distorts the basis of the comparison.
1077
 
The group faced the difficulty of having to determine “what might be called a degree of 
protection equal to zero, i.e. a situation which would be characterized by the absence of any 
kind of intervention":
1078
 
the only theoretically correct procedure is to compare a given situation with that which 
would exist in the absence of the protection that is to be measured. This comparison cannot 
in fact be made because of the obvious impossibility of experimentation and the lack of 
comparable historical circumstances that could take the place of experimentation. The 
assumption of absence of protection would imply many consequential changes inside and 
outside the country concerned, which are not susceptible to evaluation.
1079
 
Given these difficulties, it was acknowledged that the very concept of the “degree of 
agricultural protectionism” would be “defin[ed] by the methods employed for its 
measurement”.1080 The experts group ultimately settled on what it called the “standard 
                                                 
1074
 GATT 1958, paras. 45 and 205.  
1075
 Ibid. para. 45.  
1076
 L/1326, 2. See also COM.II/92.  
1077
 COM.II/103, para. 5; see also ibid. para. 14, where the experts reject the method of comparing domestic 
prices with a uniform world price.   
1078
 COM.II/94; Germany similarly pointed to the "difficulty of marking precisely the point at which 
economic measures begin to have a protectionist effect"; COM.II/103, 22.  
1079
 COM.II/103, para. 4. See also COM.II/W.7, para. 1: 
The concept of the degree of agricultural protectionism is highly complex. Ideally, it ought to rest, 
for  each given country, on a comparison between the situation, as regards supply …, demand 
and price, actually existing under its given agricultural policies and that which would eventually 
result from the complete abolition of all protectionist devices – or possibly that which would exist if 
no such devices had ever been applied.  
1080
 COM.II/W.7, para. 3. 
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method” for measuring agricultural protection, under which “the contribution to farm 
income arising from governmental action or authority” would be  
assessed on the basis of the sum total of the difference between farm prices and import 
prices and import prices or export prices (for import and export commodities, respectively) 
plus all direct and indirect subsidies for agriculture (where not already included in the prices 
differences).
1081
   
This first attempt to establish the degree of “protection” illustrates the analytical moves 
associated with a levelling technique: first, a benchmark needs to be established; in the case 
of "discrimination", this benchmark is furnished by the actual treatment accorded to a like 
or directly competitive or substitutable product; in the case of “distortion”, the benchmark 
is a hypothetical, counterfactual state unperturbed by “governmental action or authority”. 
As a second step, the conduct in question is compared with the benchmark, to establish 
whether and to what extent it deviates from this benchmark.  
The attempt to regulate domestic support in agriculture through this technique was 
not further pursued until more than two decades later, after the method for measuring 
agricultural support had been refined by economists working for the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) and later the OECD. Unaware of the discussions on this issue that had 
taken place in the GATT,
1082
 an economist working for the FAO developed the concept of a 
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE), which measured agricultural support by calculating 
what the government would have to pay its farmers to maintain their income in the 
hypothetical case that it abolished all protection and support for the agricultural sector. In 
other words, the PSE is the "subsidy that would be necessary to replace the array of actual 
farm policies employed in a particular country in order to leave farm income 
unchanged."
1083
 In the 1980s, the PSE concept was taken up and developed by the OECD in 
a major study of the agricultural policies of major agricultural trading countries, which was 
published shortly after the launch of the Uruguay Round.
1084
 This analytical groundwork 
was then relied upon by the Uruguay Round negotiators to develop an Aggregate 
                                                 
1081
 COM.II/103, para. 13. 
1082
 Interview with Timothy Josling.  
1083
 Tangermann/Josling/Pearson 1987, 266.  
1084
 OECD 1987; cf. Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996, 105-110.  
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Measurement of Support (AMS) that formed the basis for reduction commitments in the 
Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.
1085
  
The AMS used in the Agreement on Agriculture requires two distinct judgments 
about benchmarks. The first is a judgment about the existence and amount of agricultural 
"support"; such support exists, according to the Agreement, where a government pays a 
subsidy to, or foregoes revenue otherwise due from, the producers of an agricultural 
commodity, or where it maintains an administered price that is higher than "a fixed external 
reference price".
1086
 The benchmark here is the government's budgetary situation or the 
price of an agricultural product in the hypothetical scenario that the government is not 
supporting agricultural production. The second judgment about a benchmark required by 
the Agreement is the decision whether governmental support is "trade distorting"; support 
measures that have "no, or at most minimal, trade-distorting effects or effects on 
production" are exempt from the calculation of the AMS.
1087
 The circumstances under 
which a support measure conforms to this standard are carefully defined through a long list 
of "policy-specific criteria and conditions" in Annex 2 of the Agreement. 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
formulates benchmarks in more general terms. The first benchmark is similar to the one in 
the Agreement on Agriculture, in that it involves an analysis of the government's budgetary 
situation, the income of producers or prices of products, in light of the question of whether 
there has been a "financial contribution" by the government or "any form of income or 
price support".
1088
 The second and third benchmarks differ more markedly from what one 
finds in the Agreement on Agriculture: While the Agreement on Agriculture distinguishes 
between "trade-distorting" and "non-/minimally-trade distorting" measures on the basis of a 
detailed catalogue of policy-specific criteria, the SCM Agreement attempts to get at 
something similar by asking two general questions, namely, whether the measure confers a 
"benefit" on the recipient, and whether the measure is "specific", i.e., limited to a particular 
recipient or group of recipients.     
                                                 
1085
 The initial proposal by the US to use the PSE as a basis for reduction commitments is 
MTN.GNG/NG5/W/14; for a comparison of the PSE and the AMS, see Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996, 
204-206.  
1086
 Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 3.   
1087
 Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2.  
1088
 SCM Agreement, Article 1.1(a)(1) and 1.1(a)(2). The benchmark character of this provision is most 
obvious in the subparagraph 1.1(a)(1)(ii), which requires an examination of whether "government revenue 
that is otherwise due is foregone".    
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Benchmarks are essentially filtering devices, designed to capture conduct that 
deviates from a particular baseline. Benchmarks would appear to be particularly prone to 
one of the risks involved in the use of lawmaking techniques identified above: partiality. 
Benchmarks almost by definition capture an issue along a single dimension. The "benefit" 
benchmark, designed to filter government action that is not in conformity with market 
outcomes, is a good example.
1089
 The question asked by the benefit benchmark is whether a 
firm has received something from the government on terms that it could not have obtained 
in the marketplace.
1090
 The one-dimensionality of this question is immediately obvious. The 
benchmark does not distinguish between well-functioning and failing markets, between 
efficient and inefficient government activity, or between socially desirable and undesirable 
subsidies – rather, it distinguishes between outcomes that could have obtained in an actual 
market, and outcomes which could not.   
One way to reduce the partiality of the benchmark technique is to use several layers 
of benchmarks, which will address different dimensions of the subject matter at issue. Thus, 
the SCM Agreement in effect applies three filters: it captures only government action that 
(a) involves an actual or potential cost to the government ("financial contribution"), (b) 
produces non-market outcomes ("benefit") and (c) advantages some firms or sectors over 
others ("specificity"). The third filter, in particular, has been widely interpreted as a proxy 
for the distinction between "good" and "bad" subsidies. Quite apart from the questionable 
success of the "specificity" standard on this score,
1091
 the layering of benchmarks creates its 
own problems, since each layer filters out some action that, by the logic of the other layers, 
should be included. For example, government action that provides non-market advantages 
to some firms but does not take the form of a financial contribution is (with the limited 
exception of income and price support mechanisms) excluded from the Agreement's 
purview. The incoherence produced by the layering of benchmarks – as well as the 
inadequacies of these benchmarks themselves – has led critics to argue that subsidy rules 
such as those embodied in the SCM Agreement  
                                                 
1089
 Apart from its one-dimensionality, the use of market benchmarks in itself is fraught with problems; see 
only Zheng 2010.  
1090
 See SCM Agreement, Article 14.  
1091
 Tarullo and Sykes, among others, are sceptical of the specificity standard's ability to tell apart efficient 
from inefficient government intervention; see Tarullo 1987; Sykes 2010.  
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rely on arbitrary baselines, distinctions that elevate form over substance, and on myopic 
analysis of government programs that inevitably masks the full effects of government 
activity on business enterprise. Hence, there is little reason to believe that the rules … serve 
to identify market-distorting subsidies with much accuracy, or that they identify subsidy 
practices that ought to be discouraged by any other principled criterion.
1092
   
 
By contrast to the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture attempts to avoid 
the partiality of the benchmarking technique not simply by layering benchmarks. While it 
also purports to identify "trade-distorting" subsidies, it spells out what this is taken to mean 
for individual policies, and thus takes into account the varied features and merits of those 
policies.
1093
 In particular, the Agreement spells out specific requirements for general 
services provided by the government, including research, pest and disease control, training, 
inspection, marketing and infrastructural services, for public stockholding for food security 
purposes, domestic food aid, direct payments to producers, decoupled income support, 
government contributions to income insurance and safety-net programmes, natural disaster 
relief and a number of structural assistance programmes.
1094
 With respect to all these forms 
of government support, which are subject to up to six discrete requirements, the Agreement 
avoids the one-dimensionality of the benchmark technique. The principal drawback of 
spelling out criteria for what makes discrete policies "non-trade distorting" is the limited 
scope of this approach as compared to a general benchmark. Policies that are not explicitly 
provided for will either not be disciplined or, as in the Agreement on Agriculture, will be 
deemed to be trade-distorting by default (i.e., they will be "non-exempt" from reduction 
commitments). While this approach may thus be feasible for particular sectors,
1095
 it would 
be difficult to implement for subsidies across the board.                                           
III. Managing Techniques and "Stability" Narratives 
Narratives emphasising the need for stability in international trade have been part of 
multilateral trade lawmaking from the outset. In its Proposals for Expansion of World 
Trade and Employment, the United States propagated the “release from fear of disorder in 
                                                 
1092
 Sykes 2010, 474.  
1093
 Sykes explicitly exempts the Agreement on Agriculture from his critique of subsidies disciplines; Sykes 
2010, 475.  
1094
 Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2.  
1095
 A sector approach to subsidies regulation was also long favoured in relation to civil aircraft; see the 
Tokyo Round Civil Aircraft Code; the 1992 EEC-US Civil Aircraft Agreement; and SCM Agreement, fns 15, 
24.   
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the markets for primary commodities”1096 as one of the four objectives that the proposed 
ITO would achieve. The Proposals noted the “danger of violent and rapid movement in the 
markets for primary commodities”1097 after the end of the Second World War and warned 
that the necessary adjustments should not come “too fast” lest they “bring serious distress 
to many small producers and to their communities”.1098 The United States anticipated the 
need for intergovernmental commodity agreements “to provide a program of adjustment 
and a period of time within which the essential change can be made without undue 
hardship” and acknowledged that during the transitional period it might be “necessary to 
restrict production or exports, to fix prices, or to allocate shares of markets among 
producing countries.”1099 In other words, the United States suggested to “manage” trade by 
controlling economic variables – production, exports, prices, market shares – that would 
otherwise be determined endogenously by the market. The US emphasised that the purpose 
of managing international trade in this way was “not to protect vested interests, but to 
prevent widespread distress during the course of necessary change.”1100 
While the United States envisioned that tools to manage trade would be employed 
on a temporary basis to smoothen the transition from the wartime economy to the peace, the 
United Kingdom saw a more permanent role for managing techniques in the multilateral 
trading system, particularly with regard to agricultural products. In the bilateral discussions 
between the US and the UK preceding the preparatory conferences, UK negotiators 
acknowledged that it was “necessary to prevent unlimited protection and preserve 
multilateralism”, but also insisted on the need “to take care of stability and the political 
factors bound up with it.”1101 The British noted that “agricultural production is particularly 
subject to wide fluctuations” and found that the “ideas developed at Washington are not 
adequate for dealing with this problem.”1102 In particular, UK negotiators found that 
techniques for liberalisation and non-discrimination that were at the centre of US thinking 
were not adequate to their objectives. They pointed out  
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 US Proposals 1945, 5. 
1097
 Ibid. 
1098
 Ibid. 
1099
 Ibid. 6. 
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 Ibid.  
1101
 FRUS 1944, 100; see also ibid. 102: "Special stress is given to the need for stability." 
1102
 FRUS 1944, 102. 
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that stability cannot be attained unless imports are regulated, that no single method is 
adequate for the purpose of such regulation, and that either tariffs or subsidies or quotas or a 
combination of two or all of them might have to be used in particular cases.
1103
  
In short, when it came to agriculture, the British did “not wish to be restricted as to method 
of controlling imports”.1104 Instead, they proposed that disciplines be formulated in terms of 
production and price levels that must not be exceeded. Thus, “protection” – in whatever 
form – would be allowed as long as domestic production did not exceed a certain level 
(specified in relation to the level of production in a representative period) and as long as the 
domestic price did not exceed the world price by more than a specified percentage.
1105
 The 
formulas for calculating the permitted production and price levels would be the subject of 
multilateral negotiations.    
Apart from their discomfort with permanently enshrining a regime aimed at 
maintaining the stability of agricultural production in individual countries in the 
multilateral trading system,
1106
 US negotiators found it difficult to envision how the 
managing technique proposed by the British would work in practice, and in particular, how 
to quantify the required “reduction of protection” in case the permitted production or price 
levels “were exceeded”.1107 The UK negotiators responded that  
                                                 
1103
 FRUS 1944, 102.  
1104
 FRUS 1944, 102.  
1105
 FRUS 1944, 102. The United Kingdom's Wheat Act served as a template. At a later point in the 
discussions, UK negotiators gave a more technical explanation of what they envisioned; see FRUS 1945, 13-
14: 
In respect of any food product coming within the scope of the measure, let X equal the permitted 
protection which is the degree of protection required to maintain the permitted excess of domestic 
price over the average world price in the base period. Let P equal the actual protection at any given 
time. Let Y equal the specified level of production, which is the maximum level to which production 
is allowed to be raised by the permitted protection. The specified level is arrived at by multiplying 
average production in the base period by an agreed percentage. Let Q equal the actual quantity of 
domestic production at any given time. Then if P equals X but Q is less than Y no increase of P is 
allowed and domestic production must be allowed to remain P [Q?] unless it can be raised by other 
than protectionist measures. On the other hand if P equals X and Q is greater than Y, then P must be 
reduced until Q is equal to Y. 
1106
 See the US question at FRUS 1945, 6:  
With regard to stability of (domestic) production, is it the British view that this would be recognized 
in the proposed convention as a permanent and accepted objective of economic policy? Specifically, 
would they be inclined to resist the inclusion of accompanying provisions making it clear that 
measures against imports imposed on the grounds of promoting stability would be merely of a 
transitional character and looking towards the relaxation and ultimate removal of such measures as 
soon as practicable? 
The UK response is at FRUS 1945, 14:   
 These are intended as permanent and not merely transitional measures. 
1107
 FRUS 1945, 6; US negotiators noted that  
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Precise formulas would be impracticable. Governments would be obligated to take adequate 
steps and would be judged on attainment of the required result rather than on methods.
1108
 
After further discussion, US negotiators summarised their understanding of the 
British proposal as follows:  
[C]ontracting states [would] be permitted to deal with special problems of agricultural price 
or income support, affecting a list of 'primary foodstuffs' to be set out in the agreement, by 
any methods of intervention they wish to use, provided:  
(a) That their domestic production of these commodities does not exceed Y per cent of a 
pre-war base; and 
(b) That their domestic (presumably wholesale) market price of these commodities does not 
exceed the world market price by more than X per cent, the values of X and Y to be 
negotiated and specified in the agreement.
1109
 
 
The British proposal for dealing with agriculture had the hallmarks of the managing 
technique of trade lawmaking: it formulated disciplines in terms of trade outcomes (prices 
and production levels) instead of instruments, leaving the choice of instruments open. In 
this the technique differs fundamentally from reduction techniques, which tend to target 
particular instruments for elimination or reduction.     
Nothing resembling the British proposal made it into any of the drafts of the ITO 
Charter or the GATT. Nonetheless, managing techniques are embodied in these documents 
in several provisions. Three provisions of the GATT expressly allow contracting parties to 
manage trade through quantitative restrictions – Article XI(2) permits the use of 
quantitative restrictions to restrict imports of agricultural and fisheries products in 
connection with programs to control the domestic production of the like or directly 
substitutable products; Article XII allows the use of quantitative restrictions to safeguard 
the balance of payments;
1110
 Article XVIII authorises developing countries to use 
quantitative restrictions to safeguard their balance of payments or to protect infant 
                                                                                                                                                    
It seems clear that in the case of subsidies, as illustrated by the pre-war United Kingdom wheat act, 
the British have in mind that appropriate reduction would be achieved by limiting the subsidy in 
effect to a goal quantity. It is not clear how this would be done if tariffs or quotas were used in lieu of 
subsidies. 
1108
 FRUS 1945, 14.  
1109
 FRUS 1945, 32.  
1110
 See Dam 1970, 15, on the need to resort to "direct controls on trade" under a system of fixed exchange 
rates as it existed in the postwar period.  
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industries.
1111
 Moreover, Article XIX allows parties to take “emergency action” in response 
to import surges that are causing or threatening “serious injury” to domestic producers.  
These GATT provisions embody managing techniques in that they allow 
contracting parties to manage trade in order to achieve a particular outcome: to implement 
their domestic agricultural policy, to safeguard their balance of payments, to protect infant 
industries, or to avoid serious injury to their producers. Whereas reduction techniques 
impose an absolute limit on the use of particular instruments and levelling techniques 
establish relative standards of treatment based on specified benchmarks, managing 
techniques circumscribe trade measures by reference to a particular goal, effect, or result 
that is to be achieved.
1112
 While some of the GATT provisions enshrining managing 
techniques specifically identify the instruments that can be used to achieve these objectives, 
in practice contracting parties have resorted to a wider range of instruments than foreseen in 
the provisions. Thus, the European Community famously employed a system of variable 
levies in order to ensure that imports did not undermine the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). Variable levies were more suitable than the quantitative restrictions foreseen in 
Article XI to prevent imports from undercutting the price levels set by the CAP since they 
automatically adjusted the price of imports to the domestic price. Similarly, GATT practice 
saw frequent instances of the use of import surcharges, instead of quantitative restrictions, 
which were authorised by Articles XII and XVIII(B), to safeguard the balance of 
payments.
1113
 Articles XVIII(C) regarding infant-industry protection and XIX regarding 
safeguards are open-ended regarding the choice of instruments. The only obligations that 
cannot be suspended for the purposes of infant-industry protection are the obligations in 
GATT Articles I and XIII, which outlaw discrimination among different contracting 
parties.
1114
 And while Article XIX expressly mentions the possibility of suspending tariff 
                                                 
1111
 See Article XVIII, para. 9, regarding measures to safeguard the balance of payments ("may … control the 
general level of imports by restricting the quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported"); and 
Section C regarding infant-industry protection.  
1112
 Tarullo 1987, 550: Safeguards "provide for restrictions on imports solely because of unacceptable or 
undesirable effects in the United States and are not concerned with the conduct of the foreign seller or 
government". 
1113
 See the notification about a "temporary import surcharge" imposed by the United States on all dutiable 
imports for balance of payments purposes, L/3567. The surcharge was subject to examination by a working 
party.  
1114
 See GATT, Article XVIII, para. 20. Paragraph 20 also lists Article II regarding tariff concessions as an 
obligation which cannot be suspended under the procedures of Section C of Article XVIII. However, this is 
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concessions in order to avoid “serious injury” to domestic producers, the use of the term 
“including tariff concessions” makes it plain that safeguards can also be implemented 
through other means, say, quantitative restrictions.
1115
 The only limit on instruments that 
can be used under Article XIX may be, as in the case of infant-industry protection under 
Article XVIII, the obligations regarding non-discrimination in Article I and XIII.
1116
 The 
GATT thus establishes a clear hierarchy between levelling and managing techniques; 
discrimination is not allowed, even where discriminatory measures might be the most 
effective way of achieving a particular legally authorised goal.     
While the four GATT provisions discussed so far allowed individual contracting 
parties to manage trade for particular purposes, the ITO Charter also contained a chapter 
providing for the collective management, through “inter-governmental commodity control 
agreements”, of the international trade in particular commodities.1117 The chapter 
recognized that  
the conditions under which some primary commodities are produced, exchanged and 
consumed are such that international trade in these commodities may be affected by special 
difficulties such as the tendency towards persistent disequilibrium between production and 
consumption, the accumulation of burdensome stocks and pronounced fluctuations in 
prices.
1118
  
                                                                                                                                                    
only because Section A of Article XVIII already provides special procedures for the modification and 
withdrawal of tariff concessions for the purposes of infant-industry protection.    
1115
 For safeguards, see Sykes 2006, 11: 
Safeguard measures under Article XIX are not limited to the suspension of negotiated tariff 
concessions. Paragraph 1(a) makes clear that the increased quantities of imports may result from 
other obligations as well, and that it is permissible to suspend such obligations in addition to 
modifying or withdrawing a tariff concession. An obvious candidate for suspension aside from a 
tariff concession is Article XI, which generally prohibits quantitative restrictions. 
For an example for the use of quantitative restrictions under Article XIX, see L/859. US officials explained 
the choice thus: 
quotas selected in preference to tariff in this exceptional case because compatible with international 
discussions regarding export curtailment, our hope that a permanent solution can be worked out on 
international basis promptly and because quotas allow foreign countries realize larger portion 
proceeds from sales in US market (FRUS 1958-1960, 183) 
1116
 See Sykes 2006, 11. Sykes suggests that selective safeguards (i.e., the suspension of GATT Article I and 
Article XIII) may not be allowed.  
1117
 The Charter defined "commodity control agreement" as "an intergovernmental agreement which 
involves":  
(a) the regulation of production or the quantitative control of exports or imports or a primary commodity 
and which has the purpose or might have the effect of reducing, or preventing an increase in, the 
production of, or trade in, that commodity; or 
(b)  the regulation of prices. 
ITO Charter, Article 61.  
1118
 ITO Charter, Article 55.  
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The ITO Charter acknowledged that “such difficulties may, at times, necessitate special 
treatment of the international trade in such commodities through inter-governmental 
agreement”.1119 The objectives for which the Charter considered commodity agreements as 
appropriate ranged from the US concern about the need to help along adjustments between 
supply and demand
1120
 to the desire of many other countries to “achiev[e] a reasonable 
degree of [price] stability” for primary commodities.1121 The Charter provided that 
commodity agreements could only be resorted to where the problems in question could "not 
be corrected by normal market forces".
1122
 
When the ITO Charter failed to come into force, some contracting parties attempted 
at the 1955 Review Session to include "provisions along the lines of Chapter IV of the 
Havana Charter"
1123
 into the GATT; they were rebuffed by the US and Germany, and the 
effort to establish a permanent framework for commodity agreements in the GATT was 
subsequently abandoned.
1124
 However, increasing the stability of trade in primary products 
remained a central objective for many contracting parties for decades to come; arguably, it 
was only in the course of the Uruguay Round and in the context of the negotiation of the 
Agreement on Agriculture that one of the chief proponents of this objective, the EC, was 
forced to abandon it.
1125
 In the intervening decades, calls to "organise" international trade in 
primary commodities were regularly considered for, and sometimes included in, 
declarations adopted in the GATT;
1126
 the elaboration of commodity agreements was 
endorsed in the GATT;
1127
 and a few agreements were adopted within the GATT itself.
1128
 
                                                 
1119
 ITO Charter, Article 55. 
1120
 ITO Charter, Article 57: 
to prevent or alleviate the serious economic difficulties which may arise when adjustments between 
production and consumption cannot be effected by normal market forces alone as rapidly as the 
circumstances require  
1121
 ITO Charter, Article 57:  
to prevent or moderate pronounced fluctuations in the price of a primary commodity with a view to 
achieving a reasonable degree of stability on a basis of such prices as are fair to consumers and 
provide a reasonable return to producers, having regard to the desirability of securing long-term 
equilibrium between the forces of supply and demand  
1122
 ITO Charter, Article 62. 
1123
 Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996, 34. 
1124
 See ibid. 34-35.  
1125
 Oxley 1990, 199, reports that up until the mid-1980s 
the French proposed with regular monotony that the five major wheat suppliers – the United States, 
the European Community, Canada, Australia and Argentina – agree on market shares for the world 
wheat market. 
1126
 MIN(63)7, paras. 6 and 11 (EEC):  
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The US's general opposition to commodity agreements
1129
 did not prevent it from 
embracing managing techniques with respect to agricultural commodities in which it was 
uncompetitive and in which it would have been unable to survive if “liberalisation” or 
“fairness”, rather than “stability”, had been the guiding paradigms. For example, the United 
States participated for several decades in the International Wheat Agreement, which 
allocated export quotas and stipulated maximum and minimum prices for international 
wheat trade.
1130
 US officials internally explained the attractions of using managing 
techniques in this area as follows: 
Since the United States can only compete in the world wheat market by means of export 
subsidies, the International Wheat Agreement provides a convenient framework within 
which our export subsidy program can be operated in an atmosphere of international 
cooperation. In effect the Agreement gives international acceptance and approval of our 
export subsidy program, for it is operated to implement the provisions of an internationally 
agreed marketing arrangement. This fact has important political implications, for it removes 
an important area of our export trade from potential controversy. Unilateral action by the 
United States would be a constant source of charges that we were impairing the markets of 
others and depressing world wheat prices. As our current arrangements have international 
sanction, the export subsidy program is not a source of irritation among friendly 
competitors.
1131
 
                                                                                                                                                    
international action should … be directed to a deliberate effort to organize international trade in 
products of interest to the less-developed countries … the general and primary objective was to 
organize markets … 
MIN(73)W/2, paras. 60 and 61:  
the conditions for expansion of trade would be more favourable if the stability of world markets were 
better assured. The best way of achieving that objective would be to organize some orderly world 
markets by means of appropriate international arrangements. … a price mechanism (minimum and 
maximum prices) would be negotiated for certain products, along with measures concerning stocks, 
in order to regulate supply … 
Prep.Com/W/6, para. 10: 
In the discussions on agricultural products it has been suggested that the negotiations should, in 
addition, have stability of markets, acceptable and predictable conditions of access and stable and 
remunerative prices as their objectives. 
The Tokyo Declaration 1973, para. 2, envisaged 
 measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for primary products.  
1127
 MIN(63)7, paras. 13 and 15:  
Ministers … endorsed the commodity agreement approach to cocoa … Ministers confirmed the 
intention of their governments to apply in an efficacious manner the International Coffee Agreement 
…  
1128
 Agreements on bovine meat and dairy were adopted in the Tokyo Round, and later became plurilateral 
agreements in the WTO; for background, see Winham 1986, 156-157; McRae/Thomas 1983, 65; 
Paemen/Bensch 1995, 67. 
1129
 See Winham 1986, 157, reporting that the US was "specifically opposed to market organization schemes 
such as commodity agreements and the like"; for the US opposition to commodity agreements at the outset of 
the Tokyo Round, see also FRUS 1973-1976, 615-616, quoted infra at fn 1342. 
1130
 For a history of commodity agreements regulating the international trade in wheat, see Wheeler 1967.  
1131
 FRUS 1958-1960, 167.  
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In the late 1950, the United States also developed an interest in managing trade in 
another area, cotton textiles. The US suggested that the contracting parties “study the 
problem of alleviating 'the adverse effects of an abrupt invasion of established markets 
while continuing to provide steadily enlarged opportunities for trade'”1132 – what the United 
States called the problem of “market disruption”. As with regard to agricultural trade after 
the Second World War, the US purportedly embraced managing techniques to allow a 
smoother adjustment than would occur if the competition was allowed to run its course.
1133
 
In practice, however, the restrictions on textile trade that were implemented as a result of 
the US initiative and that were ultimately enshrined the Multi-Fiber Arrangement (MFA), 
would be maintained for several decades. The MFA became the "apotheosis of the concept 
of managed trade" in the multilateral trading system.
1134
 Only in the Uruguay Round did the 
developed countries agree to a gradual phase-out of the MFA.
1135
 
More than sixty years after the debate about the management of agricultural trade in 
the US-UK exploratory talks, the conflict between reduction and managing techniques is 
again at the forefront of international trade lawmaking. Two proposals advanced by the G-
33 group of developing countries in the Doha Round agricultural negotiations, regarding a 
Special Safeguard Mechanism and public stockholding for food security purposes, arguably 
represent an attempt to obtain additional tools to manage trade in the pursuit of certain 
substantive aims, such as rural development and food security. Both proposals clash with 
the liberalisation narrative favoured by the US and other developed countries in relation to 
agriculture, as well as with the reduction techniques for tariffs and agricultural subsidies 
that are already embodied in the Agreement on Agriculture. At the level of lawmaking 
techniques, this clash finds it clearest expression in the conflict about the possibility of 
                                                 
1132
 SR.15/17, 153; for the US statement, see also Spec(59)222.  
1133
 The US initiative faced opposition from developing countries; India, for example,  
did not accept the position that goods produced in countries with low wages could be considered as 
presenting a different type of competition from goods produced in countries where other factors 
contributed to cheapness of production. (SR.15/17, 154) 
Internally, US officials acknowledged that their approach to managing import competition was influenced by 
considerations of where the competition came from; see FRUS 1961-1963, 532-535: 
We cannot deal with the United Kingdom as though it were a low-wage producer pouring disruptive 
imports into our market, as we dealt with the cotton textile-producing countries. …we cannot treat 
Italy as though it were Hong Kong.  
1134
 Wolf 1983, 455; see also Aggarwal 1985. 
1135
 See the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing.  
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exceeding pre-Doha bindings. From the perspective of the liberalisation narrative, 
exceeding pre-Doha bindings is a taboo – it defies the logic of reduction techniques and 
runs counter to what trade negotiations are supposed to achieve. From the perspective of 
narratives centred around substantive goals such as rural development and food security, 
the question of whether one exceeds a previously negotiated binding in pursuit of these 
objectives has no particular significance; if doing so is necessary to achieve these important 
objectives, so be it. The conflict between reduction and managing techniques contributed to 
the failure of the 2008 mini-Ministerial Meeting in Geneva, and it is the biggest obstacle to 
the conclusion of a "Doha-light" package at the Bali Ministerial Conference in December 
2013. This conflict is only the latest example of the contestation over the objectives and the 
appropriate techniques of multilateral trade lawmaking that has been a feature of the trading 
system since its beginning.         
IV. Minimizing Techniques and "Necessity" Narratives1136 
The concept of “necessity” has a long history in public international law as a principle 
circumscribing the legal obligations of a state.
1137
 It was on this model – as a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness of otherwise illegal conduct – that the concept of necessity was 
initially incorporated into trade law, in Articles XX and XXI of the GATT. Minimizing 
techniques were thus initially employed only as a second layer of discipline that operated 
below reduction and levelling techniques: it was only when a measure violated a party's 
obligation not to maintain trade barriers beyond a specific level or not to discriminate 
against imports that the question of whether that measure was "necessary" to achieve a 
particular regulatory objective could arise.
1138
 
With the Tokyo Round Standards Code, and more prominently the TBT and SPS 
Agreements adopted in the Uruguay Round, the requirement not to create "unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade" has become a free-standing obligation. As Hudec has 
pointed out, the development added a new objective to trade law,    
                                                 
1136
 Due to limited space, I can discuss this technique here only in the most cursory fashion. 
1137
 For a recent discussion, see Sloane 2012.   
1138
 See Sykes 2003 for a general discussion of least-restrictive means requirements.   
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one that can be described as the prevention of unjustified regulation per se, whether or not 
such a regulation creates a competitive disadvantage for foreign goods vis-à-vis domestic 
goods.
1139
 
The SPS Agreement for the first time sets out legislatively what it means for an SPS 
measure to be "more trade-restrictive than required": 
a measure is not more trade-restrictive than required unless there is another measure, 
reasonably available taking into account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves 
the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly less 
restrictive to trade.
1140
 
Minimising techniques share some important properties with managing techniques; in 
particular, both techniques seek to discipline trade measures by stipulating when and how 
they may pursue a specific authorised aim. The problems that beset these types of legal 
techniques will be discussed in some depth in Sections III.C and III.D of Chapter 4. 
V. Regulating Techniques1141 
Regulating techniques have been employed in multilateral trade lawmaking to formulate 
standards of three kinds: procedural standards, substantive standards, and minimum 
standards.  
Procedural standards regarding the prompt publication of "laws, regulations, judicial 
decisions and administrative rulings" and the impartial and uniform administration of laws 
have been included in the GATT from the outset
1142
 and are now an integral part of 
virtually every field of trade law; they are particularly prominent in the trade remedy field. 
Apart from the objective of ensuring equal treatment of foreign traders, the use of 
procedural standards has been inspired by ideals derived from administrative law
1143
 and, 
more recently, narratives of "good governance".
1144
   
                                                 
1139
 Hudec 2003, 187; Hudec cites Articles 2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement and Article 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement as examples of provisions embodying this goal.  
1140
 SPS Agreement, fn 3 to Article 5.6.  
1141
 Due to limited space, I can only provide an extremely brief overview of regulating techniques. 
1142
 GATT, Article X.  
1143
 See Stewart/Sanchez-Badin 2011.  
1144
 See, with respect to GATS Article VI, Sauvé/Stern 2000, 14; Feketekuty 2000.  
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The attempt to harmonise domestic regulation through substantive standards is of 
more recent provenance, and substantive standards remain relatively rare in trade law.
1145
 
Participants in trade lawmaking increasingly perceived the need to address the trade effects 
of “regulatory heterogeneity”1146 when the significance of border measures as barriers to 
trade had diminished in the 1960s and 1970s.
1147
 The primary example for the use of this 
technique in trade law is the obligation to base technical regulations and SPS measures on 
relevant international standards.
1148
 The narrative supporting efforts to establish substantive 
standards in trade law sees the gradual "harmonisation" of domestic regulation of WTO 
members as a goal for the trade regime.
1149
 
The use of minimum standards, as embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, is a closely 
related technique. The key difference between substantive standards and minimum 
standards is that, in the case of the latter, WTO members are free to "implement in their law 
more extensive protection than is required by" the agreement.
1150
 In the SPS and TBT 
Agreements, by contrast, the possibility to implement measures that seek to attain a higher 
level of protection than international standards is heavily circumscribed.  
In the wake of the Uruguay Round, in which regulating techniques were used on a 
broader scale than ever before, trade negotiators set their sights on other subject matters 
which could be addressed through these techniques, in particular trade facilitation, 
transparency in government procurement, investment, and competition. While negotiations 
on the latter three of the so-called Singapore Issues were ultimately discontinued due to the 
resistance of the developing countries, the post-Uruguay Round enthusiasm for regulating 
techniques illustrates how the negotiators' technical repertoire affects their sense for the 
possibilities of trade law.   
                                                 
1145
 See Lang 2011, 284: "establishing regulatory standards was (and remains) highly unusual in the context of 
international trade negotiations"; Lang analyses the example of regulatory standards in basic 
telecommunications.  
1146
 Sykes 1999, 49; Sykes distinguishes harmonisation from other ways in which regulation can be 
constrained in order to limit their trade effects, namely "non-discrimination requirements" (levelling 
technique), "least restrictive means requirements" (minimising technique), and "notice and transparency 
requirements" (procedural standards), and "mutual recognition"; ibid. 50. 
1147
 See MIN(73)W/2, para. 53, where the Tokyo Round Preparatory Committee identifies harmonisation as 
an alternative to the elimination or reduction of measures such as "sanitary and administrative regulations of 
all kinds".  
1148
 See TBT Agreement, Article 2.4; SPS Agreement, Article 3; for discussion, see Howse 2011.    
1149
 For example, the Preamble of the SPS Agreement expresses WTO members' desire to "further the use of 
harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures between Members", and Article 3 is entitled 
"Harmonization".  
1150
 TRIPS Agreement, Article 1.1. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was twofold. On one hand, I have sought to compile an 
inventory of the narratives and techniques of trade lawmaking, in order to give a sense of 
the range of the technical repertoire that trade negotiators have developed. On the other 
hand, I have also attempted to substantiate three more specific claims. First, I have argued 
that the objectives of trade lawmaking have always been contested in fundamental ways. 
The perennial conflict between the liberalisation and stability narratives, which is also at 
the forefront of current disagreements in the Doha Round, is the foremost example of this 
contestation. In this respect, the chapter adds support and detail to the more general 
discussion of the historical significance and teleology of the trading system in Chapter 1.  
A second claim that I have advanced is that what trade law can achieve is 
circumscribed by the techniques that negotiators have available. The contrasting fortunes of 
managing and regulating techniques over the past three decades are perhaps the prime 
exhibit for that claim. The failure of virtually all commodity agreements has left many trade 
officials with a sense that there is little that trade law can do to deal directly with 
international commodity problems. The difficulties that the trade regime has had in 
accommodating developing countries' demands for a greater international effort to promote 
structural adjustment in the developed countries can also partly be explained by the lack of 
straightforward techniques for addressing this complex issue.
1151
 At the same time, the 
addition of a number of regulating techniques to their repertoire has made trade lawmakers 
more confident that trade law is equipped to deal with issues that reach deeply into 
domestic regulatory policy, such as qualification requirements and procedures,
1152
 or 
competition disciplines.  
Finally, I have argued that techniques frame the way in which a particular issue is 
perceived, and have drawn attention to three specific risks in this regard. Thus, levelling 
techniques, and in particular the use of benchmarks, can lead to a one-dimensional, partial 
perspective on a subject matter. By comparing the subsidies disciplines in the SCM 
Agreement and Agreement on Agriculture, I have attempted to reveal the limitations of 
different strategies for avoiding this one-dimensionality of benchmarks. Thus, the layering 
of benchmarks in the SCM Agreement leads to incoherent results, whereas the strategy of 
                                                 
1151
 See the discussion supra at fn 592 and infra at fn 1223.   
1152
 See GATS, Article VI.  
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defining policy-specific criteria in the Agreement on Agriculture, while allowing greater 
sensitivity to the many dimensions of agricultural policies, is necessarily of a limited scope, 
which means that any policies that are not specifically addressed are subject to a default 
rule.  
I have discussed the second risk, of entrenchment, in the context of the use of 
schedule. I have suggested that the tool of the schedule has such a strong affinity with 
progressive liberalisation and reduction techniques that the mere fact that a commitment 
has once been expressed in the form of a quantity in a schedule will be strongly suggestive 
of how negotiators will approach the issue in question in subsequent negotiations. 
Finally, I have discussed the risk of abstraction in the context of modalities. I have 
argued that, while modalities increase the intelligibility of reduction commitments at the 
aggregate level, they have the effect of decoupling trade negotiations from concrete trade 
problems, with the result the negotiations increasingly revolve around features of, and 
problems produced by, the technique that is being employed rather than the substance of 
the issue that they are purportedly addressing.    
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Chapter 4: The Use of Law 
In his article “The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence”, Robert Hudec 
explores “one of the more striking puzzles” of the early trade regime: the contrast between 
the “style” in which the GATT was drafted and “the manner in which the GATT 
Contracting Parties ha[d] gone about enforcing it”.1153 In its “substantive provisions”, 
Hudec notes, the GATT “resemble[s] a tax code”: “a long, complex and carefully drafted 
instrument which is on the whole fairly rigorous in its demands”.1154 The dispute settlement 
provisions, by contrast, “seem[ed] to make no functional distinction between breach of 
legal obligations and other grievances”; “[l]egal decisions rendered” under these provisions 
“often [left] it unclear whether there ha[d] even been a legal ruling at all”.1155 
Hudec's puzzle provides a useful entry point into the analysis of the role that “law” 
plays in multilateral trade lawmaking, because the contrast between the rigidity and 
“lawyerlike precision”1156 of the GATT's substantive obligations, on one hand, and the 
pragmatic, flexible, and compromise-oriented manner in which they were applied, on the 
other hand, brings the question of what it means to make and apply “law” into sharp relief. 
What distinguishes the “tax code”-type language of the GATT's text from the “diplomat's 
jurisprudence”? What is it that makes the diplomat's jurisprudence “puzzling for 
lawyers”?1157 And why was it that “lawyers and judges” were, for all intents and purposes, 
banned from GATT dispute resolution processes?
1158
  
While Hudec does not put it in these terms, the most plausible answer is that it is the 
diplomats' reluctance to make distinctions between legal and illegal conduct that makes 
their jurisprudence so peculiar.
1159
 Thus, Hudec notes that trade negotiators spent 
“considerable time … drafting precise and detailed provisions”1160 – precise and detailed, 
presumably, as to which conduct would count as legal and which as illegal. However, 
“these obligations had restricted use” in the diplomats' jurisprudence – when a provision 
                                                 
1153
 Hudec 1970, 615.  
1154
 Ibid.   
1155
 Ibid.  
1156
 Ibid.  
1157
 Ibid.   
1158
 Ibid. 619; see also Jackson 1967, 132. 
1159
 As will become clear further below, this discussion owes much to Luhmann's theory of law, in particular 
his conceptualization of law as the code legal/illegal; see Luhmann 1995/2004, chapter 4.  
1160
 Hudec 1970, 618. 
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came into play in a dispute, the distinction between legal and illegal conduct that it 
established was of little import, and certainly not determinative of what the report would 
say.
1161
 Presumably, it is this reluctance on the part of the diplomats to assign the values 
legal/illegal to a party's conduct that often left it “unclear whether there has even been a 
legal ruling at all”.1162 And the “lawyers and judges” presumably had to be kept out of 
dispute settlement because their inclination to distinguish between legal and illegal conduct 
manifested a “failure to understand the need for compromise” in international economic 
matters.
1163
 The hallmark of the diplomats' jurisprudence developed in the GATT, then, was 
to “suppress the law's natural instinct for final decisions”1164 – decisions, that is, which 
unequivocally classify conduct as either legal or illegal.  
From Hudec's reconstruction of the diplomat's jurisprudence, then, we can infer by 
negative implication a central aspect of what it means to make law – namely, establishing 
distinctions between legal and illegal conduct.
1165
 Starting out from this very basic 
understanding, I will in the following explore three questions related to the role of law in 
multilateral trade regulation. The first section addresses the question of why the trade 
policymakers of the postwar period decided to adopt a “code-of-laws approach”1166 to the 
problems of international trade in the first place. The very need for a "diplomat's 
jurisprudence" in the GATT would suggest that law was, at the very least, not a perfect fit 
for the issues posed by international trade in the postwar period (I). The second section 
discusses the particular kind of law that trade lawmakers have deemed suitable for the 
regulation of international trade, namely, law modelled on the private law “contract” (II). 
The third section explores how law is recursively implicated in the process of its own 
making – by stipulating procedures for the making of "valid" law, by substantively 
                                                 
1161
 Ibid. 618:  
the disputes procedures in most agreements did not even distinguish between legal claims and other 
disputes. … There was no need to separate the claims involving legal obligations, for the procedure 
in all cases was simply voluntary consultation. 
1162
 Ibid. 615.  
1163
 Ibid. 619. Hudec repeatedly mentions the fact that the GATT Secretariat did not have any lawyers.  
1164
 Ibid. 665.  
1165
 See Luhmann 1995/2004, 176/182. As I will argue below, there is another central element of what it 
means to make law, namely, establishing distinctions between law and non-law. The distinctions legal/illegal 
and law/non-law roughly correspond to Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules; see Hart 
1994. For Luhmann's discussion of Hart, see Luhmann 1995/2004, 109/130.    
1166
 Dam 1970, 13.  
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circumscribing the authority of the lawmakers, and by its formal properties and functional 
exigencies (III).  
I. Why Law? 
There are reasons to think that a “binary scheme” distinguishing between legal and illegal 
conduct – a scheme that “runs the risk of abstraction and the enforcement of a harsh 
either/or”1167 – was rather unsuitable for the post-war trade regime. As the discussion in 
previous chapters has shown, and as others have argued, there was no consensus on central 
elements of the proposed design, in particular on the privileging of price-based over 
volume-based instruments of protection and on the question of preferential treatment.
1168
 
Dealing with these issues through a “harsh either/or” would inevitably force those who find 
themselves on the “illegal” side of the equation to take refuge in exceptions, excluding 
them from the “normal” business of the trade regime.1169 As Winham has argued, “[t]he 
code approach formulated by the United States proved unacceptable to many of the original 
signatories of the GATT largely because the substance of the code was unacceptable.”1170 It 
was disagreement on substance that led some less-developed countries to prefer the “liberty 
of the jungle”1171 – i.e., no law – to the law proposed by the United States.      
For many states, the central element of the United States' design – the “outlawing” 
of virtually all non-tariff barriers to trade – was not only undesirable as a matter of policy 
preference, but was also unworkable as a matter of economic reality. As Dam has argued, 
the international monetary system of the postwar period left the majority of countries that 
did not have currency reserves with little choice but to impose trade controls whenever they 
were faced with a current account deficit.
1172
  
The predictable outcome of writing a code of law under these circumstances was 
that the reach of its rigid pronouncements would have to be whittled down through 
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 Luhmann 1995/2004, 191/193. 
1168
 See in particular Dam 1970, 13-14; Winham 1986, 30-32. Other authors downplay these disagreements; 
see Hudec 1971, 1314. Hudec "admit[s]" that doing so attributes only marginal importance to the views of the 
developing countries, which were "in fundamental disagreement about the equity of the entire structure" of 
the US-UK design; ibid. fn 36; see also Lang 2011, 196, who notes that the "embedded liberal consensus" 
relied on the marginalization of developing countries.  
1169
 See Chapter 1, section II.A.  
1170
 Winham 1986, 32; Winham includes the major European powers in this statement.  
1171
 E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 37.  
1172
 Dam 1970, 15; Dam notes that "adjustments in exchange rates were permitted, but only as a last resort".  
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exceptions, carve-outs and safeguards.
1173
 Given this prospect, why did the policymakers of 
the postwar period, and in particular US policymakers, nevertheless insist on a detailed 
code of conduct, rather than, say, a document stipulating a range of principles? Why did 
they not limit themselves to setting up an institution that could serve as a forum for 
deliberation and for consultations in case of conflicts?
1174
 The analysis of the history of 
multilateral trade lawmaking in the previous chapters suggests four closely linked answers.  
 
The “Rule of Law” 
The first answer can be found in the view that US negotiators took of the historical 
significance of the multilateral trading system. As shown in Chapter 1, US policymakers 
portrayed the interwar years as a Hobbesian state of nature, and imagined the creation of 
the ITO as part of a process of establishing the rule of law in international relations. 
Creating actual legal rules was an essential part of realizing this civilizational 
accomplishment.
1175
 Thus, lawmaking was a key element in the larger civilizational 
imagery that motivated the US push for the ITO.  
 
Moral Certainty and the Opportunity for Lock-in 
Another reason why US policymakers were comfortable with the rigidity of a legal code 
may lie in the fact that this rigidity dovetailed with the ideological clarity and moral 
certainty of the US position. There were two essential elements of this position:
1176
 What 
Hudec has called the United States' private enterprise "ideology"
1177
 accounted for its 
aversion towards volume-based instruments of protection, such as quantitative restrictions; 
and Cordell Hull's conviction that non-discriminatory trade was essential to peace explains 
the US rejection of preferential treatment.
1178
 These two elements gave US negotiators a 
clear sense of what kind of trading system they wanted, and US policymakers did not 
                                                 
1173
 Dam 1970, 14; Hudec 1971, 1311, in particular fn 28.  
1174
 As suggested by Dam 1970, 16. 
1175
 It is probably no coincidence that John Jackson, with Robert Hudec probably the scholar most immersed 
in early "GATT think", coined the famous trajectory from a power-based to a rules-based system, linking it 
explicitly to civilizational progress; see Jackson 1990, 52: 
To a large degree, the history of civilization may be described as a gradual evolution from a power 
oriented approach, in the state of nature, towards a rule oriented approach.   
1176
 Cf. Irwin/Mavroidis/Sykes 2008, 41, who cite an "Interim Report" by the US State Department setting out 
"the two major postwar commercial-policy objectives of the United States": 
(1) the greatest possible expansion of international trade on a sound and non-discriminatory basis; 
and (2) the conduct of that trade so as to give widest possible scope to private competitive enterprise. 
1177
 Hudec 1979, 206. 
1178
 See Dam 2005.  
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hesitate to use the postwar lawmaking moment to enshrine this vision in legal rules and 
thereby “lock it in” for the future. This sense of an opportunity to shape the course of 
international economic relations is clearly reflected in the first sentences of the Proposals: 
The main prize of the victory of the United Nations is a limited and temporary power to 
establish the kind of world we want to live in. 
That power is limited by what exists and by what can be agreed on. Human institutions are 
conservative; only within limits can they be moved by conscious choice. But after a great 
war some power of choice exists; it is important that the United Nations use it wisely.
1179
 
In having a very firm conception of what it meant to use this power “wisely”, the United 
States differed not only from the developing countries, who were looking for maximum 
flexibility in the use of policy instruments to pursue their development plans, but also from 
the other Western countries; faced with war-ravaged economies and potentially 
uncompetitive agricultural sectors, entangled in colonial relationships, and under the 
influence of Keynesian ideas that suggested the need to resort to a whole range of trade 
policy instruments, their positions were altogether more messy and ad hoc, and did not 
have the ideological purity of the US position. 
From this perspective, the fact that the prohibitions of quantitative restrictions and 
preferences were circumscribed by exceptions (some of which insisted upon by the United 
States itself) and were not fully enforced for decades
1180
 was of secondary importance. 
What mattered was that the United States managed to legislate its moral disapproval of 
these policy instruments into the DNA of the trading system. In a telling example of how 
law disguises authorship, what had been US principles and preferences became principles 
of “the GATT”.1181   
 
Legal Obligation as “Effective” Action 
The need to make “hard” law was also reinforced by what US negotiators saw as failed past 
attempts to rein in the state of nature in international economic relations. In their view, 
international conferences during the inter-war years, which had largely limited themselves 
to pronouncements of general principles and recommendations, had been ineffective or 
                                                 
1179
 US Proposals 1945, 1.  
1180
 Arguably, widespread resort to quantitative restrictions ended only with the comprehensive tariffication of 
quantitative restrictions in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. See Agreement on Agriculture, 
Article 4(2).    
1181
 As an illustration, see Hudec 1987, 3: "The GATT code of behavior rested in three central principles"; see 
Lang 2009, 34-36, on how law can "objectify" knowledge.  
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worse.
1182
 The ITO by contrast, was “not to be a goodwill mission occupied in merely 
passing resolutions but it was to be an organization tied to action”.1183 As discussed in 
chapter 2, the “action” in question was the reciprocal reduction and “binding” of tariffs – 
i.e., the assumption of legal commitments not raise tariffs above a specified value.  
 
Legal Commitments as Units of Payment 
A fourth reason for using the code approach was that the US's entire trade negotiations 
machinery was geared towards the negotiation of reciprocal legal commitments.
1184
 Under 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme, the US President was granted authority to 
lower US tariff rates in exchange for reciprocal action on the part of trading partners. Since 
tariffs are a legal construct and their reduction is a legal event, only action in the same 
currency, i.e., in the currency of legal commitments, could be accepted as payment. The 
very rigidity of legal commitments made them particularly suitable to serve as units of 
payment. As already noted in chapter 1, there is a mutually facilitative relationship between 
“hard” law and the conception of reciprocity as payment in the multilateral trading system. 
As will be discussed in the next section, this relationship also determines which kind of law 
serves as the model for lawmaking in the multilateral trading system.      
 
The four rationales for using law in the regulation of international trade have by and 
large retained their force over the decades of the operation of the GATT. The GATT's 
contracting parties have preferred to temper the harshness of the law on the implementation 
side,
1185
 rather than to refrain from making it in the first place. While the contracting parties 
                                                 
1182
 E/CONF.2/C.6/SR.14, 9:  
Experience between the two World Wars showed the danger of adopting resolutions at international 
conferences which lacked any provision making for their implementation. 
See also Hudec 1970, 619, and Dam 2005, 85. 
1183
 E/CONF.2/C.6/W.8, 2.  
1184
 See Hudec 1971, 1315, fn 37, on the question of "why the draftsmen used the form of legal obligation at 
all": 
The answer, I think, is that the momentum of past practice virtually forced them to accept the 
conventional form of an international agreement as a starting point. On the purely technical level, the 
United States Executive's authority to negotiate tariff reductions was tied to the formation of 
conventional agreements.  
1185
 The wide variations in the extent to which GATT law was implemented and enforced are well known. At 
a meeting of the Consultative Group of 18, one member argued that 
GATT was based on a few common sense rules and principles of fairness. Many of them had 
evolved from practices and were, though unwritten, of precise content. The GATT exerted pressure 
on governments prudently, pragmatically and without over-extending itself. The recipe for GATT's 
relative success had been one element of law, two elements of common sense and a good dose of 
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did experiment with other approaches to governing their trade relations,
1186
 they always 
made sure that the making of law remained at the centre of the GATT's activities.  
The rationales, which originally principally motivated the United States, have 
evolved and been appropriated by others, not least representatives of the GATT. While the 
idea that trade law provides a bulwark against a fallback into protectionism and anarchy 
remains a powerful theme, the “rule of law” idea has acquired the additional meaning of 
protecting the weak members of the trading system against the strong. In the 1970s, this 
argument was advanced against the so-called “management approach” to trade 
regulation.
1187
 In a discussion on “the relative merits of a rule-oriented and a management-
oriented approach to international trade relations” in the Consultative Group of 18, for 
example, one member argued that   
rules protected the smaller members of the trading community and made governmental 
interventions in the flow of goods across borders predictable; inherent in the management 
approach was the danger of unpredictable ad hoc solutions imposed by the stronger trading 
partners on the weaker ones. … the present world economic situation was characterized by 
such instability and diversity that greater reliance on management procedures was 
inevitable. However rule application and management procedures had to be clearly 
separated. Otherwise the trading community ran the risk that all aspects of commercial 
relations were dominated by considerations of power and short-term interests.
1188
 
On this view, “law was the only counterbalance to the economic and commercial influence 
of the most powerful nations.”1189  
The founding of the WTO, with its more developed dispute settlement system, has 
added substance to the view that the "rule of law" embodied in the trade regime can protect 
the weak against the strong. In particular, the new Dispute Settlement Understanding 
outlawed the use of unilateral measures to enforce trade obligations,
1190
 which had been 
                                                                                                                                                    
fairness. If the relative weight of these elements were substantially altered the result might very well 
become indigestible for governments. 
CG.18/7, para. 23.  
1186
 The agriculture and development components of the Programme for the Expansion of International Trade, 
discussed in chapter 1, are perhaps the primary example.   
1187
 The best discussion of the debate is Hudec 1971; Hudec identifies Dam as a proponent of the management 
approach, and Jackson as a proponent of the rules-based approach. Hudec has his own reasons for preferring 
the rules-based approach, which centre on the way in which law empowers those who argue in favour of trade 
liberalisation within national governments and bureaucracies and among domestic publics; see Hudec 1971, 
1315-1325; see also Hudec 1987, part II. On the empowering effects of law generally, see Lang 2009, 37-38.    
1188
 CG.18/7, para. 23.  
1189
 4SS/SR/1, 5. Chile made this argument in the context of asking for more effective dispute settlement 
procedures.  
1190
 DSU, Article 23.  
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used aggressively by the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s.
1191
 Providing “security 
and predictability” to the multilateral trading system is one of the central aims of the 
dispute settlement system, and it now sometimes appears that a commitment to a “rules-
based system” has become the one goal that the entire WTO membership can agree on.1192  
As regards the second rationale – the use of law to express and "lock in" firmly held 
moral convictions –, it remains true that those with the clearest sense of purpose argue most 
forcefully for new legal rules, and appear most comfortable with the rigid and potentially 
harsh distinctions that they imply. The United States' proposal in the Uruguay Round to 
eliminate all export subsidies, production subsidies and market access barriers in 
agriculture is a case in point.
1193
 Just as with its uncompromising stance towards 
quantitative restrictions in the GATT/ITO negotiations, the United States would plainly not 
have been able to live up to its own rhetoric. However, its proposal was not only a shrewd 
negotiating move,
1194
 it was also a proposal that made the legal regulation of agricultural 
subsidies – something that had eluded negotiators for decades – appear eminently feasible, 
even logical: prohibiting certain conduct is, after all, something that the law does rather 
well.
1195
   
Turning to the third rationale, the idea that making law is what distinguishes an 
“effective” international organisation remained central to the identity of the GATT.1196 As 
one of the GATT's Director Generals, Olivier Long, put it in a speech  
It is the hallmark of GATT as a forum that all negotiations there … are essentially practical 
and down-to-earth, directed to achieving concrete results. … I believe that it owes most to 
the fact that participants in any GATT negotiation know that they can call for support on 
their rights as signatories to a binding agreement. It is the existence of the General 
                                                 
1191
 At an event at the WTO in July 2013, former Brazilian WTO ambassador and foreign minister Celso 
Lafer emphasised that, for Brazil, the protection against Section 301 has been the most important aspect of the 
"rule of law" embodied in the WTO.   
1192
 As reflected a recent speech by the new WTO Director-General Azevedo; see Azevedo 2013:  
all Members benefit from a predictable, rules-based multilateral trading system, embodied in this 
Organization.  
1193
 See MTN.GNG/NG5/W/14. 
1194
 This is, at least, how it appeared to EC negotiators at the time; see Paemen/Bensch 1995, 106-107. 
1195
 The proposal did not completely avoid the complications of "measuring" aggregate agricultural support 
which plagued proposals to "manage" agricultural support, since it called for phasing out agricultural support 
over a 10-year period. See MTN.GNG/NG5/W/14, 2, on the proposed method for measuring support, the 
PSE.  
1196
 L/4306, 2:  
The General Agreement itself – the set of rules for international trade - … remains the essential focus 
of GATT and its activities.  
279 
 
Agreement itself that underpins the effectiveness of GATT as a forum for conciliation and 
negotiation.
1197
  
There were of course periods in GATT history during which no or little lawmaking was 
happening, and the contracting parties focused on analysing and deliberating emerging 
issues, sometimes in the framework of "work programmes". There was usually a sense, 
however, that at some point it would "become necessary … to push forward the 
implementation of the Work Program through a new round of negotiations to exchange 
contractual concessions”1198 – a point at which "further collective progress … could only be 
achieved by contractual commitments through multilateral negotiation”.1199 In other words, 
whatever else the contracting parties were doing, what ultimately mattered was that the 
results of the work were embodied in new legal commitments.  
In the 1970s, as ever more developing countries joined the GATT, the prospect of 
the GATT becoming more like the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) sent shudders down the spines of Western trade negotiators. US diplomats in 
Geneva sent anguished cables to Washington warning of the “creeping UNCTADization” 
of GATT, a development that "risk[ed] undermining the concept of the obligations of 
individual contracting parties that has been central to an efficient functioning of the 
GATT".
1200
 They pointed to the increasing participation of non-GATT developing countries 
in the activities of the GATT, to increasingly common "block-type" behaviour, i.e., the 
forming of developing country coalitions, and to a tendency to establish links between the 
activities of UNCTAD and the GATT; thus, UNCTAD resolutions would "invite" the 
GATT to engage in this or that activity. Michael Hart, a former Canadian negotiator, 
expressed the sentiment thus: 
UNCTAD's penchant for long speeches, dreary meetings, and highly negotiated political 
statements full of rhetoric and weasel words had been alien to the GATT before the 1980s. 
The decline in UNCTAD's attractiveness as a forum for political negotiations had led to a 
new fascination with GATT and the introduction to GATT meetings of UNCTAD's 
preoccupation with procedure, texts, and agenda. … The result is a Geneva or New York 
mentality that is more fascinated by gamesmanship than by genuine policy discussion, a 
mentality that began to show up at GATT meetings in the 1980s.”1201 
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 Ibid. 4.  
1198
 C/M/191, 8.   
1199
 4SS/SR/1, 13.  
1200
 Interview with Richard Steinberg.  
1201
 Hart 1995, 394, fn 16; see also Oxley 1990, 100-110.  
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These developments, of course, did not necessarily inhibit the making of law per se;
1202
 
however, they threatened to undermine the particular kind of lawmaking that had become 
established in the GATT, namely, lawmaking on the model of reciprocally negotiated 
contracts (see next section).  
The idea that "hard law" is the distinctive contribution that the trade regime makes 
to the governance of the global economy has recently been reiterated by the US in the 
context of the negotiation of an agreement on trade facilitation in the Doha Round. As the 
US Ambassador stated: 
… For there to be real benefits for all, obligations must be clear and binding.   
The value that the WTO adds to global trade is binding rules. If we don't create binding 
rules, our WTO negotiations add no value, and frankly, that type of outcome is of no interest 
to the United States. We already have a non-binding customs codes in the World Customs 
Organization. …1203 
 
Finally, as shown in chapter 1, reciprocity, and with it the indispensability of using 
legal commitments as units of payment, has remained central to multilateral trade 
lawmaking. The major attempt to govern trade relations in a different manner, namely, 
through analysis, discussion, and action in light of a common aim, was defeated precisely 
because the GATT contracting parties were unwilling to do anything of (legal) consequence 
outside the context of a reciprocal exchange of concessions.
1204
      
The continuing force of the rationales for making international trade law 
notwithstanding, there have also been doubts as to the suitability of using law to address 
some of the issues that are, or could be, the subject of international trade rules. These 
doubts have intensified in the aftermath of the unprecedented expansion of trade law in the 
Uruguay Round. Some of the criticism, discussed briefly in chapter 1, focuses on the 
association of “hard” law and reciprocity. Thus, Abbott and Snidal have argued for a “soft 
law track” in WTO lawmaking that would free states to address complex normative issues, 
such as corruption, without the concern of having to "pay" for progress in addressing these 
                                                 
1202
 In fact, there was quite a bit of law that the developing countries would have been more than happy to 
make. For example, the developing countries were pushing for the binding of preferences and international 
measures to promote structural adjustment at this time 
1203
 US TNC Statement 2013.  
1204
 See Chapter 1, section II.B.  
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issues in the currency of rigid legal requirements.
1205
 In a related vein, Finger has taken aim 
at the rigidity engendered by the generality of rules generated in a multilateral process, 
arguing that the domestic regulatory issues that are increasingly the subject of WTO rules 
would be better addressed through “country-specific and project-specific legalities”.1206  
Yet other critics have doubted the wisdom of legal disciplines that purport to 
minimize the impact of health and food safety regulation on trade.
1207
 The latter criticism 
has echoes of Dam's warning against adopting a code-of-laws approach to subject matters 
marked by fundamental value conflicts. There is a new dimension to the problem, however. 
The value conflicts Dam had in mind related to the role of the state in the economy, and 
manifested themselves, inter alia, in divergent preferences for different protective 
instruments. Since these protective instruments – principally tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions – were themselves legal creations, subjecting them to legal discipline was a 
straightforward exercise. The conflict could be unambiguously expressed in legal language 
– e.g., whether to prohibit quantitative restrictions, or not – and compromises could be 
clearly enshrined in the law too, for example by stipulating exceptions. No problems of 
“translation” posed themselves.     
When it comes to questions of health, food safety, and environmental concerns, by 
contrast, trade law takes cognizance of conflicts that play out on a different terrain, in a 
different idiom. In adjudicating these conflicts, trade lawmakers have attempted to defer to 
scientific judgments about evidence, and to democratic choices about acceptable risks
1208
 – 
in other words, they have tried to “couple” the legal system with its scientific and political 
environment. As I will argue more extensively later in this chapter, this kind of coupling 
has been perceived as problematic when the environment does not generate any easily 
observable metric onto which the legal system can map its legal/illegal distinction. In the 
absence of such a metric, the legal system has to rely on proxies, often of a procedural kind, 
to apply its distinction.
1209
  
                                                 
1205
 Abbott/Snidal 2002, 201; see supra text at fn 160.  
1206
 Finger 2005, 38; see supra text at fn 163.  
1207
 In particular, through the SPS Agreement; for a recent discussion (and rebuttal) of academic criticism of 
the SPS Agreement, see Rigod 2013.   
1208
 See Lang 2011, 251, describing "the primary innovation of the SPS Agreement" as its "turn to scientific 
expertise as an arbiter of the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate domestic regulation."  
1209
 See Lang/Cooney 2007.  
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The long-standing criticism of anti-dumping and countervailing duty law can be 
understood through the same lens. Here, the law purports to track economic efficiency. 
However, as Tarullo and many others have shown, judgments about economic efficiency 
confront a number of practically insurmountable conceptual and empirical problems.
1210
 
The law hence relies on a number of intuitive proxies – e.g., countervailing duties can be 
imposed to the amount of the subsidy – that make little sense from an economic 
perspective.
1211
  
Arguably, it is the imperfection, not to say crudeness, of structural coupling that has 
engendered much of the dissatisfaction with trade law at the intersection with science and 
in the trade remedy context, and has caused some to call for its abolition.
1212
   
 
II. What Kind of Law? 
While there is an old debate in international law on whether international treaties should be 
conceptualised on the model of private law contracts,
1213
 the analogy was enthusiastically 
embraced by the “contracting parties” of the GATT. Initially, this reflected the need to 
portray the GATT as a “trade agreement” rather than an international organisation, to 
ensure that its negotiation and adoption was covered by the US president's authority under 
the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. It was for this reason that the participants in the 
GATT were not called “members”, but “contracting parties”, which would be capitalised 
when the “CONTRACTING PARTIES” took any official decisions.1214 As Hudec puts it 
rather dramatically, the  
                                                 
1210
 Tarullo 1987, 556.  
1211
 Imposing countervailing duties to the ad-valorem value of the subsidy will under virtually all 
circumstances "overcompensate" the domestic industry. An alternative model for calculating countervailing 
duties is the "entitlement approach", which limits itself to insulating the domestic industry from the effects of 
the subsidy. For a critique of countervailing duties in general and the entitlement approach in particular, see 
Sykes 1990.    
1212
 See only Voon 2010.  
1213
 See Lauterpacht 1927. As Lauterpacht puts it, the core of the question is whether using private law as a 
model for international law reflects  
the practice of States and the nature of international relations, or a regrettable lack of originality on 
the part of international lawyers who, unable to grasp the special and quite peculiar character of 
international relations, proceed to mould them after the private law pattern? (ibid. 6)  
1214
 See GATT Analytical Index, 874, and Jackson 1967, 132, fn 5.  
283 
 
spelling of the name in capitals was to be the sole indication of a collective entity. Every 
other hint of organizational existence was ruthlessly hunted down and exterminated.
1215
  
 
Over time, the conception of GATT as a contract became an article of faith.
1216
 The 
GATT's Director-General Olivier Long began a speech at the United Nations in the mid-
1970s thus: 
Let me begin by stressing that GATT is above all a contract. It is a legal instrument; a 
multilateral agreement into which all its member governments have entered voluntarily.  
This contractual character of GATT is central to it. It colours its nature and the way it 
functions. GATT cannot be properly understood or assessed unless the fact of the contract is 
kept constantly in mind. … The existence of the GATT contract – the network of specific 
legal rights and mutual obligations – remains the characteristic that most distinguishes 
membership of GATT.
1217
 
 
In practice, the contract conception of the GATT has served three principal 
purposes. The conception has been invoked, first, to resist changes to the GATT outside the 
context of reciprocal bargains, and, second, to exclude subject matters from its purview that 
would be unsuitable for such bargains. Third, the contract conception has served more 
broadly to legitimise the pursuit of narrow self-interest in trade negotiations, by 
assimilating the “contracting parties” to economic actors in pursuit of individual gain, 
oblivious to any larger common purpose.  
Examples of the first use of the contract conception are particularly prominent in 
discussions in the Consultative Group of 18 concerning the Brazilian proposal for a 
“framework” group to consider the trade relationships between developed and developing 
countries during the Tokyo Round negotiations. In relation to the proposal, other members 
expressed apprehension that, if  
                                                 
1215
 Hudec 1975, 46; see also Jackson 1967, 132, fn. 5, who notes that this decision was made "in order to 
remove any connotation of formal organization".   
1216
 It was even reaffirmed by the Appellate Body in Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 15:  
The WTO Agreement is a treaty – the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that in 
an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of their own respective national interests, the 
Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive as 
Members of the WTO, they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to the commitments 
they have made in the WTO Agreement.    
It is probably no coincidence that Julio Lacarte-Muró, the most seasoned trade negotiator of the GATT era, 
was the presiding member of the Appellate Body division deciding this appeal. See already E/PC/T/A/PV/22, 
18, and MTN.GNG/NG14/17, para. 18, where the GATT is described as "a collective contract". 
1217
 L/4306, 1 and 6.  
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the reform activities of the [framework] group were to extend beyond that date [on which 
the Tokyo Round was supposed to be concluded], a situation could be created in which 
attempts would be made to obtain additional benefits after the negotiations proper were 
completed and this prospect would tend to disrupt working relationships and the scope of 
concessions within the negotiations.
1218
 
In this regard, it was noted that “changing one article of a contract such as the General 
Agreement necessarily put into question other elements or articles of the contract.”1219 At 
the next meeting of the Group, the same point was made again: 
Several members drew attention to the fact that the General Agreement in its present form 
represented a balance of rights and obligations. Proposals for reform in one area, however 
limited they might be, necessarily affected the balance as a whole as perceived by 
contracting parties individually as well as collectively. One of the group's aims should 
therefore be to keep this notion of balance in view when considering individual changes. 
The need for such a global approach in the work of a framework group was also reinforced 
by the unique contractual character of the General Agreement …1220 
 
The contract conception has also been employed to delimit the scope of what can 
properly be the subject of GATT/WTO law. Olivier Long's above-quoted speech was made 
to an Ad Hoc Committee on Restructuring of the Economic and Social Sectors of the 
United Nations System.
1221
 The speech was marked by a barely disguised desire to keep the 
objectives and methods of the institutions working on trade-related issues in the UN system 
at a healthy distance from the GATT, and Long's principal tool in this endeavour was to 
emphasise the contractual character of the GATT. This technique was continued by his 
successor, Arthur Dunkel, who, at a meeting of the Consultative Group of 18, invoked the 
contract conception of the GATT to delimit the GATT's competence vis-à-vis other 
international bodies, in particular UNCTAD, by noting that 
it would be important to bear in mind the contractual nature of the GATT and the strict 
limitation of GATT's competence to those international trade questions which could be 
embodied in legal undertakings by governments.
1222
 
 
Structural adjustment, i.e., assisting workers in moving out of uncompetitive 
industries, was not one of those trade questions, at least in the view of developed country 
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 CG.18/2, para. 26. 
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 CG.18/2, para. 26.  
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 CG.18/3, para 29. 
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 L/4306. 
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 CG.18/15, para. 8.  
285 
 
delegates. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, developing countries realized that they would 
only be able to convince developed countries to remove barriers to trade in sectors in which 
the developing countries were gaining market share if the political pressure on developed 
country governments to maintain those barriers eased. The developing countries thus 
started to advocate a greater role for the GATT in pressuring developed countries to retrain 
workers in those industries so that they could move up the value chain.
1223
 This effort never 
came to fruition; one of the arguments against it was "that the final aim of all GATT 
negotiations was to arrive at contractual undertakings" and that "it was difficult to see how 
this aim could be reached in the context of positive adjustment measures.”1224 
It is not hard to understand what made it "difficult" for some countries to envision 
legal obligations regarding adjustment assistance. Adjustment assistance implicated 
potentially sensitive issues of public policy – aspects of a state's welfare system, such as 
employment insurance and education, as well as industrial policy and, more generally, the 
role of the state in business and in its citizens' lives.
1225
 Moreover, given the diversity of 
domestic political systems
1226
 and the array of tools necessary for successful structural 
adjustment, there was no easily observable metric which could be used as a basis for 
constructing international legal obligations – one of the reasons for unease with the use of 
law identified above. Furthermore, structural adjustment is a complex and protracted 
process; it is not something that a government can legislate into existence on a whim.
1227
 
Another reason is suggested by the objection that obligations regarding structural 
adjustment could not take the form of "contractual ", as opposed to more generally "legal", 
undertakings. It was clear to all involved in the discussion that obligations regarding 
structural adjustment would, in effect if not in form, have been one-sided obligations: It 
was the developed countries that would be asked to move up the value chain, not the 
developing countries.
1228
 The lack of reciprocity ran counter to the idea of a contract.  
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 See CG.18/11, para. 24 and CG.18/W/39; see also supra text at fn 592.  
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 CG.18/11, para. 24.  
1225
 See CG.18/11, paras. 21-22; and CG.18/12, paras. 10, 12. 
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 See CG.18/11, para. 17. 
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 See CG.18/11, para. 18:  
[One] member said that the idea that a government could predict the future of industries and then 
restructure them accordingly was certainly tempting. But in his view this required a foreknowledge 
and powers of intervention that at least his authorities did not possess.  
See however ibid. para. 20.  
1228
 See CG.18/11, para. 19 for the debate on this issue. The view of the developing countries was that "[t]he 
issue should be seen primarily against the background of the industrialization of the developing countries and 
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Whatever the reason why some contracting parties deemed structural adjustment 
unfit for "contractual undertakings", the important point here is that, for them, "unfit for 
contractual undertakings" meant "unfit for the GATT". Something that could not be made 
the subject of a contract was not within GATT's purview, however germane it might 
otherwise be to the development of the trading system.    
The link between the idea of GATT as a contract, the concept of reciprocity, and the 
scope of what was deemed an appropriate subject matter for the GATT is brought into even 
sharper relief by another example: the question of trade preferences in favour of developing 
countries. As discussed above, the possibility of using legal commitments as units of 
payment was one of the reasons why the US and others choose the code-of-laws approach 
to trade regulation: Law was chosen to facilitate payments. The link also cut the other way, 
however: Only when a country that paid for a concession was it entitled to that concession 
as a matter of law; and only law was an appropriate subject matter for the GATT.  
Trade preferences in favour of developing countries violated two principles of the 
GATT: the principle of non-discrimination, and the principle of reciprocity. The first 
conflict was addressed through waivers – first temporary, then permanent – of the MFN 
obligation. The second conflict was "solved" by excluding the granting of preferences from 
the scope of GATT negotiations, and the granted preferences from the scope of GATT law. 
During the Tokyo Round – the first negotiating round subsequent to the granting of the 
MFN waiver – developing countries attempted to negotiate the "binding" of preferential 
rates and/or preference margins in GATT schedules; these attempts were rebuffed with the 
reminder that preferences granted under the General System of Preferences were “unilateral 
and non-contractual”1229 – in other words: since they were not "paid for", preferences were 
not subject to the GATT contract, and hence also not an appropriate subject for the 
multilateral lawmaking process in the GATT.
1230
  
Proponents of the contract conception of the GATT were always particularly 
disturbed by proposals that would have reduced the control of the contracting parties over 
                                                                                                                                                    
the complementary structural adjustments required in the developed countries". See also ibid. 20: "The task 
the international community was facing now was to deliberately accelerate the adjustment process in the 
developed countries for the benefit of the newly industrializing nations."  See further CG.18/12, para. 8. 
1229
 MIN/TAR/W/23, 2; see also MTN.GNG/NG1/W/6, 1, where Brazil describes preference schemes as 
"non-contractual". 
1230
 See also MIN(73)W/2, para. 34; the proposal has recently been revived in the academic literature; see 
Bartels/Häberli 2010.  
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the GATT Secretariat's activities, and would have imbued the work of the GATT with a 
larger collective purpose. The Jamaican proposal regarding adjustment assistance would 
have had this effect; it envisaged that  
the GATT secretariat establish a list of sectors which had become or were likely to become 
sensitive to changes in the pattern of world trade, that information on governmental 
measures to facilitate structural adjustments in these sectors be collected, and that 
recommendations with regard to the sensitive sectors and the governmental adjustment 
measures be made.
1231
  
One of the reactions to this proposal was that "[i]t was preferable to solve trade problems 
through general rules"; "specific policy recommendations by the GATT" might "call into 
question" a country's "legitimate resort to the GATT safeguard provisions".
1232
 Essentially, 
this was an argument that countries should be free to act within their contractual rights and 
should not be constrained by any larger public policy pursued by the GATT membership.  
In the Uruguay Round, proposals to "strengthen the analytical capacity of GATT" 
provoked nervous questions about whether this "implied a change in the contractual nature 
of the GATT, and whether there was any link in this context with proposals to establish a 
World Trade Organization”.1233 The Trade Policy Review Mechanism established during 
the Uruguay Round, which subjects WTO Members' trade policies to collective 
examination and confrontation, has indeed been described as a “a small step towards 
making individual members responsible to a greater collectivity” and “as a subtle change 
from GATT as a contract between individual signatories towards GATT as an international 
institution.”1234 Even after the constraints on the institutionalisation of the trade regime had 
been overcome with the establishment of the WTO, however, many participants in trade 
lawmaking and WTO officials have continued to view the WTO primarily as a “contract 
organization”, i.e.  
a 'Member-driven' institution that facilitates the negotiations of trade agreements (the 
'contracts'), helps oversee implementation or the resulting contractual commitments, and, 
where requested, issues judicial decision over these commitments.
1235
  
                                                 
1231
 CG.18/11, para. 24, referring to CG.18/W/39. 
1232
 CG.18/12, para. 12.  
1233
 MTN.GNG/NG14/17, 9, para. 27. 
1234
 Winham 1990, 802. 
1235
 Shaffer 2005, 248.  
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Shaffer has noted that “[m]any developing countries would like to have the WTO mandate 
explicitly include 'development' issues, but developed countries prefer to keep it narrow, 
focusing on the 'rules' of a 'contract' organization.”1236 As Andrew Lang has put it,  
[l]aw is … imagined as protecting the pursuit of individual projects, arbitrating between 
different individual projects, and providing an institutional space for the fulfilment of those 
projects.
1237
 
 
In one important respect, the WTO is less of a "contract organization" than the 
GATT was: as discussed in chapter 2, a subset of WTO members can no longer use the 
WTO framework as a forum for the conclusion of contracts among themselves without 
sanction by the entire WTO membership. Rather, new plurilateral agreements can only be 
added to Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement with the consensus of all WTO members.
1238
 In 
this respect, then, the WTO is more akin to a legislative body, since the entire membership 
determines when new legal rules can be made. This differs markedly from the GATT, 
where the membership at large only had the relatively crude sanction of preventing the 
secretariat from servicing any agreements concluded among a subset of the contracting 
parties, and the Trade Negotiations Committee "could not prevent a number of countries 
from entering into an agreement if they wished to, unless the provisions of the agreement 
were contrary to the GATT.”1239 
Another legal element of the GATT that reinforced the conception of it as "bundles 
of bilateral 'contracts'"
1240
 was preserved in the WTO, however: the non-application 
clause.
1241
 The idea behind the non-application clause was that no GATT contracting party 
should be forced  to apply the GATT to another party "without its consent" – a possibility 
that arose because of the two-thirds majority decision-making rule for accessions to the 
                                                 
1236
 Shaffer 2005, 268, fn 106. 
1237
 Lang 2011, 246. I should note that Lang makes this comment in the context of his discussion of the 
perspective assumed by the dispute settlement organs, and views this attitude towards law as a relatively 
recent development (I have omitted a "now" from the above quote). I would argue that, while this attitude 
may have only recently manifested itself in the dispute settlement process, it has been characteristic of 
lawmaking throughout the history of the multilateral trade regime.  
1238
 WTO Agreement, Article X.9  ("exclusively by consensus"). 
1239
 MTN/P/5, para. 14; as discussed in chapter 2, this was the view that prevailed by default.  
1240
 This formulation is borrowed from Pauwelyn 2003, 939.  
1241
 See GATT Article XXXV. Some of the Tokyo Round Codes contained non-application clauses as well; 
see Tokyo Round Subsidies Code, Article 19.9; Tokyo Round Government Procurement Code Article IX.9. 
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GATT.
1242
 While the practical significance of the non-application clause is much 
diminished by the practice of deciding on accessions by consensus, giving all WTO 
Members the ability to block accessions, some WTO Members have chosen the option of 
invoking the clause rather than blocking a country's accession altogether.
1243
  
The legal implications of the contract conception of GATT obligations have been 
explored at length elsewhere.
1244
 I want to highlight two more subtle ways in which the 
contract conception affects multilateral trade lawmaking. First, by analogising lawmaking 
in the trading system to negotiations among private commercial actors in the marketplace, 
the contract conception legitimises the pursuit of narrow self-interest in trade negotiations. 
When individuals or companies act as private commercial actors, they are not expected to 
concern themselves with anything but their own advantage.
1245
 The contract conception of 
trade law arguably does its part in diminishing such expectations in trade negotiations as 
well.  
Second, the contract conception makes it more difficult to change rules of trade law 
that are not or no longer desirable, and thus makes it more difficult to experiment with trade 
law. If trade law was adopted in pursuit of a common goal, it would be logical to change it 
when it proves ineffective in achieving that goal, or when it proves to be otherwise 
inequitable. Under the contract conception, however, any change to the rights acquired as a 
result of trade negotiations entitles the parties who benefit from these rights to 
compensation in order to maintain the initial “balance” of concessions. The idea that states 
have “paid” for these rights makes it more difficult to revise rules that have proved 
ineffective, unfair or have turned out to benefit only a minority of states.
1246
  
It is not the case that the GATT contracting parties never contemplated fashioning 
their law on models other than the contract. I have already noted that the adoption of the 
ITO Charter might have given the multilateral trade regime the character of a more "public" 
institution pursuing a wider range of substantive policy goals more independently of the 
                                                 
1242
 The non-application clause was introduced when the decision-making rule for accessions was changed 
from consensus to two-thirds majority; see supra fn 723 and GATT Analytical Index, 1037-1038.  
1243
 WTO Analytical Index, 57. Of nine invocations, six have been withdrawn, while three are still in force.  
1244
 See Pauwelyn 2003.  
1245
 At the same time, individuals confront such expectations in other roles: as citizens of a state, as members 
of a society, community, family etc.  
1246
 For example, only a small minority of WTO Members are net-beneficiaries of the TRIPS Agreement.  
290 
 
immediate self-interests of its individual members.
1247
 In later decades, while the UNCTAD 
served more as a cautionary tale, the OECD was occasionally brought into play as a 
potentially attractive model for the GATT. In fact, a number of topics that were taken up in 
GATT lawmaking had been first discussed and analysed in the OECD, and the OECD 
served as the main inspiration for the "management" approach to trade problems that found 
strong advocates in the 1970s.
1248
 References to this model were creeping up in GATT 
discussions in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, while the Working Group drafting the text of 
what would become the Tokyo Round Standards Code adopted the "working hypothes[is]" 
that the result "could take the form of a contractual code", some delegations preferred to 
keep the options open, emphasizing that "the draft could also serve as a basis for other 
types of approach, such as a voluntary code, a set of principles, etc., if one of these 
solutions were preferred.”1249 In the early stages of the Uruguay Round, Brazil noted the 
possibility that a multilateral agreement on services could be "of a simple exhortatory 
character, as those existing in an OECD context, or of a more contractual character, as is 
the case in GATT".
1250
 Finally, Abbott's and Snidal's critique of the inability of WTO 
lawmaking to address complex normative issues was inspired by a comparison with how 
the OECD had dealt with the same issue, corruption.
1251
  
Academic commentators have for some time also advocated yet another model for 
the law of the multilateral trading system: that of a "constitution".
1252
 Some of the 
rationales identified above for using law in the regulation of international trade do indeed 
seem to call for this model: thus, the "rule of law" in international economic relations 
would certainly be more firmly established by a "constitutional" document than by 
"bundles of bilateral 'contracts'" from which any party can withdraw after a 6-month notice 
period.
1253
 Similarly, the principle of non-discrimination and the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions would have been "locked-in" more comprehensively by a document that did not 
                                                 
1247
 See chapter 1. For the distinction between "private" and "public" institutions in the context of procedures 
for dispute settlement, see Abbott 1992a and 1992b.   
1248
 See Hudec 1971.  
1249
 MTN/NTM/W/5, 6, para. 6. 
1250
 MTN.GNS/W/3, para. 41; Brazil's point was that, in any case, the agreement would have to be arrived at 
by consensus. 
1251
 Abbott/Snidal 2002. 
1252
 See Cass 2005 for an overview.  
1253
 See GATT Article XXXI and WTO Agreement Article XV. Most contracting parties to the GATT applied 
it pursuant to the Protocol of Provisional Application, under which the notice period was reduced to 60 days; 
Protocol of Provisional Application, para. 6.   
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give the parties to it the option not to apply them towards a newly acceding party, and that 
withheld from its adherents acting collectively the power to waive even these fundamental 
obligations. The potential attractions of the constitutional model notwithstanding, however, 
there is no indication that the participants in multilateral trade lawmaking ever considered 
this model as a desirable option. As Dunoff has persuasively argued, "neither WTO texts 
nor practice" support the conception of the WTO as a constitutional entity.
1254
 By the 
constitutionalists' own standards – Jackson's famous distinction between “power oriented” 
and “rule oriented” approaches, for example –, GATT/WTO lawmaking arguably finds 
itself squarely in the first category. Jackson has acknowledged  
the extent to which GATT reflects bargaining power. GATT has been termed a 'negotiating' 
institution, 'pragmatic and flexible.' But negotiation implies 'swap,' which implies that he 
who has most to 'swap' will likely receive the most.
1255
 
Jackson contrasts this to what would supposedly be a more “constitutional” approach, 
namely one based on “fixed rules and principles based upon a rational appraisal of 
beneficial policy, where bargaining power should (ideally) be less relevant”.1256  
 
III. How Is Law Recursively Implicated In Its Own Making? 
The previous two sections have examined the rationales for choosing law to regulate 
international trade, as well as the particular kind of law that has served as a model for the 
law made in the multilateral trading system. The present section will explore the question 
of how law shapes the process of its own making.  
This is not a question that has received much attention in the academic literature, 
and authors who have investigated the role of law in trade negotiations have tended to 
conceptualise it in exceedingly narrow terms. Busch and Reinhardt, for example, have used 
the phrase “bargaining in the shadow of law” to refer to negotiations in the consultation 
phase of dispute settlement proceedings.
1257
 In their analysis, the “shadow of law” is 
equated with the prospect of adjudication: if the negotiations fail, the dispute will advance 
to the panel stage. The negotiation of mutually agreed solutions can also occur after the 
                                                 
1254
 Dunoff 2006, 648.  
1255
 Jackson 1969, 669. 
1256
 Ibid. 
1257
 Busch/Reinhardt 2000. 
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conclusion of dispute settlement proceedings, where it takes place under a similar "shadow 
of law", i.e., the threat of further adjudication in the form of compliance proceedings).  
Actual or potential adjudication can also affect negotiations that are not part of 
dispute settlement proceedings themselves: by interpreting WTO law, the Appellate Body 
can change what the participants in lawmaking perceive as the legal status quo, and can 
thereby affect the bargaining position of the participants: according to the reciprocity logic 
governing WTO lawmaking, a member would have to pay with concessions on other issues 
to have its preferred interpretation of a provision restored by making that interpretation 
more explicit.
1258
 An example of this constellation is the Appellate Body jurisprudence on 
the prohibition of "zeroing" in the calculation of anti-dumping duties, which the US would 
have to “pay” dearly to change (through an authoritative interpretation or an amendment of 
the Anti-Dumping Agreement).
1259
 The interpretations of the dispute settlement organs can 
also make negotiating positions unsustainable, as the US experienced in the negotiations on 
cotton subsidies, which were simultaneously litigated by Brazil.
1260
 The impact of law as 
adjudication on WTO lawmaking is hence relatively straightforward: the possibility of 
reaching a desired outcome through dispute settlement enhances the bargaining position of 
the advantaged member by making its desired outcome the default situation. Conceptually, 
the impact of law as adjudication on the lawmaking process is thus not different from the 
way in which the legal status quo generally shapes the lawmaking process. 
Another sense in which the “shadow of law” has been understood is as the impact of 
procedural rules. In his article on decision-making under the GATT and WTO, Richard 
Steinberg has distinguished bargaining in the “shadow of law”, in which rules of procedure 
based on the sovereign equality of states are fully respected, from bargaining in the 
“shadow of power”, when powerful states use coercive methods to achieve their desired 
outcomes.
1261
 According to Steinberg, in the GATT/WTO context the procedural rules 
derived from the legal concept of sovereign equality serve important information-gathering 
and legitimising functions for powerful states without substantially affecting the outcome 
                                                 
1258
 On the strategic use of litigation in the Uruguay Round, see Nordgreen 1991. On the effects of Appellate 
Body decision on negotiating dynamics, see also Tarullo 2002, 165-179; and Stoler 2004.  
1259
 Interview with Jane Bradley.  
1260
 Interview with Joseph Glauber; according to Glauber, the position that the United States had taken in 
Cancún in response to the demands of the Cotton-4 was abandoned because it became untenable in light of 
the findings of the Panel and Appellate Body in the US-Upland Cotton dispute. 
1261
 Steinberg 2002. 
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of the lawmaking process, which is determined by the constellation of interests among the 
most powerful states.  
According to these accounts, then, the role of law in WTO negotiations is fairly 
limited. Law is either a bargaining chip in the form of the threat of adjudication, or appears 
in the form of procedural rights that can be disregarded at key moments. In the present 
section, I will paint a more complicated picture of the ways in which law is implicated in its 
own making. I start from the intuition that although law becomes formally binding only in 
the moment when it is adopted and ratified, the fact that one is making law must exert some 
kind of structuring influence on the process of its making. In other words, those who make 
law inevitably operate under some conception of what it means to make law. In this section, 
I will consider four elements of this conception: procedures for making valid law, 
substantive limitations on the authority to make law, the form of law, and the function of 
law.    
A. Procedural Rules 
In Steinberg's account of lawmaking in the multilateral trading system, procedural rules, 
such as the consensus principle, have some impact at the early stages of a negotiating 
rounds, but lose significance towards the end of the round, unless a powerful external force 
compels the major powers to continue to pay heed to them.
1262
 This account raises the 
question of how the major powers can create law without following the rules for making 
valid law? Who or what says whether something is valid law?  
One answer is that law stipulates the conditions of its own validity: 
At least since the advent of legal positivism, law has been cast as an institution, regime, or 
system that exists only as an effect of self-description; that is, law comes into being 
paradoxically, as an effect of the identification of certain enunciations or transactions as 
`legal' by reference to a criterion that is posited by those enunciations or transactions 
themselves.
1263
 
One way in which law is implicated in its own making, then, is by stipulating the 
conditions for its own existence. Both the GATT and the WTO Agreement stipulate the 
                                                 
1262
 On Steinberg's account, in the Tokyo Round this external force were the foreign policy imperatives of the 
Cold War; they compelled the developed countries to implement the Tokyo Round codes on an MFN basis; 
see also supra text at fn 803. Note that Steinberg's argument is based on a very small sample of two 
negotiating rounds, one of which does not actually support his argument.  
1263
 Pottage 2012, 173. 
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time and circumstances of their own "entry into force".
1264
 At the same time, they also 
circumscribe the conditions of validity for subsequent law, through procedural rules 
regarding decision-making, waivers, authoritative interpretations and amendments.
1265
 
These procedural rules unravel the paradox of law's self-referentiality in time: adopted at 
one point in time, they stipulate what shall be considered valid law at a later point in 
time.
1266
  
What is the impact of these kinds of rules in multilateral trade lawmaking? It is 
clear that relatively little law has been made in the trading system pursuant to these rules. 
While the power to waive obligations has been used with some regularity,
1267
 the GATT 
has only been successfully amended on two occasions since the early 1950s,
1268
 and the 
only attempt so far to amend one of the WTO agreements remains in limbo.
1269
 The 
problem was recognised during the GATT era, and discussed in forums such as the 
Consultative Group of 18, where members acknowledged 
that there was a need for more flexible rule adjustment procedures both under GATT and 
the codes negotiated under the auspices of GATT. In many instances the non-observance of 
GATT rules was not due to lack of willingness to co-operate but rather due to the fact that 
the rules were no longer realistic and appropriate in the present circumstances. For the sake 
of preserving the integrity of the General Agreement and the supplementary codes, flexible 
rule amendment procedures should be agreed.
1270
  
 
To some extent, the GATT contracting parties simply ignored the rules – thus, 
during the GATT years a series of certifications of rectifications and modifications of 
schedules which would have derived their legal force from an amendment that failed to 
attract the necessary unanimous acceptance, "were generally treated by contracting parties 
as if they were in effect".
1271
 More importantly, however, subsets of contracting parties 
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 GATT, Article XXVI.6; WTO Agreement, Article XIV.1.  
1265
 See GATT, Articles XXV:3 and XXX:4 (decision-making), XXV:5 (waiver power), XXX (amendments) 
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1267
 For an extensive discussion, see Feichtner 2012; for the GATT era, see GATT Analytical Index, 882-888. 
1268
 At the 1954-55 Review Session and in 1965, to add Part IV to the GATT; see GATT Analytical Index, 
1002. 
1269
 See Kennedy 2010; see also WTO Analytical Index, 49-50.  
1270
 CG.18/7, para. 23. 
1271
 GATT Analytical Index, 1006. (emphasis added) See also Jackson 1967, 141-142: 
… oddly enough … these schedule changes are treated by GATT parties as if they were in force. … 
These certifications are also treated by GATT parties as if they were in force! 
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resorted to concluding agreements that established their own validity autonomously,
1272
 
rather than deriving it from the lawmaking authority provided for in the GATT. This was at 
times criticised as circumventing the amendment provisions of the GATT,
1273
 and it 
produced a highly fragmented legal order.
1274
  
While the conclusion of such autonomous agreements was not envisaged in the 
GATT, it was not foreclosed either – as it is in the WTO framework, where the consensus 
requirement makes such agreements subject to multilateral sanction – and it was certainly 
facilitated by the contract conception of the GATT. A contract does not foreclose other 
contracts, while a constitution would normally preclude lawmaking outside of the 
framework that it sets up. A contract does not even exclude the possibility of a new contract 
replacing the original contract – again, a possibility that is rarely contemplated in 
constitutions.
1275
 
The opportunities for autonomous lawmaking alongside the GATT did not mean 
that negotiators did not consider the possibilities of lawmaking pursuant to the procedures 
envisaged in the GATT. As discussed in chapter 2, it was especially before taking the 
radical step of replacing the GATT with a new agreement that the negotiators of the Quad 
countries extensively considered the full range of options offered by the GATT, including 
various combinations of amendments (to annex new agreements to the GATT), waivers (of 
the MFN obligation in relation to those agreements), and expulsions (of those parties who 
refused to join the new agreements).
1276
 It was only in light of the realisation that 
practically insurmountable obstacles, in terms of the number of votes required, stood in the 
way of implementing the Uruguay Round results in the desired manner (i.e., with universal 
membership for almost all agreements), that the Quad countries opted for the conclusion of 
a successor agreement to the GATT.  
In sum, the relatively high hurdles that saddle the lawmaking authority conferred 
upon the contracting parties by the GATT have to a large extent channelled lawmaking 
towards the conclusion of legally autonomous agreements and, ultimately, the replacement 
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 See the Kennedy Round Anti-Dumping Code and the Tokyo Round Codes. 
1273
 See MTN/W/35.  
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 As famously pointed out in Jackson 1990.  
1275
 The German Basic Law, which provides in Article 146 for its own replacement by a new constitution to 
be adopted by the people of a unified Germany, is a notable exception.  
1276
 Interview with Richard Steinberg.  
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of GATT with a new agreement that subsumes a substantively identical, but legally distinct, 
GATT 1994. 
The incentives to make law pursuant to the procedures foreseen in the WTO 
Agreement are in principle stronger than they were in the GATT due to the more integrated 
nature of the WTO legal system. In particular, it is only by adding a new multilateral 
agreement to Annex 1 of the WTO Agreement by formal amendment, or by adding a 
plurilateral agreement to Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement pursuant to Article X:9 thereof, 
that new agreements can be made the subject of dispute settlement proceedings in the 
WTO, and can thus ultimately be enforced through the suspension of trade concessions. 
This stands in contrast to the GATT, where parties could in practice use unilateral trade 
sanctions to enforce legal obligations outside the GATT framework.    
Nevertheless, there are some parallels between the GATT and the WTO experience, 
in that the most significant lawmaking activity since the establishment of the WTO has 
taken place outside the WTO framework – not in the form of the conclusion of new 
plurilateral agreements, but through the conclusion of new bilateral or regional trade 
agreements, which are authorised through the exceptions from the MFN rule for free trade 
agreements and customs unions in GATT Article XXIV and GATS Article V. 
 
B. Substantive Legal Limits on the Authority to Make Law 
If the primary impact of procedural rules on lawmaking activity has been to channel this 
activity out of the framework of the trading system, arguments that there are substantive 
legal limits on the authority to make law in the framework of the trade regime – in other 
words, that the trade regime has a circumscribed "competence" or "jurisdiction" – have had 
no comparable force.
1277
  
Arguments to this effect first came to prominence in the context of the Uruguay 
Round:
1278
 India, Brazil, and many other developing countries insisted that negotiations on 
                                                 
1277
 Arguments about "competence" or "jurisdiction" need to be distinguished from arguments that a subject 
matter is unsuitable for the trading system because it does not lend itself to "contractual obligations": The 
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possibility of addressing an issue with what are seen as the particular legal means of the GATT. As discussed 
above, the latter type of argument has been effectively employed on several occasions.  
1278
 For a contemporary discussion of the issue, see Roessler 1987; cf. GATT Analytical Index, 878-881 
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services and intellectual property rights could not take place within the framework of the 
GATT because  
GATT and the CONTRACTING PARTIES had competence only in the areas covered by 
the Articles of the General Agreement [and these] jurisdictional and legal realities could not 
be altered because some major trading nations held a different view[.]
1279
 
The view that the GATT did not have "jurisdiction" to address services led India and Brazil 
to propose that the contracting parties 
invite Governments represented in the CONTRACTING PARTIES meeting in Punta del 
Este to give consideration to holding an intergovernmental meeting to examine, outside the 
GATT framework, what appropriate multilateral action is desirable on trade in services.
1280
 
Even after the Punta del Este Ministerial had endorsed negotiations on goods and services, 
Brazil held firm to the legal fiction that the negotiations on goods and the negotiations on 
services had been launched at different meetings by different bodies. Thus, Brazil argued 
that the decision to negotiate on trade in services had been taken  
in an ad hoc intergovernmental meeting, parallel to the special session of the 
CONTRACTING PARTIES where a decision on a new round of negotiations on trade in 
goods in the GATT was simultaneously adopted
1281
 
and that “two legally distinct negotiating processes” had been established:  
“one, on trade in goods, to be conducted in the GATT framework; the other, on trade in 
services, to be carried out in an ad hoc juridical frame of reference.”1282 
When the Punta del Este Declaration was adopted, Brazil and India had insisted that the 
Chairman gavel twice, to signal that the separateness of the negotiations on goods and 
services.
1283
 Initially, India also objected to negotiations on trade in services taking place in 
the GATT building.
1284
 With respect to intellectual property, India insisted to the very end 
of the Uruguay Round that the World Intellectual Property Organization had exclusive 
jurisdiction regarding substantive intellectual property rights.
1285
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1284
 Interview with Jane Bradley.  
1285
 See only supra fn 891.  
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These arguments were ultimately ineffective, if not counterproductive. As discussed 
in chapter 2, the developed countries accommodated the developing countries' 
"jurisdictional" concerns to some extent, by leaving open the question of institutional 
implementation. If anything, however, this limited accommodation gave the developing 
countries a false sense of security that they would be able to block the implementation of 
agreements on services and intellectual property in the GATT framework. In a way, then, 
the developed countries took advantage of the developing countries' "legalistic"
1286
 faith in 
their own position.
1287
     
Subsequent invocations of the concept of jurisdiction confirm the point that the 
trade regime's legislative competence is not effectively circumscribed as a legal matter. 
Robert Hudec has argued that “post-discriminatory” standards are “outside the scope of the 
jurisdiction or the purpose of the [WTO]”1288 – at a time when these kinds of standards had 
of course already been incorporated in several WTO agreements, as acknowledged by 
Hudec himself.
1289
 More recently, the WTO's Director-General elect Roberto Azevedo has 
argued that the WTO does "not have the competence nor the jurisdiction" to address the 
question of exchange rate distortions.
1290
 The WTO had held discussions on exchange rate 
questions only months before
1291
, and if there had been agreement to address this question, 
it is hard to see how the WTO membership could have been legally prevented from doing 
so.
1292
  
                                                 
1286
 Recall Paemen and Bensch's remark that it was due to India's "legalistic attitude in matters relating to the 
GATT" that India had "allowed itself to be persuaded" to negotiate on substantive intellectual property rights 
by the proviso regarding institutional implementation; Paemen/Bensch 1995, 143.    
1287
 Steinberg describes the "developing countries' legal competence argument" as "utterly baseless", which, 
he reports, "irritated the North"; Steinberg 1995, 29.  
1288
 Hudec 2003, 188; Hudec notes that  
[t]he [WTO] is supposed to be about promoting international trade, and this [i.e., the prevention of 
unjustified regulation per se, N.L.] is not part of that original mission or indeed its stated mission.  
1289
 Hudec mentions Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, Articles 2 and 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, and, with 
some qualifications, Article XX of the GATT.  
1290
 WTO Reporter, 24 June 2013. 
1291
 Azevedo himself, as Brazil's ambassador at the time, had played a leading role in pushing for these 
discussions.  
1292
 There is, of course, Article XV of the GATT, the provision that comes closest to delimiting the 
jurisdiction of the GATT vis-à-vis another international organization, the IMF. See also Roessler 1987, 76. 
Article XV assigns exclusive jurisdiction to the Fund with respect to factual questions relating to foreign 
exchange, and with respect to questions of compliance with the Fund's Articles of Agreement or with special 
exchange agreements. It otherwise only imposes consultation requirements. It is hard to see how this 
provision could be used to circumscribe the competence of WTO members to address exchange questions 
legislatively.  
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There is one substantive limitation on the authority to make law, however: the most-
favoured-nation rule. Even the defenders of the conception of the trade regime as a forum 
for the conclusions of contracts acknowledged that the provisions of such contracts could 
not be "contrary to the GATT".
1293
  
C. The Form of Law 
A third aspect of the conception of what it means to make law relates to form. How does a 
lawmaker create something that will be recognised as a legal obligation? At the beginning 
of this chapter, I defined lawmaking as the establishment of distinctions between legal and 
illegal conduct, as well as of distinctions between law and non-law.
1294
 If we accept this 
basic conception, we can say that lawmaking involves the generation of "programmes" for 
making distinctions between legal/illegal conduct and legal/non-legal action.
1295
 The 
techniques analysed in Chapter 3 can be said to constitute such programmes: they represent 
different ways of systematically distinguishing between legal and illegal conduct – with the 
help of bindings, benchmarks, objectives, efficiency calculations, and several types of 
standards.     
Luhmann has argued that the programmes of law are always conditional 
programmes, i.e., they take the form of "if-then" propositions.
1296
 As Luhmann explains, a 
conditional program has the function of "governing the assignation of code values to 
cases": "The conditional program establishes conditions that determine whether something 
is legal or illegal."
1297
 This raises the question of how the managing techniques, and to a 
lesser extent the minimizing techniques, analysed in the previous chapter, which allow 
states to adopt trade measures in pursuit of a particular aim, can generate a legal 
programme. As Luhmann points out,  
From a legal perspective, the designation of an aim can only mean that measures are legal 
only if they are consistent with purposive criteria, such as criteria of causal suitability or of a 
                                                 
1293
 MTN/P/5, para. 14. 
1294
 The latter distinction revolves around the question of whether an action has a particular legal significance 
or not. For example, a law that is not made according to the proper procedures is not illegal, it is merely not 
law. Again, I should emphasise that this is merely a different way of describing what Hart conceptualised as 
secondary, power-conferring rules.  
1295
 On the concept of "programming" and its relationship to "coding", see Luhmann 1995/2004, chapter 4.   
1296
 Luhmann 1995/2004, 195-196/196-197, 203/202. Luhmann distinguishes conditional programs from 
purposive programs. For a similar observation, see the Appellate Body's distinction between "purposive" and 
"operative" language, with the former not a "separate obligation in itself"; Appellate Body Report, Turkey – 
Textiles, para. 57.     
1297
 Luhmann 1995/2004, 197/197 (my translation). 
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reasonable means-ends relationship. A legislatively or judicially established aim cannot be 
more than a guideline for the determination of the conditions that can be the basis for a 
decision between legal and illegal.
1298
  
The goal-orientation of managing and minimising techniques thus does not prevent them 
from generating conditional programs. However, "the conditional program will have to be 
put together (more or less) on a case-by-case basis, and experience suggests that judges will 
then consider stereotypical 'measures' which they consider suitable."
1299
 As I will argue in 
the following section, it is because of this case-specific design of the conditional program 
that these techniques tend to do a poorer job at fulfilling the function of law than other 
techniques. 
In some cases, trade lawmakers have been so reluctant to spell out the conditions for 
legal/illegal conduct that many have refused to recognize the product of their work as 
"law". The prime example is Part IV of the GATT. Hudec has described the "language of 
Part IV" as "a bit more legalistic" than the "non-binding texts" from which it developed, 
"giving the illusion of greater commitment". In Hudec's view, though, "the text of Part IV 
contained no definable legal obligations":
1300
 
The drafting reached new heights in suggesting commitment where there was none. Instead 
of 'should', the text now said 'shall' several times. But the 'shall' never went anywhere.
1301
  
Hudec points to qualifications such as "to the fullest extent possible"
1302
 and formulations 
to the effect that developed countries shall "accord high priority", "make every effort", shall 
"give active consideration", and shall "have special regard"
1303
 to one thing or another, to 
support his claim.  
From the perspective on the form of law developed in this section, these 
formulations do not render the text of Part IV devoid of legal commitments. The text still 
has the form of a conditional program, it is just that the locus of the distinction legal/illegal 
has been displaced from the question of whether a developed country has, say, "refrain[ed] 
from introducing … customs duties or non-tariff import barriers on products currently or 
potentially of particular export interest to less-developed contracting parties" to the 
                                                 
1298
 Ibid. 202/201-202 (modified translation).  
1299
 Ibid. 202/202 (modified translation). 
1300
 Hudec 1987, 56.  
1301
 Hudec 1987, 56-57.  
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 GATT Article XXXVII(1). 
1303
 GATT Article XXXVII(3). 
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question of whether it has done so "to the fullest extent possible".
1304
 This displacement has 
no doubt rendered the conditions under which a developed country complies with the 
obligation more obscure, but it has not made it impossible to specify them.
1305
   
What the reluctance by Hudec and others to recognize Part IV of the GATT as 
imposing legal obligations goes to show is the extent to which form, as opposed to 
pedigree, can influence the perception of something as "legal". I have noted above how a 
series of certifications for the rectification and modification of schedules that would have 
derived their legal validity from an amendment that never came into force, were treated by 
the contracting parties as though they were in force, i.e., they were treated as legally 
binding. While this reflected the famous pragmatism of the GATT era, it was certainly 
facilitated by the fact that these certifications had a quintessentially legal form: a modified 
number in a schedule leaves no doubt about the conditions under which a contracting 
party's conduct falls into the legal or the illegal category. Thus, it was easy to treat these 
certifications as law, despite their lack of legal status. Part IV represents the opposite case: 
Its impeccable legal pedigree – Part IV was the last amendment of the GATT to come into 
force – could not make up for the relative obscurity of the conditions under which a 
contracting party's conduct falls into the legal or the illegal category. Whether a text is seen 
as law, then, can depend on the extent to which it clearly spells out the conditions for the 
application of the values legal/illegal, more than on its traceability to a validity-conferring 
"source".  
D. The Function of Law 
Lon Fuller has famously set out the "implicit laws of lawmaking", i.e., the rules that a 
lawmaker has to respect if she wants to succeed at making law. Conceiving of law as "the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules",
1306
 Fuller contends that 
a lawmaker will fail to achieve this purpose if she fails to make general rules, fails to 
publish the rules, makes retroactive rules, makes unintelligible rules, makes inconsistent 
                                                 
1304
 See GATT Article XXXVII(1).  
1305
 A similar point is made at much greater length by Sonia Rolland in Rolland 2012, 119-126. Rolland also 
provides an overview of the jurisprudence on Part IV at 145-152. 
1306
 Fuller 1964, 96. For a more complex conception of the function of law, see Luhmann 1995/2004, chapter 
3. For Luhmann, regulating conduct and solving conflicts are performances which the law can effect; ibid, 
157/168. 
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and contradictory rules, makes rules that are impossible to comply with, constantly changes 
the rules, or arbitrarily applies the rules.
1307
  
Not all of these potential pitfalls are of equal concern to trade lawmakers: as regards 
generality, trade lawmakers have developed an ingenious device for reconciling 
individually customised obligations with a general rule: schedules.
1308
 The question of 
promulgation is generally less of an issue where the maker and addressee of the law are 
identical. While the retroactive reach of WTO rules has been an issue in a number of 
disputes
1309
, this is not a pervasive problem and is in any case counterbalanced by the 
primarily prospective character of the remedies provided in the WTO system.
1310
 
Inconsistent rules were of some concern in the fragmented legal system of the GATT, but 
in the more integrated WTO system, the problem is marginal, and mostly arises in the 
relationship between GATT provisions and the WTO agreements developing them.
1311
 
Given the difficulties of making law in the trading system, constant change in the rules is 
certainly not a problem that those who have to comply with trade law confront.
1312
 And 
what some perceive as the arbitrary application of trade law has been a source of concern 
for trade lawmakers
1313
, but it is the dispute settlement organs, rather than lawmakers, that 
are primarily responsible on this score. 
In the present section, I will focus on the two remaining challenges that lawmakers 
confront if the law they make is to fulfil its function: the challenge to make intelligible 
rules, and rules with which compliance is possible. Before I examine these challenges in the 
context of trade lawmaking, however, I need to say more about how these challenges are 
bound up with the function of law.  
Habermas's theory of law goes beyond Fuller's purposive conception of law by 
exploring why law becomes necessary as a complement to morality in human society.
1314
 
                                                 
1307
 See Fuller 1964, chapter 2.  
1308
 See the discussion of schedules in Chapter 3.   
1309
 EC – Sardines; EC – Large Civil Aircraft; EC – Hormones. 
1310
 See the discussion of prospective and retrospective remedies in Eeckhout 2009, 448-451.  
1311
 Most prominently, between GATT Article XIX and the WTO Agreement on Safeguards; see Ortino 2009, 
151-154; for a general discussion of norm conflict in the WTO context, see Chase 2012.  
1312
 The concern is rather the opposite: that many rules of trade law may be outdated. As early as the Kennedy 
Round, the contracting parties had the sense that they were "parties to a contract which they were aware was 
not completely up to date"; TN.64/21, para. 21. 
1313
 See Tarullo 2002; Greenwald 2003; and Stoler 2004.  
1314
 Habermas 1998, 143. Habermas emphasises that this exploration is "part of a functional explanation, not, 
for instance, a normative justification of law":  
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According to Habermas, law alleviates the cognitive, motivational, and organisational 
burdens imposed by a "post-conventional morality".
1315
  
With regard to the first element, Habermas notes that post-conventional morality 
only generates highly abstract norms which may be difficult to apply in concrete cases: 
"The problems of justification and application posed by complex questions will often 
overtax the analytical capacities of the individual".
1316
 It is here that law enters the picture: 
positive law can make up for the "cognitive indeterminacy" resulting from the high level of 
abstraction of moral imperatives by spelling out what is expected from an individual in a 
particular situation.
1317
 Law can thereby "alleviate the individual from the cognitive 
burdens of forming her own moral judgment".
1318
  
Of course, law only fulfils this function if it is less "cognitively indeterminate" than 
the moral norms that it complements. To take a well-known example from the trade 
context: The GATT originally disciplined export subsidisation of primary products by 
providing that  
such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results in [the subsidising] contracting 
party having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product, account 
being taken of the shares of the contracting parties in such trade in the product during a 
previous representative period, and any special factors which may have affected or may be 
affecting such trade in the product.
1319
 
The central concept in this provision – equity – is a moral concept, which, as successive 
GATT panels noted, was not further defined.
1320
 Arguably, in terms of cognitive 
determinacy, the provision does not add much to what a moral discourse about the fairness 
of particular economic policies would have to offer. This stands in contrast to the export 
subsidy commitments adopted as part of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, 
which are specified in a country's schedule in terms of quantities and budgetary outlays for 
each individual product. As Josling et al. comment,  
No more is there anything like the "equitable share", and all language referring to "special 
factors" has gone. There is no need to debate what a "previous representative period" might 
                                                                                                                                                    
For the legal form is not at all a principle that could be 'justified' either epistemically or normatively. 
Ibid. 143 (original emphasis, my translation).     
1315
 Habermas 1998, 146.  
1316
 Ibid. 147.  
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 Ibid. 
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 GATT Article XVI(3).  
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be, or how to determine "displacement" or "price undercutting". If one wants to know how 
far an individual country can go in subsidizing its agricultural exports, one turns to its 
Schedule and finds precise numbers regarding its commitments.
1321
    
While there is still scope for interpretative conflicts,
1322
 these commitments are clearly 
more determinate
1323
 than the standard of the GATT era.
1324
 
A second way in which positive law complements morality is by compensating for 
the motivational deficiencies of morality. On Habermas's account, morality's demands on 
the willpower of individuals are buttressed by the facticity of state-enforced law.
1325
 
Habermas also identifies a third way in which law complements morality: law provides an 
institutional framework to translate the universal imperatives of morality, especially as they 
relate to positive duties, into specific competences and obligations. In other words, it allows 
for "a moral division of labour".
1326
  
Law has been fulfilling both of these latter two functions to varying degrees over 
the history of the trade regime. The effectiveness of trade law in motivating compliance is 
the subject of a vast literature;
1327
 as it is primarily a matter of dispute settlement and 
enforcement, however, I will only consider to what extent the way in which law is made 
has an appreciable effect on the prospects for compliance. The most basic way in which 
that is the case is expressed in Fuller's maxim that the law must be made it such a way that 
compliance with it is possible.    
The question to which degree trade law is used to organize a moral division of 
labour goes to the level of institutionalisation and bureaucratisation of the trade regime. As 
noted above, the contract conception of trade law has severely limited the extent to which 
states have used this function of law in the context of the trade regime. The provision of 
technical assistance to developing countries by the WTO Secretariat and the increasing 
                                                 
1321
 Josling/Tangermann/Warley 1996, 195.  
1322
 See only Appellate Body Report, EC – Export Subsidies on Sugar.  
1323
 One should note, however, that "cognitive determinacy" does not necessarily require favouring more 
specific over more general rules. As Braithwaite 2002 argues, whether general or specific rules are more 
likely to produce legal certainty depends on the circumstances. 
1324
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ultimately go to the issue of whether an area of regulatory endeavour should to be subject to law at all.  
1325
 Habermas 1998, 148.  
1326
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involvement of the WTO in "aid for trade" are the primary examples of WTO members 
pooling resources and delegating tasks to meet their moral obligations to assist the poorer 
members of the trading system.  
In sum, if we understand the function of law as complementing morality in "the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules", we can say that law 
will fail to fulfil its function (a) if it stipulates rules that are unintelligible, or not 
determinate enough to alleviate the cognitive burdens associated with following moral (or 
other) imperatives; or (b) if it stipulates rules with which compliance is impossible, and 
with respect to which law's special aptitude to induce compliance will thus come to 
nothing.   
 
a) Governing by Goals:1328 The Limitations of Managing and 
Minimising Techniques 
I have already noted above that managing and minimizing techniques will tend to do a 
poorer job at guiding conduct than other techniques because they discipline trade policy by 
specifying an authorised aim, in the light of which the conditions for "legal" conduct will 
have to be specified on a case-by-case basis. Obligations generated through managing and 
minimizing techniques will thus tend to be more cognitively demanding than obligations 
derived from other techniques. To provide a simple example: It is relatively straightforward 
for a country to establish whether a duty that it levies on an imported product exceeds its 
tariff binding, or whether a measure that it has adopted imposes higher burdens on imports 
from one country than on imports from other countries or products of domestic origin.
1329
 
When obligations are stipulated in terms of a goal, the implications for a country's conduct 
will tend to be much less clear.
1330
 In multilateral trade lawmaking, this feature of 
managing and minimising techniques has caused problems in different ways.  
In the case of managing techniques, wariness of the freedom of action that a state 
can potentially claim under the banner of an authorised goal has led lawmakers to 
overcompensate by defining exceedingly restrictive conditions under which a state can 
pursue the goal in question, severely diminishing the practicability of pursuing these goals 
                                                 
1328
 The title is borrowed from Westerman 2007.  
1329
 Admittedly, the inquiry can be more complex when a measure is not de jure, but only de facto 
discriminatory. 
1330
 On the difficulties of legislating by goals, see generally Schoenbrod 1983 and Westerman 2007.  
306 
 
within the confines of the law. As noted in chapter 1, GATT contracting parties were not 
authorised to use trade measures to safeguard their balance of payments or to protect infant 
industries until, in the words of US negotiator Wilcox,  
numerous obstacles ha[d] been surmounted, conditions fulfilled, criteria satisfied, 
procedures followed, and permissions obtained.
1331
  
Even the articles providing for the management of trade that were favoured by the US, 
namely, the exception from the prohibition of quantitative restrictions for agricultural trade 
in GATT Article XI and the safeguards provision in Article XIX – provisions that, as 
Wilcox highlighted, became "effective without any sort of finding or approval by any 
international agency"
1332
 – ultimately proved too restrictive to be workable: With regard to 
agriculture, the US was granted a waiver that allowed it to employ quantitative restrictions 
beyond the scope of GATT Article XI:2(c).
1333
 And while the safeguards provision of the 
GATT was initially used with some regularity, it fell into disuse in the later decades of the 
operation of the GATT.
1334
 As Sykes has argued, the WTO Agreement on Safeguards did 
little to resolve the perplexities regarding the conditions under which safeguards could be 
used, and has been interpreted by the Appellate Body in a way that makes it virtually 
impossible to apply safeguards in a WTO-consistent manner.
1335
 There may of course be a 
number of reasons for the restrictiveness of the conditions for the use of managing 
techniques in GATT/WTO law. Hostility towards the stability narrative from those who see 
the purpose of trade law exclusively in terms of liberalisation is certainly an important 
factor. However, I argue that the necessity to compensate for the cognitive indeterminacy 
of disciplines formulated in terms of a goal by establishing highly determinate (and 
potentially over-determinative) conditions under which those goals may be pursued is at 
least part of the explanation. The legal problems resulting from this "overuse" of law are 
thus to some extent a symptom of the limitations of managing techniques in fulfilling the 
cognitive function of law.   
In the case of minimising techniques, the cognitive indeterminacy engendered by 
formulating disciplines in terms of a goal has been more plainly in view: thus, the attention 
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 Wilcox 1949, 493. 
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of litigators and commentators has focused on the appropriate means to achieve the 
authorised goal, rather than the conditions under which the goal can be pursued in the first 
place. While I cannot review here the extensive debate on the interpretation of GATT 
Article XX, I will suggest three ways in which the trade regime's adjudicatory organs have 
coped with the indeterminacy of obligations to minimise the trade effects of the pursuit of 
"non-trade" goals. First, the adjudicatory bodies have gone some way in reformulating the 
purposive programme of the necessity test into a conditional program.
1336
 Thus, GATT and 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body have clarified some of the conditions under which a 
measure will be considered "necessary".
1337
 Second, in what can be understood as a 
corrective move to the first approach, the Appellate Body has introduced a "weighing and 
balancing" test that has restored some of the flexibility that had been lost by reformulating 
the necessity test as a series of rigid "if-then" propositions.
1338
 While this was arguably 
motivated by the political sensitivity of striking down measures pursuing objectives such as 
the protection of health and the environment, it has re-opened up space for broader 
considerations of appropriateness,
1339
 or, to put it less charitably, for the use of Luhmann's 
"stereotypical 'measures'" as yardsticks for "necessary" measures.
1340
 Third, the Appellate 
Body has also been able to sidestep the indeterminacy inherent in minimising obligations to 
some extent by shifting the emphasis from these obligations to the more comfortable terrain 
of non-discrimination obligations that apply cumulatively with the minimising obligation, 
such as the chapeau of GATT Article XX and Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement.
1341
    
In sum, the deficiencies of managing and minimising techniques in fulfilling the 
cognitive function of law have led, in the case of managing techniques, to attempts to 
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 Cf. Luhmann 1995/2004, 202/201-202.  
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 Luhmann 1995/2004, 202/202. 
1341
 Cases in which a measure passed muster under the necessity test or another of the subheadings of GATT 
Article XX, but was found wanting under an accompanying non-discrimination obligation, include US – 
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restrict the scope of these provisions by imposing restrictive thresholds for their use. In the 
case of minimising techniques, the uncertainty is still there; the trade regime's adjudicatory 
bodies have avoided it to some extent by emphasising discriminatory elements of the 
measures at issue. 
Managing techniques are potentially flawed in another respect, as well, namely, 
when they stipulate an aim the achievement of which is wholly or partially outside the 
control of the parties to the agreement. The most striking example of the use of managing 
techniques in this way are commodity agreements that formulate obligations in terms of 
price ranges without regulating the factors determining supply and demand of the product 
in questions. This was the basis for the US's growing opposition to commodity agreements 
in the early 1970s: 
We must make it abundantly clear at the outset that we will not be diverted during the 
course of the negotiations by proposals to use multilateral commodity arrangements that 
seek to deal with prices. Experience has proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that 
international arrangements dealing with prices – and that do not and cannot deal with 
production and trade policies affecting exports and imports – are bound to fail, because 
these policies are the primary determinants of price. The price ranges of agreements often 
have proved to be inconsistent with the underlying supply and demand situation, therefore 
they could not accommodate to sudden changes in the supply-demand curve … let us be 
firm in our resolve not to go through another 'agreement' exercise aimed at organizing world 
trade in wheat and possible other commodities along rigid lines. As we have learned, 
agreements are not the answer to trade problems.
1342
  
To a lesser degree, the problem is also present in other obligations: for example, 
whether a party complies with its domestic support commitments under the Agreement on 
Agriculture depends to some extent on factors outside the party's control, such as the world 
price of the agricultural products which the party subsidises, and the exchange rate of its 
currency. Even where factors outside the party's control do not make compliance 
impossible (which would violate one of Fuller's laws of lawmaking), designing legal 
obligations in this way likely diminishes the law's ability to motivate compliance. Thus, a 
party will tend to make fewer efforts to comply if there is a prospect that other factors may 
bring it into compliance; and while the ability to blame those factors – if at any point it is 
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found to be non-compliant – will not save the party as a legal matter, it will at least have 
some politically face-saving effect.
1343
 
 
b) Governing by Proxy: The Challenge of "Structural Coupling" 
I have hypothesised above that dissatisfaction with trade law focuses on those elements of 
the law that attempt to take cognisance of the logic of other idioms, disciplines or systems, 
such as the economy, the sciences, politics or morality. One often encounters complaints, 
for example, that "WTO rules do not make full economic sense",
1344
 warnings that "the 
WTO should not set itself up as an arbiter of objective science",
1345
 and concerns that trade 
law might "rob democratic communities of sovereign regulatory choices."
1346
 As I argue, 
this dissatisfaction reflects the challenges of "coupling" the trade regime with these other 
systems.
1347
   
A trade lawmaker faces two basic options for addressing this challenge: The first 
choice is to incorporate the concepts, standards, and knowledge claims of other systems 
directly into the law. In legal theory, this strategy of incorporation is perhaps best known in 
the context of the law's relation to morality. Thus, legal rules frequently incorporate moral 
concepts, such as "reasonableness" and "fairness"; in trade law, as noted above, we find the 
concept of an "equitable share of world trade". Trade law also provides examples of the 
reliance on the knowledge claims of systems other than morality. Thus, under the SPS 
Agreement, measures taken to protect human, animal or plant life or health have to be 
"based on scientific principles" and must not be "maintained without sufficient scientific 
evidence".
1348
 It is hard to see how an adjudicator could answer the question whether a 
measure is "based on scientific principles" without asking a scientist. Similarly, it is 
difficult to see how an adjudicator could assess the economic harm resulting from a trade 
                                                 
1343
 This problem is not unique to trade law; indeed, it would appear to be a minor problem in trade law as 
compared to a field such as climate change regulation, where legal obligations are formulated in terms of 
emissions targets. Emissions are notoriously subject to factors wholly or partially outside the parties' control, 
such as economic activity and climatic conditions.  
1344
 Pauwelyn 2013b, 238.  
1345
 Lang/Cooney 2007, 543, referring to a concern widely shared in the literature.  
1346
 Howse 2000, 2330. 
1347
 I borrow the idea of conceiving of these subject matters as "systems" from Niklas Luhmann. On 
Luhmann's conception of "systems" and the concept of "structural coupling", see Luhmann 1992.  
1348
 SPS Agreement, Article 2.2.  
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restriction (the "level of nullification or impairment"
1349
) without relying on economic 
expertise. In these cases, then, trade law seeks, as far as possible, unmediated access to the 
knowledge of other systems.
1350
  
One problem posed by this kind of coupling is that the knowledge produced by 
other systems may not always fit the requirements of the law: as I put it above, these 
systems do not necessarily generate an easily observable metric onto which the legal 
system can map its legal/illegal distinction. Thus, it has been argued that, when it comes to 
complex ecological systems, "scientific understanding [i]s necessarily partial and 
provisional".
1351
 Such knowledge may not provide clear guidance on whether a particular 
measure is supported by "sufficient scientific evidence". Alternatively, the question asked 
by the law may not make any sense in a different system. For example, economists have 
been perplexed by the meaning of the notion that increased imports "cause" "serious injury" 
to domestic producers, since from an economic perspective imports and the health of 
domestic producers are both endogenous variables that are explained by underlying factors 
such as input costs, consumer incomes, and productivity.
1352
 Finally, the incorporation of 
moral concepts such as equity may detract from law's ability to fulfil its function to provide 
clear guidance for conduct. In sum, the problem with seeking direct access to the 
knowledge of other systems is that the knowledge provided by these systems may be unfit 
for law's requirement of clear and final decisions.
1353
     
A second way in which trade lawmakers can seek to couple law with other systems 
is by developing legal proxies for events and effects in other systems.
1354
 The use of such 
proxies is arguably a pervasive phenomenon in trade law, particularly in relation to 
economics. As Pauwelyn has argued, the drafters of the WTO agreements employed "a 
                                                 
1349
 DSU Article 22.4; see Pauwelyn 2012 on the use of economic expertise in WTO dispute settlement. 
1350
 Of course, completely unmediated access is impossible; access is still mediated by law in numerous ways, 
for example, by procedural rules for the selection of experts etc. The point of these rules is to secure the 
highest quality of knowledge provided by other systems.  
1351
 Lang/Cooney 2007, 543. 
1352
 Sykes 2003, 266; Sykes notes that "[a]gainst this backdrop, the question 'did increased quantities of 
imports cause serious injury to a domestic industry?' is simply incoherent"; ibid. 267.  
1353
 Another problematic aspect of law's "coupling" with other systems is how law in turn affects the operation 
of these systems, as they seek to respond to the needs of the law; for the effects of the GATS Agreement on 
the production of knowledge on international trade in services, see Lang 2009; for the potential impact of the 
demands of the SPS Agreement on regulatory decision-making, see Lang/Cooney 2007, 544-545. 
1354
 The term "proxy" is also used by Pauwelyn 2013b, 236:  
The test of 'control' by the government (e.g. through ownership or the right to appoint directors), that 
is, the test upheld by the Panel in this dispute (and previous Panels before it) is a more objective test 
and more workable, even though it does remain a proxy. 
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number of 'legal fictions'" "to simplify matters".
1355
 Pauwelyn has compared the "legal 
fictions" employed by negotiators for different scenarios with respect to the treatment of the 
cumulative application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties. Thus, in the case of 
export subsidies, negotiators decided to prohibit cumulation on the basis of "the simplifying 
assumptions or 'legal fiction' that an export subsidy will have no impact on domestic prices 
and fully pass through into lower export prices".
1356
 In the case of domestic subsidies, on 
the other hand, negotiators  
'assumed' something different and, to simplify complex economic effects, worked on the 
basis of another 'legal fiction', namely that domestic subsidies pass through to the same 
extent into both domestic and export prices so that a prohibition on cumulation is not 
warranted.
1357
 
Thus, instead of seeking unmediated access to the knowledge of other disciplines, trade 
lawmakers can adopt simplifying assumptions about events and effects in other systems 
and use these assumptions as proxies for the "real" events and effects. These proxies can 
then in turn be employed as the foil for legal obligations. In Pauwelyn's example, instead of 
having to engage in the "messy" exercise of "measuring the exact degree of 
cumulation",
1358
 an adjudicator will simply have to establish whether the subsidy which is 
applied cumulatively with an anti-dumping duty is an export subsidy or a domestic subsidy 
in order to apply the legal/illegal distinction to the conduct in question. Proxies thus allow 
law to fulfil its function of providing guidance with some determinacy.  
In a different way, proxies have also become an increasingly popular device for 
managing the interface between trade law and science. The proxies considered in this 
context have been largely of a procedural nature.
1359
 Instead of passing judgment on the 
substantive regularity choices of WTO members, which presupposes direct access to 
scientific expertise, the WTO adjudicator would instead police the procedural quality of the 
regulatory process of WTO members.
1360
 While some authors see this role of the 
                                                 
1355
 Ibid. 237. 
1356
 Ibid. 237-238. 
1357
 Ibid. 238. (emphasis omitted)  
1358
 Ibid. 239.  
1359
 Given what is at stake in disputes under the SPS Agreement, the kind of substantive proxies that trade law 
routinely employs with respect to economic questions would hardly be acceptable with regard to scientific 
questions.  
1360
 For a review of the jurisprudence and literature on the "proceduralisation" of WTO review of domestic 
regulation, see Lang 2011, 324-330 (in the context of GATT Article XX) and 330-343 (in the context of the 
SPS Agreement).    
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adjudicator as valuable in itself, since it can enhance the democratic quality of decision-
making in WTO members,
1361
 one can also interpret the analysis of procedural questions as 
a proxy for the quality of the scientific judgment reflected in the decision adopted by the 
member.
1362
 It is a proxy that is immediately intelligible to law – for example, in terms of 
administrative law concepts such as due process, transparency, and participation –, and thus 
gives trade law a reasonably clear metric for applying the legal/illegal distinction.  
To provide a final example of the use of a proxy in trade law: In the context of the  
regulation of measures protecting human health and the environment, trade law not only 
has to contend with scientific evidence, but also with democratic value choices. Trade 
lawmakers have attempted to capture the element of democratic choice with the concept of 
an "appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection" that a member may 
choose.
1363
 Given that it is virtually impossible to directly "observe" a country's value 
choices and attitudes to risk, trade lawmakers have used the level of protection that is 
"embodied" in the measure at issue as a proxy for these choices and attitudes.
1364
        
The use of proxies in trade law has met with several types of criticism. One type of 
criticism is, predictably, that proxies often capture one type of conduct, but not another type 
of conduct which has equivalent effect.
1365
 This criticism goes to the "responsiveness" of 
the legal standard to the underlying phenomenon, to the extent to which legal proxies can 
mirror the phenomena they try to capture, or, in Luhmann's terminology, to the complexity 
of law's "internal reconstruction of its environment".
1366
  
In some cases, the alleged mismatch between legal proxies and the "real" world can 
be easily remedied by, for example, extending a prohibition on one type of conduct to 
                                                 
1361
 See e.g. Howse 2000.  
1362
 Arguably, the extensive use of procedural standards regarding the administration of trade remedies can be 
read as serving this double purpose as well: On one hand, these standards embody core principles of 
administrative law that are central to any system of accountable government; their observation is thus, to 
some extent, an end in itself. On the other hand, there is also the expectation that following these procedures 
will lead to more "accurate" substantive outcomes. For example, in the wake of a recent WTO dispute 
between the United States and China, in which China was faulted for violating a number of procedural 
obligations in a trade remedy investigation, a USTR attorney expressed the hope "that China will become 
more transparent in response to this ruling and that this will lead to 'better substantive decisions' in Beijing"; 
Inside U.S. Trade 2013, 8.    
1363
 SPS Agreement, Articles 3.3, 5.5; see also TBT Agreement, preamble.  
1364
 See Du 2010.  
1365
 See the example of quantitative restrictions vs. export taxes; Pauwelyn 2013b, 238. 
1366
 Luhmann 1995/2004, 225-226/219-220.  
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another type of conduct having equivalent effect.
1367
 There is an obvious trade-off involved, 
however, which Tarullo has described in relation to the "surrogates for a direct efficiency 
test" used in countervailing duty law:  
Efforts … to make these tests more manageable would either make them easier to apply at 
the risk of substantial deviation from the presumed efficiency ends of the law or make them 
more consistent with the efficiency aim at the risk of turning toward direct efficiency 
analysis.
1368
 
In other words, the more "true" to the "real world" a proxy is designed to be, the more 
complex, the less intelligible, and thus the less useful it becomes. Trade lawmakers here 
again confront the challenge of achieving an "adequate complexity" of the law.
1369
   
In some instances, the underlying phenomena are so complex that any attempt to 
capture them through legal proxies can appear futile, and may do more harm than good. 
Thus, Tarullo has argued that "a trade policy intended to foster general equity and 
economic effectiveness cannot be based on even sophisticated legal standards".
1370
 In 
Tarullo's view,  
a legal standard directly or indirectly based upon efficiency norms is impossible to apply in 
any practical way when the actions to be judged are those of a sovereign government 
making economic policy decisions that cannot be realistically divorced either from the 
multitude of policies that constitute an economic program or from the basic political choices 
of a society.
1371
 
As a consequence, Tarullo argues that trade remedy law should give up on trying to model 
economic efficiency, and should instead be guided by openly political choices regarding the 
management of the adjustment process.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
In the present chapter, I have explored why trade negotiators decided to use law for the 
regulation of international trade, what kind of law they have deemed appropriate for this 
                                                 
1367
 To use Pauwelyn's example again: It would be relatively straightforward to extend the GATT's prohibition 
of quantitative export restrictions to export taxes. One would, however, have to confront the question of 
whether export taxes are sufficiently different from quantitative export restrictions (for example, in light of 
their potential to generate revenue) to justify treating them differently.  
1368
 Tarullo 1987, 556. According to Tarullo, "direct evaluation of the efficiency consequences of particular 
government interventions is, for all practical purposes, impossible." Ibid.  
1369
 Luhmann 1995/2004, 225/219.  
1370
 Tarullo 1987, 551. 
1371
 Tarullo 1987, 556, fn 26; for a similar view in relation to international disciplines on subsidies, see Sykes 
2010, 474-475.  
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purpose, and how law affects the process of its own making. In the course of the analysis, I 
have briefly sketched what could be regarded as the dominant view on each of these three 
questions.  
With respect to the first question – why law? – the benefits that come with the 
"security and predictability" of a "rules-based" trading system are almost universally 
recognised as a major contribution that the trade regime makes to the global economy, and 
these benefits are now regarded as valuable – although not necessarily for exactly the same 
reasons
1372
 – across virtually the entire WTO membership. Given the US' preoccupation 
with establishing the "rule of law" in international economic relations in the post-war years, 
this view has indeed a solid, albeit partial,
1373
 basis in the historical record.   
With regard to the second question – what kind of law? – there is arguably a deep 
gulf between the view held by many academics on one hand and the perspective of the 
WTO membership on the other hand. Following in the footsteps of John Jackson, it is 
commonplace for academics to regard the trading system as in some way a constitutional 
entity, a view that has gained particular currency in light of the exclusive and compulsory 
jurisdiction of the WTO's dispute settlement organs, and of the possibility to enforce their 
rulings through officially authorised and supervised trade sanctions. There is little to no 
evidence, however that this view of the trading system is shared by the participants in trade 
lawmaking; instead, the model that has been consistently invoked by trade negotiators, 
particularly those from developed countries, is that of the private law contract.  
The third question – how does law shape the process of its own making? – has 
received relatively little attention and has primarily been analysed with respect to the extent 
to which concurrent or prospective dispute settlement influences the lawmaking process.  
 In an attempt to disturb and move beyond these views,
1374
 I have taken up and 
pursued two insights from the previous chapters. The first insight relates to the central role 
of reciprocity in multilateral trade lawmaking, and in particular the close kinship between 
the principle of payment and "hard" law. Thus, a key claim that I have made in the first part 
of this chapter is that the choice for law is partly explained by the need to use legal 
                                                 
1372
 See Steinberg 2004, 250, on the different reasons that the US and other countries had for supporting the 
legalisation of dispute settlement in the trade regime.   
1373
 Recall the discussion of the different conceptions of the historical significance of the trading system in 
Chapter 1.  
1374
 I will immediately admit that the simplified representations of these views that I have given here do not 
come close to doing justice to what are often extremely sophisticated and diverse positions.   
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commitments as units of payment. As I have argued, the rigid either/or character of law 
made it particularly suitable to serve as a medium of payment. This perspective offers a 
necessary corrective to the "rule-of-law" interpretation of the choice for law, since it can 
explain why some subject matters were not subject to legal rules in the trading system, even 
though the "rule-of-law" rationale would have applied to these subject matters with equal 
force.     
I explore this limiting effect of the link between law and payment in the second part 
of the chapter. Under the contract conception of international trade law, only a concession 
that has been paid for is one to which the beneficiary is entitled as a matter of law. The 
most significant manifestation of this principle is the "non-contractual" character of the 
developed countries' preference schemes in favour of developing countries. Since the 
developing countries have not "paid" for it, their preferential access to the developed 
countries' markets is not guaranteed as a matter of law. But that is not the end of it: the 
"non-contractual" character of preferences has not only meant that preferences cannot be 
legally enforced, but also that they are not an appropriate subject for discussion and 
negotiation in the multilateral trading system: the developing countries' attempt to negotiate 
preferential rates or preference margins in the Tokyo Round was rejected out of hand by the 
developed countries. As a result, the contract conception of international trade law has not 
only shaped the form of legal commitments in the trade regime, but also served a gate-
keeping function with respect to what subject matters the trade regime will address.  
In the third part of the chapter, I identify a further effect of the contract conception 
of international trade law: a contract does not preclude the conclusion of other contracts, or 
its replacement with a new contract, as a constitution arguably would. The contract 
conception has therefore legitimised the creation of autonomous codes in parallel to the 
GATT in circumvention of the amendment provisions of the GATT, and facilitated the 
GATT's ultimate replacement with a new contract, the WTO Agreement. While the 
establishment of the WTO represents a marked change in this respect, as new plurilateral 
agreements now need to be sanctioned by the entire membership, other aspects of the 
contract conception, not least those relating to the link between payment and hard law, 
remain alive.    
     The second insight from the previous chapters that I have taken up relates to the 
effects and limitations of legal techniques. In Chapter 3, I analysed the risks of partiality, 
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entrenchment, and abstraction that arise in the use of tools such as benchmarks, schedules, 
and formulas in multilateral trade lawmaking. In the present chapter, I have taken this 
discussion further by probing how the form and function of law circumscribe what trade 
law can achieve. The form and function of law, I have suggested, impose limits on the law's 
capacity to accommodate managing and minimising techniques, and on its ability to 
appropriate the knowledge of other "systems", such as the economy, science, and the 
political system, for its purposes. These limits arise from two sources: first, the conditional 
form of law stands in tension with the goal-orientation of managing and minimizing 
techniques; and second, the law's functional requirement of a cognitively determinate basis 
for applying the legal/illegal distinction stands in tension with the indeterminacy of 
purposive programmes as well as with the nature of the knowledge produced in other 
systems. 
I have only been able to analyse the strategies employed by trade lawmakers in 
order to deal with these tensions in a preliminary and tentative manner. With respect to  
managing and minimising techniques, I have argued that lawmakers (and adjudicators) 
have attempted to shift the focus of the analysis away from the purposive program in 
question and onto more comfortable terrain: in the case of managing techniques, lawmakers 
have sought to circumscribe the freedom of action that a state can potentially claim in 
pursuit of an authorised goal by establishing exceedingly restrictive conditions that a state 
has to meet in order to be allowed to pursue that goal in the first place; in the case of 
minimising techniques, adjudicators have used levelling provisions applying cumulatively 
with the purposive programme in question, such as the chapeau of GATT Article XX, to 
take some of the weight off the necessity analysis. I have also analysed trade lawmakers' 
attempt to "couple" trade law with events and effects observed in other systems through the 
use of proxies or "legal fictions".  
What I have attempted to bring out in this discussion are the trade-offs that 
lawmakers face when they try to reconcile the goal-orientation of managing and minimising 
techniques, as well as the knowledge of other systems, with the formal and functional 
requirements of law. Defining restrictive conditions for the use of managing techniques 
gives adjudicators a clear basis for applying the legal/illegal distinction, but can also make 
it impracticable to pursue the goal in question within the confines of the law. Allowing 
adjudicators to focus on discrimination rather than the necessity of measures alleviates their 
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burden of having to pronounce themselves on the sensitive question of which policies a 
state can adopt in the pursuit of important regulatory objectives, but also leaves the 
implications of the necessity requirement relatively obscure (which of course may not be a 
bad thing). I have also noted the well-known dilemma that presents itself in the use of 
proxies: the more closely a proxy tracks the phenomena that it tries to capture, the less 
intelligible and useful – in other words, the less of a proxy – it is likely to become.  
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Conclusion 
It has not been the aim of this thesis to lead the reader to any particular conclusion about 
the truths of multilateral trade lawmaking. A reader may well find that, whatever their 
drawbacks and sometimes awkward implications, these truths have, on balance, served "us" 
well.
1375
 Such a reader might note that the principle of reciprocity has, after all, sustained 
considerable lawmaking activity for several decades, and that the conception of legal 
commitments as payments has provided a convenient organising device for framing what 
are often hugely complex negotiating problems. Such a reader might find that thinking of 
the trading system primarily as a bulwark against protectionism is simply the most 
compelling narrative that there is – after all, who should be on that picture in the Director-
General's office if not Senator Smoot and Representative Hawley?
1376
 Such a reader might 
further argue that trade lawmakers should stick with what they do best, namely liberalising 
trade, and that all experiments with managing trade – and be it through limited safeguards – 
have proved to be dead ends.  
Another reader may be less sanguine about the effects of the reciprocity principle; 
she may be concerned that the principle of payment prevents trade negotiators from 
identifying (or acknowledging) areas of common interest; and she may find the founding 
story of the trading system as a paragon of the rule of law arising out of death and 
destruction not only uncomfortably partial as a historical matter, but also somewhat ironic 
in light of the fact that the present market access enjoyed by the majority of WTO members 
in the major markets of the world is not guaranteed as a matter of law, because it has not 
been paid for, and is thus at risk both from changing political currents and legislative 
dysfunction. Finally, she may find that trade lawmakers should remain open to a range of 
objectives, and should not doggedly pursue a path simply because it has been taken in the 
past. 
The aim of the present thesis has not been to arbitrate between these (certainly 
caricatured) views. Rather, this thesis has fulfilled its purpose if, whatever conclusion the 
reader may arrive at, she or he does so with a greater awareness of the contingent and 
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 A crucial question is of course: who is the "us" here? Is it the citizens of the world? Is it the citizens of 
those states who have participated most actively in multilateral trade lawmaking? Or should the assessment 
focus on the poorest people in the world? The question of who should compose this reference group is one of 
the key questions that a broader normative account of multilateral trade lawmaking would have to answer.  
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 See supra fn 586. 
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contested origins of the truths of multilateral trade lawmaking, a more acute sense of the 
trade-offs and ramifications of these truths, and a broader appreciation of the potentials and 
limitations of trade law. It is fitting, then, to recall some of the major ways in which the 
present thesis has attempted to provide the resources for such a more circumspect attitude 
towards the truths of multilateral trade lawmaking.  
In my analysis, the ramifications of the principle of reciprocity, and more 
particularly, of the conception of reciprocity as payment, appear as a pervasive feature of 
multilateral trade lawmaking. The metaphorical conception of trade negotiations as a 
marketplace for the exchange of "concessions", and the understanding of legal 
commitments as "payments", are only the most obvious manifestations of this principle. As 
I show in Chapter 2, for example, the principle of reciprocity has deeply shaped 
conceptions of what it means to "participate" in trade lawmaking. Thus, "participation" in 
the trading system has not primarily carried a political meaning; a country which took part 
in deliberations and sought to influence the course of the evolving trade regime did not 
thereby become a "participant" in trade lawmaking. Instead, "participation" in trade 
lawmaking was analogised to its equivalent in the marketplace, where the only ones who 
matter are those who buy and sell. While this was often only implicit in the way that trade 
negotiations were organised, it was made explicit in the Kennedy Round, where only those 
who were prepared to pay for what they wanted were recognised as "full participants" in 
the negotiations and enjoyed the attendant privileges.  
The principle of reciprocity has also had a profound influence on how law has been 
used in the trading system. As I argue in Chapter 4, there is a strong two-way link between 
the principle of payment and "hard" law: On one hand, the need to use legal commitments 
as units of payment goes a long way towards explaining trade negotiators' long-standing 
attachment to "hard" law. On the other hand, the principle of payment also limits the reach 
of law in the trading system: most significantly, only a concession that has been paid for is 
one to which the beneficiary is entitled as a matter of law.  
Given how deeply entrenched and pervasive in its effects the principle of payment 
is in the knowledge practices of multilateral trade lawmaking, it is natural that destabilising 
this principle has been one of the central objectives of this thesis. I have tried to achieve 
this in a number of ways. Thus, I have pointed to the contingent circumstances of the 
principle's adoption for tariff negotiations in the emerging trading system. While the 
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principle of reciprocity had a tradition in bilateral trade agreements, most prominently in 
the US Reciprocal Trade Agreements programme, the adoption for the multilateral trading 
system of the method of bilateral tariff bargaining, in which the principle of payment is 
embodied in its purest form, was by no means a foregone conclusion. Instead, the method 
was adopted against the better judgment of the trade negotiators of the time, and the force 
of their reaction against this development indicates that these negotiators perceived very 
acutely that more than the practicality of negotiations was at stake. Among the effects 
feared by the trade negotiators was that the method would render bargaining outcomes 
unintelligible and impossible to assess in moral terms. They were also concerned about the 
impact of the principle on the political economy of trade, and in particular about the 
prospect that changes in trade policy, even if beneficial to the country which considered 
implementing them, would only be made in response to payment. The adoption of the 
principle of payment for the trading system was thus not only contingent (on the domestic 
political constellation in the US), but was also contested from the start.  
In Chapter 1, I have also extensively discussed the effects of the reciprocity 
discourse on the dynamics of multilateral trade lawmaking. One of these effects, which I 
believe is particularly consequential, is the extreme difficulty of recognising and correcting 
policy mistakes in the trading system. Quite apart from the practical difficulties of 
amending WTO law, this effect comes about because the reciprocity discourse can only 
describe policy failures, such as – from the perspective of most WTO members – the 
adoption of the TRIPS Agreement in the Uruguay Round, as instances of 'overpayment' by 
those who suffer the consequences of a given failure. It thus encourages the idea that the 
problem can be remedied by the conclusion of a new 'bargain' that would be balanced in 
favour of those who overpaid the last time around. As I have argued, this perspective not 
only cuts short the critical engagement with past negotiating results, but also prompts 
negotiators to think of the regulatory policies and values in question as fungible 
commodities that can, if necessary, be traded off against each other.  
Finally, I have explored alternatives to lawmaking based on reciprocity; the 
cooperative approach to trade lawmaking that was adopted in the context of the Programme 
for the Expansion of International Trade in the 1950s differed in fundamental ways from 
lawmaking based on reciprocity. This approach involved the analysis of obstacles to trade 
in light of a common objective, and relied on collective pressure, rather than payment, to 
321 
 
achieve changes in trade policy. Its failure can in large part be attributed to the extent to 
which the principle of payment had already been entrenched at the time, especially among 
the developed countries. 
My analysis of the techniques of trade lawmaking in Chapters 3 and 4 has a 
somewhat different impetus than my discussion of the reciprocity discourse. These 
techniques are of central importance for multilateral trade lawmaking: they effectively 
circumscribe the universe of what trade law can do. At the same time, they are essentially a 
set of tools, and their impact depends on how they are used in particular instances of 
lawmaking. The effects of the techniques of trade lawmaking are thus much more 
indeterminate than the effects of the reciprocity discourse.  
My discussion of the techniques of trade lawmaking has served a dual purpose: 
first, I have sought to give a sense of the range of techniques that trade negotiators have 
developed, and thereby give an indication of the possibilities, but also the limits, of the 
technical repertoire of trade law as it currently exists. Second, I have sought to reveal the 
trade-offs and risks involved in the use of particular techniques. In Chapter 3, for example, 
I have shown how the use of modalities can increase the intelligibility of negotiating 
outcomes at the aggregate level, but only at the cost of removing the negotiations from the 
concrete substantive issues that are at stake. In Chapter 4, I have explored how the use of 
legal proxies requires striking a balance between, on one hand, the desire to "track" events 
and effects in other systems as closely as possible and, on the other hand, the need to 
preserve the simplicity and clarity of the proxy, which is essential if the proxy is to fulfil 
the law's function of providing cognitive determinacy. In respect of both the use of 
modalities and the use of proxies, negotiators thus have to define what constitutes 
"adequate complexity" – a question that itself illustrates the open-textured nature of 
lawmaking techniques. 
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Appendix: The Market Metaphor of Multilateral Trade 
Lawmaking
1377
 
 "Market" 
o Hoekman/Kostecki 2001, 25: 
"the WTO is …a forum for the exchange of liberalization commitments. That is, it is a 
market." 
 
o Collier 2006, 1425:  
"basically a marketplace for OECD countries to strike deals for reciprocal trade 
liberalisation"; 
  
o Lang 2011, chapter 8, passim.  
 
 To "buy" 
o Hoekman 1988, 212:  
"developing countries may have to show a willingness to 'buy' the type of safeguards 
agreement they want";  
 
o Finger 1995, 290:  
"A VER buys back previously sold market access";  
 
o Gerhart 2000, 370:  
the developed countries "'bought' TRIPS". 
 
 To "bank" 
o Hoekman 2013, 758:  
"trading partners will simply 'bank' its reforms and not recognize them as 'concessions' in a 
future multilateral trade round". 
 
 To "purchase" 
o FRUS 1947; 
 
o Wilcox 1947, 4:  
US tariff reductions "would be used to purchase equivalent reductions in foreign tariffs and 
in other barriers to trade". 
 
 To "sell" 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 41: 
"the industrialised countries were able to 'sell'" the liberalisation of textile trade "as a 
genuine concession";  
 
                                                 
1377
 The quotations are listed in chronological order; all emphases are added. 
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o ibid. 115:  
"Behind this attitude lay the suspicion … that the automatic extension of concessions had 
led to U.S. interests being sold off at rock-bottom prices in earlier multilateral 
negotiations"; 
 
o Finger 1995, 290:  
"A VER buys back previously sold market access". 
 
 "Payment"; to "pay" 
From negotiating records and official documents: 
 
o E/PC/T/A/PV/22:  
"a procedure, under which we should return to certain countries part of the price they were 
paying for the benefits conferred upon them by the other nations of the world"; 
 
o E/CONF.2/W.15:  
"Members … will not be called upon to pay an unreasonable price for continuing to enjoy 
concessions already granted to other Members"; 
 
o L/2002, 2:  
countries expected "to pay fully for all benefits received"; 
 
o GATT 1960, 9: 
"The Member States will, of course, be expected to pay compensation for increases in the 
form of duty reductions on other items in the common tariff." 
 
o Ibid. 9: 
"The 'entrance fee' which an acceding country has to pay under this procedure is likely to 
vary considerably. A country with a diversified export trade will … be expected to pay a 
bigger 'entrance fee' than a country whose export trade consists of a few products." 
 
o FRUS 1961-1963, 522:  
"the United States paid compensation for certain changes which it had made since the last 
tariff negotiations in 1956"; 
 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 818:  
US representatives "asked the question (unanswered) what the Community would be 
willing to pay for a U.S. concession on petroleum if it were available"; 
 
o MTN/P/5, 68:  
"Canada would … be able to adjust its tariff rates … as a matter of right and without being 
expected to pay compensation"; 
 
o FRUS 1973-1976, 629:  
The US "must pay for agricultural concessions with industrial concessions"; 
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o C/M/191:  
"developing countries could not be expected to make further contributions towards 
something for which they had already paid" (Nicaragua); 
 
o 4SS/SR/1, 5:  
"The dismantling of measures not consistent with GATT was not a concession and should 
not require payment" (Chile); 
 
o MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/ST/38, 2 (India):  
"It is disingenuous to expect that developing countries need to pay for this integration and 
are obliged to offer reciprocal market access."; 
 
o Statement of India to the TNC on 2 February 2011, reaffirming a statement by a 
Swiss minister:  
"those who ask for more have to pay more";  
 
o TN/AG/26, 3 (Chair's Report):  
It remains to be seen "what payment would be required" for Japan and Canada to designate 
additional products as "Sensitive Products".  
 
From the academic literature: 
 
o Curzon 1965, 59:  
concessions were spread "to other countries unwilling to 'pay' for them" (referring to 
arguments made in the pre-GATT period); 
  
o Ibid. 73 and fn1:  
"knowledge that a second or third country is willing to pay something too"; a supplier "may 
declare that as he has 'paid' for the present tariff position the new concession may 
'invalidate' his original 'payment', he must therefore be compensated by a new equivalent 
concession"; 
 
o Ibid. 103: 
“those who can 'afford' to pay for such concessions will be asked to make their 
contribution” 
 
o Patterson 1966, 285, fn 27:  
"A few such concessions were made [by the US to third countries in exchange for 
concessions by those countries that benefitted Japan, N.L.] and were 'paid for' by Japanese 
concessions to the United States"; 
 
o Jackson 1969, 219:  
"If 'unpaid' benefits thereby flowed to GATT members, it would be possible in most GATT 
negotiations to seek 'payment' for those benefits"; 
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o Hudec 1970, 616:  
"one country's tariff reductions being paid for, in theory, by the reductions on the other 
side"; 
 
o Curzon and Curzon 1973, 305:  
the acceding government "pays an entrance fee in exchange for all the benefits and 
concessions that have already been negotiated in the past"; "many former dependencies 
enter without any payment at all";  
 
o Ibid. 311:  
countries having bilateral MFN treaties with the United States "obtain the benefits of 
concessions negotiated by the United States in GATT without 'paying' for them"; 
 
o Rivers/Greenwald 1979, 1454:  
"there was to be no payment in terms of improved discipline over subsidies"; 
 
o Hudec 1987, 7:  
Reciprocal trade liberalization is "based on full payment by the other party";  
 
o Ibid. 17:  
Reductions in US trade barriers must be "paid for" with other countries' trade barriers 
(paraphrasing the US position); 
 
o Tussie 1987, 27:  
"To keep an eye on reciprocity, the principal supplier is the one made to 'pay' in kind for 
the concession"; 
 
o Winham 1986, 187:  
"What had caused the problem was the demand by the American negotiators that they be 
'paid' something for dropping the ASP and final list, in order that they would have a more 
reciprocal package to present to Congress. The demand for payment had angered the 
Europeans, who hardly felt that a party violating GATT law through the stratagem of a 
grandfather clause should be compensated for ending the illegality";  
 
o Ibid. 260:  
"EC negotiators felt that they had already paid full value" for a concession;  
 
o Ibid. 364:  
"reciprocity led negotiators to demand payment for the actions they took"; "the U.S. 
demand that it be paid for" a concession;  
 
o Ibid. 372:  
"the EC … paid for this benefit by rewriting European customs practices"; 
 
o Hudec 1992, 75:  
"developing countries viewed the Uruguay Round as the opportunity to receive payment" 
for their unilateral reforms … [s]ome payment was made on tropical products";  
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o Ibid. 76:  
"proposing to pay for all the new developing country concessions";  
 
o Ibid. 76-77:  
"developing countries … were simply making a late payment for the trade access that 
developed countries had given them";  
 
o Ibid. 77:  
"the new developing country policies do not constitute 'full payment.' Full payment would 
require that the developing countries have their markets as open as those of the U.S. in all 
respects"; 
 
o Finger 1995, 290:  
"… exporters who had paid for the initial concession"; 
 
o Hart 1995, 207:  
the European Community "was not prepared to pay for these new rules on the basis of a 
major reform of agricultural trade"; 
 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 54:  
"the developing countries feared that any concessions they obtained from industrialised 
countries in the area of goods might involve paying a price in the area of services";  
 
o ibid. 76:  
"It [MFN, N.L.] enables a large number of countries which have done absolutely nothing to 
earn the privilege to benefit from a concession for which only the original negotiating 
countries have 'paid'. … each country will sooner or later benefit from negotiated 
concessions 'paid for' by others";  
 
o ibid. 98:  
the EC's "enthusiasm for 'legal globality' might be inspired by the notion that it could 'pay 
for' its agricultural protectionism with concessions elsewhere";  
 
o ibid. 115:  
"many countries had gained advantages without 'paying' for them";  
 
o ibid. 138:  
There would not be "any payment in return for the elimination of the grey area";  
 
o ibid. 208:  
"According to GATT rules, if a direct cause-and-effect link can be established between a 
subsidy and a drop in imports, the main beneficiaries of the binding, who in effect 'paid for' 
the original concession, are entitled to demand that the original value of the concession be 
restored"; 
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o Finger, Reincke, and Castro 1999, 3:  
the essence of the "mercantilist bargaining model" is the principle that "what you get is 
what you pay for"; 
 
o Gerhart 2000, 370:  
"price the United States had to pay to secure the intellectual property rights"; 
 
o Abbott/Snidal 2002, 193:  
in the WTO, "you get what you pay for" (citing a USTR official); 
 
o Tarullo 2002, 173 and fn 228:  
"It looks … as if the United States must 'pay' twice to obtain discretion to choose among 
'permissible' legal interpretations … Members that challenge U.S. anti-dumping 
administration will have obtained a concession without paying for it. … The United States 
might have been willing to 'pay' more for such a standard …"; see also ibid. fn 228, 
referring to "costs", "pay", and "price"; 
 
o Gallagher/Stoler 2009, 377:  
"in a redistributive framework, you cannot ask the poor for cuts in trade barriers if you 
define them as a payment or a concession made to other economies, including the rich".  
 
o Lester 2012:  
"Under Article 28, Ukraine should 'pay' for tariff increases by lowering tariffs on other 
goods"; Rolland 2012, passim.   
 
The formulation that a member had to "pay" for concessions was also used by former and 
current trade negotiators and WTO officials whom I interviewed. 
 
 "Free rides"; for "free" 
o Jackson 1969, 40 
 
o Stiglitz/Charlton 2005, 92 
 
o Sykes 2006, 6: 
"existing members are unwilling to extend these benefits to new members for free". 
 
 Getting something "in return" 
o FRUS 1961-1963, 456:  
"Since we will seek from other countries tariff reductions of much greater depth than we 
will be able to offer in return, we need to be able to make reductions on as broad an amount 
of trade coverage as possible";  
 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 108-109, characterising a possible negotiating approach 
for the EU during the Uruguay Round in the following terms:  
"I have something to offer which you all want - … [w]at are you willing to offer me in 
return?" Paemen and Bensch comment: "Despicable though this attitude may seem, trade 
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negotiations are not for the faint-hearted. When employed correctly, this strategy is one of 
the most effective available to the negotiator. The Americans used it with considerable flair 
in the area of industrial tariffs throughout the Uruguay Round." 
 
 "Compensation" 
o GATT 1960, 9: 
"The Member States will, of course, be expected to pay compensation for increases in the 
form of duty reductions on other items in the common tariff." 
 
o Curzon 1965, 73, fn 1 
 
o Evans 1971, 10:  
"Where two exporting countries stood to benefit substantially from a tariff concession, the 
offer could be, and often was, made contingent on the receipt of 'compensation' from both." 
 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 800: 
"Countries must be willing to register debits and credits in individual areas and look for 
compensation within the total Kennedy Round package"; 
 
o Winham 1986, 82, fn 30:  
"In the Kennedy Round, the U.S. negotiators had argued that the EC should compensate the 
United States for the removal of the ASP". 
 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 39:  
developing countries were offered "compensation" in the form of liberalization of textiles 
trade in exchange for taking on commitments in services trade; 
 
o GATT/CPS/5. 
 
o MTN/P/5, 68. 
 
o TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, fn. 19:  
"Switzerland shall compensate with new market access opportunities equivalent to 1 per 
cent of domestic consumption." 
 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 787, para. 28:  
"The United States initial negotiating position is that this offer is in itself more than 
equivalent compensation for the Community's present maximum offer". 
 
 "Bill" 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 79: 
"a particular effort at liberalisation in the area of trade in tropical products was one of the 
items on the 'bill' presented to the industrialised countries in return for the launch of the 
New Round in general and, more particularly, the inclusion of the new subjects." 
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 "Debit" 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 787, para. 31: 
"an agreement might leave debits and credits to be balanced off in the final stage of the 
negotiations";  
 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 800: 
"Countries must be willing to register debits and credits in individual areas and look for 
compensation within the total Kennedy Round package". 
 
 "Credit" 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 787, para. 31:  
"an agreement might leave debits and credits to be balanced off in the final stage of the 
negotiations" 
 
o FRUS 1964-1968, 800:  
"Countries must be willing to register debits and credits in individual areas and look for 
compensation within the total Kennedy Round package" 
 
o Canada, MTN/TAR/W/18, 2: 
The proposal to use weighted average reductions would "take into account the need to give 
credit for tariff reductions of greater than such linear cut as might be hypothesized and to 
give proper credit for tariff cuts less than an agreed level, i.e. for what might be called 
partial exceptions." 
 
o COM.AG/W/77, 15:  
"the country may claim negotiating credit" 
 
o Oxley 1990, 75:  
"The Americans did not accept the argument that the EC measures created 'credit' that 
others now had to match by cutting back their own production"; 
 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 152:  
"In the developing countries' view, 'exploiting' these measures [i.e. their unilateral 
liberalisation undertaken largely at the behest of IMF and World Bank, N.L.] meant giving 
nothing else away in the Uruguay Round whilst obtaining 'credit' after the event from other 
GATT partners for this autonomous opening up of markets." 
 
o Dam 1970, 242:  
"the developed countries were loath to reduce any customs duties except in the context of 
the Kennedy Round for fear of losing credit for their concessions in the final balancing of 
bindings" 
 
o MTN.TNC/11, 4, para. 2:  
"… Ministers agree on the following: … (c) The need for an approach to be elaborated to 
give credit for bindings…" 
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o Oxley 1990, 183:  
"Because tariffs are legal, credit can be claimed for offers to cut them. To mix up 
reductions of tariffs and non-tariff measures might lead to claims for credit for cutting 
illegal measures"; 
 
o MTN.GNG/MA/W/24, para. 8: 
"Credit shall be allowed in respect of actions undertaken since the year 1986." 
 
o Hoekman 2013, 758:  
"How much 'credit' should be given for such autonomous reforms in subsequent 
negotiations has been a source of contention." 
 
 "Capital" 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 45:  
A country "might be tempted to 'make capital' out of the removal of … new restrictions by 
presenting this pseudo-withdrawal as a genuine concession, to be added to its tally in the 
Uruguay Round". 
 
 "Redistribution" 
o Tarullo 2002, 178:  
"there will be some 'redistribution' effected by the AB practice". 
 
 "Balance sheet" 
o MTN/W/35, 2, Yugoslavia, on behalf of the developing countries:  
"As matters look at present, the developing countries are justified in feeling apprehension 
that they might come out of these negotiations with a negative balance sheet." 
 
 "Price" 
o E/PC/T/A/PV/22;  
 
o Milthorp 2009, 107 and 109;  
 
o Paemen/Bensch 1995, 115;  
 
o Tarullo 2002, 174;  
 
o Gerhart 2000, 370:  
"Threats made by the United States to close its borders softened up the target countries and 
effectively lowered the price the United States had to pay…". 
 
 "Exchange Rate" 
 
 "Entrance fee"; "ticket of admission" 
o GATT 1960, 9: 
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"The 'entrance fee' which an acceding country has to pay under this procedure is likely to 
vary considerably. A country with a diversified export trade will … be expected to pay a 
bigger 'entrance fee' than a country whose export trade consists of a few products." 
 
o Dam 1970, 110; 
 
o Curzon and Curzon 1973, 305. 
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